

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
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THE 7TH (QUEEN'S OWN) HUSSARS

By C. R. B. BARRETT

(IN TWO VOLUMES)

VOL. I.

LONDON
ROYAL UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION
WHITEHALL, S.W.
1914

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PREFACE

In the following pages I have endeavoured to write the History of the distinguished cavalry regiment now known as the 7th (Queen's Own) Hussars.

The First Volume contains the Military History of the Regiment from its incorporation down to the conclusion of the Waterloo Campaign. The Second carries on the story down to the present day; it also contains sundry subsidiary chapters and the Register of Officers. An Index is annexed to each volume. Illustrations in the three-colour process, monochrome, and line are scattered through the pages of both volumes, and a number of maps and plans also provided.

The Military History begins with the origin of the Regiment, and narrates the circumstances which attended the raising of certain Independent Troops of Horse in Scotland in 1688, which two years later were constituted a complete regiment of cavalry. I recount, as far as I have been able to trace them, the services of the Regiment in the various campaigns in Flanders and Germany during the years 1694–1697, 1711–1713, 1742–1749, 1760–1763, 1793–1795 and 1799. During this period the Regiment fought many times and oft. The pitched battles in which they were engaged included the historic fields of Dettingen, Fontenoy, Roucoux, Val, Warburg, Vellinghausen or Kirchdenkern, Beaumont and Willems. Into the long list of minor affairs, combats, sieges and skirmishes I need not enter here.

But besides these campaigns the Regiment saw active service in the Jacobite Rebellion of 1715. A Light Troop was raised in 1755 and was employed in the two expeditions to the French Coast.

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In 1783 the 7th (Queen's Own) Dragoons were converted into Light Dragoons and in 1807 into Hussars.

In 1808 they participated in the rigours and hardships of the Coruña Campaign. Five years later they were for the second time sent to the Peninsula, where, after the invasion of France, they fought at Orthes and Toulouse.

On the declaration of peace the Regiment returned home. The escape of Napoleon from Elba again called the 7th (Queen's Own) Hussars into the field. Their services were engaged both at Genappe and at Waterloo, on both of which memorable occasions their casualties were heavy.

For reasons, to ascertain which I must refer the reader to the history itself, it has been needful to enter very fully into the events which took place at Genappe on June 17, 1815. The Regiment remained in France as a part of the Army of Occupation until 1818. For twenty years the 7th Hussars were not actively engaged, but in 1838 the Service Troops were ordered to Canada, where they were employed against the insurgents in the Lower Province, and one Troop was similarly engaged in the following year. It did not fall to the luck of the Regiment to be ordered to the Crimea, but in 1857 for the first time the 7th Hussars were despatched to India. Here they were engaged in the strenuous Mutiny Campaign, being most actively employed at Lucknow and on various expeditionary services. Order being restored in India, the Regiment remained in cantonments until 1863, when they had an opportunity of taking their share in one of our so-called 'little wars.'

As part of a column under the command of Colonel Alexander Macdonnell, C.B. (Rifle Brigade), a Squadron of the Regiment charged and overthrew a large body of fanatical tribesmen at Shabkadr. This affair is noteworthy as being the only occasion on which British Cavalry had an opportunity of distinguishing themselves as a body in a charge against hill-men.

In 1881 the Regiment went to Natal, and during the next year a detachment was for a short time stationed in Cyprus.

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When in September 1884 a Camel Corps (Heavy and Light) was formed for temporary service in Egypt, the 7th Hussars furnished a contingent to the Light Camel Corps. Their experience of desert warfare necessarily entailed discomfort, though happily the actual war casualties were not heavy. In 1886 the Regiment was ordered to India for the second time and remained there until 1895. Next came the Matabeleland and Mashonaland Campaigns, and then after three years' service at home the 7th (Queen's Own) Hussars, during 1901 and 1902, took part in the South African War. From 1905 to 1911 the Regiment was at home, after which a third period of service in India rather unexpectedly began.

The 7th (Queen's Own) Hussars are now stationed at Bangalore. (1914)

This then is the brief *résumé* of the Military History of the Regiment. For the rest, I have endeavoured to give many details of events, whether at home or abroad, with which the Regiment has been concerned. Anecdotes, Public Occurrences, Riots, &c., have been mentioned as far as possible in their chronological place. Augmentations and Reductions are duly chronicled, but besides these I have here and there added passages illustrative of the conditions of military life in Great Britain at various dates, and I venture to hope that these may prove not uninteresting to the reader, nay, perhaps even of some little utility to those engaged in military research. I would particularly draw attention to the interesting and valuable diary and correspondence of Lieutenant and Adjutant Hunt, which, being for the first time published, throws considerable new light upon the unfortunate expedition to the Helder in 1799. In this we get the personal note which is so much needed in Regimental Histories. It is to be regretted that more old diaries and a greater number of letters belonging to former officers of the 7th Hussars are not to be discovered. In this connection I must confess that the writing of this book has been no easy task, and also that it has occupied a somewhat protracted period of time—nearly three years. But the manuscript materials were very scanty, and in consequence the research required was materially increased. The Manuscript Record of the Services of the Regiment is by no means voluminous, nor indeed is it

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the original copy. Probably the original was either lost during the retreat to Coruña or perished in the wreck of the *Despatch* Transport in 1809. That a copy existed when Cannon wrote his History is known, for it was sent to the Horse Guards in 1834 and was never returned to the Regiment. The present copy, which verbally agrees to a large extent with Cannon, purports to begin in 1690; but as the handwriting is the same down to later than 1840 one is inclined to suppose that the age of the writer was somewhat patriarchal. I have therefore been compelled to turn to other sources for information, and have searched every document or printed book which I thought likely to assist me. How many these may number I cannot say, nor do I intend to fill pages with a list of them. But I wish here to express my obligations to all those from whose labours in the past I have derived assistance.

The chapter on Uniform will, I trust, prove interesting, and I have endeavoured to make it as complete as space would permit. The uniform distinction between Dragoons and 'Royal' Dragoons and similarly that between Horse and 'Royal' Horse is, I believe, a new find.

The catalogue of the arms used by the Regiment since 1690 is, I trust, complete, and the notes on Guidons, the Band, Regimental Medals, and Regimental Sobriquets contain all that I have been able to gather. The curiosities culled from the 18th Century Inspection Reports are sometimes amusing. The handsome collection of Regimental Plate has a chapter to itself, and I am happy to have been able for the first time to trace the donors of a fine series of antique spoons and forks. These I traced through their bearing not only the Regimental Badge but also the private crests of the givers. Lists of the chief successes of the Regiment on the Polo Ground and on the Steeplechase Course complete the work.

Appendices contain alphabetical lists of all the officers, with their commission dates, services, honours, rewards and such biographical details in brief as may be required. They are arranged in periods 1690–1713, 1714–1871 (the Abolition of Purchase), and 1871–1914.

It may be interesting not only to British but also to American

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readers to note the entry in Appendix II of the name 'George Washington,' which may. possibly prove to be a fresh fact with regard to the life of that distinguished soldier and statesman.

As regards the illustrations, I regret that there are not more portraits of 18th century officers, but it would appear that such portraits do not exist; at any rate, if existing, their whereabouts could not be traced.

The incidents which Mr. Harry Payne has illustrated appear to me to be most excellent, and they will, I trust, satisfy the reader. The minute attention given by this artist to details of bygone uniform and equipment merits great commendation, and in execution the groups are full of spirit.

To Mr. P. W. Reynolds I am also much indebted for the drawings in colour strictly illustrative of types of uniform at different periods. To Mr. D. Hastings Irwin, and also to Mr. Reynolds, I must express my obligations for much kindly information on doubtful points connected with old time uniforms and also for the tracings of certain sketches in their collections. As is well known, both gentlemen are high authorities on this subject.

Interspersed throughout the narrative will be found drawings of the medals, &c., awarded for the various campaigns in which the Regiment has taken part. Official rewards are also included, and likewise the private regimental medals of old time.

I have also to express my great gratitude to Lieut.-Colonel Sir Arthur Leetham for the more than kind interest he has taken in my work and the great assistance he has given me, not only in his capacity as Curator of the Museum of the Royal United Service Institution, but also as the Honorary Managing Editor of *The Cavalry Journal*. From the numbers of that periodical indeed, not a few illustrations have been most generously placed at my disposal for this book.

From the Library of the Institution I have received most invaluable assistance. The entire book was in fact written on the premises. I must here express my obligations and thanks to the Librarian, Major C. H. Wylly (late 1st Battalion South Staffordshire Regiment), and

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also to Mr. Harper, the clerk (late 5th Dragoon Guards), whose assistance, not only in questions referred to them concerning books, but also in the selection of maps, has been most freely given to me. Without the use of the Library at the Institution I will not say that a Regimental History could not possibly be written, but it would be almost impossible to write one satisfactorily. I have also had need many times to consult the War Office Library, where from the Parliamentary Librarian, A. D. Cary, Esq., I have, as ever, received most valuable and kindly assistance.

The encouragement and aid which I have experienced from the Colonel of the Regiment, Major-General Sir Hugh McCalmont, K.C.B., C.V.O., has been very great, not only in illustrations, but also in the considerable trouble which he has taken to answer numerous queries and to place me in communication with those likely to be able to assist me in my work.

In the production of a book of this description much depends upon co-operation between the printer and the author. The extreme care which Mr. K. R. Wilson (of Messrs. Spottiswoode & Co., Ltd.) has bestowed in aiding me with his technical knowledge, and the many most useful suggestions which he has made, I here most gratefully acknowledge.


Finally, in presenting to the 7th (Queen's Own) Hussars the History of their Regiment, and to such other readers as may be interested in the Military History of our Country, I trust that despite deficiencies which must exist in the book, it may yet prove on the whole not unworthy of the distinguished Corps whose record its pages contain.

C. R. B. BARRETT.

ROYAL UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION,
April 25, 1914.

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THE author desires to express his most sincere thanks to the following ladies and gentlemen who have so kindly permitted him to use for the purpose of these volumes, miniatures, pictures, photographs, prints, letters, &c., and also for the verbal or written information upon many points with which they have been so good as to furnish him:— The Lady Bateman, Mrs. Bland, Mrs. Fyers, Miss B. Wylie, Major His Royal Highness Prince Arthur of Connaught, K.G., G.C.V.O., A.D.C.; Major His Serene Highness Prince Alexander of Teck, G.C.B., G.C.V.O., D.S.O.; Major-General Sir H. Augustus Bushman, K.C.B. (Colonel, 9th (Q.R.) Lancers); Colonel Harold Paget, C.B., D.S.O.; Colonel Maisey, Lieut.-Colonel John Vaughan, D.S.O.; Lieut.-Colonel R. M. Poore, D.S.O.; Lieut.-Colonel The Right Honourable The Earl Waldegrave, V.D.; Lieut.-Colonel E. W. N. Pedder, Major Robert Poore, Major C. E. G. Norton, Major J. Fryer, Major M. Barne, Captain W. Paget-Tomlinson, Captain H. M. McCance, The Rev. W. A. Diggens, R. P. Copeland, Esq., *The Illustrated London News*.



THE REGIMENTAL LACE

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CONTENTS

Chapter		Page
I.	THE ORIGIN OF THE REGIMENT, 1690–1695	1
II.	THE CAMPAIGNS OF 1695, 1696, AND 1697	17
III.	HOME SERVICE, 1697–1711—THE CAMPAIGNS 1711–1712—HOME SERVICE—THE REGIMENT 'BROKEN,' 1714	30
IV.	THE REGIMENT IS RE-ESTABLISHED—HOME SERVICE—JACOBITE REBELLION—SHERIFFMUIR—RETURN TO ENGLAND	53
V.	HOME SERVICE, 1716–1742	71
VI.	DETTINGEN—1743	96
VII.	1744, 1745 AND FONTENOY	111
VIII.	THE CAMPAIGNS AFTER FONTENOY, 1745–1749—BATTLES OF ROUCOUX AND VAL	124
IX.	HOME SERVICE, 1748–1760—THE HISTORY OF THE LIGHT TROOP, 1758	142
X.	CAMPAIGN OF 1760—BATTLE OF WARBURG	158
XI.	CAMPAIGN OF 1761—BATTLE OF VELLINGHAUSEN	174
XII.	CAMPAIGN OF 1762—BATTLE OF WILHELMSTHAL	190
XIII.	RETURN FROM GERMANY—HOME SERVICE, 1764–1792	198
XIV.	CAMPAIGN OF 1793 IN THE NETHERLANDS	209
XV.	CAMPAIGN OF 1794—BEAUMONT AND WILLEMS	224
XVI.	CAMPAIGN OF 1795—HOME SERVICE, 1795–1799	235
XVII.	CAMPAIGN OF 1799—THE HELDER	240
XVIII.	HOME SERVICE, 1800–1808	284
XIX.	CORUÑA CAMPAIGN, 1808–1809	293
XX.	HOME SERVICE, 1809–1813	332
XXI.	THE SECOND PENINSULA CAMPAIGN, 1813–1814	337
XXII.	HOME SERVICE, 1814–1815	364
XXIII.	THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815—GENAPPE, JUNE 17, 1815	370
XXIV.	WATERLOO, JUNE 18, 1815	387

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ILLUSTRATIONS

COLOURED PLATES

WILLEMS, 1794 . . . . . *Frontispiece*
1751 . . . . . *To face p.* 144
WARBURG, 1760 . . . . . ,, 158
A PICQUET AFFAIR, 1808 . . . . . ,, 312

PLATES

CORNET JOHN BLAND . . . . . ,, 16
DETTINGEN, 1743 . . . . . ,, 106
H.R.H. WILLIAM DUKE OF CUMBERLAND—MARSHAL DE SAXE . . . . . ,, 114
MARSHAL DE BROGLIE—THE MARQUIS OF GRANBY—H.S.H. FERDINAND, DUKE OF BRUNSWICK . . ,, 174
LIEUT.-COLONEL THOMAS BLAND . . . . . ,, 204
DAMPIERRE—PICHEGRU—DUMOURIEZ . . . . ,, 208
LIEUT.-COLONEL MICHAEL BARNE . . . . . ,, 248
CAPTAIN CHARLES TAYLOR . . . . . ,, 250
THE EVACUATION OF HOLLAND, 1799 . . . . ,, 270
BUYING PIPES OF MR. HUDSON . . . . . ,, 288
THE PENINSULA CAMPAIGN, 1809 . . . . . ,, 292
TORO—VILLAFRANCA . . . . . ,, 302
FRENCH HUSSARS IN BIVOUAC . . . . . ,, 308
BENEVENTE—PASS OF MANZANAL . . . . . ,, 318
LIEUT. HON. EDWARD WILLIAM WALDEGRAVE . . ,, 326
1813 . . . . . ,, 336
LOS PASSAGES . . . . . ,, 338
COLONEL SIR EDWARD KERRISON, K.C.B., M.P. . . ,, 354
THE ALLIED SOVEREIGNS REVIEWING THE TROOPS, 1814 . . . . . ,, 364

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A GALLOPER, 1814 . . . . . *To face p.* 368
THE KING'S GERMAN LEGION . . . . . ,, 370
GENAPPE, 1815 . . . . . ,, 374
A POLISH LANCER AND CHASSEUR À CHEVAL . . ,, 382
THE MARQUESS OF ANGLESEY, K.G. . . . . ,, 386
A CHARGE AT WATERLOO, 1815 . . . . . ,, 390
WATERLOO, 1815 . . . . . ,, 392
1815 . . . . . ,, 394

MAPS

PAGE
FLANDERS: CAMPAIGNS, 1694–7 AND 1711–12. 14
DETTINGEN (WITH KEY) 110
FONTENOY, 1745 115
VAL (OR LAUFFELD) 141
WARBURG, 1760 162
WARBURG, 1760 165
VELLINGHAUSEN (OR KIRCHDENKERN), 1761 181
WILHELMSTHAL, 1762 195
THE HELDER, 1799 283
CORUÑA CAMPAIGN, 1808–9 321
CAMPAIGNS, SPAIN AND FRANCE, 1813–14 349

MEDALS

PENINSULA 363
WATERLOO 400

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HISTORY

OF THE

7th (QUEEN'S OWN) HUSSARS.

CHAPTER I

THE ORIGIN OF THE REGIMENT, 1690–1695

THE Regiment now known as the 7th (Queen's Own) Hussars originated under circumstances which will be related hereafter. As a preliminary, however, it may be well to mention the following facts.

The Manuscript Regimental Record ostensibly begins in 1690, but internal evidence shows that its pages must have been written in the earlier portion of the nineteenth century, and may even date in part as late as 1840. The account therein is also most fragmentary. Whether Cannon's official History of the Regiment was compiled from records now destroyed, but which were then in existence, cannot well be determined, though this was probably the case, and for this reason.

The MS. Regimental Record contains several details as to routes and expenses while on the march which are evidently authentic, but which are not to be found in Cannon's History.

Unfortunately, the original manuscripts of Cannon's histories, now preserved in the War Office Library, only concern infantry regiments; those of the cavalry of the line are no longer to be found there, if indeed they were ever preserved. However, although many details which would have been full of interest are lacking, it is possible from Cannon

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and from other sources, as well as from the existing Manuscript Regimental Record, to piece together a fairly accurate and detailed account of the early history of the 7th (Queen's Own) Hussars.

One fact is curious, and that is, that there is a very scanty list of the names of the original officers. In Appendix I, however, the names of all it has been possible to discover will be found, and this list comprises those who served in the Regiment from 30 December 1690 till its disbandment in Ireland in the spring of 1714.

And here it is also strange that the exact date of this disbandment is unknown. Without entering upon an account of the political situation which arose after the flight of James II, we will now proceed to the account of the origin of the Regiment. To counteract the endeavours of the Jacobites in Scotland who desired the restoration of the exiled King, during the year 1688 three troops of horse were raised, and were commanded by the Earl of Annandale, Lord Belhaven, and William, Laird of Blair, respectively. Sundry independent troops of dragoons were also raised, and besides these several regiments of foot.

It may be remarked that the troops of the Earl of Annandale and Lord Belhaven fought at Killicrankie, 27 July 1689. They were the only cavalry present. The Laird of Blair had previously been captured by Viscount Dundee, and what had become of his troop is not known. There are good reasons, however, for concluding that it had not at that time been properly armed and equipped, and that it melted away, or remained, as it were, disembodied, after the capture of its nominal commander. The Laird of Blair, it may be mentioned, was imprisoned by Dundee in the Isle of Mull, after being carted about the country as a captive. There he died owing to the ill-treatment he had received.

His lieutenant, the Laird of Pollock, who was also a prisoner, likewise suffered much at the hands of his captors.

It will be remembered that Dundee fell during the action at Killicrankie. Major-General Mackay, who commanded the Royalist Army, came off second best in the battle, but managed to conduct the retreat of his shattered troops with some skill; and later succeeded in raising a fresh force. The Jacobites after the loss of their leader withdrew to the mountains, where they remained in temporary security.

Early in the following year (1690) the troops of horse, now again three

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in number, were formed into a regiment of which the following were the three chief officers:

The Earl of Eglintoun, Colonel;

The Hon. William Forbes (Master of Forbes), Lieut.-Colonel; and

Sir George Gordon, of Edinglassie, Major.

The three troops of dragoons were similarly enrolled as a regiment with

Lord Cardross, Colonel (Henry 3rd Lord);

Robert Jackson, Lieut.-Colonel; and

David (Master of Cardross), Captain of a troop and apparently the major's troop.

Cannon gives the name of —— Guthrie as the Major, but this requires investigation.

At the same time a regiment of foot was incorporated, and the command thereof was given to Richard Cunningham, who in the following year became the first colonel of the present 7th (Queen's Own) Hussars. For Colonel Cunningham's dates and services see Appendix I.

A document exists which refers to this and is as follows:

'18 *December* 1689.—Holland House.

'Instructions to the Earl of Leven, Major-General Mackay and Sir G. Munroe concerning the forces.

'You are to form a regiment to be commanded by Richard Cunningham.

[This was a regiment of foot.]

'You are to model 3 troops of dragoons, each troop to consist of 50 men and the Lord Cardross to be Colonel and Captain of one troop, Robert Jackson to be Lieut.-Colonel and Captain of the 2nd and Patrick Hume of Polwarth to be Captain of the 3rd, and —— Guthrie [his name was John] to be Major without any troop.

'You are to appoint lieutenants and other inferior officers for the said troops of dragoons.

'You are to complete such regiments first as you think most proper for our service and to transmit a list of such officers as you nominate to George Lord Melville our Secretary for commissions.'

It was from these three troops of dragoons that the Regiment eventually sprang. The names of the officers are given, but do not concern this history.

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These regiments were actively employed in Scotland during the major portion of the year 1690. The operations of the Royalist Army had been successful; the Jacobites, after being continuously repulsed and harassed, found garrisons strongly posted in the Highland districts. Resistance for the time being gradually ceased, as it was clearly perceived by the disaffected clansmen that active operations would be absolutely futile.

King William now determined on remodelling the Scots army.

Certain of the infantry regiments were 'broken,' but Cunningham's Foot was not. Cannon states that 'the two regiments of cavalry, of three troops each, were incorporated and constituted a regiment of dragoons, of six troops of fifty men each, of which *Robert* Cunningham was appointed colonel by commission dated 30th of December, 1690.'

Cannon is inaccurate. Cunningham's Christian name was Richard and not Robert, and Lord Cardross's Dragoons certainly numbered six troops.

A complete list of the officers is recorded in the Muster Rolls for November and December 1690.

Here the name of John Guthrie occurs as Major, but not in command of a troop.

Also Robert Jackson appears not only as Captain of the lieut.-colonel's troop, *i.e.* lieutenant-colonel, but also beneath Guthrie's name as 'aide-major.' Certain it is that there were six troops in Cardross's Dragoons, but how many men there were in each troop we do not know. But assuming that there were only three troops in the Earl of Eglintoun's Horse, we have nine troops out of which the new cavalry regiment was to be formed.

What we do know is this, that by a commission dated 30 December 1690, Richard Cunningham was appointed Colonel of this new regiment, being succeeded in the command of his old regiment of foot by John Buchan. At the same time the Master of Forbes was appointed Lieut.-Colonel, and the Hon. Patrick Hume the Major.

Lastly, the strength of each troop was 'fifty men each.'

Of the other officers who were appointed to the Regiment or commissioned on 30 December 1690 not another name has come down to us; the next commission dates being in June 1691.

1 *February* 1692, dated from Dublin Castle, the Lords Justices writ to the Earl of Nottingham with regard to supplying horses, as follows:

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'We have now in possession about 400 horses, fit for troopers and dragoons, for which we paid but one third in hand and gave a note for the rest. The Troop horses were rated according to value, but not exceeding 10*l.*, and the dragoons the like, but not above 5*l.* We design to deliver them as recruits to the Regiments of Schaack, Oxford, Levenson, Cunningham and Wynne, the commanding officers being willing to take them as such; what remains we shall so dispose of as shall be most to the King's advantage.'

This is interesting for several reasons. It shows that Irish horses were at that time bought for the British service.

It gives some indication as to price, and lastly tells us definitely that the class of horse purchased for dragoons differed from that bought for 'horse.'

The 7th (Queen's Own) Hussars, to give it its present title, was therefore originally a Scots regiment. In Scotland Cunningham's Dragoons remained until February 1693–4, their occupation being at first to hold in check the disaffected in the Highlands; and later to take up quarters near Edinburgh.

The date of this movement is thus fixed:

A paper is extant, dated 26 March 1692, ordering Colonel Cunningham's Regiment, then in the county of Fife, to proceed to Leith (*S.P. Dom. King William's Chest*, vol. 12, no. 57). The paper is a long one and interesting. For our purpose it is important as fixing the whereabouts of the Regiment at that particular date, and it corroborates the Regimental Records and Cannon's History.

26 *March* 1692.—An interesting light on the military situation in Scotland at this date is to be found in a letter from Lord Melville addressed to the King. The letter (a very long one) contains the following extract and is dated from Edinburgh:

'I am just now informed of a tumultuary kind of business which has fallen out here, which may make a noise at a distance, which was this. Colonel Cunningham's regiment was brought from the county of Fife within these few days to the town of Leith, within a mile of this, because there were but few forces about the city, which was not safe to be in time of Parliament, whatever should fall out. There being no pay to give the soldiers, and the parliament being adjourned,

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so no expectation of money soon, had it seemed instigated a multitude of women to come here and infest and threaten Major-General Mackay; more of this kind is threatened and feared. The poor people are not able to give the soldiers subsistence, for many have difficulty to subsist themselves.'

The letter continues in speaking of the general state of the country, and states that there is some endeavour to 'possess the people with the blackest things of your Majesty that hell can invent.'

Unfortunately we cannot learn how the matter ended, but it is clear that, at any rate for the time, the Regiment was in a by no means comfortable station.

By this time proclamations proffering indemnity and pardon to rebels who were prepared to submit and take the oath of allegiance had produced a good effect in the way of pacification. Within six months, that is by the end of January 1692, the clans had submitted, and for a few years Scotland was to be free from war. England was not, however, at peace. William III had gone to war with France. He had been absent from England in order to carry on his campaign, and did not return till the end of 1693. It must be remembered that in those days, as in the days of Caesar, armies were wont to 'go into winter quarters,' and into winter quarters the allied armies went, while William returned to look after his British Dominions.

Early in 1693–4 orders were received by Cunningham's Dragoons to march into England, and then to embark for Flanders in preparation for the campaign of 1694.

The document concerning this is as follows:

WHITEHALL, 9th *Febry*, 1693/4.

SIR,

His Majesty having ordered Col. Cunningham's Regiment of Dragoons to March forthwith out of Scotland in order to embark in the river of Thames, for Flanders, is pleased to direct that care be taken for supplying that Regiment with Subsistence upon the English Establishment as soon as they shall arrive at Berwick.

I am, Sir,
Yours &c.,
WILLIAM BLATHWAYT,
Secretary at War.

To
Mr. Guy.

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Nine days after the date of this letter the Regiment began its march southwards. On arrival at Berwick, Cunningham's Dragoons were duly placed on the English Establishment. The Regimental Record gives the following details as to routes and expenses after leaving Berwick, showing that the destination of each of the six troops was different in the first instance, and that it was not until 21 May that the regiment was fairly embarked at Greenwich.

1 Troop from Berwick to Cambridge 236 miles at 8*d.* per mile	£7	17	4
1 Troop from Berwick to Saffron Walden 245 miles ,,	8	3	4
1 Troop from Berwick to Bishop Stortford 252 miles ,,	8	8	0
1 Troop from Berwick to Newmarket 245 miles ,,	8	3	4
1 Troop from Berwick to Sudbury 261 miles ,,	8	14	0
1 Troop from Berwick to Bury St. Edmands 255 miles ,,	8	10	0
Fire and candles in the above march and Quarters from 17th Febry. to 10th April, 52 days at 1/- pr day each quarter and 2/- for Head-Qrs.	18	4	0

The expenses for the remainder of the march are not given, but the six troops then converged on London duly arrived there, and were quartered in Holborn and the neighbourhood till 9 May. The waggon expenses of this latter portion of the march are given as follows:

1 Waggon for 1 Troop from Saffron Walden 40 miles	£1	6	8
1 ,, ,, ,, ,, St. Edmonds Bury 64 ,,	2	2	8
1 ,, ,, ,, ,, Cambridge 45 ,,	1	10	0
1 ,, ,, ,, ,, Newmarket 52 ,,	1	14	8
1 ,, ,, ,, ,, Bishop Stortford 30 ,,	1	0	0
1 ,, ,, ,, ,, Sudbury 50 ,,	1	13	4
Fire and Candles in their march and quarters from the 10th April till the 9th May	10	3	0

Meanwhile officers left behind in Scotland for the purpose had been actively engaged in recruiting. Two entire troops, of sixty men each, were newly raised, and besides these an augmentation of ten men to each of the existing troops had been accomplished. The regimental tradition is that the requisite men were enlisted at and near Hamilton.

30 *March* 1694.—A warrant was issued from Whitehall reciting that 'Two Troops of dragoons are to be added to the regiments of dragoons

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commanded by Major General Sir Thomas Levingston and Colonel Cunningham respectively, consisting each of two sergeants, two drummers and sixty private soldiers. An addition of ten men is also to be made to each of the six old Troops and the necessary arms are to be provided for arming the same.'

The two new troops were marched with speed to London, *viâ* Huntingdon, in April. We read:

2 Waggons from Berwick to Huntingdon 224 miles at 8*d*.	£14	18	8
Fire and candle on their march and quarters from 7th April to 20th May	6	12	0
Ditto from Huntingdon to London	3	6	8
Fire, candles and quarters	1	10	0

From the following paper it is clear that considerable exertions must have been made to thus augment the Regiment and to get the new troops to London:

Col Cunningham's,
About embarking part of Coll Cunningham's & Coll Winns (Wynne's) Regts Dragoons

HAGUE $\frac{8}{18}$ *May* 1694

SIR,

His Majty is pleased to order that in case the two additional Troops of Col Cunningham's Regt of Ds. do not arrive in time so as to Embark with the Regmt. they Do then embark with the Six Troops of Col Winns Regmt., and ye four other additional Troops Wherein you will take care that they receive the necessary orders. I refarr you for our news to ye enclosed paper (missing) and am,

your most humble servant

W. BLAYTHWAYT.

Mr. Clark.

18 *May* 1694.—A warrant was issued to Henry, Earl of Romney, directing that out of the Ordnance Stores 'one hundred and twenty pair of pistols are to be issued for arming the two additional Troops in the Regiment of dragoons commanded by Colonel Cunningham.' This is interesting as proving that the Regiment was armed with pistols, a pair to each private man at that date.

They did, however, arrive in time, and the whole eight troops

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embarked at Greenwich on 20 May 1694. Even in these early days, therefore, the zeal for His Majesty's service was a marked feature in the conduct of Cunningham's Dragoons.

The charges for waggons, fire, candles and embarkation expenses are given as follows :

21st May,	6 Waggons for 6 Troops to Greenwich 6 miles	£1	10 0
	2 do. „ 2 „ to do.	8	0
	Fire and Candles at Greenwich 2 nights . .	18	0
	Extraordinary charges for embarking . .	7	10 0

24 *May* 1694.—A news-letter from London addressed to the Earl of Derwentwater at Newcastle-on-Tyne contains the following extract:

'To-morrow, six additional troops of dragoons for the Regiments of Essex, Fairfax and Cunningham, embark for Flanders, and on June 6 the remaining six troops of Wynne's dragoons embark for the same, which will be the last of the troops that will be sent thither for the service of this campaign.'

It should be observed that there was another Colonel Cunningham at that time in command of a regiment of dragoons. With regard to this officer and his regiment there are many entries in the State Papers, and much care is needed in order to avoid confusing one with the other.

This regiment of dragoons (not the 7th) was raised and served in Ireland.

It was at or near Derry in 1689, and appears to have returned thence to Dublin, reporting that 'the town was in hazard of surrendering.'

On 24 May of that year its Colonel (Cunningham) was committed to the Gatehouse. Three troops of the regiment were brought to England in 1794 from Dublin, it being proposed to send them to Flanders, an intention which was not carried out.

The voyage appears to have been prosperous, at least no misadventures are recorded.

The Regiment arrived at its destination, Willemstad (Williamstadt), on 31 May. Willemstad, a town in N. Brabant, is situated on the middle

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mouth of the delta of the river Maas (Meuse). It is about 33½ miles due north of Anvers (Antwerp), and about 16 miles south-east of Helvoetsluys (Sluys), though upon the opposite bank of the estuary. King William was at this time at Breda, a town about 15 miles south-east of Willemstad; this we learn from the following document:

Copy.

BREDA 22 *May* 1694
N.S.

SIR,

This serves to accompany the enclosed orders for your March towards Brabant with the Regiment under your Command which orders it is H. Majtie Pleasure you observe notwithstanding the former received by you for the Marching into Flanders. I am

Sir

Yr &c.

To the Officer in Chief
with ye Regts of Dragoons
Commanded by Sir Thomas
Levingston & Colonel
Cunningham, at or about
Willemstadt.

The 'enclosed orders,' however, are not forthcoming, neither are the 'former' orders apparently in existence.

The regiments of dragoons duly left Willemstad, though the precise date of departure is not known. However, on 16 June the King reviewed Sir Thomas Levingston's and Colonel Cunningham's Dragoons that had 'lately come over from Scotland' and were cantoned near the town of Aerschot. The review actually took place at Tremont. The main army was now in camp at Mont St. André near Iodoigne. Its position is thus stated, though it does not seem possible to identify on modern maps the villages named.

The right was at Harlue and Taviers on the Mehaigne. The left was beyond Marilles and in rear of Molembaix. The line formed a sort of elbow near the village of Henieux Heddin, which was in front. The right of this camp was a plain, and on the left it 'went to narrow and close grounds.'

Here at Mont St. André all the cavalry joined the main army.

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All the dragoons, commanded by Major-General Eppinger and consisting of twenty-six squadrons of Dutch and twenty-eight squadrons of British, were now stationed to form the reserve.

The brigades of British were thus composed :

		Squadrons.			Squadrons.
Brigadier Wynne	Eppinger	5	Brigadier Mathews	Fairfax	4
	Essex	4		Levingston	4
	Wynne	3		Mathews	4
	Cunningham	4			

This was a force of twenty-eight squadrons of British cavalry which amounted to about 5400 men.

On 22 July all the dragoons were sent to the rear to a place named Hottemont.

On 8 August 1694 the army decamped from Mont St. André to march to Rosselaer (or Rousselaer).

Two days previously, to prevent disorders on the march and the probable cutting off of small parties by the enemy, an order was issued to be read at the head of every regiment. In it these offences were forbidden, any breach being *punishable by death*.

1. ' Maroding ' (Marauding).
2. Foraging without orders.
3. Molestation of victuallers or any persons who came to camp with provisions.

The army marched towards the ' spring of the Mehaigne ' and Gembloux (Gembloux), passing by the defile of Perwys.

The King took up his quarters at the Château of Sombref, where, being in front of the army, he was covered by all the English and Dutch dragoons, who encamped in a long line.

The French, who were near the plains of Fleury, however, declined battle, and retired over the Sambre.

The allied army then marched to Nivelle, *viâ* Mellé and Genappe. The right rested on Arkennes, the left extended to near Promel.

Here a camp was formed for a few days.

On this portion of the march a suspicious-looking stranger was observed in conversation with the driver of one of the ammunition carts.

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He was seized, and on being searched a lighted match was discovered concealed on his person. It was found on inquiry that he had ingratiated himself with the driver by means of 'drink money.' 'Persuasion' was applied to the prisoner, who then confessed that his intention had been to blow up the cart. Tried by court-martial, he was condemned, and was subsequently put to death. The manner of his execution does not, however, commend itself to modern ideas of punishment. A fire was lighted, and the man's right hand was first cut off and then burnt before his eyes. That being accomplished, the rest of him was cremated alive. It appears that in the previous campaign a similar case had occurred, and that the punishment was precisely the same.

On 12 August the army marched to Aeth, crossing the Cambron at Lens. The King's quarters were at Chievres. Aeth, a town at the confluence of the rivers Cambron and Dender, was finely fortified by Vauban. Edward d'Auvergne gives a long and interesting description of the place and its three fine gates.

The next camp was at Grames, a place about four miles from Tournai and close by Mount Trinity. King William took up his quarters at the Château de Cordes, while the Elector rested at Chastelet. Meanwhile the French were at Courtrai. The King passed the Scheldt at a spot two leagues below Oudenarde. The French had made a most terrific march as regards speed, to cut him off, but failed. It is stated that their losses in men and horses on this hurried march were terrible, and that the stench of dead men and animals tainted the air for miles along the road.

At Escanass King William came in sight of the French army, but no battle ensued. The next halting-place of William was Berghem.

On 7 September all the English horse and dragoons were sent to Rousselaer from Wouterghen. Three days later the King went toward Dixmuyden. Here he reviewed the English horse and dragoons, finding all 'in good order.'

But although there had been no actual fighting in this campaign, in regard to marches it had been very arduous and harassing. A paper issued about this time is of interest and its contents may be summarised.

From 'Camp at Rosselaer' $\frac{12}{22}$ Sept. 1694.

Horse and dragoons are to be completed as regards men, horses, clothes and accoutrements before 1 March 1695; and all lieutenant-

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colonels are to be personally at their quarters under pain of being cashiered.

Doubtless there had been many casualties which needed filling up, though the fighting had been nil. It is clear that the success achieved by the officers of Cunningham's Dragoons in recruiting was not always equalled by other regiments. For the previous campaign, that of 1693, we read of a scarcity of recruits, and apparently the officers were slack. Captains were ordered to be cashiered if they did not complete their troops within a specified time, and an abatement of their pay proportionate to the deficiency in men was decreed after 1 May. With all that, it was, however, forbidden most strictly to enlist 'Prest men for Flanders,' and the severest punishment is decreed to be meted out if 'the practice continues.'

After the review by the King the British dragoons, Cunningham's among them, went into cantonments in the villages between Ghent and Sas van Ghent, and here they remained till the opening of the campaign of 1695.

The most important, nay, even the only important, result of the campaign of 1694 was the capture of the town of Huy.

In this Cunningham's Dragoons were not concerned; yet a brief account of it may be inserted, seeing that on its surrender the French were compelled to evacuate the whole territory belonging to the bishopric of Liege.

Field-Marshal His Highness the Duke of Holstein Ploen commanded the allied army. The besieging force left the camp at Wouterghem (otherwise Aerschot) in detachments early in September, and established a blockade of the place by the 7th.

Huy was a fortified town of which the defences had been much improved by the French during 1693–4.


The allied army had a strength of about 20,000 foot and 3800 horse.

At the time of the investment the French governor of Namur was within the place, but under orders quitted it with a strong escort of dragoons, and after some difficulty reached Namur, leaving his baggage behind him.

The force defending Huy amounted to 1400 foot and a troop of dragoons under the command of Monsieur de Regnac.

At noon on 7 September the magistrates of Huy came into the allied camp and obtained terms by which the town was surrendered. This was

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by the leave of Monsieur de Regnac. The defending force then withdrew into the castle and forts. The town itself was occupied by four battalions of the allied troops.

Batteries were then erected by the besiegers. A condition of the surrender was that the allies 'should not attack the Castle by the Town or Faubourgs, nor cause any troops to pass the Bridge in a Body during the Siege; nor any Cannon, Ammunitions or any other Provisions of War; and that by vertue of this Capitulation he should deliver the next Day by Six in the Morning the Keys of the Town in the hands of the Magistrate.'

A brisk cannonade on both sides began on the 7th, and continued with but few breaks until the 17th, when the garrison surrendered.

The besieged sallied on the 7th, but were repulsed.

On that day the besiegers finished a bridge of communication at Taverne.

On the 9th three guns were disabled in the Fort Picard and some gunners killed. This was reported by deserters.

Meanwhile the batteries of the allied army were being perfected and the heavy artillery placed in position.

Besides field artillery the siege train consisted of fifty-five battering pieces and twenty-eight mortars. These had been brought to Huy by water from Maestricht.

On the 10th the fire of the besieged slackened, as they were employed in covering themselves 'in their works with earth and hay, to defend themselves from our Bombs.'

Next day the fire of the defenders was much hotter. The five batteries of the besiegers were completed.

On 12 September the fire on both sides was very hot, and trenches were opened at the Brandenburgh quarter against Fort Picard.

Fog prevented bombardment for some time on the 13th. When it lifted, the fire of the allies was hotter than ever. Volleys directed against the bridge by the French caused a message to be sent that if this continued no quarter would be given, it being a breach of the capitulation. The well of the besieged was this day ruined, and the store of casks of beer and water destroyed.

On 14 September the fire of the besieged ceased. Fort Picard, in which a breach had been made, was stormed and carried. Fort Rouge

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next fell, as did the Tower of St. Leonard. Another tower surrendered at discretion. Of all these, however, the guns were spiked by the commandant, who escaped with about seventy men. A mine was sprung after his retreat, but did no harm. Many prisoners were taken. The loss of the allies was not more than ten men.

On the 15th the castle was summoned to surrender, and there was a cessation of hostilities for half an hour. The French, however, determined to hold out. During the following day the guns of the besiegers pounded the defences, and this was continued till 1 P.M. on the 17th, when the enemy beat the *Chamade* and asked to capitulate.

On the 18th the defenders were permitted to march out *through the breach* between nine and ten o'clock in the morning, and had much difficulty in getting over the ruins. The breach, in fact, was by no means practicable, and had it been stormed could hardly have been taken.

This marching out by the breach arose from the fact that in the Articles of Capitulation to 'march out by the breach' had been specifically named. When the besieged found how difficult it was to make their way over the ruins they stopped, and asked to be allowed to march out through one of the gates. Leave was however refused, and they had to scramble out as best they might. Terms of capitulation, of which many are extant, often form curious reading, but cannot, of course, be quoted here.



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CORNET JOHN BLAND.

(*Afterwards Colonel.*)

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CHAPTER II

The Campaigns of 1695, 1696, and 1697

We left the regiment cantoned for the winter at some villages between Ghent and Sas van Ghent.

Mainly owing to the absence of King William in England the opening of the campaign of 1695 was delayed till the middle of May.

The King landed in Holland on the 14th of that month, and remained at the Hague until the 20th, when he went to Loo. Meanwhile, the allied armies began to take the field. One was commanded by the Elector of Bavaria and the Duke of Holstein Ploen, the other by King William in person and Charles Henry of Lorraine, Prince of Vaudemont. King William designed to operate in Flanders. When Cunningham's Dragoons left their winter quarters they marched to Dixmuyden in West Flanders, and thence to Arseele. The King, who had left Loo for Breda, now proceeded to Ghent, where he was accorded a most enthusiastic reception by the burghers. At Ghent he remained but a few hours, and arrived at the camp at Arseele about midnight the same day. On 31 May, in the morning, the King reviewed the English cavalry which was encamped upon the right wing, having arrived on the 29th.

Cunningham's Dragoons, according to d'Auvergne, were brigaded with Dopf's Dragoons and under the command of Brigadier Wynne, being posted in the 2nd line of the left wing. They were reviewed in the afternoon of the 31st, and are stated to have been, like the cavalry in general, in 'an extraordinary good condition.'

On 2 June the army marched in four columns from Arseele towards Rousselaer, 'dividing from the centre.' Cunningham's Dragoons proceeded by the high road. At Rousselaer the force camped. The army on the morrow marched to Becelaer, and for the first time came in touch with the enemy. A detachment of 400 dragoons, which had been sent out

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on the extreme left of the left flank, fell in with a party of the dragoons of the enemy. These they incontinently charged, defeated, and chased to the very stockades of Menin, returning to the army with twenty-three prisoners. Captain Stanhope, a volunteer, is recorded to have had his horse shot, but it is not clear to what regiment these dragoons belonged. From Becelaer, on the evening of his arrival, William rode out to reconnoitre the enemy's line, which was some three miles distant from the allied camp. He found the enemy's line 'very well Pallissaded, and the Parapet very thick and strong, flanked with good Redoubts, and Cannon mounted for the defence of them.'

William returned to camp late that night, and found that not until midnight had the artillery, baggage, and rear-guard arrived. Marshal Villeroy, who had already sent forward reinforcements to the French army, was himself approaching rapidly with the main bulk of his force.

Prior to marching on the morrow William again rode out to reconnoitre. He had with him a considerable detachment. It was in fact a reconnaissance in force. The enemy, fearing an attack and assuming that the King's detachment was the vanguard of the attacking force, beat to arms. William then returned to the camp at Becelaer and countermanded the order to march which had been issued on the previous night. William's design was to compel the enemy to bring as many troops forward to defend the fortified camp as possible, though he well knew that it was next to impossible for any attack thereon to succeed.

Manœuvring of a somewhat intricate nature now continued for several days. The Elector passed from Nivove to Houthem, towards the Scheldt. Next day he passed the river below Oudenarde. On the 6th he encamped near the enemy's line with his right towards Courtrai, his left near Veermande, and his headquarters at Castres.

Cunningham's Dragoons were now to have an opportunity of coming to hand grips with the enemy.

At Becelaer forage for the horses was by no means plentiful, and the dragoons were fully occupied in obtaining whatever supplies they could. It was by this method that the forage was gathered when near the lines of the enemy. The dragoons dismounted and accompanied by infantry would go out and cut forage. Then, leaving the infantry to guard it, they returned to camp, brought out their horses and loaded up.

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By this precaution they foraged almost up to the gates of Ypres without losing a horse.

On 14 June King William received news that the French had conceived the design of intercepting the bread waggons which were coming laden from Bruges to the camp with the provisions for the army. The spot where they intended to fall upon them was Rousselaer. Accordingly, Lord Essex was ordered, with 500 dragoons, to join the convoy at Rousselaer, and Lord Portland, with 500 more dragoons commanded under him by Brigadier Wynne and sustained by some horse, was told off to intercept the enemy. Lord Portland received information that the French force designed to pass the night at the village of Moorsleede, and thither he made his way with the troops under his command. The enemy was found already established in the village, the streets of which they had managed to barricade with overturned carts and waggons. The strength of the French force, which was under the command of a lieutenant-colonel, amounted to 400 men.

Dismounting, the British dragoons at once attacked the barricades and speedily captured them. Several of the enemy fell in the assault; a captain and thirty men were taken prisoners, while the remainder bolted. With the British the Count of Soissons, a brother of Prince Eugene, was serving as a volunteer and bore good testimony to the briskness of the attack. The affair lasted about half an hour. On the British side a Lieutenant Webb, the brother of Lieutenant-Colonel Webb of the Guards, was killed. Brigadier Wynne was shot in the knee, and Captains Collins and Holgate were both wounded. The wound of Brigadier Wynne, at first not deemed serious, afterwards proved mortal, and that gallant officer died a few days later at Ghent. Besides these the British lost some men in killed and wounded. None of the three officers whose names have been given belonged to Cunningham's Dragoons. On the morrow the convoy of bread waggons arrived safely in the camp. Almost simultaneously a force of some fifty of the enemy had been captured near Bruges.

This was, however, somewhat balanced by a success of the enemy on the night of the 15th, when the French fell upon an outpost near Sonnebeck and made several prisoners.

On the 17th the artillery of the allies proceeded from Becelaer to Rousselaer, marching by night. A few bodies of French troops were

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on the extreme left of the left flank, fell in with a party of the dragoons of the enemy. These they incontinently charged, defeated, and chased to the very stockades of Menin, returning to the army with twenty-three prisoners. Captain Stanhope, a volunteer, is recorded to have had his horse shot, but it is not clear to what regiment these dragoons belonged. From Becelaer, on the evening of his arrival, William rode out to reconnoitre the enemy's line, which was some three miles distant from the allied camp. He found the enemy's line 'very well Pallissaded, and the Parapet very thick and strong, flanked with good Redoubts, and Cannon mounted for the defence of them.'

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Dismounting, the British dragoons [illegible] and speedily captured them. Several of the enemy [illegible] a captain and thirty men were taken prisoners, while the remainder bolted. With the British the Count of Solms, a nephew of Prince Eugene, was serving as a volunteer and took a good share in the business of the attack. The affair lasted about half an hour. On the French side a Lieutenant Webb, the brother of Lieutenant-Colonel Webb of the Guards, was killed. Brigadier Wynne was shot in the thigh, and Colonels Collins and Holgate were both wounded. The latter died soon after. Wynne, at first not deemed [illegible] gallant officer died a few days after at Ghent. Besides these the British lost some men killed and wounded. [illegible] whose names have been given in the London Gazette. On the morrow the corpses of the [illegible] Almost simultaneously with the attack [illegible] captured near Bruges.

This was, [illegible] s on the night [illegible] g Sonnebeck and [illegible] ff,

On the [illegible] the Rousselaer, [illegible] To



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seen, but the escort prevented any attack from being made on the guns.

Next day the whole army marched to Rousselaer in two lines, King William remaining with the rear-guard. Marshal Villeroy meditated an attack on the rear-guard, but did not carry it into execution, and the allies reached their destination on 19 June.

Early that morning William left for the Meuse with a strong escort. The siege of Namur was now about to be undertaken. Namur was a strong place and was deemed by its garrison almost impregnable. On one of the gates was inscribed 'Reddi quidem, sed vinci non potest,' as much as to say they could restore the town to its owners, but that it could not be taken. The siege began on 3 July; by 6 August Count Guiscard the commandant had surrendered. Meanwhile, Marshal Villeroy had suddenly fallen upon Dixmuyden and Deinse and compelled them to capitulate. Later, the officer who had been in command at Dixmuyden was tried by court-martial and decapitated by the common executioner. He was by nationality a Dane, and was accused of misbehaviour in the fact that he did not show fight. A British dragoon officer, by the way, was the only man who opposed the capitulation, and was thereafter promoted for that reason.

Cunningham's Dragoons, however, had not been engaged at Namur, but had formed part of the army under Charles Henry of Lorraine, Prince of Vaudemont, to whom was entrusted the duty of covering the besieging force.

The Prince of Vaudemont's army numbered about 36,000 men. His camp was at Wouterghem originally, but on 3 and 4 July he slightly shifted his ground to a position more favourable for defence. His right extended as far as the rising ground at Arseele, and his left towards Wacken and the river Lys. The whole line was entrenched. Here he awaited Villeroy, though the latter had more than double his force. The French army approached unmolested save by a Dutch major, who, posted with two hundred foot at Inghelmonster on the river Mandel, had entrenched and palisaded a neighbouring house which also possessed a moat. This plucky officer interrupted the march of the whole French army for some time, causing them considerable annoyance, and it was not until cannon was brought against him that he surrendered. Some of his captors wished to make an example of him for his temerity,

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but Villeroy, to his credit, 'approved of his courage and bravery, and was pleased to applaud it.'

On came the French, and were drawn up in line of battle facing the Prince of Vaudemont quite early in the day. Nor was this all, for a strong detachment under Montal had got round on the right rear of the allies and had outflanked them. Villeroy might have attacked at once, and could have done so with every prospect of immediate and complete success, but, whether from over-caution or from a desire to make his victory absolute and complete, he delayed. The Prince of Vaudemont, however, fully comprehended the dangerous situation in which he was placed. He therefore put into execution a clever manœuvre by which he succeeded in withdrawing his army in a masterly manner, and practically right under the nose of his foe. That he was justified is amply proved from the fact that, had he remained to fight, it would simply have meant the loss of his entire army.

When Villeroy decided not to attack at once, he gave orders to Montal to take the posts of the allies which were existing on the rear of their right, between Arseele and Wincke. The Prince of Vaudemont became acquainted with these orders, and what he did to escape from the net by which he was threatened to be surrounded d'Auvergne tells us in detail. Let us quote his account.

'Our Army was then posted in the Retrenchment, Expecting the Enemy; and though Montal had already pass'd Thielt, and was drawing near to Caulghen, Prince Vaudemont chang'd Resolution, and thought it very hazardous to venture a Battle which promis'd the total ruin of his Army, and then, though the time was urgent and pressing, he immediately, with a most admirable Judgment, resolv'd upon, and contriv'd a Retreat. The Prince had very wisely provided for such an Accident in the Morning, by ordering all the Baggage to load immediately and to march by Deinse to Ghent that it might not embarrass the motions of the Army. The Prince order'd first the Cannon to be drawn off the Batteries, and to march towards Deinse; which was done so secretly, that the Enemies did not perceive it. He had wisely ordered the Artillery to be moving from Battery to Battery all the Afternoon, so that when it went clear off, the Enemies thought it had been but the ordinary motion. After, the two Lines of Foot march'd upon the Left, along the Retrenchment. To

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cover this March of the Foot the Prince order'd a Body of Horse to come and post in the Retrenchment; as 'twas quitted by the Foot. The Foot march'd with their Pikes and Colours trailing to conceal their march; neither did the Enemies perceive this motion till the Cavalry mounted again, and abandon'd the Retrenchment, and then the Infantry was already got in the bottom between Arseel and Wouterghem, marching towards Deinse. At the same time that the Foot were filing off from the Retrenchment, the Prince order'd Monsieur. d'Auverquerque, with the Right Wing of Horse, interlin'd with Collier's Brigade of Foot to make a Line facing Caneghem, extending himself from the Windmill of Arseele towards Winck. This motion was to make Montal believe that this Line was design'd to oppose his attempt upon the Rear of our Right; but his secret orders were to march off by Winck to Nevel, and so to Ghent. At the same time that the Foot march'd by Wouterghem and Deinse, my Lord Rochford who was posted with the Left Wing of Horse and two Battallions towards the Lys, made the Reer Guard towards the Left, with a Line of Foot on one side, and three Squadrons of Eppinger upon the other. All this was contriv'd by the Prince, from the Right to the Left, that the Army disappear'd all at once, just as if it had vanish'd out of the Enemy's Sight. The Prince, and the Duke of Wirtemberg, and other Generals, kept to the Retrenchments till all was march'd off; forming with themselves, Domestics and Attendants, a little Body of Horse, still to impose upon the Enemy, and followed the Army as soon as 'twas all got off. The Enemies finding themselves cheated, did what they could to overtake and fall upon our Rear: Montal particularly endeavour'd to fall upon that Body commanded by Monsieur d'Auverquerque, which march'd off by Winck to Nevel. He overtook the Rear with some Squadrons of Horse and Dragoons: But our Defiles were good, and Brigadier Collier had order'd all the Granadiers of his Brigade to the Rear of all, to face the Enemy from time to time as they advanc'd in their Defiles; which was so well contrived that the Granadiers with their Fire kept the Enemies at a distance, and made the Retreat good, and Montal could not do us the lest harm. When they had fail'd here they endeavour'd to fall upon the Rear of our Body of Foot, which was brought up by Count de Noyelles Lieutenant-General. The (he) order'd a Line of Foot to advance, with some Horse and Dragoons; but the Foot were already got so far that they could not hurt them. However two

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Squadrons of their Dragoons put green Boughs in their Hats,[1] which is our sign of Battle, and spoke some French and some English, as if they had been some of our Reer-Guard: It was then the dusk of the Evening; and with this Stratagem they were suffered to come up close to our Rear of Foot, and march'd with them a little way, till they came to a convenient place, that they fir'd upon our Rear, and then fell in with their Swords. This put the first Battallion in great disorder; but the other immediately facing about, oblig'd the Enemies to retire. They killed us several Men, and made some Prisoners: The Lunenburgh Regiment of Luck suffer'd most on this occasion. And this is the only loss we receiv'd from the Enemy in this great and renown'd Retreat; which is as fine a piece of the Art of War as can be read of in History, and which can hardly be parallel'd in it; which has shew'd more the Art, Conduct, and Prudence of a General, than if the Prince had gain'd a considerable Victory: and this is the Sense his Majesty was pleas'd to express of it in a Letter he Writ to Prince Vaudemont on this occasion.'

Thus it was, then, that the Prince of Vaudemont saved his army and made good his retreat to Ghent. Had any disaster occurred to his force, it would have meant the raising of the Siege of Namur.

On arrival at Ghent, Cunningham's Dragoons were detached with Rosse's Dragoons and twelve battalions of infantry under Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Bellasis to cover Nieuport, a seaport town, being stationed between Bruges and that place. Here they remained until Marshal Villeroy advanced towards Namur in an endeavour to raise the siege. Cunningham's Dragoons then were moved to Brussels.

Meanwhile, Dixmuyden and Deinse had fallen, as has been mentioned, Namur had capitulated, and Brussels had been bombarded by the French, in the presence, too, of the allied army, who were unable to prevent this needless and wanton destruction of property. Brussels suffered much from the fire caused by this bombardment, the Stadthuys and the market-place and several streets near being destroyed. The wealthy and trading part of the town, too, was most affected. Besides this a large number of churches were consumed, and their valuable contents, such as pictures, jewels, and plate, perished in the flames. As a matter of fact, this bombardment was a most wanton affair, causing needless suffering,

[1] The troops of William III at the battle of the Boyne all mounted green boughs in their hats.

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and for no military reason whatever, except an attempt to draw off the forces then engaged in laying siege to Namur.

Later, Cunningham's Dragoons encamped for a short time on the Bruges canal, and then in October went into winter quarters in villages upon the canal of Ostend, in the Pays du Nord. The campaign of 1696 was decidedly uneventful. A plot had been formed for the restoration of James II, and to assist in its execution a number of French troops were marched to the coast, it being intended to transport them to England to assist the Jacobite rising. In consequence, twenty battalions of Dutch and British troops were sent over from the Continent in preparation for the expected French invasion. William was detained in England until the middle of May. The plot failed, but the measures adopted by the British Government to oppose the invasion crippled the army of the allies in Flanders, and practically prevented almost any operations of importance from taking place there. Still, as early as March, the Duke of Holstein, who commanded the allies in the neighbourhood of Namur, detached a force under Lord Athlone and another under General Cohorn, and sent them up the Meuse. Dinant and Givêt were closely invested, and the extensive French magazines at the latter place were totally destroyed. The detached force, having accomplished its mission, returned scatheless to Namur. Meanwhile, the bulk of the French army, which, under Villeroy, was encamped on the plains of Cambron, did nothing, and the remainder, then encamped at Rousselaer under Marshal Boufflers, was equally inactive. On the arrival of William he encamped with the Elector at Halle in order to cover Brussels, while the Prince of Vaudemont lay along the canal between Ghent and Bruges to oppose Boufflers.

Both armies faced each other during the whole campaign of this year and did nothing. In October both armies retired to winter quarters, and rumours of peace were rife.

The events referring particularly to Cunningham's Dragoons during this year are few.

On 13 May clothing arrived from England, being brought by water from Bruges to Marykirk. By this time it must have been badly needed.

King William had reached the Hague on 7 May, where he remained until the 13th, proceeding thence to Loo, and finally arriving at Breda on the 25th. He marched into the camp near Ghent on the 27th. In the afternoon of the 30th King William reviewed the English cavalry, and

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it is reported that Cunningham's Dragoons 'made a very good appearance, both Man and Horse being in very good order.' On 31 May many officers were promoted, among them being Colonel Cunningham, who was 'made Brigadier of Dragoons in the place of Brigadier Wynne, that had died the last year of his Wounds received at Moorsleede.' In June King William was at Wavre, leaving that place on the 9th.

Cunningham's Dragoons were then serving under their old general the Prince of Vaudemont, being brigaded with the regiments of Eppinger and Miremont, the regimental command being still retained by Cunningham. They were not engaged in the attempt against the French cavalry on 19 June, an attempt which proved ineffectual.

The Regiment remained in its quarters near Ghent until 27 June, when it marched out and encamped along the Scheldt near to the citadel.

The allied armies during July were reinforced by a body of about 15,000 men and twenty-eight guns under the Landgrave of Hesse. This force had been marched thither through Germany.

During this month the Prince of Vaudemont, with a strong escort of 500 dragoons and 700 foot, journeyed in his coach with the utmost secrecy to the King's camp and arrived there on the 21st. His escort on the way was reinforced from the King's army. He returned to his camp on the 22nd by a more circuitous route, the shorter and more direct way he had taken on his outward journey not being considered safe.

Expectation was rife in the camp that some operation was at length about to be actively undertaken, and that the army was about to decamp. It did decamp, but only to take up a new ground and on a more methodical plan, the reason being that the corn had now been garnered, rather early it is true, but this was by the special order of the Prince of Vaudemont. Hence it was possible to have the camp lines drawn upon a more regular system and more in consonance with the military ideas of that day. The Prince also insisted on all corn being threshed out and conveyed to his side of the canal.

The army was now cantoned along the canal of Bruges. Cunningham's Dragoons were again in the 2nd line of the left wing, and appear to have been encamped 'between the Halfway House and St. George.' places it does not seem possible now to identify. At least, one account states that the 'Dragoons' were so placed, while a few lines later it is

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stated that 'the English Cavalry' lay 'between Marykirk and Ghent, upon the Left.'

During the month of August there were several small skirmishes, but nothing of importance occurred. Foraging parties were frequently sent out on both sides, and sometimes came into collision.

Towards the end of the month the camp of the Dragoons of Eppinger, Rosse, and Miremont, with whom Cunningham's were brigaded, was shifted to a spot 'between the Right of the Foot and Bruges.' On 31 August orders were received for the dragoons to pass the canal and to encamp within a new entrenchment that had been recently constructed and finished on the previous night. This entrenchment extended 'from the Chateau of Coudekenken upon the Right of St. Andreas his Cloister to St. Michael upon the Left, which defended all the plain, this being the most open passage to Bruges.'

Villeroy had been very active in making a reconnaissance in force, and was expected to attack on this line, hence the entrenchment.

On arrival within the entrenchment the dragoons were encamped near the canal of Ostend on the right of the first line. On the same day Villeroy's army marched towards Torhout and the canal of Nieuport. Their right was at Torhout, Ichteghem towards the canals of Nieuport and Dixmuyden was on the left, and the wood of Wynendale in the rear of the centre of the camp. At Wynendale Villeroy took up his quarters.

On 1 September guns were placed in position within the entrenchment. Plassendael was now fortified, and four guns were mounted there. To aid in the defence of the entrenchment and also to annoy the enemy, the *digue* of the canal of Nieuport was broken down in two or three places, and the French got the benefit of a heavy flood of water. Early in September the French concluded a separate peace with the Duke of Savoy. From this peace the enemy expected to derive much advantage, hoping to extend its influence so as to include all Italy.

The strenuous efforts of the allies to safeguard the town of Bruges did not pass unrecognised by the magistrates of that place. They arrived one day in a body at the camp in order to compliment the Prince of Vaudemont on the success of his endeavours. Nor were the soldiers forgotten, for the worthy burghers brought with them a present of 400 barrels of beer! This was doubtless a most welcome gift, and duly appreciated by the men. The end of this uneventful campaign was now

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at hand. On 28 September the Prince of Vaudemont reviewed the English cavalry and dragoons at Moorbrugghe. The King had already left the army and was on his way to England. He sailed from the Hague on 4 October. On the same day the army of the Prince of Vaudemont began to file off towards its allotted winter quarters, the dragoons, Cunningham's amongst them, being located behind the canals of Ostend and Bruges.

The Regiment was now about to lose its first colonel. On 1 October 1696 Brigadier-General Richard Cunningham was succeeded in the colonelcy by William, Lord Jedburgh, the eldest son of the Marquess of Lothian. In consequence of this change the designation of the Regiment became 'Jedburgh's Dragoons.'

The events of this campaign are of comparatively little interest. In the month of May the opposing armies began operations. To the French a considerable accession of strength had come owing to the fact that the peace with the Duke of Savoy had released a large army.

This army, under the command of Marshal Catinat, then joined the forces already in Flanders under the command of Villeroy and Boufflers.

The French host drew together and encamped on the plains of Cambron, and totalled 133 battalions of foot and 350 squadrons of cavalry.

King William encamped at Bois-Signior-Isace, his army being about half the size of that of his opponents, and by means of spies kept a most careful watch on the movements of the French.

It was a most critical juncture, for negotiations for peace were in progress at Ryswick near the Hague, the French plenipotentiaries having already arrived there.

William knew that if the French could steal an advantage by any unforeseen move it would most adversely affect the terms proposed for the peace. Hence he was more than ordinarily watchful, as at Ryswick procrastination was the order of the day and its intention was pretty evident.

Bois-Signior-Isace was about five leagues from the French lines.

Suddenly, early in May, the French army moved forward towards the King's camp.

He had, however, obtained previous information of the design, and being unable to fight with any hope of success, he retreated towards Promel, where he was about to encamp and take up a position.

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But the French advance was a blind, and they suddenly deflected their march in the direction of Brussels.

Now, if Brussels fell into the hands of the French it would have been a most serious matter, besides the question of pillage.

With all speed, therefore, William set his army in motion, and a race for that city began.

Marching night and day King William outstripped the enemy, and having passed through the wood of Soignies, arrived at Brussels some hours before the French. A strong position was taken up at Anderlecht, where a camp was formed. A strong entrenchment with several redoubts was hurriedly constructed, and by this means both the army and the town were secured.

The French, finding themselves foiled, stopped short at Halle, and a force was detached under Catinat to lay siege to Aeth, though it was confidently expected that peace would be concluded before the town fell.

This expectation was realised ; still the town was taken.

Aeth had been fortified by Vauban, and it is curious to note that that distinguished master of the art was himself engaged in directing the siege.

Peace was signed between England, Spain, Holland, and France on 20 September and between France and the Empire on 30 October.

Both armies immediately quitted the field, thankful, no doubt, that this protracted war was at last at an end. The British troops were quartered in Ghent and Bruges till transports could arrive on the coast to take them to England or Ireland, Ostend being the chief port of embarkation.

A passage in a book published in 1748, which purports to be the diary of a Captain Robert Parker, who served through several campaigns both in Ireland and the Low Countries, is so curious as to be worth quoting. It is as follows : 'It is worth observing how great a number of Troops were quartered in the single Town of Ghent at this time, and the affair was so happily conducted, that the burthen on the inhabitants was very inconsiderable. This was owing to the contrivance of a poor button-maker who made a fortune by it.'

Unfortunately, he does not tell us what the 'contrivance' of the poor button-maker was.

As a matter of fact 29,650 men were collected together in Ghent, of which not half were British.

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Here again we find a discrepancy between Cannon and the Regimental Record.


Cannon says: 'The Regiment, bearing the title of Jedburgh's Dragoons, served the campaign of 1697 in Flanders with the army commanded by the Elector of Bavaria, and was formed in Brigade with the Regiments of Nassau-Sarbruck, and Opdam, under the orders of Brigadier General Pyper. It took part in several operations; and in May joined King William's Army in Brabant, but subsequently returned to Flanders.'

From the Regimental Record we find that in April Jedburgh's Dragoons were stationed at 'Merchtein and Asche near Brussels with the Elector of Bavaria,' and that on 17 May they were 'at the Camp of St. Quintin Linneck with King William's Army.'

The next entry reads oddly, and is as follows:

'The Regiment was not at any time engaged with the Enemy during its stay in Flanders'!

I transcribe this last entry to draw attention to some of the difficulties likely to occur to those occupied in writing the history of a regiment.



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CHAPTER III

HOME SERVICE, 1697–1711—THE CAMPAIGNS 1711–12—HOME SERVICE—THE REGIMENT 'BROKEN' 1714

THE Regiment accordingly returned home, and from Marching Orders W.O. 5, No. 10, we learn:

William and Mary

Jedborough

Our W and P is That you Cause Our Regiment of Dragoons under your Command now in the River to land forthwith at Deptford and Greenwich and march the same day to Our Borough of Southwark from Whence they are to continue their March according to the Routs they shall receive in that Behalf to Berwick, and from thence into Scotland pursuant to such orders as shall be given them by Our Councill of that Our Kingdom or the Commander in Chief of our forces there. And the officers &c. &c.

ye Routs entred Six Leaves further.

Given &c 9 Febry 169⅞

By Order

W. B(LAYTHWAIT).

To

Ye Ld Jedborough.

The route was as follows: The Regiment started on Wednesday 16 Feb. 1697–8 and arrived on Tuesday 19 March at Berwick. For the march the Regiment was divided into four divisions of two troops each. All the divisions took the same road: Waltham Abbey, Waltham Cross, Cheshunt, Ware, Hoddesdon, Royston, Huntingdon (one day's rest), Peterborough, Stamford, Grantham

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(one day's rest), Newark, Tuxford (one troop), Worksop (one troop)—evidently half the Regiment went to Worksop and half to Tuxford—Doncaster, Pontefract, Newbridge, York (one day's rest), Boroughbridge (one troop), Essingwould (one troop), Northallerton (one day's rest), Darlington, Durham, Newcastle (one day's rest), Morpeth, Alnwick (one day's rest), Belford, Berwick. This is the route given for one division, and it is given in precisely the same order for all four.

This corrects the account given in the MS. Regimental Record which states that the Regiment landed 'at Harwich in December.' Cannon states the same thing, and adds that they 'proceeded to London, where they occupied quarters for several weeks; at the same time their numbers were reduced to a peace establishment.'

It is possible that the numbers were reduced, but there is no documentary evidence to prove the fact; consequently, we can but mention the matter without offering any suggestion as to the amount of the reduction if any.

The expenses of the march to Berwick are given in the Regimental Record, and are as follows:

	£	s.	d.
For 4 Waggons for the Regiment in four Divisions 320 miles at 8d per mile	43	13	4
For Fire and Candle in their several quarters in their March from 9 Feb. to 20 March being 39 days at 2/– a Day for each Division	15	12	0
	£183	9	0
Poundage .	8	4	4
	£191	13	4
Deduct Overcharge for Fire and Candles .	21	19	8
Total .	£169	13	8

The last entry, 'Deduct Overcharge for Fire and Candles,' cannot well be explained, seeing that the amount deducted, £21 19*s.* 8*d.*, is greater than the whole charge, £15 12*s.*

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The Regiment evidently brought its horses back from Flanders, otherwise a far greater length of time would have been consumed on the march between London and Berwick.

From this date, *i.e.* 19 March 1797–8, until 15 March 1707–8, it appears impossible to discover the whereabouts of the Regiment, beyond the fact that it was in Scotland. Nor, indeed, is there any record as to its proceedings. All possible manuscript records have been diligently searched in London, but without success. The fact is, that there is a great dearth of information as to regiments at this period when on the Scots Establishment. The task of searching at random collections of contemporary letters for possible information would occupy a lifetime, and in all probability with but little commensurate result. One might find references to the Regiment by its colonel's name, but more often cavalry would simply be called 'dragoons,' without any clue being given as to what particular regiment of dragoons the allusion referred.

The author has been already some considerable time engaged in an endeavour to fill up this gap, but unfortunately without result. He has therefore reluctantly been obliged to abandon further systematic quest.

From McPherson's 'Secret History of England,' edition of 1775, vol. ii. p. 7, Mr. Scott's relation, 'An Account of the State of Scotland, in July 1706,' we get the following:

'The Earl of Lothian's regiment of dragoons (as I remember) consists of six companys, each company, including serjeants, corporals, and drummers, is thirty men. The colonel's character is already given. The lieut.-colonel is son to Polwarth, now called Earl of Marchmont. When the late Earl of Hume listed, this lieut.-colonel was thought well-affected, and very much under the influence of Hume; but what to say of him now I know not. The major of the regiment, John Johnston of Westraw, is reported to have loyal inclinations, being much managed by his very loyal lady, whom few of any side must trust.'

Upon this extract the following remarks may be made.

William Kerr, second Marquess of Lothian, succeeded to the title in 1703, and never commanded the Regiment as 'Earl of Lothian.' Of course 'companys' should be troops. For the character of the colonel see Appendix I.

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The Hon. Patrick Hume, afterwards Lord Polwarth, was Brevet-Colonel 30 March 1704, Colonel 28 April 1707, and died in 1709. What 'the late Earl of Hume' had to do with the matter is not apparent. The father of Lord Polwarth had, it is true, been suspected of Jacobite leanings and wrongfully, but Colonel Lord Polwarth was always an anti-Jacobite (see Appendix I).

From this extract it would appear that the strength of the Regiment, at that period was 180 men.

Also we see that it had been reduced from eight troops to six.

In only one instance can the quarters of the Regiment be fixed during the period between March 1697–8 and March 1707–8; and that is for the month of September 1703, when the six troops of the Regiment were inspected as follows:

Johnston at Dunse, 10 September.

Guidett at Queensferry, 22 September.

Douglas at Costorphine, 28 September.

Drummond at Jedburgh, 11 September.

Preston at Inverkeithing, 29 September.

Polwarth at Greenlaw, 10 September.

Dated from Whitehall, 15 March 1707–8, is a letter to Lord Polwarth and others to 'increase his Regiment by 129 Private Men.' This, too, is curious, for Lord Polwarth was not gazetted to the colonelcy of the regiment until 28 April 1708.

On the same date the troops were stationed at Kelso, Dunse, Coldstream, Queensferry, Pittenweem, and Greenlaw. During the month of May they shifted to Queensferry, Costorphine, Greenlaw, Kelso, Dunse, and Jedburgh.

From April 1708 the establishment of the Regiment was increased from thirty-two a troop to fifty-four; at least so we learn from the Regimental Record, and it is probably an incorrect version of the letter of 15 March 1707–8 quoted above. The augmentation was caused by the threatened French Invasion, an invasion designed to assist the Jacobite cause. It failed.

In another letter to Lord Polwarth, also addressed from Whitehall and dated 16 July 1708, he is directed to transmit 'an Exact List of Officers in his Regiment and the date of their Commissions.'

From an 'Abstract of the Quarters where the Several Troops of

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Dragoons in North Brittain are Quartered,' we read of 'The Lord Polwarth's Regim[t]' as follows:

April 2[d] 1709.

Polwarth

The Col[s]. Troop at Musslebourgh.
The L[t]. Coll[s]. Troop at Kelsoe.
The Maj[rs]. Troop ordered from Falkirk to Coldstream.
Captain Prestoun's Troop at Jedborough.
Major Guydet's Troop at Dalkeith.
My Lord Torpichen's Troop at Easter and Wester Calders.

(W.O. 5, No. 15.)

The next paper is dated St. James's, 31 May 1709.

Routs.

Rout for One Troop of the Lord Polwarth's Reg[t]. of Dragoons from Kelsoe to Polwarts.
do. from Coldstream to Polwarts.

This would appear to refer to the troops of the Lieutenant-Colonel and the Major.

Apparently another troop went to 'Polwarts,' as we find from an almost contemporary paper.

Rout.	Polwarths.
Polwarts	3 Berwick.
Easdell	1 County of Easdell.
Gortoun	1 (no destination given).
Cather and Binny	1 Midlothian.

This appears rather differently in the MS. Regimental Record, dated 31 May 1709.

1 Troop from Jedburgh to Easdell.
,, ,, Dalkeith to Polwarth.
,, ,, Kelso to do.
,, ,, East and West Calder to Gortoun.
,, ,, Coldstream to Polwarth.
,, ,, Musselburgh to Cather and Binney.

On 18 October 1709 a troop was ordered to be moved to 'Couper in

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Angus,' but from what place or which troop of the Regiment is not stated. Three other troops are ordered to Kelsoe, Dumfries, and Crieff (W.O. 5, No. 16).

In most of the marching orders and routes of those days you find the following inserted :

'To rest the Sundays and every third or fourth day on their march as the Officer in Chief shall see Cause.'

A route given in the Regimental Record, dated 18 October, accounts for the movement of four troops.

One from Newbattle to Cupar in Angus.

One from Greenlaw to Kelso.

One from Greenlaw to Dumfries.

One from Dalkeith to Crieff.

This is evidently the order given above (W.O. 5, No. 16).

Lord Polwarth had now retired owing to ill-health, and he was succeeded in the command by Colonel the Hon. William Ker, the younger son of the second Earl of Roxburghe and brother of the first Duke of Roxburghe.

In documents his name frequently occurs as Kerr, but it is in these days more correctly Ker.

Colonel the Hon. William Ker obtained the colonelcy of the Regiment 10 October 1709.

The Regiment, now known as Ker's Dragoons, was again about to proceed upon foreign active service.

Early in January 1710–11 definite orders were received for the Regiment to proceed to Flanders.

With regard to this subject many papers exist, and copies of them are here produced when necessary.

WHITEHALL, 5th *Janry*, 171⅟.

SIR

It is Her Majesty's Pleasure that you do appoint an Officer forthwith to attend the Commrs. of Transportation to Indent for the Number of Men and Horses of your Regiment which are to be Embark't as well at Leith as at Harwich, the said Commrs. representing that they are not able to proceed in this Service till the same is done.

I am, Sir,

Your most humble Servant,

G. GRANVILLE.

To
Coll. Kerr.

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It is curious that this order should precede that which follows, which is evidently the official order to proceed on active service abroad.

WHITEHALL, 1 *ffebrỹ*, 17½.

SIR

Her Majty having thought fitt that the Regt of Dragoons under your Command do serve this next Campagne in Flanders, I am commanded to acquaint you therewith, that the same may be in a readiness to March and Embark afsoon as Transport ships can be taken up for them, And in order thereto I am to desire you to cause an Accot to be forthwith return'd to me of the exact Number of Men and Horses for which Transports are to be provided, distinguishing the Numbers to be Embark'd in Scotland, and how many Men and Horses you will have here that may be ship'd at Harwich. I am

Sir your most humble Servant

Col. Kerr. G. GRANVILLE.

The Like letter to Sr Richd Temple Bart.

WHITEHALL, 5th *Febry.*, 17½.

MY LORD

Her Majesty having thought fitt that the Regts of Dragoons of Sr Richard Temple & Col Wm Kerr now in North Britain be Embark't for Her Service this next Campagne in Flanders, I am to desire your Lordsp to lett me know at what distance the said Regiments do now lye from Leith, where it is design'd they shall be embark't and what places nearer to Leith are proper to March them to, so as that they shall be the more in a readiness of going on Board, when Shipping shall arrive there to receive them. I am

Your Lordsps most humble

Earl of Leven and Obedt Servant,

G. GRANVILLE.

W.O. 5, No. 17.

Order for the March of Col. Wm Kerr's Regimt of Dragoons in Order to their Embarking at Leith.

ANNE R. 19 *Feb.* 17½.

Whereas we have thought fitt that Our Regiment of Dragoons under your Command be forthwith embark'd for Our Service in the Low Countries— Our Will and Pleasure is, And in Order thereto you Cause the Severall Troops to March forthwith from their present Quarters in such manner as shall be Directed by Our Right Trusty & Right Wellbeloved Cousin David Earl of Leven, Lieut. Generall and Com-

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manding Our Forces in North Brittain, and be so Disposed of as foll[s] viz[t] Two Troops at Dalkeith, One at Kincross, One at Couper in fife, One at Dysert and One at Calder, or at such Other Places as the Said Earl shall judge most Convenient, from whence they are to March to Leith and Embark on Board such Shipps as shall be appointed to Receive them upon notice from Our Commissioners of Transportation or their Agent that Shipping is ready for that purpose. And in the meantime the Officer is to take Care that the Soldiers behave themselves Civilly and Duly Pay their Landlords. And all Magistrates &c. &c.

Given at Our Court at St. James's.

To Our T. & W. W[m] Kerr Esq. Colonel of One of Our Regiments of Dragoons, Or to the Officer in Chief Commanding the Regiment.

B.H.M.C.

G. GRANVILLE.

The Regiment duly went into the quarters specified.

There were, however, both recruits and horses in England, and these were dispatched from London to Harwich.

The route given is Burntwood (Brentwood), Witham, Manningtree, and Woodbridge, 'Hence to March and Embark at Harwich.'

Woodbridge is quite near to Harwich. The old local saying of this ancient but decayed place is 'Woodbridge was a town when Harwich was a village.' Harwich folk object to the remark!

The next entry refers to an advance of pay to the troops, and enjoins the strict payment of all debts before embarkation.

WHITEHALL, 22[d] *ffebr*$\tilde{y}$, 17$\frac{1}{1}$.

SIR:—

The Lords Comm[s] of the Treasury having directed a months Pay in advance to the Troops that are order'd from Scotland, whereof your Reg[t]. is one; I am to Signify to You Her Majesty's Pleasure that all due care be taken by your Officers for discharging their Quarters, and that they do not leave any Debts upon their Marching.

I am
Sir
Your most hum[ble] servant,

Col. Kerr. G. GRANVILLE.

The next document refers to the clothing destined to be dispatched

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to the troops, and also for the conveyance of the 'horses &c. for fflanders,' and gives the date of embarkation at Harwich.

WHITEHALL, 5th *March*, 17½.

SIR :—

My Lord D of Ormond having appointed the Commrs of Transports to have the Ships ready to receive the Cloathing of the Regts in fflanders on board on Monday next in the River of Thames and order'd the Transpts to fall down the River on Thursday foll. that they may be at Harwich on the 15th inst : which Day his Grace has appointed for the Embarkation of the Riding Horses &c. for fflanders, I am commanded to give you notice hereof that You may take care to put the Cloathing of Your Regt. on board in the River & to have Your Recruit Horses &c. ready to Embark at Harwich on the 15th inst. for which You will receive the necessary Routs in time.

I am
Sir
You &c.
LANSDOWNE.

Col. Kerr.

Following upon this, the next day another order arrived which concerned a draft of thirty-six men and horses taken from the Earl of Hyndford's Regiment of Dragoons.

WHITEHALL, 6th *Mar.* 17½.

SIR.

Her Majesty having order'd a Draught of Thirty-Six men and Horses, such as are fittest for the Service to be made out of the Earl of Hyndefords Regt. of Dragoons and incorporated into the Sevl. Troops of your Regt. for compleating the same to Sixty men in each Troop, Servants included. It is Her Majesty's Pleasure that You appoint an Officer forthwith to receive the said additional men and Horses, which You are to cause to be embark't with your Regt. upon the Arrival of the Transps. at Leith, and to be paid as belonging unto your Regt. from the day of their being deliver'd over to you.

I am
Sir
Your most humble Servt.
G. GRANVILLE.

Col. Kerr.

The order contained in the last paper was duly executed ; and its execution is referred to both by Cannon and the Regimental Record.

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'1711. The Troops were encreased from 54 to 60 each from March 1711.'

The increase of thirty-six men would, of course, provide six extra men per troop, as the Regiment then consisted of six troops.

During the month of March, the Regiment, which it will be remembered was then quartered in places near Leith for the purpose, embarked upon the transports at that port.

Ill luck in the shape of contrary winds, however, prevented the flotilla from sailing at first. When at length, towards the end of the month, the vessels put to sea it was found impossible to continue the voyage, as the wind was still unfavourable. In consequence the ships put back into the Firth of Forth, where they were detained until the end of April, when at last they sailed for Holland.

For details as to the course of the campaigns in the Low Countries while Ker's Dragoons were serving at home, the reader must be referred to military histories which treat of that particular period.

Suffice it to say that, under Marlborough, the allied armies had pressed back the enemy gradually until the theatre of war was approaching the borders of France. To meet this danger Louis XIV had assembled an enormous force.

The advisers of Queen Anne in consequence increased the British troops, and among those who were dispatched abroad on active service Ker's Dragoons were numbered, as we have already stated.

Marlborough, who had been in England, embarked for Holland on 18 February, and arrived at the Hague on 4 March. His first move was to place detachments from all the garrisons 'along the Scarpe and between that River and the Canal of Douay.' He also established vast magazines of provisions and other necessaries at Tournai.

About the middle of April the French began to assemble near Cambrai and Arras.

Marlborough arrived at Tournai on 26 April.

The Emperor Joseph died on 17 April, and this delayed the arrival of Prince Eugene, who did not join the Grand Army until 23 May, on which day he was present with Marlborough and the rest of the generals at a dinner given in commemoration of the anniversary of the battle of Ramillies. This is the earliest reference to a military anniversary dinner the writer has met with.

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Prince Eugene did not, however, remain long with the army, as he had to return to attend to the interests of the Archduke Charles, who had been elected Emperor. A considerable corps of the imperial troops were also withdrawn for the same purpose. The great event of the campaign was the capture of Bouchain.

Bouchain was invested on the right bank of the Scheldt on 7 August; but the investment was not completed on the other side of the town until the 18th. Bouchain surrendered on 14 September, the French army, which numbered 100,000 men, being perforce spectators of the fall of the place from their position between the Scheldt and the Sauzet.

They even had a corps across the Sauzet at Wavrechain, almost within musketry range of Fagel's entrenchments.

It was most mortifying, but in so masterly a manner had this siege been conducted by Marlborough that they could do nothing.

It may be noted that this glorious achievement was the last act in the military life of the great Duke of Marlborough.

For political reasons, or rather from that curse of England then and now, party reasons, Marlborough was removed from his command.

During the retirement into Holland at the conclusion of the campaign the young Prince of Orange was unfortunately drowned while crossing the ferry over the Hollands Diep at Moerdijk. From his posthumous son the reigning family is descended.

For Ker's Dragoons this campaign was absolutely uneventful.

Detained, as has been related, by the weather, the Regiment did not arrive in Holland until the allied armies had taken the field. After being cooped up in the so-called transports, which were really only adapted trading vessels, and ill adapted at that, for the conveyance of cavalry, both horses and men were out of condition and needed a period of rest for recuperation.

Ker's Dragoons were therefore ordered to remain in quarters in Holland for a brief space to recover after the voyage.

Orders were then received for them to march to Brabant *en route* for the theatre of war, which was then very near the French frontier. They proceeded on their march for some distance; when near Brussels an order arrived for them to halt and go into quarters in that city.

Here they remained in reserve till the end of the campaign of that year. Probably through losses by sickness during the year it became needful

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to reinforce the Regiment. An undated paper, in which, however, reference is made to 'Quarter Orders of 17 September 1711,' gives a 'Route for the Riders and Horses of Col° Kerr's Regim' of Dragoons from London to Sudbury.'

The route is Waltham, Hatfield, Bradfield, Sudbury. The paper is signed 'Lansdowne.'

Another paper directs their embarkation at Harwich after marching from Sudbury.

For the campaign of 1712 Prince Eugene, with whom was associated the Duke of Ormond, held the command. The regiment formed part of the army which was under the command of the Duke of Ormond.

In the spring an advance was made towards the French frontier, and an invasion of Picardy was in preparation.

The seige of Quesnoy was first undertaken, for which purpose General Fagel was again detached, having the command of thirty battalions and eighteen squadrons.

The seige began on 7 June and the place surrendered on 4 July. Its garrison consisted of 2700 men.

Peace negotiations were now in progress. The Duke of Ormond withdrew from the allies, taking with him the British troops. On 17 July he marched to Ghent and Bruges. Troops were sent from England to garrison Dunkirk, which town had been placed in the hands of the British Government as a pledge of the sincerity of the French king. This separation from the allies was as unjust as it was cruel and impolitic, for it left several smaller German States at the mercy of their enemy, and be it remembered that they had, as it were, been forced into the war by British influence. Now they had to make the best terms for themselves that they could.

For the winter of 1712 Ker's Dragoons went as usual into quarters. The Treaty of Utrecht was signed in February 1713, and by the middle of the summer Ker's Dragoons had received orders to return home.

There are a few papers extant which give information as to the transport of Ker's Dragoons from the Low Countries to home.

In the first place the Regiment was marched to its port of embarkation, Dunkirk. Here orders were received for it to proceed to Ireland.

Meanwhile, in pursuance of the policy of disbandment which followed on the Peace of Utrecht, the British Government had determined that

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Ker's Dragoons should be 'broken.' But why they should have been sent to Ireland for this purpose passes comprehension. The Regiment originally of Scottish nationality was even now largely so, and the remainder was of English blood. Why, then, turn all these men adrift in Ireland of all places? But it was done. The order is as follows:

ANNE R.

Our will and pleasure is, that upon the embarkation of our regiment of dragoons under your command, for our kingdom of Ireland, you cause all the horses belonging to the non-commissioned officers and private dragoons thereof to be delivered over to such person or persons as shall be appointed to receive the same; your said regiment being to continue unmounted until further orders. Given at our Court at Kensington, this 6th day of June, 1713, in the 12th year of our reign.

By Her Majesty's Command,
WILLIAM WYNDHAM.

To our trusty and well-beloved Colonel William Kerr, commanding one of our regiments of dragoons in Flanders.

With regard to the reduction of the British troops in Flanders, from a paper dated 2 June 1713, we learn that 'all British troops were reduced in Flanders, and afterwards by Degrees all were disperst from thence to England.'

Only the Royal Regiment of Ireland, commanded by Colonel Moses Leathes, held Ghent till 25 February 1715–6, and then delivered it up to the German troops and returned to England.

The reason why the Regiment was dismounted at Dunkirk is this. After their adventures in Spain the Royal Dragoons were returning dismounted, and the Government purposed to mount them on the horses of Ker's Dragoons.

The Regiment arrived at Dunkirk for embarkation to Ireland on 15 August. The horses were shipped for Dover, and the men had sailed for Ireland by 21 August.

A number of the men, however, accompanied the horses to Dover to take charge of them until the arrival of the Royal Dragoons. The horses and the party of dismounted dragoons duly arrived at their destination.

There appears to have been some trouble with the dragoons who were sent to Dover. Dated 23 July 1713, we read a letter from Wyndham

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to Sir James Abercromby. It appears that nobody seems to have known how the dragoons thus sent to Dover were to be 'subsisted.' The men seem to have been left without either food or pay themselves or forage for their horses. Wyndham orders that 'the Dragoons who brought over Kerr's horses are to be subsisted till they arrive here,' and he adds, 'I believe it will make them easy.'

This really looks as if there had been trouble.

In a letter dated 3 August 1713 from Whitehall, Wyndham asks Sir James Abercromby for an account 'as to the Equivalent the Officers desire to have made for their Servants having hitherto kept their Comp[s] effective,' and adds, 'You will please transmit me a Stated Account thereof together with that for Subsisting the reduced Dragoons who take care of Col. Kerr's Horses, and the same shall be layd before Her Majesty.'

In both these papers there is a conflict of dates with the 21 August and 15 August of the MS. Regimental Record. If the dates of the State Papers are correct, and they must be believed to be so, it is evident that the entry in the Regimental Record was carelessly made. Besides, the horses were already in England by 23 July and had been some days.

As a dismounted regiment Ker's Dragoons remained embodied until the spring of 1714; the precise date is, as has been already stated, unknown.

In the spring of 1714 it was 'broken.' At the same time the Royal Dragoons and the Scots Greys were augmented, and a number of men from Ker's Dragoons were either transferred to, or on discharge enlisted in, these two regiments.

Thus ends the first portion of the 'History of the 7th (Queen's Own) Hussars.'

In future pages will be told the services of the Regiment at home and abroad after being re-embodied on 3 February 1714–5.

A few interesting details as to military administration at this date may be inserted here, we think, without impropriety, more particularly as some of them have not, we believe, been hitherto included in any regimental history.

The methods of obtaining recruits were various.

The first was the free recruit, who, either from a desire to serve, or for private reasons, such as trouble, domestic or amatory, or a wish to avoid arrest for some delinquency, of his own deliberate purpose joined the army. This class of recruit, however, was never obtained in sufficient numbers to fill the ranks.

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Another method was by 'beat of drum.'

In this case the local authorities for general army purposes, or the officers of a regiment for the ranks of their own particular corps, by hook or by crook obtained men to augment the forces of the Crown.

The regimental method was somewhat after this fashion. A crowd having been collected by the aid of that somewhat noisy instrument the drum, possibly assisted by a fife, a sergeant by verbal exhortations, during which the fairy-tale element as to the advantages of soldiering was eminently to be discerned, endeavoured to inflame the martial susceptibilities of his audience. His exertions doubtless produced a thirst, and in the consumption of fluids stronger than water at, for the moment, apparently his cost, success was often his reward. With aching heads on the morrow thousands of young fellows have in the course of years found themselves duly captured as food for powder.

This recruiting by beat of drum in later days, when bands were established, developed the system of recruiting by band, in which the sight of marching troops through villages and towns accompanied by the lively strains of the band was found to be most successful. As late as the year 1883 it is on record that the Montgomeryshire Militia employed this means of filling its ranks to the required strength—the recruits thus obtained being numerous and of good quality, and they took the Queen's shilling readily.

Yet there are people to be found who would desire to see bands abolished in the service. In France the reduction in bands has been tried. It was a failure; and to the re-establishment of bands in that military country and to the institution of military parades through the streets is largely due the marked revival of the ancient martial spirit in the French nation. But in early times in England there were other methods of raising men. Prisoners for debt (and the prisons were full of these unfortunates in those days) could purchase their freedom by enlistment—nay, could almost be compelled to do so, no man under the age of forty being exempt; over that age he could plead and obtain the benefit of an Act of Parliament. There is a paper dealing with this dated 1695-6. Men could also be obtained by being 'pressed,' but 'prest men' were forbidden to be enlisted for Flanders. It was found that forced service did

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not produce a good class of fighting man. The enlistment of Catholics, in Ireland especially, was absolutely forbidden, and later on the enlistment of Irishmen themselves was ostensibly completely banned. Both these edicts were absolutely a dead letter, one method of evasion being to enlist men in Ireland, to send them over to Scotland, and bring them back to Ireland dressed in Scottish garb as Scots. With regard to the non-enlistment of Irishmen and to show how this regulation was simply ignored, a case has been known in which out of the numbers composing a regiment (much reduced, indeed it totalled only one hundred and thirty-eight in strength) no fewer than one hundred and twenty-seven were Irishmen, whose enlistment was contrary to law. It is, however, curious to note that in the 7th (Queen's Own) Hussars in early times the enlistment of Irishmen in the ranks was very rare indeed. Among the commissioned and non-commissioned officers the same conditions obtained. Why this was so we cannot decide, unless it was owing to the fact that the 7th Hussars were never one of those regiments who passed long periods in Ireland upon the Irish Establishment. The fact, however, remains. A favourite method of defrauding the Government was this. It was illegal to enlist an apprentice. An apprentice, however, desired a holiday, and obtained it thus. He would enlist, spend the bounty money, and then in due course be claimed by his master. All the latter had to do was to produce his indentures; and the professed 'would-be' soldier was delivered up to him. Very large sums of money were at one time annually lost to the Government by this ingenious fraud.

The meshes of the enlistment net were also used to entrap felons. In fact, convicted felons—and the punishment for felony then was death—could often escape the consequences of their misdeeds by enlistment. But in the conditions of service there was this difference, whereas those who enlisted freely could join the regiment of their choice, prisoners for debt and felons were sent to whatever regiment the Government desired to send them, and theirs was 'service for life,' and a service for life usually in some hated and unhealthy foreign station, where in a bad season they died like flies.

Deserters from one regiment often re-enlisted in another, chose their own regiments, and were careful, of course, to avoid proximity to their old ones. If detected, remission and severe punishment

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awaited them. Another point worth notice is that pay was often terribly in arrear.

Some time after he had been appointed colonel of the regiment now known as the 7th (Queen's Own) Hussars, but then styled Cunningham's Dragoons, we find the petition of Colonel Richard Cunningham and the officers of his old regiment of foot relative to the arrears due to their late regiment.

These amounted to no less than £17,000, and the officers volunteered to compromise the debt for an immediate payment of £5000. If this was the case with a man like Cunningham, who was in favour with the Government and possessed moreover of influential friends, how much more was the less favoured officer likely to suffer! Hundreds of other examples could be cited.

And here one cannot but record a meed of praise to the measures which were taken by either William III or his advisers to ameliorate the state of affairs at that time. If these were due to the King, the credit is his; if they were initiated by his officials, he was to be congratulated on the possession of most capable servants. Let us cite a few examples, all derived from the State Papers. Officers are directed to take care that soldiers 'behave themselves civilly and orderly' to landlords and others, and the officers are to be held responsible for breaches of decorum, and *vice versa*.

It must be remembered that in those days billeting was most unpopular, and with civilians soldiers as a body were held in the greatest dislike. That the aversion was to a certain extent mutual is not to be wondered at, but the reasons for this dislike need not be discussed here. A relic of this aversion existed not so many years ago in the use of that objectionable term 'a common soldier' —that this form of speech is now practically obsolete is a matter for congratulation. A 'soldier' we know, a 'private soldier' or a 'private' we know, but of a 'common soldier' we now have no knowledge, and resent the application of this term to any man who has the honour to wear his Majesty's uniform. But, as has been related above, King William III took measures to bring about a better understanding. How that King attempted to regulate the pecuniary relations between soldier and civilian in those barrackless days we will briefly tell below.

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The superior officer in each quarter is ordered to sign the accompts of Quarters when ye Landlord requests him.'

No 'trust' is to be given to any soldier in quarters, and to prevent this in the case of foot 3*s*. per week was to be paid in two equal payments, one at the beginning and the other in the middle of the week, to each soldier. For guards and fusiliers the amount is 3*s*. 6*d*. The payment to dragoons is not stated. The money was to be *paid without any deduction whatever*, and officers were to account every two months with each man for 6*d*. a week extra, allowed for providing necessaries for each soldier to which the 'Off Reckonings or residue of their pay hath not formerly been liable.' These 'off reckonings' were to be employed by the 'Colonels of each respective regiment for the clothing and poundage and satisfying of other remaining expenses for which due account is to be made for every soldier at each Clothing.'

This was a step in the right direction, and was meant to counteract the evil effects of the 'Proprietory Colonel' system. Unfortunately, in later times it failed to do so. To prevent riots and the illicit use of weapons both officers and soldiers were forbidden to 'wear a dagger or bayonet' at any other time than when such officers or soldiers were on duty or under arms. This order was to be read at the head of each respective regiment, troop, or company.

It, of course, did not affect the wearing of swords by officers, but dirks and bayonets (the latter at the time a part of the dragoon equipment) were banned. It is interesting to read a paper which gives the details of the feeding of men and horses on board ship, and this scale of food was probably that in vogue when Cunningham's Dragoons sailed for Flanders.

For each man per diem one pound of bread, half a pound of cheese, and two quarts of beer or one quarter of a pint of brandy *with water*. It does not say how much water was allotted. Beef, mutton, pork, or bacon are unmentioned. For each horse eighteen pounds of hay and one peck of oats with water. At the end of the voyage 'all residue of provisions' are to be *strictly* returned to store. If bread was not to be obtained, then one pound of biscuit per man was substituted. On shore at about the same time the dietary was somewhat different.

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Every dragoon had 1½ lbs. avoirdupois 'of good and wholesome well baked wheaten bread.' This was very well if the dragoon got it—but did he?

The bread he had to fetch from the bakehouse, and his allowance was 5½*d.* a day to pay for it. Bread must have been dear, as the quantity would be about three-quarters of an ordinary loaf in these days.

He was allowed ½*d.* a day for fire, 'picketts,' and other necessaries.

His horse had two trusses 'of *very good old* hay of the last year, weighing 56 lbs. each truss, and one truss of straw of 36 lbs., per week, to be fetched Monday and Thursday at a distance not exceeding two miles from the Camp at a rate of 6*d.* a man a night.' As the camp referred to was at Hounslow, this entry is of interest to the 7th Hussars. Later the scale was somewhat changed, and the paper from which it was derived is worth quoting.

For dragoons for seven days, two trusses of *new* hay of 64 lbs. a truss and one truss of 36 lbs. straw at 4*d.* a man a night. Also a stone of '*very good and sweet*' oats at 6*d.* a peck. These were to be fetched a distance also not exceeding two miles from the camp. Each tent was to be provided with two trusses of straw, new every ten days. Sea coal was to cost 7*d.* a bushel. Stakes or pickets were to be provided by Government. A brewer, one Captain John Grant, was under a bond to supply 'good sound wholesome beer' to be sold 'at an agreed rate.' The sutlers were under bond to sell only this Government beer and to sell nothing but 'what is good.'

They had also to 'fill up the latrines' when the camp was struck.

Sutlers were to pay no licence fee, but their bond required a 12*d.* stamp.

The Commissary-General is enjoined often to visit the sutlers in the field and see if all is 'good and safe' which they sell.

Mention of the sanitary arrangements above leads naturally to the consideration of the hospital arrangements of that date. Of these the rules and regulations have come down to us in some detail; and a comparison with the existing hospitals is of interest. In each division of a military hospital—and these were founded in 1686—there was a matron and one chief nurse, who were in charge of the beds and furniture; the pay of the matron being £10 annually.

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During the summer only, a maidservant and cook were provided for sick soldiers at £3 each. Why in the summer only is not explained.

Three nurses or 'tenders' engaged by the matron had the care of the sick, washed for them, and watched them, at 5s. per week each.

A clerk was employed to keep the accounts. £10 for summer subsistence money for each soldier in hospital was paid to the matron, who was bound to feed the sick as the physician ordered, and also to find fire, soap, and candles. The Physician General or Chirurgeon (surgeon) General or Surgeon (if of a regiment) was to see each sick man daily and sign a report. Cases of sickness were to be promptly notified by the Commissary-General to the Paymaster-General in order that the subsistence money for the invalid should be duly paid. A printed certificate of discharge from hospital was ordered to be given to each sick man either by the captain of his troop or company or by the Provost Marshal. A sentinel was to be posted always to prevent the 'sick from rambling,' or the 'healthful from coming to them' without permission.

Until the year 1691 the supply of drugs for the army had been in the hands of the surgeons of the regiments, who purchased what they pleased, where they pleased, and probably were not too particular as to the quality of the stores they bought. In this year four very prominent physicians—Sir Thomas Millington, Dr. Hutton, Dr. Harald, and Dr. Lawrence—were called in to devise measures for supplying the army with good and pure drugs.

Now in England the manufacture and supply of drugs had since 1617 been vested by charter in the Society of Apothecaries of London. Of course this was a monopoly, but unlike most monopolies it worked well by preventing grocers and quacks from selling poisonous rubbish or useless confections. But between the physicians and the apothecaries there was a feud of long standing: it had already led to a Star Chamber cause. Hence, instead of going to the Society of Apothecaries as a society, to supply the army drug-chests, the physicians entered into negotiations with Jonathan Leigh, Colonel Robert Gower, Edwin Harle, and James Anderson, 'of London, Apothecaries.' Gower had been a Court nominee for the post of assistant on the Court of the Society. Harle was the City sword-bearer, and in virtue of his office was elected to the Court, but

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declined to serve. Leigh or Lee was later the upper warden of the Society. Anderson cannot be traced as James, but if his name was William he was the gardener to the Society, and managed the Botanical Physic Garden; otherwise he was merely an apothecary and held no office. Clearly it was a breach of the charter of the Society for any four members to unite to sell to the Government to the detriment of the Society as a whole. But this they did. It was agreed that the Government should hand over three rooms in the Savoy to be used as an 'Elaboratory' for the manufacture and store of drugs for the army. Two of these rooms were occupied by a man named 'Allen, a messenger,' and the third was used as a prison for Irish prisoners. Chests of drugs, linen, vessels, and other things were to be supplied at rates agreed upon with the physicians, and these rates were £3 6*s.* 10*d.* each.

The apothecaries, of whom three out of the four had to proceed to Rotterdam, Brussels, Breda, Maestricht, and elsewhere, were to be provided with conduct by sea and horses on land, or in the case of horses an equivalent if desired of 7*s.* apiece per diem.

They are styled '3 able and careful apothecaries,' and are charged to deliver the chests of drugs to the surgeon of each regiment. And it may be mentioned that the first known surgeon of Cunningham's Dragoons was one Peter Telfer (or Talifer), who by repute was singularly skilful in his profession.

The cost of drugs, &c., for the army in Flanders for the campaign of 1697 was only £3885; '95 pairs of chests of Drugs and Medicines and utensils and for so many Battalions of Foot and Squadrons of Horse at £23 a pair, £2185 0*s.* 0*d.*' The price of a chest of drugs had risen. But there are 'Magazines or Stores of Medicines and for the hospitals to be lodg't in the towns in Flanders over and above what remains of the last year's stores—£1700 0*s.* 0*d.*' The total is £3885.

To the original four physicians is given the task of examining into the purity of the drugs, and to them are added a Mr. Van Loon, a Mr. Rottermant, and others. The status of these gentlemen is unknown; but they were not on the Court of the Apothecaries' Society.

In January 1702 another breach of the Apothecaries' Charter took place.

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Sir Thomas Millington, apparently dissatisfied with the drugs supplied by Harle, Gower & Co., obtained from Queen Anne a letter directing the Bishopsgate Dispensary, a very early quasi-benevolent medical society, to provide medicines for the army and also for the fleet then going to the East Indies. The Society protested in vain. Later they obtained the contract for supplying the navy, and this they did for long years. But with regard to supplying the army and the Army Medical Board when formed, no further negotiations went on till 1810, when the Board approached the Society.

Pages of letters and long lists of questions on one side and answers on the other passed between the Board and the Society. Could the Society supply drugs? Would they keep enough ready packed for home and foreign use? Would they establish depôts at Plymouth, Falmouth, Portsmouth, and elsewhere? Would they take back damaged drugs? The Society replied that they could supply the drugs and would keep sufficient stock, but could not establish depôts; and as for taking back damaged drugs, such would be of no use to them. The Government urged that other customers could have them. The Society suggested that if pure drugs of proper strength were needed, they were as equally needed for civilians as for soldiers. Then the Army Medical Board dropped these queries and put others. What profit, if any, did the Society expect to make? This was the outcome of a natural desire by the Society to know who was to pay them, how they were to be paid, and at what periods.

The Army Medical Board then suggested that as the Society already supplied the navy they might, if supplying both services, do it at a cheaper rate. To this no answer was returned. A short time elapsed, and then from the Army Medical Board came a long disquisition on the properties, strengths, and qualities of ipecacuanha, jalap, and Peruvian bark, which were apparently the three drugs they principally used!

Their questions were answered, though a most unwarranted accusation of adulteration of 'bark' had been made by the Army Medical Board, and in a most offensive way.

With this the matter dropped, and it was not until ten years later that the secret of the failure of negotiations crept out. Mr. Garnier,

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the King's Apothecary, died in 1820, and it appears he had held, if not the actual contract all the time, at least such vested interests in the supply of drugs that he was master of the situation, and that situation was somewhat 'Gilbertian,' for, being King's Apothecary, he was *ex officio* a member of the Court of Assistants of the Society of Apothecaries, and had been doubtless present at the sittings of the Court of Assistants, and quietly chuckling throughout the discussions raised there by the Army Medical Board's letters, suggestions, and questions.

But these early records of the Army Medical Service are not without, interest, being certainly, from one point of view, instructive, and, besides that, not entirely bereft of humour. It is not generally known that in the middle of the last century the detonating powder for the percussion caps of muskets, rifles, and pistols was made by the Society of Apothecaries for the Government at their laboratory. This laboratory still exists, and is still in use. It is attached to the rear wall of the Hall of the Society in Water Lane, Blackfriars. It will be admitted that this was a most extraordinary place to select for the manufacture of a most powerful and dangerous explosive. The manufacture there ceased after an explosion in which one of the operatives was blown to pieces. Luckily, only a very small amount exploded; as a matter of fact, the powder was a small experimental supply, which was being tested before a larger quantity was put in hand. Had there been even a few pounds only there at the time of the accident the havoc would have been tremendous. Things are, luckily, managed differently now.



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CHAPTER IV

The Regiment is Re-established—Home Service—Jacobite Rebellion—Sheriffmuir—Return to England

The wholesale disbandment and reduction of regiments which immediately preceded the signing of the Treaty of Utrecht, 11 April 1713, and the similar proceedings which, in the case of Ker's Dragoons and other regiments, followed it, had most dangerously weakened the strength of the British army.

This disbandment and reduction had been the outcome of three distinct political forces; one a professed desire for economy, the second the rooted objection which was popularly held to a standing army, and the third, and perhaps the most potent, the intrigues of the Jacobite party. All these factors were, of course, political.

Queen Anne died on 1 August 1714, and was apparently succeeded peacefully by George I. But this peaceful succession was more apparent than real, for throughout the Jacobites meditated a recourse to violence. Every possible engine of political intrigue that could be brought to bear to cause the disbandment of regiments of known Protestant, and therefore of Hanoverian sympathies, was exerted by the Jacobite party to the utmost.

Naturally Ker's Dragoons, being mainly Scots and the rest English, were Protestant. That some of their officers were or had been suspected of Jacobite leanings is true, but it had been merely the malicious gossip of a court spy who, for a living, had to retail as much as he could to justify his miserable existence.

Undoubtedly, on the accession of George I the security of the kingdom was in a somewhat parlous state. Of course, the hopes of the Jacobites naturally rested on a weak army; against a strong one they knew they could make no headway.

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George I arrived in England from Hanover on 17 September 1714.

Almost immediately it became apparent that if he was to retain his new kingdom a considerable increase to its military strength must be made, and measures to increase that military strength were speedily undertaken. Ker's Dragoons, which after a few months in Ireland as a dismounted regiment had been 'broken' in the spring of 1714, were ordered to be re-established.

Now, while Ker's Dragoons had been disbanded, the Royal Dragoons and the Scots Greys had been augmented, and their increase of strength came from the disbanded men of Ker's Dragoons. Whether these men (five troops) were first discharged and then re-enlisted, or whether the five troops—two to the Royal Dragoons and three to the Scots Greys—were simply transferred to those regiments, does not appear.

Neither do we know how the regiment had been employed while dismounted in Ireland, though probably police and preventive work was their portion;—it usually was the occupation of troops in Ireland at that time, varied only by occasional rebel hunts when there chanced to be rebels to harry.

The officers were all placed on half-pay.

George I determined early in 1715 to re-establish Ker's Dragoons, and the warrant so to do is here given.

George R.

WHEREAS we have thought fit that a regiment of dragoons be immediately formed to be under your command, to consist of one colonel, one lieut.-colonel, one major, one chaplain, one chirurgeon, and six troops, each consisting of one captain, one lieutenant, one cornet, one quarter-master, one serjeant, two corporals, one drummer, one hautboy, and thirty private dragoons, (including two for widows.) And WHEREAS we have directed our right trusty and right well-beloved cousin Thomas, Earl of Strafford, to deliver over unto you the two youngest captains, two youngest lieutenants, two youngest cornets, and the two youngest quarter-masters, together with the non-commissioned officers and private men of the two youngest troops of our royal regiment of dragoons under his command, with the horses, arms, clothing and accoutrements; and also our right trusty and right well-beloved cousin David, Earl of Portmore, to deliver unto you the three youngest captains,

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three youngest lieutenants, three youngest cornets, and three youngest quarter-masters, together with the non-commissioned officers and private men of the three youngest troops of our regiment of dragoons under his command with their horses, arms, clothes and accoutrements; our will and pleasure is, that you receive from the said Earl of Strafford, and the said Earl of Portmore the commissioned and non-commissioned officers and private men directed to be delivered over unto you as aforesaid, towards forming the said regiment of dragoons. And we do authorize you, by the beat of drum, or otherwise, to raise so many volunteers as shall be wanting to complete and fill up the regiment to six troops, each consisting of the numbers aforesaid. And all magistrates, justices of the peace, constables, and other of our officers whom it may concern, are required to be assisting unto you, in providing quarters, impressing carriage and otherwise, as there shall be occasion.

Given at our court at S^{t}. James', this 3rd day of February, 1714–15, in the first year of our reign.

By his Majesty's Command,

WILLIAM PULTENEY.

To our trusty and well-beloved
Colonel William Kerr.

The term 'Widdows Men' requires a brief explanation.

'Widdows Men' were imaginary privates, usually two for each troop. They existed on paper only, and pay was drawn for them as if their existence was real. They were borne as phantom soldiers on the strength of the regiment. The sum of money which accrued in this manner was applied to form a fund for the purpose of supplying pensions for the widows of deceased officers. A warrant on this subject was issued in the reign of George I, and bears date 26 April 1717.

In those days the adjutant of a regiment held a position quite different from that held by an adjutant later. His duties were more nearly analogous to those of a regimental sergeant-major in these. His commission, however, was signed by the King, and therein he was styled 'Gentleman.'

A quartermaster was also styled 'Gentleman' in his commission or warrant. This commission was not, however, signed by the King, but by the colonel of the regiment.

It very frequently happened that a quartermaster after a very short

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service received the commission of a cornet in the cavalry or an ensign in the infantry. Sometimes a man who had held a commission of superior rank in a former regiment became a quartermaster in another, dropping his previous commission *pro tem.*

The list of officers of the re-established regiment is as follows:

Colonel Kerr's Regiment of Dragoons

William Kerr	Colonel	31 Jan. $17\frac{14}{15}$
James, Lord Torphichen	L^{t}.-Col.	do.
Matthew Steuart	Major	do.
Lewis Dollon	Captain	blank
Peter Renouard	do.	blank
William Crawford	do.	blank
George Dunbar	do.	blank
James Livingston	do.	31 Jan. $17\frac{14}{15}$
David Ogilvie	Capt.-Lieut.	blank
Alexander Auchenleck	Lieutenant	blank
William Delavale	do.	blank
James Ogilvie	do.	blank
Samuel Southouse	do.	blank
Bernard Lustau	do.	15 June 1715
William Richardson	Cornet	blank
George Lauther (Lauder)	do.	blank
George Knox	do.	blank
James Agnew	do.	blank
Henry Carlisle	do.	blank
John Keat	do.	blank
Rev. James Ramsay	Chaplain	blank
William Johnson	Adjutant	blank
Patrick Telfer	Surgeon	blank

Of these officers Captains Dollon and Renouard were transferred to Ker's Dragoons from the Royal Dragoons, and Captains Crawford, Dunbar, and Livingston from the Royal Scots Greys.

The Rev. James Ramsay was chaplain of the Earl of Portmore's Royal Regiment of Dragoons 4 May 1714.

Samuel Southouse was a lieutenant in Lord Cobham's Dragoons 6 November 1712.

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But the transfer of 'youngest' captains, lieutenants, and cornets never appears to have been fully carried out in the manner ordered in the warrant quoted above.

Captains Dollon and Renouard with their troops joined from the Royal Dragoons, and Captains Crawford, Dunbar, and Livingston similarly joined from the Scots Greys.

Lieutenant Southouse came from the Royals, but no cornets. Cornets Lauder, Knox, and Agnew came from the Scots Greys and no lieutenants.

Ramsay the chaplain belonged to the Royals. There is no trace of the quartermasters.

The Regiment now consisted of five troops, to which a sixth was at once added, the men requisite being raised in or near London. On re-establishment the Regiment was permitted to retain its former rank and standing in the army.

By 19 February the Regiment was equipped and five troops had received orders to march. The three troops which were transferred from the Scots Greys were then in Scotland; the two transferred from the Royals were in England at Macclesfield and Pontefract; while the newly raised troop, which was under the command of the colonel, was in London.

The route was as follows:

One troop from Dunse to Barnards Castle.

Two troops from Kelso to Richmond (Yorkshire).

One troop from Macclesfield to Bolton.

One troop to remain at Pontefract.

Colonel Ker's troop to march from London to Skipton (Yorks).

On 15 March the troop from Bolton removed to Bradford and Otley.

The designation of the Regiment was now about to be changed, and never since 1 August 1715 has it been officially known by its colonel's name. Unofficially, and probably for convenience, for some little time the old designation Ker's Dragoons was used in letters and in print.

The document authorising this change is here given:

WHITEHALL, 1st *August*, 1715.

GENTLEMEN,

His Majesty having been pleased to declare the Regiment of Dragoons whereof the Honorable Wm. Kerr is Colonel to be 'Her Royal Highness the Princess of Wales's own Royal Regiment of Dragoons,' I

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am to desire you will acquaint the Lord Townshend therewith, that a Commission may be accordingly prepared, constituting the said William Kerr Esquire Colonel of the said Regiment.

I am, Gentlemen, your most humble Ser^{t}.

The Secretaries to
The Lord Townshend
&c., &c., &c.

W^{m}. PULTENEY
(*Secretary at War*).

This paper is extracted from the 'Notification Book,' vol. 1317, fo. 100. The names of the Princess of Wales were Wilhelmina Carolina.

It should be noted that at this period the Regiment was styled 'Royal.'

The next paper is dated from Whitehall, 2 August 1715, and is a letter to Colonel Ker in which he is ordered to hold his regiment of dragoons 'in readiness to take the field,' and to give immediate notice to the officers 'to provide forthwith everything necessary in order to it.'

On 15 August the Regiment shifted its quarters:

Two troops from Skipton, Bradford and Otley to Manchester and 'Sawforth' (? Salford).

One troop from Pontefract to the same places.

Two troops from Richmond (Yorks) to Wolverhampton.

One troop from Barnards Castle to Leeds.

The Jacobite Rebellion, known familiarly as the '15,' was now about to break out in Scotland.

Colonel Ker next receives a letter from Whitehall, dated 31 August 1715, in which the writer is 'commanded to signifie' to him His Majesty's pleasure that 'you hold the Reg^{t}. of Dragoons under your Command in a Readiness to march at an hour's Warning.' It is added that General Carpenter and Cobham had received similar orders.

Some order which was now given is missing, but in the Regimental Record we read, under date 3 September, that 'Notwithstanding former Orders, the Regiment to March into North Britain,' viz. One Col. Ker's Troop from Skipton, one Captain Dollon's from Pontefract, one Captain Renouard's from Bradford, one Captain Crawford's from Barnards Castle, one Captain Livingston's from Richmond, and one Captain Dunbar's from Bedal. All six troops were to rendezvous at Stirling Camp, N.B.

Early in September the Rebellion broke out. The Earl of Mar raised the Pretender's standard in the Highlands, and to that standard flocked

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the disaffected clansmen. Meanwhile Major-General Whetham was encamped in command of the royal force then assembling or assembled at Stirling.

It would appear from the following paper that orders had been issued for all half-pay officers to immediately repair to Stirling camp, but that for some reason this order was cancelled.

WHITEHALL, 28 *Sepr.*, 1715.

MY LORD

Enclosed I send Your Lordp a Copy of His Matys Warrant to M. G. Whetham in which His Maty is pleased to countermand the Ordrs for the Half Pay Officers of Your Lordps Regt of Drags to repair to North Britain, of which publick notice will be given in the Gazette.

I am

My Lord

Your Lordps

&c.

Wm. PULTENEY.

E. of Hyndford.
The Like to
Colo Kerr.

In contradiction to this, in one of the printed accounts of the campaign it is distinctly stated that Major-General Whetham made satisfactory arrangements for the half-pay officers at Stirling and in several other places, where they were placed in charge of small garrisons and outposts; so that presumably they went there after all, and probably a fresh order to that effect was issued, a copy of which is not now forthcoming.

At the camp at Stirling the Regiment remained for some time.

In September orders were sent to Major-General Whetham, the then commander-in-chief in Scotland, to secure the important pass of Stirling Bridge over the Forth.

To several officers was given the charge of watching the coast, so as to prevent the landing either of the Pretender, suspected persons, arms, or ammunition. Nevertheless, one small vessel arrived at Arbroath which carried some 'gentlemen on board from France,' and also a supply of munitions of war. A few days later another ship got through, carrying passengers who at once proceeded to Mar's rebel camp at Perth. They also announced the speedy arrival of the Pretender.

Thereupon, Mar resolved to march for Edinburgh, and purposed to cross the Forth, if possible, about five or six miles above Stirling.

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am to desire you will acquaint the Lord Townshend therewith, that a Commission may be accordingly prepared, constituting the said William Kerr Esquire Colonel of the said Regiment.

I am, Gentlemen, your most humble Ser^{t}.

The Secretaries to
The Lord Townshend
&c., &c., &c.

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(*Secretary at War*).

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the disaffected classes. [illegible] encamped in command of the [illegible] at Stirling.

It would appear from the following [illegible] for all half-pay officers in immediate [illegible] for some reason this order was [illegible]

[illegible]

My Lord

Enclosed I send Your Lord[illegible] Whetham in which His Ma[illegible] Half Pay Officers of Your Lord[illegible] Britain, of which publick notice will be given in the Gazette

[illegible]

E. of Hyndford
The Like to
Col[illegible] Kerr.

[illegible]

In contradiction to this [illegible] paign it is distinctly stated that [illegible] tory arrangements for the half-pay officers [illegible] places, where they were placed in charge [illegible] so that presumably they were there [illegible] to that effect was issued [illegible]

At the camp at Stirling the [illegible]

In September orders were sent [illegible] commander-in-chief in Scotland [illegible] Bridge over the Forth.

To several officers was given the charge [illegible] prevent the landing either of the [illegible] ammunition. Se[illegible] carried [illegible]

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October 18 was appointed as the day for starting; the plot or rather the intention of the rebels leaked out, and finding a detachment of the royalists waiting upon his march, Mar abandoned his project after proceeding some miles and returned to Perth.

Argyll now arrived and assumed the chief command in Scotland according to his commission. *En route* to Stirling he summoned Colonel Ker and Major-General Whetham to Edinburgh, where he left them in command of 100 dragoons and 150 foot, with some militia and volunteers, to protect the city and also to carry on the siege of Seaton House. No great garrison this, it must be admitted, but men were scarce. The Duke of Argyll left Edinburgh on 16 October and arrived at Stirling on the next day. He took with him 200 cavalry and 50 foot.

The strength of Ker's Dragoons on 29 October 1715 was '6 Sergeants, 6 Drumms, 3 sick, 10 Entertained, 0 in prison, 153 Corp^{ls} & Cent^{ls} Effective, Total of Corp^{ls} & Cent^{ls} 166, 0 Dead, 0 Deserted.' This is extracted from 'State Papers, Scotland, Domestic,' Bundle 9, No 92.

The meaning of 'Entertained' is probably recruits as yet unfit for the ranks. Total 153 + 3 + 10 = 166.

'Cent^{ls}' stands for Sentinels and has the same signification as private men, troopers, privates.

Mar now issued a proclamation which had for its intention the raising of money, for ready money was scarce in the rebel camp. Argyll, who was now commander-in-chief of the royal army at Stirling, upon 25 October issued a counter-proclamation.

Two days later he issued another, this time for recruiting purposes. On 1 November Mar replied to Argyll's recruiting proclamation by a counter-proclamation.

On 20 October news reached Edinburgh that some 2300 men of the Western Highland clans under command of General Gordon had threatened Inverary. They approached within half a mile of the place, but finding the garrison ready to receive them, drew off. Here they received a reinforcement of 300 of the Earl of Breadalbane's men, and the rebels, now 2600 strong, marched off to join Mar at Perth.

The preservation of Inverary was a very important matter. The commandant there was the Earl of Islay, brother to the Duke of Argyll.

On 23 October Argyll at Stirling received news that a party of rebels,

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200 foot and 100 horse, were marching towards Dunfermline *viâ* Castle Campbell.

A detachment of dragoons under Colonel Cathcart (Scots Greys) were sent after them. The royalists came up with the enemy on the 24th at 5 A.M. They attacked them with vigour, killed and wounded several, and returned to camp that evening with seventeen prisoners, mostly gentlemen.

A few days later a detachment sent by the Earl of Hay surrounded and dispersed a body of 400 rebels (Breadalbane's men).

But Mar's force all this time had been growing in numbers, and now amounted to over 8000 men. He therefore prepared to march from Perth to join General Gordon with the western clansmen at Auchterarder, in order to attempt the passage of the Forth.

This was on 12 November. Argyll, however, heard of the movement, and in all haste ordered up a train of field artillery from Edinburgh.

He could expect to receive no other reinforcements and determined to give battle before the rebels could reach the bank of the Forth. Accordingly he passed the river by Stirling Bridge and advanced towards Dunblane.

On Sunday 13 November was fought the battle known as Sheriffmuir or Dunblane. Of the engagement there are at least four printed contemporary accounts, besides many manuscript letters which contain either professed narrations of the events or references thereto.

Let us endeavour to disentangle the variations in these accounts, a matter of no little difficulty, since both sides claimed the victory.

Colonel Harrison, who was sent express to King George by the Duke of Argyll immediately after the battle, and who arrived at St. James's on Saturday 19 November, gives an excellent account of the disposition of the royal and rebel armies. Argyll, he states, chose Dunblane because it was much more advantageous for his horse than a position at the head of the river Forth.

He had ascertained that the rebels designed to encamp at Dunblane that night. Hither then he marched on the evening of 12 November, and encamped with his left at Dunblane and his right towards Sheriffmuir. The enemy stopped short that night at a spot some two miles distant.

Next morning Argyll heard from his advance guard that the rebels were forming, and rode to a rising ground to reconnoitre. Here he had a good view of the enemy and observed that his right flank was threatened.

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The moor on the right had been impassable on the previous night, but frost had hardened the surface and it was now possible for troops to cross it.

Argyll, therefore, extended his troops on the right in the following formation: 'Three Squadrons of Dragoons upon Right and Left in the Front Line, & six Battalions of Foot in the Center. The second Line was compos'd of two Battalions in the Center, one Squadron on the Right, and another on their Left, and one Squadron of Dragoons behind each Wing of Horse in the first Line.' But it must be remembered that his whole force was barely 3000 men.

When the right of the royal army came over against the left of the rebels, which rested on a morass, Argyll perceived the enemy was not quite formed and gave an order for an immediate charge.

This was carried out, and the royalists 'charged both their Horse & Foot,' being received 'very briskly.'

After some resistance the royal troops were not to be denied; they broke through the rebel left and put them to flight. The retreating clansmen were pursued for some two miles by dragoons, infantry, and a squadron of volunteer horse.

The pursuit was continued as far as the river Allan, and the royalist troops deemed that the whole rebel army was discomfited and in retreat.

It is on record that the enemy several times attempted to rally and to make a stand, but each time they were attacked and broken.

Having arrived at the river Allan, Major-General Whetham, who was in command of the infantry, sent to the Duke of Argyll to inquire what had become of the troops forming the royalist left, as he could see no signs of them, and also that a considerable force of rebel horse and foot was formed in his rear.

Argyll halted, formed his troops in order, and marched towards a hill upon which the rebel horse and foot had by this time formed. Argyll then extended his right towards Dunblane to give his left an opportunity of joining them. Awaiting the left his men remained there until it was quite dark, upon which they slowly withdrew to the ground on which they had formed in the morning.

The rebels on the top of the hill, still undispersed, thereupon moved off to Ardoch.

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About half an hour later 'our troops which had been separated from the Duke of Argyll joined his Grace.' This was, of course, Whetham's force.

Meanwhile, what had befallen the royalist left? The story appears to be this.

In the beginning of the action the dragoons on the left charged some of the rebel horse on the rebel right, and captured a standard. The rebel foot, however, attacked the royalist foot with such vigour that the latter were thrown into complete disorder and were obliged to take refuge among the dragoons, the whole being mixed up in inextricable confusion. The effect of the rebel attack was to cut the royalist left completely off from the remainder of the royal army. A message or news of some kind at this period reached them to the effect that a body of the enemy was endeavouring to get to Stirling, and by great exertions their officers managed to rally and bring off their men so as to seize and occupy the 'passes leading there,' thus, in a way, saving the situation.

But a hideous slaughter took place during the time that the royalist left was in confusion.

In a certain sense, therefore, both sides could claim the victory. To the Duke of Argyll's army the spoils of war were 'fourteen Colours and Standards, four Pieces of Cannon, Tombrells with Ammunition, and all their Bread-Waggons.'

Viscount Strathallan, two colonels, two lieutenant-colonels, one major, nine captains, besides subalterns, were taken prisoners and lodged in Stirling.

Lord Forfar, of whom we shall write later, was wounded, mortally, as it proved.

The Earl of Islay, who had only arrived two hours before the battle, received two bullets, one in the arm and one in the side; General Evans was cut over the head; Colonel Hawley shot through the body; Colonel Lawrence taken prisoner; Major Hamers and Captain Armstrong, the latter aide-de-camp to the Duke of Argyll, were both killed.

The references to the wounded Lord Forfar are many, and are to be found mainly in the correspondence of the Duke of Argyll. These letters are preserved in the 'Scottish State Papers, Domestic.' They form very interesting reading, but cannot, of course, be quoted at length. A few extracts may, however, be given.

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'The Lord Forfar was shot in the Knee, & cut in the Head, and receiving ten or twelve strokes after he had got his Quarters (obtained quarter) from the Rebels: He is in very great Danger of his life. Of his Regiment Ensign Branch and eight private men killed.'

'My Lord Forfar, who acted as Brigadeer and charg'd at the Head of Morrisons' Regiment, was barbarously butchered.'

'Of our Side the Earl of Forfar is missing, and we're afraid is killed.'

'The Earl of Forfar lies dangerously ill of his Wounds at Stirling. After he was shot thorow the Knee, he received sixteen Wounds from their broad Swords.'

Dated from Stirling 26 November 1715. From the Duke of Argyll to Lord Townshend:

'I was this night sent for by poor Lord Forfar who is a dying, he made me promise to pray the favour of Your Lordship to represent to his Majesty that the money with which he purchas'd his employments was lent him by his Aunt M^rs. Lockhart, and that having behaved himself to the approbation of everybody, and dying in his Majesties Service, possessed of too small a fortune to repay her, He humbly hopes from His Majesty's great goodness that he will be pleased to permit the Regiment to be dispos'd of for Four Thousand Pound to repay her.'

The letter concludes with a recommendation of Lieutenant-Colonel Cathcart of Lord Portmore's Dragoons for gallantry at the battle, and suggests that that officer should be promoted Brigadier.

The expression 'permit the Regiment to be dispos'd of for Four Thousand Pounds' needs brief explanation. It was not the regiment that was to be sold, but the colonel's commission to command it. This could be sold during the lifetime of the holder, but its value would be lost to his heirs if he died before the sale were completed. Lord Forfar was hourly expecting death, and it would seem had begged for a special act of grace from the King in reward for his services.

Stirling, 27 November 1715: 'Poor Lord Forfar is still alive, but there is little or no hopes of his recovery.'

Two days later comes more favourable news in an Edinburgh letter from Andrew Hume to Pringle the Secretary: 'they writte from Sterling that the Doctors have good hopes of forfar.'

The hopes were illusory, for we next hear of his death.

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In a postscript to a letter from Argyll to Townshend, dated 10 December 1715, we read: 'P.S. My Lord, Poor Lord Forfar died last Wednesday.'

The amount of sympathy felt for the deceased soldier is very marked, and we can but surmise that he was a most popular as well as a most brave and gallant officer.

Lieutenant-Colonel Cathcart was promoted Colonel 15 February 1717; Brigadier-General 27 November 1735. Apparently the recommendation of the Duke of Argyll did not carry sufficient weight.

The rebel force amounted to 9100 men, according to General Whetham's dispatch. The royal army 'did not consist of above a Thousand Dragoons and Two Thousand Five Hundred Foot,' and but little more than half of them were engaged.

General Whetham writes of the enemy thus: 'I must do the Enemy the Justice, to say, *I never saw Regular Troops more exactly drawn up in Line of Battle, and that in a Moment; and their Officers behaved with all the Gallantry imaginable.*'

The Earl of Mar says:

'We discern'd a Body of the Enemy on the North of us, consisting mostly of the Grey Dragoons (Scots Greys), and some of the Black. . . . Our Baggage and Train Horses had all run away in the beginning of the Action. . . . Had our Left and Second Line behaved as our Right, and the rest of the First Line did our Victory had been compleat: But another Day is coming for that, and I hope e'er long too'

The 'Day' did not, however, come.

On 13 November General Wills and General Carpenter forced a complete surrender of the English Jacobites at Preston.

Writing on 16 November the Governor of Burnt Island, a Jacobite, writes on the authority of the Governor of Perth that '800 Royalists fell and only sixty Rebels,' and that '1500 stand of arms were captured from Argyll's men.'

A Jacobite account of the battle describes the failure of the rebel left to repulse the royalist right thus, and gives the following information:

'An incident happened, which contributed considerably to the Duke of Argyll's success:—one Drummond, an officer in Argyll's army, went to Perth, as a deserter, and communicated information to Lord

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Drummond, who made him his aide-de-camp. During the action of the 13th, the Earl of Mar, perceiving his right wing successful in repulsing the Duke of Argyll's left, despatched Drummond to General Hamilton, who commanded Mar's left, with orders to attack the enemy resolutely. Instead of communicating these orders, he informed the General that the Earl of Mar, being defeated on the right wished him to fall back immediately, with as much order as circumstances would permit. General Hamilton, agreeable to these orders, gave way without firing a gun ; when many of his men were killed, wounded and taken prisoners. Another incident aided the Duke of Argyll :—Rob Roy M'Gregor, noted for resolution and courage, being within a little distance of the Earl of Mar's army with his men, when desired by one of his friends to go and assist, answered, " If they cannot do it without me, they shall not do it with me."

At the battle the Princess of Wales's Own Royal Dragoons were on the left of the royal line.

When the rebel attack upon the royalist infantry threw the latter into confusion, Colonel Ker led his regiment to the charge in a most gallant manner. In this charge General Carpenter's squadrons and some gentlemen volunteers were associated. The rebel horse were completely routed and lost a standard. Colonel Ker had two horses killed under him and lost a third. A pistol bullet struck him in the breast, but, luckily, did not injure him, merely tearing his coat.

The Regiment lost two troop horses killed, and one man and four horses wounded.

Then followed the discomfiture of the royalist foot, who were driven back and became mixed up with the dragoons as has been stated.

Lord Torphichen, the lieutenant-colonel, distinguished himself greatly in the charge.

On the morrow a body of dragoons went out to the battle-field and brought in the wounded to Stirling.

The rebels accused the royalists of stripping their prisoners and of wounding them after quarter had been asked for and granted. An instance they gave was the case of Lord Panmure. The royalists made similar accusations, and cite Lord Forfar as an example.

Thirty years later the treatment of the wounded and prisoners by the Scots after Prestonpans was most humane.

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Of the Duke of Argyll it is written that 'he behaved with great humanity and himself parried three strokes aimed by a dragoon at a rebel gentleman who was wounded and begged quarter.'

Elsewhere we read, 'For a time the Dragoons gave no quarter.' This was when they cut up the rebel cavalry on the right.

Some of the comments of the Duke of Argyll are worth quoting.

In a letter to Lord Townshend, dated from Stirling 21 November, he states: 'He is glad the reinforcements of Dutch Troops are going to be sent.' He had been clamouring for them for some time, knowing full well that the strength at his disposal was not sufficient to safeguard the kingdom. What would not have been his plight if, in lieu of going to Preston, the English Jacobites had turned north and hemmed him in between that army and Mar's?

Argyll adds to Lord Townshend 'that he has something to say in support of the need for them' (the Dutch), but he hopes 'your Lord^{p} will think it very necessary to keep it secret, it is that some of our Troops behaved as ill as ever any did in this world, wch makes it the more wonderfull that the Day should have ended as it did.' This letter of Argyll's is a good one.

Among other difficulties his troops needed 'subsistence,' that is to say, pay. It was due on 24 November, and he writes: 'I have not as yet heard of the Paymaster who was to come down.'

He beseeches the Government not to be over-confident from the fact that his small army got rather the best of the battle: he says that his success of 3000 against 9000 was not 'likely to be repeated,' it having been due to luck, or at any rate to accident.

David Dalrymple, writing to the Lord Advocate, states that he encloses an 'extract of a letter from Lord Torphichen, Lieut.-Col. of Ker's Dragoons, which gives the plainest view of the action on our left that I have seen.' Unfortunately the extract is not contained in the letter.

Of Lord Forfar and others Argyll writes to Lord Townshend on 6 December:

'Poor Lord Forfar was at the head of Coll. Morison's who behav'd himself as well as a man could do, Major Hammers who commanded the Regt. was killed at the first fire. Lord Forfar soon fell and the Regt. was so overpowered that I wonder how Capt. Lloyd was able in those

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Circumstances to bring off one of his Colours and the Remainder of the Regiment for which I think well deserves the majorship.'

This was Captain Leonard Lloyd, and he was promoted major in 1716. Argyll goes on to say that

'Coll° Kerrs two Squadrons & Lord Stairs Second Squadron, tho' they were caried off with the rest on that occasion are Troops that may be depended upon, the Colonell and the two other Commanding Officers I am persuaded did their best and will do extreamly well upon all occasions, and I do most sincerely think that what hapned was M^r^ Whetham's misfortune and not his fault.'

The long looked for Dutch troops to the number of 1200 arrived on 15 December.

Dated 24 December from Whitehall we have the following answer to a letter from Colonel Ker to the Duke of Marlborough, in which he appears to have asked for a commission for his adjutant. Reference is also made to Lord Torphichen and the Major of the Regiment.

WHITEHALL, 24 *Dec.* 1715.

SIR :—

I am to acknowledge the Favor of Yours of Ye 10^th^ Ins^t^., which I do with pleasure. I must Acq^t^. you that My L^d^ Marlborough is at present out of town, and that I shall not fail at His Return speaking to Him about ye Commission for Adjutant Johnston as you desire, and then you shall hear further from me.

Be pleased to assure Lord Torphichen and Your Major No opportunity that offers of doing them Service shall be lost by

Sir

Your most humb^le^ Servant

Coll. Kerr. W^M^. PULTENEY.

The major here mentioned was James Nasmyth.

On 29 December the ship with artillery, which should have reached Stirling months before, was still in the Thames.

However, the arrival of the 1200 Dutch troops eased the mind of Argyll.

On the last day of the year we read in a letter addressed from Stirling to Pringle: 'Yesterday his Grace sent a Detachment of 100 Dragoons &

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100 foot of the troops here to Dunfermline to remain there, and they are to be re-inforced by a Detachment from some of the Dutch Regiments which quarter near the place, that is to say Queensferry & Borrowsbounes (*sic*).'

From the Manuscript Regimental Record the following account of the battle is extracted:

'The Regiment was present at the Battle of Sheriffmuir. The Order of battle for the Cavalry was three Squadrons on the right of the first Line of Infantry, namely Evans's, Scotch Greys, and Earl of Stairs, to the left these three other Squadrons of Dragoons, Carpenter's, Kerr's, and a Squadron of Stairs under the Command of General Whiteham (Whetham). In the second line of Infantry a Squadron of Dragoons supported each extremity.

'The Battle having terminated the trophys of Victory remained with the Royalist General. He had taken three Standards including the Royalist* one called the "Restoration." 13 pair of Colours, 4 pieces of Cannon, 7 Waggons, and one silver trumpet. Nearly the whole wreck of the battle fell into his hands, including a great quantity of muskets, Plaids, and Broadswords of which many had silver cases for the hands. He had gained every advantage but that of being able to follow up the partial victory of the preceeding day with a second attack, or with a pursuit, the numbers and condition of his men were quite inadequate for any such movement and while Mar fell back on Perth, he judged it expedient to return to Stirling.'

An extract from 'The Flying Post,' No. 3735, testifies to the gallantry of the Hon. Colonel Ker, but we need not quote it as its substance has already been given.

On 18 January 1716 additional men and horses which were being raised for the Regiment in England were ordered to be quartered at Dunstable and Newport Pagnell.

Meanwhile, the various troops of the Regiment had been scattered about in quarters in Scotland. The colonel's was at Leslie, Captain Dollon's at Dunfermline, Captain Renouard's at Dunfermline, Captain Crawford's at Kinross, Captain Livingston's at Cupar, and Captain Dunbar's at

* Of course the Royalist Standard mentioned was 'Rebel,' and it is merely a mistake in the Regimental Manuscript.

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Anstruther. Here they remained until 27 March, when orders to march into England were received. Accordingly the various troops in the order named above marched to Ripon, Rotherham, Otley and Bradford, Selby and Cawood, Ripon, and Knaresborough.

Whether the Regiment accompanied the royal troops when an advance was made against the rebels in January 1716 does not appear, but considering the fact that even when reinforced the royalist army was not excessively strong, it is reasonable to suppose that the Regiment took part and share in the proceedings. The rebels fled. The rebellion as far as armed resistance being now at an end, the Regiment in consequence left Scotland for England, as has been already stated.

It is curious to note that in all the references to the Regiment, whether in manuscript or in print, the old style of 'Ker's Dragoons' is maintained. Even in the Manuscript Regimental Record it is so written. Can it be that the length of the designation 'Her Royal Highness the Princess of Wales's Own Royal Regiment of Dragoons' was found in practice to be somewhat cumbersome, or was it the force of habit?



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CHAPTER V

Home Service, 1716–1742

We have already traced the history of the Regiment for the first twenty-six years of its existence as an integral portion of the British army. During that period it has twice been engaged in campaigns in Flanders and once in combating the Jacobite rebels at home. The period to which attention must now be given is one in which the Regiment was employed solely on home service. That the story of these next twenty-six years will prove interesting reading cannot for a moment be even suggested. Still, it is fitting that their record should be told with as much detail as possible, seeing that some fifteen pages of none too closely written folio sheets in the Manuscript Regimental Record contain the only detailed account of the period in question now existing.

Should this record, uninteresting as it may seem, be lost or destroyed, it could never be replaced. Hence for mere considerations of safety it is here set down and as far as possible amplified. Roughly speaking, the only events to be chronicled are changes of quarters in England, marches into Scotland, changes of quarters in Scotland, and an alteration in the style of the Regiment, which in 1727 was renamed the 'Queen's Own,' a title it has retained until the present day. During this period too the death of the veteran Colonel, the Hon. William Ker, took place after a tenure of command which existed for nearly thirty-two years. Beyond these facts and mention here and there of reviews, royal escort duties, and a few cases in which detachments of the Regiment were called upon to assist the civil authorities in maintaining order there is little to tell.

On 14 May 1716 orders were received for 'Ker's Dragoons'—the old title, be it observed, being still used—to change quarters. In consequence the troops of Colonel Ker and Captain Levington left Ripon for Bedford and Newport Pagnell. Captain Crawford's, which had

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concentrated at Selby, proceeded to Ampthill. Captain Renouard's, which had concentrated at Bradford, and Captain Dollen's, then at Rotherham, marched to Bedford and Stony Stratford respectively ; while the troop of Captain Dunbar left Knaresborough for Woburn.

On 4 June the two troops at Ampthill changed quarters for a few weeks and proceeded to 'Layton,' returning prior to August.

This 'Layton' is probably either Leighton-Buzzard or Leighton in Huntingdonshire.

During August the troops from Ampthill and Woburn proceeded to Ipswich ; those from Newport Pagnell and Bedford to the same town, and those from Stony Stratford and Bedford to Bury St. Edmunds.

On 25 November the troops at Bury St. Edmunds were moved, one to Sudbury and the other to Hadley and Stratford.

This last move was made in consequence of an order from the Prince of Wales, who was then acting as regent during the absence of the King in Hanover. In the document the spelling of the colonel's name is correct, being 'Ker.'

Four days later the Ipswich troops proceeded to Woodbridge and Stowmarket.

In another order referring to the same duty the Regiment is styled 'Her Royal Highness the Princess of Wales's Own Royal Dragoons.' It is sent by direction of the Prince of Wales and bears date 1716.

By it one troop is ordered to be at Orford to attend the King as far as Woodbridge and one at Woodbridge for similar duty as far as Ipswich, and a third at Ipswich to proceed as escort either to Manningtree or Colchester.

On 17 December the Prince of Wales issued another order in which the same style is used, by which the quarters of the Stowmarket troop were enlarged to Needham.

A paper in the Record Office is here worth quoting as far as it concerns the Regiment. It would appear that there were certain arrears of 'forage money' due to the Regiment—and also to other dragoon regiments during their stay in Scotland. This was an allowance of forage money over and above the ordinary pay which had been granted by Queen Anne. Colonel Ker and the colonels of the other regiments concerned petitioned the Right Hon. George Ireby, Secretary at War, to 'move the King to grant it.'

Colonel Ker's account we here give. It is to be found in the Record Office and bears date 24 December 1716.

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'State of the Additional Forage Money due to Her Royal Highness the Princess of Wales's Own Royal Regiment of Drag^{s} Commanded by the Honb^{le} Col. Wm Ker.

		HORSES
One Troop.	28 priv^{t} Men y^{e} 2 Widdowsmen exc^{t}. . . .	28
	1 Serg^{t}	1
	2 Corps	2
	1 Drum^{r}	1
	1 Hautboit	1
	3 Capt^{s} Serv^{ts}	3
	2 Lieut^{s} Serv^{ts}	2
	2 Cornets Servts^{ts}	2
	1 Q^{r} M^{r} Serv^{t}.	1
	One Troop	41
		6
	Six Troops	246
	One to the Adjut^{t}, One to the Surgeon . .	2
		248

248	Horses at 1*d.* each p^{r} D^{m} from 1 to 24 Oct. 1715 both inc^{l}, being 24 days at £1.0.8 p^{r} D^{m} is for ye whole .	£24	16	0
248	Horses as above			
60	Additional			
308	Horses at 1*d.* each p^{d} D^{m} from 25 Oct. 1715 to 24 Dec. foll^{g}. inc^{ve} being 61 days at £1 5*s.* 8 p^{r} D^{m} is for the whole .	£78	5	8
6	Horses more added, being 1 of the widdows Men taken off the Establishment for Widdows & added to the Troop.			
314	Horses at 1^{d} each p^{r} D^{m} from 25 Dec. 1715 to 30th April foll^{g} inclusive, being 128 Days at £1. 6. 2 p^{r} Day is for the whole	£167	9	4
		£270	11	0

Will Ker.'

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The arrears were eventually paid. Of course the paper in the Record Office is a copy, but it is interesting to see that whereas the colonel's name is in most documents written 'Kerr' he himself signs 'Ker.'

On Christmas day the Stowmarket troop was ordered to march to Beccles to attend His Majesty 'in case he should land there,' and to attend him to Saxmundham and afterwards to return to their quarters. Apparently therefore, the King did not land at Orford on the date originally fixed. We can imagine that the men in general hardly welcomed this particular duty at the so-called festive season. On the same day the Orford troop was sent to Saxmundham. Beccles, by the way, is at least ten miles inland, up the river Waveney, at the mouth of which Lowestoft now stands and did then. On 4 January 1717 half the troop at Saxmundham was sent to 'Kelswell' (probably Kelsale near Saxmundham) and to Yoxford, there to remain until further orders.

February 6 a troop was ordered to march from 'Stowmarket and Needham' to Beccles. How half or a portion of this troop got to 'Needham' (Needham Market) is not stated.

March 18. The Woodbridge troop proceeded to Halesworth. On 4 April all the troops were shifted, two to Colchester, one each to Ipswich, Braintree and Sudbury, while one was divided between Hadley and Stratford.

Here the Regiment remained until 16 May, when the troops were moved to the following places: Sudbury to Peterborough, Hadley and Stratford to Peterborough, Colchester to Wisbech, Braintree to Wisbech, Ipswich to the 'Three Deepings' (Market Deeping near Peterborough, Deeping St. James near the same city, and Deeping St. Nicholas near Spalding). The sixth troop went from Colchester to Spalding.

On 1 June the troops at Spalding and Wisbech were sent to Grantham and 'Dunnington' respectively. 'Dunnington' is evidently intended for either Donnington near Spalding or Donington-on-Bain, Lincoln. There are two Donningtons, one near Alcester in Warwickshire and another in Yorkshire: obviously it was neither of these. During this month a detachment of each of the troops from Peterborough, Wisbech, the Three Deepings, and Spalding were dispatched to Lydd in Kent, but for what purpose the Record does not state. Probably, however, it was for revenue duty.

At Lydd we read that they relieved a detachment of 'Brig. Gore's Dragoons.'

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On 27 June, as the Annual Fair and Horse Races were being held at Peterborough, the two troops at that place were ordered to march to Stamford until the festival was over, when they were to return.

From the entry under date ' July 9 ' we learn that the troop at Grantham and Spalding was commanded by Captain Dunbar, for it was on that day ordered to march to Holbeach and Fleet, the two troops at Stamford being ordered to remain where they were then quartered.

The Regiment was in October moved into Yorkshire.

On 19 October the troops at Wisbech, Holbeach, Donnington, the Deepings, and Stamford were sent to Halifax, Bradford, Sheffield, Chesterfield and Doncaster, the detachment at Lydd being ordered to march thence on 25 October and to join their respective troops at the above-named new quarters.

November 5, 1717. The Regiment was now very much weakened in numbers, as by an order dated from Hampton Court it was to be reduced to ' 25 private men per troop and no more ' (Record Office).

The last move that year took place on 21 December, when the Sheffield troop was sent to Barnsley. For the year 1718 the events are as follows :

On 25 February one Doncaster troop marched to Rotherham. Two days later the Halifax troop marched to Skipton.

On 3 March the other Doncaster troop and the Skipton troop moved to Leicester; lastly, on 5 April, the Barnsley, Rotherham, Chesterfield and Bradford troops proceeded to Leicester, Lutterworth (2) and Loughborough respectively. Later in the month, that is on 28 April, one of the Lutterworth troops was transferred to quarters at Ashby-de-la-Zouch.

Dated Whitehall, 31 May 1718, is an order directing one sergeant and six private men from the troop at Leicester to march thence to ' Prasby,' and to remain there as a guard upon the horses at grass.

This information is derived from a paper in the Record Office and is the earliest mention of the horses of the Regiment being at grass quarters. The Regimental Record does not allude to grass quarters until later. Reference to the P.O. Directory fails to identify ' Prasby.'

In its present situation the Regiment was permitted to remain in peace until 10 July, when orders were received to concentrate at Leicester, there to remain until reviewed by Major-General Macartney. After the review all troops returned to their quarters. Orders to hold themselves

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in readiness for review were on the same date issued to Honywood's, Molesworth's, Gore's, Stanhope's and Cobham's regiments of dragoons.

On 17 July 1718 an order was received for the troops at Leicester to leave that town three clear days before the assizes were held.

November 15 1718. It appears that there had been a mutiny in Molesworth's Dragoons, and that six mutineers were detained at Nottingham. Here they were delivered over to a detachment of Wade's Horse, who escorted them to Leicester. At Leicester Ker's Dragoons had orders to take them over and escort them safely to Northampton, where they were to be delivered over to the Commanding Officer of Lord Irvin's regiment of horse. He had to transmit them to St. Albans, where they were finally handed over to a detachment of the Foot Guards, who took the unfortunate men to London.

On 6 January 17$\frac{1}{8}^{8}$ the detachment of 'Ker's Dragoons at Lydd' was ordered to march to Leicester, Loughborough, Lutterworth and Ashby-de-la-Zouch, to rejoin its various troops. There is not, however, any record of this detachment having been sent thither. It may, however, have relieved the one already withdrawn 25 October 1716.

On 5 March the troops at Loughborough, Ashby-de-la-Zouch, and Lutterworth proceeded to Wickware (Wickwar, Glos^{tr}.), Chipping Sodbury and Marshfield (near Chippenham) respectively, while the three Leicester troops moved to Malmesbury and 'Wooten underedge' (? Wootton Bassett near Swindon). Two days later the route of the four troops who were ordered to 'Wooten underedge,' Malmesbury and Marshfield was suddenly changed, and they were directed to proceed to Cirencester. There they were to halt till further orders. The route of the other two troops was also changed, and they were sent to Tetbury and Malmesbury, in which places they too were to halt.

Here these two troops remained until 25 March, when they were directed to join the rest of the Regiment at Cirencester.

On 4 April two troops were sent to Burford (Oxon), and on the same date another troop was dispatched to Fairford (Gloucester).

This troop, from a later entry, appears to have been Colonel Ker's own troop, as it is so designated in an order dated April 17, when it was directed to march from Fairford to Lechlade (Glos^{tr}.) and there to await further orders.

On 21 April the troops at Cirencester, Lechlade and Burford were sent

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to 'Hexham and places adjacent.' Hexham is a very ancient town in Northumberland. Here they remained until 20 June, when the whole Regiment was dispatched forthwith to Darlington (Durham), 'Yarum' (? Yarm, Yorks, 4 miles south of Stockton), Northallerton (Yorks), Barnard Castle (Durham), Stockton (Stockton-on-Tees, Durham) and 'Bishop's Aukland' (Bishop Auckland, Durham).

On 4 July the two troops at Yarm and Northallerton were dispatched in haste to Halifax to assist the civil power in suppressing the riots in that neighbourhood. This was the first time in which any portion of the Regiment had been employed upon this duty—a duty, be it observed, which has never been popular in the service; still, being a duty, it has to be done, and has, therefore, been performed.

For the civil authorities to call in the assistance of the military forces of the country to keep order when trouble was expected, or to put an end to disturbances when disorder had broken out, was in those days of far more frequent occurrence than happily it is in these. It may be asked why this should have been. The answer is simple. The civil authorities had no civil power at their backs to preserve the peace when broken, or to prevent a breach of the peace when it was either threatened or had actually taken place, or was believed to be about to take place. Those were the days when there was no police force in existence. Poverty and distress, owing mainly to the wars but lately concluded, were extreme, and this was one cause for riot. Private enmities against individuals or certain classes of individuals furnished other causes, the price of provisions another. Industrial disputes then, as now, however, were the most potent in provoking the more reckless to take forcible measures to redress what they rightly or wrongly considered their grievances. Lastly, there was then, as now, a proportion of the population ever ready to enter on a campaign of destruction, for therein lay opportunities for not only paying off old scores where personal animosity was a factor, but—and this was the main inducement—there was loot.

The order dispatching the two troops to Halifax is in the Record Office.

WHITEHALL 4 July 1719.

It is the Lords Justices' directions that you cause the two troops from Yarum and Northallerton to go to Halifax immediately and remain until further orders, and be assisting to the Civill Magistrates to Suppress the

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Rioters in and about that Place and to repel Force with Force in case it shall be found necessary to preserve the Publick Peace.

Signed

GEORGE IREBY.

Search in old newspapers has not furnished any details of these riots. County Histories are also silent on the subject.

By 28 July, order having been restored at Halifax, the two troops had returned to their quarters.

On 19 August the Northallerton troops marched to Bedale (Yorks). On 9 October the three troops at Stockton, Barnard Castle and Darlington marched to Preston, while the troop at Bishop Auckland and that at Bedale proceeded to Ormskirk (Lancs.), and the Yarm troop went to 'Earstang.' 'Earstang' evidently should be Garstang (Lancs.). This troop on 20 December was removed to Bolton. On 5 April 1720 the three troops from Ormskirk and Bolton proceeded to Lancaster and Kendal and three from Preston to the same places. Four troops were quartered at Lancaster and the remaining two at Kendal.

On the same date from a paper in the Record Office we find that the horses were at grass at Hornby (Lancs.), as an order was issued for thirty men with a due proportion of officers to proceed thither as a guard.

In these places the Regiment remained until Nov. 1, when 'Ker's Dragoons'—the old title is even yet used in the Manuscript Regimental Record—proceeded to Preston (3), Lancaster (2)—these last presumably the Kendal troops—and Ormskirk (1).

During its occupancy of these quarters on 3 December the two troops of the Regiment at Lancaster were suddenly dispatched on a curious duty—this was no less than to patrol the Lancashire coast in order to prevent persons from landing there from the Isle of Man. The Record thus gives the information: 'The two troops of Kerr's Dragoons at Lancaster to be aiding and assisting to prevent boats with persons coming over from the Isle of Man, to land upon any part of the coast of Lancashire in regard that there is advice that the Plague is in that Island, and to send notice to the 3 troops at Preston to give the like assistance and to repel force with force if necessary.' Evidently the authorities were very wisely determined to take no risks. The grounds for their apprehension of serious danger were ample, seeing that during that year (1720)

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no less than 60,000 persons had perished of the plague in Marseilles alone. The scourge was believed to have been brought to that city in a ship from the Levant.

The scare, if scare it was, did not last long, for on 20 December one of the Lancaster troops was sent to Wigan.

For a year now the Regiment was ordered to Scotland. On 5 April 1721 three troops from Preston and the other three who were then at Ormskirk, Wigan, and Lancaster were sent to Berwick, 'where they will receive orders from the Commander-in-Chief in North Britain, for their further proceeding.'

We hear no more of the Regiment until 14 April 1722, when two troops were at each of the following places: Jedburgh, Dunse and Kelso.

They had occupied the same quarters years previously when under the command of Lord Jedburgh.

On that date they were all ordered to proceed forthwith to Wakefield, Pontefract and Doncaster.

On 8 May the Regiment was directed to concentrate at Manchester and encamp in the neighbourhood. In this camp they remained until 25 September, when they went into quarters in the town.

On 13 October the Regiment marched from Manchester, three troops proceeding to Derby and three to Nottingham.

Here the Regiment remained until 13 April 1723, when the Derby troops proceeded to York and the Nottingham troops to Derby.

On 11 June the whole Regiment was concentrated at York, and on that date its strength consisted of 333 men. As in the preceding year, the Regiment was sent into camp—this time near York. Here they remained from 20 June to 21 September, when they returned to the city.

On 30 September the Regiment received orders to march, half to Reading and half to Newbury and Speenhamland on the outskirts of that place.

The last entry for this year is dated November 30, and informs us that on that day

'Twenty Men of Kerr's D^rs. to march by turns from Newbury to Reading for the convenience of the Riding House built there.'

This is quite an early mention of a cavalry riding school, at any rate of a covered one.

Early in 1724 a detachment of the Regiment was ordered on preventive duty.

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The entry referring to this is as follows :

'6 Jan. Three Men from each of the 6 Troops of Kerr's Dragoons to March to Gosport and afterwards to be disposed of as follows :

4 Men Parish of Kingston,
4 ,, ,, Fareham,
4 ,, ,, Tichfield,
6 ,, ,, Gosport.

to be aiding and assisting upon the Coasts of Hampshire and Dorsetshire when required by the Officers of the Customs against "Owlers and Smugglers."'

An 'owler' was one who was guilty of the offence of carrying either wool or sheep out of the country. It was punishable by fine or banishment. The wool trade was the staple trade of England in old times, but the only symbolical relic of it is the 'woolsack' in these days.

Tom Brown, who only died in 1707, has left us the following on this subject :

'To gibbets and gallows your *owlers* advance,
That, that's the sure way to mortify France,
For Monsieur our nature will always be gulling
While you take such care to supply him with woollen.'

Brown libelled the French King after the Peace of Ryswick and was put in gaol till by a whimsical rhyming petition he obtained his liberty. A quatrain often quoted is his—'I do not like thee, Doctor Fell,' etc.

The smuggler was one who brought or endeavoured to bring foreign goods into the country without paying the customs duty thereon.

The preventive detachment was not relieved until 14 April 1725, when a similar detachment was sent to take up the duty, and had to march all the way from Yorkshire and Durham for the purpose.

The new year found the Regiment below strength, and an order was issued to Colonel Ker on 20 January $17\frac{24}{25}$ as

'Colonel of Our Most Dear Daughter Wilhelmina Carolina Princess of Wales' Royal Regiment of Dragoons' by beat of drum or otherwise to raise volunteers in any 'County or part of Our Kingdom of Great Britain.' It will be remembered that recruiting in Ireland was absolutely forbidden at that time.

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April 3, 1724. The Regiment was ordered to march from Berkshire to Yorkshire and Durham; its appointed quarters being Ripon (two troops) and Richmond, Darlington, Knaresborough and Bishop Auckland (one each).

On 16 May the Bishop Auckland troop was moved to Yarm and 'Stocksley' (Stokesley, Yorks., twelve miles south of Middlesbrough).

One of the troops was upon 17 September sent to join the two already at Ripon and the other three troops were concentrated at Leeds, where they were ordered to remain until reviewed, after which they were to return to their former quarters.

A month later the Yarm troop was sent to Tadcaster.

There is apparently a gap in the records here, as the Tadcaster troop would seem to have left that place prior to 1 May 1725.

On that date two troops of the Regiment were ordered to march

1 Troop from Richmond to Tadcaster,

1 ,, ,, Darlington to Selby (Yorks.) and Cawood (Yorks.),

while one was to remain at Knaresborough and three at York.

On 2 September the whole Regiment concentrated again at York, where they were reviewed by Lieutenant-General Carpenter, after which they returned to their various quarters.

The last entry for 1725 tells us that the three troops at York were sent two to Wakefield and one to Pontefract. It is dated 7 Oct.

The events of the year 1726 are as follows. The first, dated 19 February, is somewhat obscure. 'The Three Troops at York to remain during the assizes and afterwards return.'

The second, dated 5 April, is equally so. 'The 3 Troops at Wakefield and Pontefract, to march to York and remain till reviewed by the Right Honble. Sir Charles Wills, and then return.' Evidently there are some entries missing. 'The Right Hon. Sir Charles Wills' was Lieutenant-General Wills, of Preston fame in 1715. The next change in the Regiment was this. Two troops from York to Doncaster, and one from York to Rotherham; the remaining three troops were left in their quarters, Pontefract (2) and Wakefield (1). This took place on 20 October. November 24 the Rotherham troop proceeded to Barnsley, and on 8 December the Pontefract troop marched to Chesterfield. The next entry, dated 10 January 1727, is as follows:

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'Kerr's Dragoons to march, viz.—

3 Troops from Doncaster and Barnsley to Stamford, 2 from Wakefield to Huntingdon and one from Chesterfield to Prantham.'

February 21. One of the Stamford troops was moved to Melton and one from Huntingdon to St. Neots.

A war cloud had again arisen on the Continent, and hostilities were expected to break out between the Emperor and Holland.

In consequence the Regiment was augmented on 21 February to nine troops, and was ordered to hold itself in readiness to proceed to Flanders to assist the Dutch. A force of which Ker's Dragoons formed a part, and which consisted of four regiments of cavalry and eight of infantry, was prepared to embark for Holland, but the expedition was never despatched.

The warrant for the augmentation of the Regiment is dated January 31, and by it each of the new troops was ordered to consist of one quartermaster, two sergeants, two corporals, two drummers, one 'Hautbois' and fifty private dragoons, besides officers. The existing six troops by the same warrant were also augmented from 45 to 50 private men each. Perhaps it should here be remarked that the hautboy was the instrument which in those days was used in the cavalry. Later it was superseded by the trumpet. The precise date when this change was actually made in the Regiment is not to be discovered in the records, but it was probably in 1767 or 1768. Cannon tells us that in 1766 'Drummers on the establishment were directed to be replaced by Trumpeters,' but he does not mention Hautboys.

On the death of George I, who it will be remembered died while on his journey to Hanover in the month of June 1727, his son George, Prince of Wales, succeeded to the throne as George II. In consequence the Princess of Wales, Wilhelmina Carolina, became queen.

The style of the Regiment was in consequence changed, and from its former title of 'Her Royal Highness the Princess of Wales's Own Royal Regiment of Dragoons' was in future to be known as 'The Queen's Own Regiment of Dragoons.'

As has been already stated, the Regiment was ordered to be augmented in January of this year both in the number of troops and the strength of each. How soon this augmentation was carried into effect we do not know, but it had taken place by 14 October.

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Meanwhile the only changes of quarters or marches recorded are these:

26 June. The three troops at Peterborough were ordered to remove during the fair at that city, two to proceed to Uppingham and one to Kettering.

On 3 Oct. the two troops then at Stamford were ordered one to Biggleswade and the other to Woburn, both places being in Bedfordshire.

On 14 Oct., however, we find that all the nine troops were in existence, as marching orders were issued as follows:

'The Queen's Own Royal Dragoons, commanded by Colonel Wm. Ker, to march from their present quarters:

2 Troops from Woburn and Biggleswade to Kingstown.

4 Troops from Peterborough, Huntingdon, St. Ives and St. Neots to Hounslow, Kingstown, the Brentfords and Richmond.

3 Troops from Oundle, Uppingham and Kettering to Uxbridge, Twickenham, and Hampton and remain till Saturday the 28th October when they are to rendezvous upon Hounslow Heath to be reviewed by His Majesty, after which they are to return to their former quarters.'

After the review, in which the Regiment acquitted itself so as to obtain commendation, three troops were sent from Kingstown (Kingston-on-Thames) on 1 Nov., 'on account of the fair there'; two troops went from Isleworth, Twickenham, Hampton, and Richmond, and four from Uxbridge, Brentford, and Hounslow.

These various detachments proceeded to Wells (2), Blandford (2), Dorchester, Wimborne and Wincanton (1 each). At the same time a Cornet and 20 men, with non-commissioned officers in proportion, received an order to march to Halesworth 'on the Revenue duty along the Sussex Coast.' Halesworth, however, happens to be in Suffolk.

This does not account for the entire 8 troops as will be seen.

A paper in the Record Office dated 'Whitehall 4 day of Novr. 1727, gives a clue to what had happened. It is as follows:

'To all Magistrates, Justices of the Peace, Constables and other Officers whom it may concern &c., &c.,' and it proceeds to give directions to 'impress wagons or carriages with horses, as shall be wanted to carry from Peterborough, Kettering, Oundle, St. Neots, Huntingdon and St.

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Ives, the Sick Men of the "Queen's Own Royal Regiment of Dragoons Commanded by Brigadier Kerr" to Dorchester, Blandford, Sherborne, Shaftesbury and Wimborne, the Officers paying for the same at the usual Rates.'

Evidently there had been an epidemic of some kind.

On 7 March 172⅞ the troop at Dorchester was moved to Sherborne and on 30 March from thence to Shepton-Mallet.

On 9 May Her Royal Highness the Princess Amelia was about to pay a visit to Bath. Princess Amelia Sophia Eleanora was then quite young, having been born at Herrenhausen 10 Jan. 1710. She was the third child and second daughter of George II by Queen Caroline.

For a long time she was designed to marry Frederick the Great, who corresponded regularly with her until his marriage in 1733. On her death in Oct. 1786, which took place at her house in Cavendish Square, it is stated that a miniature of Frederick was found upon her breast.

When a princess went abroad in those days an escort of cavalry was ever in attendance. Hence the following orders to the Regiment:

'4 April. A Sufficient Detachment of the Queen's Own Royal Dragoons, to receive from a Detachment of "Wade's Horse," at Newbury, Her Royal Highness the Princess Amelea, and Escort her to Bath, and afterwards return to their quarters.'

'9 May. 24 Dragoons from 3 Troops at Wells to March under a Subaltern to Bath, there to remain during the stay of the Princes (sic) Amelia (correct this time) in order to attend upon her whenever she shall go abroad in her Coach.'

How long the first visit of the Princess continued does not appear, but seemingly the gaieties of Bath or its waters were to her taste, as we find her paying a second visit there in August of the same year.

'17 August. A Sufficient Detachment from the Troops at Wells is to receive from the Royal Horse Guards at Newbury, the Princess Amelia and escort her to Bath and then return. 24 Dragoons from the Troops at and near Wells to march to Bath to attend upon the Princess (as directed in the Order of 9th May last).'

It was on the occasion of one of these visits that the Princess made a request to the notorious Beau Nash, the master of the ceremonies at Bath,

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the granting of which was, if not exactly refused, at any rate evaded by that worthy. Beau Nash, the so-called 'King of Bath,' ruled the festivities there with a rod of iron.

One of his regulations was that on the stroke of eleven, the dancing in the pump room should instantly cease. One night the princess was enjoying her dance and begged the upstart autocrat to indulge her with one more.

Nash replied to Her Royal Highness that he hoped she would not insist upon it, because one deviation from the rules then established, would totally subvert his authority. How he had the impertinence to unfasten the white apron of the Duchess of Queensberry and throw it over among the waiting ladies'-maids is another instance of this person's good taste. White aprons, forsooth, were contrary to his regulations. The story of Princess Amelia and Nash is true, and reminds one strongly of the consequential pedagogue of old, who asked permission when in the presence of royalty to be excused from removing his headgear, lest his pupils should lose respect for him!

There are no other events to chronicle for the year 1728, except that on 16 May the detachment then on revenue duty at Halesworth was ordered to march to Wells and thence rejoin their troops, and that on 30 July the whole Regiment was concentrated at Salisbury for review. The review took place on 14 August, when the troops returned to their former quarters except that one of the Wells troops was sent to Glastonbury.

On 24 October the visit of the Princess to Bath terminated, when the detachment at that city was ordered to escort her as far as Newbury and then to proceed to rejoin their respective troops.

On the day this order was issued (17 October) the three troops at Sherborne, Wincanton and Wimborne were sent to Salisbury, and the Glastonbury troop was despatched to Warminster.

The last event of the year was an order on 5 November for the troop at Blandford to proceed to Sherborne and one of the Wells troops to march to Shepton Mallet.

An interesting petition from the Lord Bishop of Bath and Wells, dated from Westminster December 24 1729, is extant.

It was sent by him at the request of the Mayor and Corporation of Wells and concerned the quartering of dragoons in that city.

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The Bishop states that when he was first consecrated to that diocese he found that dragoons had been quartered there for frequent and protracted periods. There were originally three troops, of which two were removed and one remained. This remaining troop had been recently reduced and the inhabitants no longer had dragoons quartered on them. There was, however, a credible rumour that 'another is going to be sent,' and against their coming the inhabitants petitioned. There were, he states, two troops there in 1728.

Certainly in that year some troops of the Regiment were quartered at Wells.

The Bishop continues that several innkeepers had been 'forced to leave their business and shut up their houses.' The fact being that the inhabitants would not frequent inns where soldiers were quartered and the billeting money was insufficient to recompense the innkeepers. He petitions for the city to be 'excused at any rate for a time from quartering any more' as they have been 'overburdened for several years past.'

We do not quote this paper with a view to offering any suggestion to the Chancellor of the Exchequer ! !

1728. As the assizes were being held at Salisbury, according to the custom then prevalent, the three troops in quarters there at the time were ordered on 20 February to march to Shaftesbury (2) and Yeovil (1).

The removal of troops from assize towns when the Courts were sitting there was usual and was professedly to avoid any suspicion of influencing justice. For similar reasons, soldiers were formerly confined to barracks, and territorials, even in these days, do not assemble for drill during an election, lest their presence in the streets should be supposed to affect the freedom of voters.

Ordinarily the three troops thus dispersed would have returned to Salisbury on the conclusion of the assizes, but on this occasion the Shaftesbury troops were ordered to remain in their new quarters.

On 3 April, 11 April, 12 May and 6 June the following changes of single troops took place. Dorchester to Cerne, Warminster to Wincanton, Wincanton to Sturminster and Sturminster to Bruton.

On 14 August we read for the first time in the MS. Regimental Record that a troop had been at 'grass quarters.' This was the Bruton troop and was under the command of Captain Maxwell. It was ordered on that date to march to Wincanton, halt there one night, and then resume its grass quarters near Bruton.

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Probably the Regiment had been in grass quarters before, as was customary, but the dates have not been preserved, save in one instance.

On 26 September, 16 October and 15 November the Cerne troop marched to Wimborne, the Bruton to Warminster, the Shepton Mallet to Taunton and the Glastonbury to Shepton Mallet.

All this time a detachment of the Regiment had been employed since 14 April 1726 in revenue duty on the coasts of Hampshire and Dorsetshire. It was not until 20 November 1729 that these men were recalled and rejoined at Shaftesbury.

Prolonged absences like these can hardly have been conducive to the efficiency of the Regiment as a whole. Still it was the custom in those days so to employ cavalry. In Ireland, when on the Irish Establishment, as some regiments were for at times forty years at a stretch, the outcome was much to be deprecated.

Instances have been known when a commanding officer never for years had an opportunity of seeing his regiment concentrated.

But the reason for the recall of the revenue detachment was this.

It will be remembered that on 21 February 1727 the Regiment had been augmented from six troops to nine. It was now about to be reduced again to six.

On 20 November a warrant was issued for the immediate reduction of the 'three youngest troops,' and the remaining six troops were also to be reduced so as to consist of 'One Captain, one Lieutenant, one Cornet, one Quarter Master, two Sergeants, two Corporals, two Drummers, one Hautboy and 40 Private Dragoons.'

It was long since the Regiment had been so weakened in strength. The troops reduced were those newly raised in 1727. The officers were relegated to half-pay as usual.

The final move of the year took place on 23 December, when the Regiment was distributed in quarters at Blandford, Sherborne, Wimborne, Yeovil, Warminster and Devizes.

These reductions were a great hardship and sometimes led to trouble. Two most interesting letters from General Wade on the subject of a mutiny in a regiment unnamed are in the Record Office and bear date December 3, 1729.

It appears that a solitary troop was quartered in a small town. Orders came for its disbandment. Without proper orders the officer

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had sold all the horses a few days before the date of disbandment. General Wade adds: 'I fear rather irregularly.' The troop when the day came was insolent and went so far as 'to Insist upon Termes Inconsistant with His Majesty's Orders of Reduction;' and refused to be drafted into other troops.

General Wade was sent to deal with the matter. He ordered up a squadron of 'old' troops under the major then in command of the regiment. This clearly shows that it was a newly raised troop which was to be disbanded. Orders to arrest the ringleaders were given, and the men were put in guard. But the town was too small to put up a squadron and a disbanded troop as well, so he moved all to a larger town.

The major who came in command of the squadron to arrest the mutineers actually read the orders of reduction on his arrival, at the head of the regiment and in presence of a Justice of Peace. The troop was disarmed, but still showed great insolence to the officers, who did not, says General Wade, behave with the 'prudence and precaution' they should. Clearly the mutinous troop should have been sent to headquarters. Two courses were open to Wade—he must either try the men by court-martial, or adopt the less rigorous procedure in the civil courts. General Wade decided on the latter course, for, as he says, he had grave doubts whether the mutinous troop was not already disbanded, and if disbanded no court-martial would have authority to deal with the case. Neither could he confirm a death sentence or other punishment on men not under martial law.

The prisoners soon repented of their behaviour, and sent a message to Wade, begging to see him and asking pardon. They also assured him that they were ready to comply with His Majesty's order. Wade accepted their expressions of regret, for, as he says, 'their conduct had not been very outrageous as far as acts of mutiny,' though 'very seditious and insolent to their officers.'

Next morning he 'drew out the troop,' and in person read out the order disbanding them again. They behaved, he states, in a 'Decent and Respectful manner and Continued so.' General Wade promises to come to London shortly and to make a full verbal report then.

It will be remembered that certain dragoon regiments were in February 1727 augmented from six to nine troops, and that in 1729 they were reduced again from nine troops to six.

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As a light cast on the military administration of those days, the insertion of this narrative is not without value.

The Regiment then remained in quarters till 21 March, when the following changes took place—Devizes to Shaftesbury and Warminster to Bruton. Four days later the Wimborne troop marched to Cerne. On 22 September the Bruton and Cerne troops proceeded to Wells, the Yeovil troop to Shepton Mallet and the Sherborne troop to Warminster. Lastly, the Shaftesbury troop marched to Wincanton on 28 November.

1731. On 31 March a detachment equal in strength to a troop was ordered to march to Lewes in Sussex to be employed on revenue duty.

April 15. The two troops at Wells, the troop at Shepton Mallet and the troop at Wincanton were ordered to Salisbury.

On 1 May the whole Regiment was concentrated at Salisbury and received orders to proceed, three troops to Uxbridge and the other three to Colnbrooke (Bucks.) and Longford (? Langley, Bucks.). The Regiment was to rendezvous on Hounslow Heath, there to be reviewed by the King on Saturday, 15 May. After the review, in which the Regiment acquitted itself well, the troops returned to their several quarters in the West of England, Wells (2), Blandford, Yeovil, Sherborne and Somerton (1 each).

At the review the strength of the Regiment was only 200 men.

Forty more men were now to be taken off on revenue duty. Assuredly the 'owlers and smugglers' must have been particularly active around Lewes, as on 26 May 'another detachment equal to that ordered on 31 March last' was dispatched to Lewes on preventive duty.

From a military point of view this was truly a most deplorable state of affairs.

On 10 June the Blandford troop was moved to 'Crookhorne' (Crewkerne, Somerset).

On 2 July an order was issued which was subsequently cancelled by which it was intended to remove the whole Regiment to the neighbourhood of Lewes, where practically a squadron was already quartered.

The places selected were Lewes, Hailshom, Eastbourne, Battle (near Hastings) and the villages adjacent.

Probably the common sense involved in concentrating the Regiment to a certain extent in one district was too much for the authorities, and in lieu of proceeding to Sussex the Regiment remained divided between Shepton Mallet, Glastonbury and Warminster, the order being cancelled.

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At length in 1732 the Regiment was removed from this district and went into quarters on 24 March at Cheltenham, Leominster, Hereford and Gloucester.

The Cheltenham troop was, however, shifted on 13 May to Moreton (? Moreton-in-Marsh, Gloucester, or Moreton-on-Lugg, Hereford, but not Moreton, Dorset), and then on 24 June was moved on to Tewkesbury.

The Regiment had now been for ten years in England and, as will have been noted, had during that period had a most extensive experience of marching hither and thither almost perpetually, with intervals only of sometimes a month or two, at others hardly a week or more. But these were days when barrack accommodation in England was scanty and barrack accommodation for cavalry specially so. Hence to billet troops became a necessity. Now the billeting system was unpopular with those upon whom troops chanced to be billeted.

But with a view to preventing more hardship than need be to the civil population this method of changing of quarters perpetually was adopted. At any rate, it prevented too large a proportion of complaints, petitions, &c.

As a system it was a bad one, but at that time no other course except that of building sufficient barrack accommodation was open to the authorities—and, as usual, money was scarce.

The petition of the Bishop of Wells already noticed throws a good deal of light on this phase of military life in those days.

On 17 April 1733 the regiment received orders to march forthwith to North Britain *viâ* Berwick, at which place on arrival they were to find orders from Lieutenant-General Wade as to their further procedure.

The order was, however, somewhat varied, for on the arrival of the first three troops at Berwick, they were despatched to Dunbar and Haddington, while the other three, having marched to Wooler (close by the battlefield of Hedgeley Moor), were directed to change their route and proceed *viâ* Coldstream to Dunse.

The ford at Coldstream was one of the most favoured crossing places into England of both regular invading Scottish armies and countless bodies of raiding freebooters of old.

The Lewes detachment left that district to rejoin in Scotland, 15 May 1733. In Scotland the Regiment remained until 10 April 1735,

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when it again returned to England. Berwick was reached on this date, and thence the Queen's Own Royal Regiment of Dragoons proceeded south, two troops being quartered at Leicester, two at Loughborough, one at Ashby-de-la-Zouch and one at Burton-on-Trent.

On 3 May the Burton troop was ordered to Leicester to join the two troops already there, and on 13 May the Loughborough troop was sent to Lutterworth.

Revenue duty again fell to the lot of a detachment, which in strength 'equal to a troop' was ordered to Boston, Lincolnshire, for that purpose. This order was dated 26 June, and on the same day a larger detachment consisting of '90 Privates with Commissioned and Non-Commissioned Officers in proportion' was ordered to march to Norwich 'on the Revenue Duty on the coast of Norfolk. The Regiment was thus deprived *pro tem.* of no less than 130 officers and men.

The only other move during 1735 took place on 6 Nov., when the Ashby-de-la-Zouch troop proceeded to Leicester.

The events for 1736 are few. On 27 April the revenue detachment for Norwich was withdrawn and the men rejoined their various troops.

An entry dated 3 May gives a reason for their return. On that day the whole Regiment, that is to say all except the Boston detachment, was ordered to assemble at Leicester, there to be reviewed by their Colonel, now Major-General the Honble. William Ker.

After the review the various troops returned to their several quarters.

Three more entries only concern this year. On 13 May one of the Leicester troops moved to Melton Mowbray. On 15 July as the Assizes were being held in Leicester the troops there were withdrawn, but their destination is not stated.

Lastly, on 27 Sept. the Loughborough troop was ordered to proceed to Ashby-de-la-Zouch.

1737. On 14 April the whole Regiment was employed on revenue duty; three troops being sent to Norwich and the other three to Lynn, Bungay, Beccles and North Walsham for that purpose.

On 9 June a detachment of 50 dragoons with commissioned and non-commissioned officers in proportion was formed and marched into Lincolnshire on the same duty. This detachment was thus employed till 13 October, when it received orders to return to Norwich.

1738. The Regiment was now ordered to march from Norfolk into

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Herefordshire and Gloucestershire. On 20 April, therefore, it proceeded to Hereford (2 troops), Gloucester (2), Ross and Tewkesbury (1 each).

Apparently they were permitted to remain in these quarters for ten months, an almost unexampled period of time for many years.

1739. Feb. 22. The Ross troop was moved to Leominster.

April 3. A detachment equal to a troop was sent to Lewes on revenue duty.

22 Sept. The Leominster troop was sent to Hereford and the Tewkesbury troop to Gloucester.

Dated from Kensington, 5 Sept. 1739. 'We have an Assignment Warrant for the Colonels of 8 regiments of Dragoons in Great Britain, the Colonel of the Queen's Own Royal Regiment of Dragoons among them.' This warrant gave the Colonels permission to make Assignments of their off-reckonings for the new men from 25 June 1739 to 24 June 1741.

An additional sergeant and 10 men per troop had recently been raised, and though assignments had been made for the old men in the Regiment no provision to defray the expense of clothing these new men existed. This warrant supplied the need. It was issued after a request from the Colonels of the respective regiments and was considered by the King to be just and reasonable. The clothing was directed to be prepared forthwith and ready to be inspected by the Board of General Officers.

1740. On 1 Oct. the 'Queen's Own Royal Regiment of Dragoons, commanded by Major-General Kerr,' was ordered to march from the camp near 'Kingsclear' (Kingsclere, Newbury, Berks.) and proceed to Cirencester (2 troops) and Tewkesbury (1), Monmouth (1), Farringdon (1), Fairford (2) and Ledlade (½). Three days later the destined Monmouth troop was sent to Highworth instead.

This is the first entry recorded in the Record for the year 1740. It may be, however, well to state that considerable exertions for those days had been expended in the formation of camps during the preceding few months.

As early as 15 March three were ordered to be held in Hyde Park, Hounslow and at Blackheath. Later, three more were pitched, at Newbury, Windsor and another at Hounslow.

The Regiment was sent to the Newbury camp, which was actually formed at Kingsclere close by.

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There four other regiments of cavalry were collected and four infantry regiments as well. Lieut.-General Wade was in supreme command.

Two other changes of quarters took place during this year, one of the Cirencester troops being removed to Burford on 11 Nov. and on 9 Dec. the Highworth troop marched to Bromsgrove.

17 Dec. 1740. The Tewkesbury troop was ordered to march immediately to Evesham 'to assist in putting down the riots in that neighbourhood.' These were corn riots, which had been prevalent in several places during the year. The worst were at Newcastle-on-Tyne 7 to 25 June, where, owing to the militia which had been called out being unwisely disbanded, the mob broke windows, burnt public records and looted £1,800. Some gentlemen armed themselves and fired on the rioters. At Wisbech in the Isle of Ely similar scenes took place. Corn was seized and sold for 1*d.* to 4*d.* per bushel by the rioters. Next they levied £200 on the town. Eventually 500 men were raised who secured some 60 of the disorderly persons. At Norwich wheat was at 16*s.* a comb. Dragoons were called out and some rioters were arrested; the mob then broke open the gaol and released them. The dragoons fired on the mob, killing three men, two women and a boy, many others being dangerously wounded.

There were also riots at Derby, Northampton, Wellingborough and at Evesham as before stated.

1741. 7 Feb. 25 Dragoons of the Burford troops were ordered to march to Chipping Norton; and the Cirencester troop on the same day to proceed to Tewkesbury.

19 Feb. 20 Dragoons of the Farringdon troop were sent to Highworth.

5 March. The troop which was divided between Fairford and Lechlade marched to Tetbury and Hampton.

4 April. The Tewkesbury troop was moved to Stroud and Painswick.

11 April. The Farringdon and Highworth troop was to be thus divided, 20 men to Witney and the remainder to Woodstock.

On the same date the men at Evesham were withdrawn, 15 being sent to Pershore and 15 to Alcester, from which it would appear that the troop was ten below strength.

14 April. The troop at Burford and Chipping Norton march to Stow and Moreton; and the troop at Stroud and Painswick to Campden (Gloucester) and Winchcombe.

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Also 30 men were dispatched from Tetbury to Dursley and Wooten.

These movements of small bodies in different directions were evidently measures of precaution against rioting.

On 18 April 1741 the Regiment suddenly received orders to march from their present quarters to North Britain. They started forthwith, but having proceeded for some days in the required direction were with equal suddenness halted and ordered 'to be disposed of in the several Towns and Villages most contiguous to the place where this shall reach.' Two days later they were all sent back again to their former quarters.

Apparently the halt was called at Nottingham, Leicester, Chesterfield, Lutterworth, Loughborough and Derby, as from those places they are ordered to Moreton, &c., Tetbury, &c., Bromsgrove, &c., Woodstock, &c., Campden, &c., and Evesham, &c.

On 2 June the Regiment was again ordered to march to North Britain, and again it started.

On 16 June it was again halted and again sent back to its old quarters —'the respective places from whence they began their march.'

By 27 June they had returned as ordered, and the Woodstock troop was then moved to Highworth.

On 12 August 1741 Major-General Sir John Cope, K.B., succeeded to the Colonelcy of the Regiment owing to the death of Lieut.-General the Honble. William Ker. For details of Lieut.-General the Honble. William Ker's life and career see Appendix I.

19 Sept. A detachment consisting of 1 officer, 1 sergeant and 20 Dragoons was ordered to assemble at Tetbury and march to Deal on revenue duty.

23 Oct. Twenty men of that part of the troops at Campden and the same number of that part of the troop at Highworth were sent to 'Skipton-upon-Stour' and Witney respectively.

For the third time this year, by an order dated 7 Nov., the Regiment was marched off to Berwick *en route* for North Britain; it being ordered that the several divisions should halt 'as long as necessary to avoid the floods or other accidents on their march to Berwick.

In North Britain the Regiment at length arrived, though the date is not known. However, it is recorded that on 27 April 1742 'The Queen's Royal Regiment of Dragoons' on their arrival back in Berwick were to march forthwith, three troops to Colchester and one each to Chelmsford,

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Ingatestone and Burntwood, and Bocking and Braintree. Meanwhile a detachment of the Regiment had somehow been posted at 'Ashford' without any clue as to which Ashford is meant, probably in Kent.

However on 6 May these men were ordered to march to Ipswich.

On 1 July one of the Colchester troops was ordered to Witham.

War was now again in progress; and on 6 August the Regiment was once more selected for active service abroad and was under orders to hold itself in readiness to embark for Flanders.

NOTE :—When we consider the multitude of provincial towns in the United Kingdom at which the Regiment was stationed during this period of its existence, that is to say between 1716 and 1742, it is impossible to avoid being struck by the fact that even in these days very many of them are places of no little architectural beauty and antiquarian interest, not to mention their historical and military associations. How much more beautiful and interesting they must have been in the first half of the eighteenth century it is not easy to gauge. In not a few of these places relics of buildings are to be found even yet which cannot be found elsewhere. Take, for instance, the Roman gate of Colchester, now overshadowed by the hideous 'Jumbo' water-tower; Woodbridge with its quaint overhanging 'weigh-bridge': it was in position but a few years since, and in use. Orford with its quaint polygonal castle and sadly dilapidated church; and was not the famous 'manfish' caught in mediæval times in the North Sea off Orford Ness? Stamford, a small town crammed even yet with remains of the England of the past, and Grantham but little behind it in interest; Hexham, one of the most attractive of the northern towns; Northallerton with its church porch stones, scored as are some on Sedgemoor, with the marks where weapons have been sharpened thereon; Wakefield with its memories of the Yorkist defeat outside the mighty ruins of its once mighty castle, and with its chapel adorned bridge: this last, one of the three chapelled bridges which now remain. A few years later the Regiment was at St. Ives in Huntingdonshire, where another chapel is to be found on the bridge, though in the eighteenth century this had been raised in height and converted into a lighthouse. Newbury with its quaint old hall, with its memories of two battles, and with Donnington Castle hard by at Speenham Land; Knaresborough, picturesque and still guarded by its noble though slighted castle, and as yet unknown to fame as the habitat of Eugene Aram; Pontefract, the 'Pomfret' of old, and one of the strategic points which in the Wars of the Roses the contending parties were ever striving to seize. These are but a few of the places at which the Regiment was quartered. And be it observed we have said nothing of cathedral cities, neither have we mentioned Tewkesbury, Evesham, Taunton, Berwick, Glastonbury, Sherborne or Devizes and others, all of which have their architectural features as well as their military memories.

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CHAPTER VI

DETTINGEN—1743

IN the preceding chapter we have told how the Regiment, whose colonel was now Major-General Sir John Cope, left Scotland and, marching south, was shortly afterwards selected to form a part of an army of 16,000 men destined for active service in the Netherlands under the supreme command of Field-Marshal the Earl of Stair. The object of this expedition was to support the interests of the Queen of Hungary and Bohemia then threatened by France and Bavaria. The design of this powerful combination was to deprive the Archduchess Maria Theresa of the Kingdoms of Hungary and Bohemia.

The quarters of the Regiment on 27 April 1742 were as follows: Three troops at Colchester, one at Chelmsford, one divided between Ingatestone and Brentwood, and the last divided between Bocking and Braintree. At the time a detachment of the Regiment was also at Ashford in Kent, probably on preventive duty, and this on 6 May was ordered to Ipswich. On 1 July one of the Colchester troops was sent to Witham, and thus distributed the Regiment remained until 6 August, when the route arrived.

On that date the several troops were ordered to march from their present quarters as follows, and there to remain until the date of embarkation was received. Four troops to proceed to Rochester, Strood and Chatham, and the remaining two troops to Gravesend and North Fleet.

In a few days the Regiment duly embarked, its destination being Ostend. On arrival the Regiment marched a few stages up the country and was then halted. No active measures were undertaken during the remainder of the year, as according to the military notions of those days it was too late, and so going into winter quarters the force remained stationary and inert until February 1743.

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The political position, which can, however, be but briefly sketched here, was somewhat curious.

The Emperor Charles VI had died in 1740, leaving Maria Theresa, his daughter, the sole heiress of his dominions, and as such she had been recognised by the Powers of Europe, a recognition guaranteed by the Pragmatic Sanction. The Elector of Bavaria, however, took a hostile view of the situation as regards Hungary. France hating Austria was prepared to support the Elector.

The various minor German States considered this an opportunity for possible aggrandisement, that is to say, they hoped for a chance of sharing the spoils, if any, should any grave political changes occur. The King of Prussia began overt acts of war by invading Silesia, where he overthrew Austria at Mollwitz in April 1741. It was the lighted torch which set Europe ablaze, though the conflagration took some little time to develop dangerous proportions.

France, who not only had designs against Germany but also hoped to strike a blow at England through Hanover, intrigued all round in an endeavour to get the Pragmatic Sanction abrogated, and also to obtain general European support for the candidature of the Elector of Bavaria (Charles Albert) as against the Grand Duke Francis of Lorraine, the husband of Maria Theresa, who claimed, and rightly, the Imperial Crown. But the point of the whole intrigue, though diplomatically concealed, was a design to divide Austria between Prussia and Saxony and to divide the entire Empire into four kingdoms—Bavaria, Hungary, Saxony and Prussia, each of which would be too weak to lead and too jealous of each other to unite against any separate or common foe. Hence France would become the predominant partner in the whole of that portion of Europe. Bavaria, Saxony, Prussia and Spain acquiesced in this charming arrangement, but England, backing as it would Hanover, adhered to the Pragmatic Sanction. Intrigues on both sides were now the order of the day. England's attempt to detach Prussia from this unholy alliance failed. King George then went over to Hanover to gather forces to support Maria Theresa. France took the field, and in two directions—one army crossed the Rhine to join Bavaria and march on Vienna, the other marched directly on Hanover. This action, unforeseen as it was, took King George by surprise, and he was compelled to temporise.

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A year's neutrality for Hanover was agreed upon, during which England engaged neither actively to assist Maria Theresa nor to vote for her husband. It was an arrangement which was equally despised and condemned in both England and Austria. Walpole then went out of office. Public opinion in England was strongly in favour of Maria Theresa, and Parliament voted her a large subsidy which amounted to no less than £500,000. This pecuniary assistance was later increased by the despatch to Flanders of the 16,000 men previously mentioned, as a force of so-called 'auxiliaries,' and a vote of £5,000,000 to prosecute the war, or rather *a war*, for at the time we were technically at peace with France; and our force when it reached Flanders was on paper supposed to be an 'auxiliary' army despatched thither to lend moral rather than active support to Maria Theresa. Lord Stair was appointed to the supreme military command of this force, but he was also entrusted with political duties. His first diplomatic employment was to persuade or endeavour to persuade the Dutch to permit the occupation of Nieuport and Ostend by the English force, bases of operations against the French being needful, seeing that the Austrian Netherlands were in danger.

For some time his efforts were fruitless; but on the news of the Austrian defeat by Frederick of Prussia at Chotusitz a grudging consent was obtained from the States-General. The situation was very serious. The French, under Marshal Maillebois, to the number of 40,000 men, lay between Hanover and the coast, should any British force be landed, and the preparations for war then in progress in Britain could point to no other design but a landing in the Netherlands.

As we have said, the force sailed from England and duly disembarked, but it is to be observed that it was self-interest alone that prompted the Dutch to acquiesce in the arrangement. For the Pragmatic Sanction they cared nothing, but of a French invasion of Holland they had a holy terror.

Meanwhile, the French had not had it all their own way in Austria, more than meeting their match in the Austrian General Khevenhüller. In Bohemia they had met with more success, having captured Prague, where a force under Marshal Broglie was established, but Broglie was not by any means a great soldier, and his occupation there caused but little anxiety.

The hostility of Frederick of Prussia was another matter, and of a far more serious nature; and while this hostility continued the serious nature

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of the crisis remained. Vainly did Stair endeavour to detach the warrior king; and vainly did he, with the use of every diplomatic wile, endeavour to persuade Maria Theresa to come to terms with Prussia. But that really remarkable woman would have none of it, till after her crushing defeat at Chotusitz. Then by the surrender of Silesia to Frederick, on the conclusion of the Treaty of Breslau, his active opposition was removed. It was now possible for the entire Austrian force to be directed against Broglie, and it looked as if he could be annihilated. In this case Austria could have invaded France *viâ* the Palatinate and along the Moselle, while England and Holland could either join them or march as invaders on Paris from the north on their own account.

Stair advocated such a proceeding, and had his view been adopted there is little or no doubt that France would have been crushed.

As it was, Austria speedily tackled Broglie, and Maillebois was compelled to hurry to his assistance, thus to all intents and purposes leaving the path to Paris open, for the French garrisons on the frontier, save at Dunkirk, were too weak to offer any real opposition. Moreover these garrisons were scattered and could have been dealt with in detail. Dunkirk was, however, a very strong place. Its fortifications had of late been greatly increased and strengthened; but this had its drawbacks, for it now needed a garrison of 40,000 men to hold it.

Dunkirk, then, Stair begged, prayed and implored the British Government to besiege, and at once. He was right, for the French must then either lock up this huge garrison in the town or withdraw it. King George, however, thought differently; his view was that the fiction of being at peace with France must be maintained, and to besiege Dunkirk, a French place of arms, would certainly be an act of war. Delay after delay took place. The veteran General Wade, to whom Stair's plan was referred, threw cold water on it, in his ever over-cautious way. The season of 1742 passed by, nothing was done, the troops already in Flanders went into winter quarters till the following year, and Stair had perforce to possess his soul in patience.

Meanwhile the French had not been idle, and a large force had moved to the Moselle to protect Lorraine; another, collected from Flanders, lay on the Meuse prepared either to join in the same object or to carry the war across the River Neckar, in the somewhat improbable event of an invasion by the Allies over the Rhine south of Cologne.

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Stair then proposed a march to the Danube—again he was thwarted. Finally, by the orders of King George, he occupied the high ground of Mainz which commanded the junction of the Rivers Main and Rhine. Gradually, and by slow degrees, the armies of England, Hanover, and Austria effected a junction on the north bank of the River Main. The French, under Noailles, were in position near Spires on the Upper Rhine, and numbered 70,000 men ; and they were in the hope of giving succour to Broglie could they but join hands with him. Stair was for an immediate advance. He wished to cross the river to follow its course downwards, and to establish himself between Oppenheim and Mainz. This would effectually have held Noailles in check, and more than that would have protected Bavaria and have enabled him to attack the enemy at will. A crossing of the Rhine would have been feasible, and having been accomplished would have opened the road for an invasion of Lorraine.

On 3 June 1743 the Allies actually began to cross the Main. But Noailles had not been idle, and had already set his force in motion, and instead of crossing the Neckar had passed through Darmstadt towards Frankfort intent on attacking the Allies. Stair proceeded to await him at a spot where the road debouched from a forest. The Austrian commander, whose military genius was not excessive, here, either through timidity or excess of caution, would by no means co-operate energetically in the movement. He considered, nay, made up his mind fully, that Stair was bound to be defeated, and in consequence withdrew his cavalry across the river, leaving only his infantry to engage in the expected struggle. Noailles marched on till he came in view of the Allied Army, and then, not appreciating the prospect, withdrew without even offering battle.

Stair's position was hardly to be envied. His grasp of the situation was complete and his proposals were sound, but King George, who had by this time arrived in Hanover intending to take command in person, thought differently. His various military advisers, both British and foreign, obsequiously echoed his opinions, and Stair was hampered in every way whenever he suggested any course of action. His very crossing of the Main, by the way, was in direct disregard of orders, for he suppressed the order forbidding him so to do ; but his doing so was justified in the event. He, however, re-crossed that river when Noailles declined battle. At this juncture King George arrived, and what is more took over command.

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The Allies were then encamped in a most unfavourable spot, a plain between the River Main and the Spessart Hills, hills thickly covered with wood and near to a place called Aschaffenburg.

This was not well in itself, but what was worse was that supplies were very short, and on this, the right bank of the Main, forage was not to be obtained. At Aschaffenburg there was a bridge, and this on the side of the Allies was fortified. Forage could be obtained across the river, and the battery thus erected would protect the passage.

Starvation speedily stared the Allied Army in the face. Their magazines were at Hanau, a town on the same bank of the river lower down, and distant by road some thirteen miles. Half-way on the other bank of the river was Seligenstadt, a place which was seized by Noailles and near which, lower down, he had thrown two bridges across the Main. It was possible, therefore, for him to cross at will and cut off the Allies should they make for Hanau by the road.

Four miles from Aschaffenburg along the road is a village called Klein Ostheim, to which for a portion of the way there is a loop in the road, which at one part passes quite close to the river.

Three miles further on is Dettingen, which is distant as the crow flies about two and a half miles from Seligenstadt. Hanau lies at between five and six miles beyond Dettingen. The country is very woody on both sides of the river, and the river itself winds considerably.

Noailles pitched his camp on some comparatively level ground facing Aschaffenburg, where the Main makes a long narrow loop. From this spot he proceeded to make such dispositions as would in his opinion render defeat to the Allies an absolute certainty directly they began to move towards Hanau; and that, being starved out, move or try to move thither they must. Noailles first erected a battery on his side of the Aschaffenburg Bridge, thus blocking it. He also posted sundry guns at intervals along the river on his side, so disposed as to rake the road along which the Allies must march. Some accounts state that he so employed five batteries, others four. By means of his two bridges below Selingenstadt he prepared to send across the river a force of 28,000 men, and these the pick of his troops, under Count Grammont to block the road hard by the village of Dettingen.

Noailles had plenty of time to effect these preparations, as for a week the Allied Army lay in Aschaffenburg lacking provisions, with discipline

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falling to pieces and with the troops in their need resorting to attempts at pillage, though there was little to be obtained thereby. Something had to be done. Affairs were in a desperate state by 26 June, and that night an immediate retreat to Hanau was determined on. Early on the morning of the 27th the retreat began, and already the signs of motion in the Allied camp had been reported to Noailles. He immediately in person delivered his orders to Grammont to cross the river, and assigned to him a spot close to Dettingen where he could wait for and attack the Allies as they crossed a little bridge, for here the ground was boggy and the road to Hanau led over a small brook by a bridge, at this place the only crossing. Truly according to all precedents the Allied Army was in a very tight place.

Ahead was Grammont with 28,000 men; on one side the Main whose banks were lined by the guns aforesaid, on the other side steep woody hills, and in the rear Noailles prepared to cross at Aschaffenburg with 20,000 troops of the French Army as soon as the Allies had cleared out of that delectable spot.

When the retreat to Hanau began the British cavalry led the van, followed by the Austrian cavalry. Next the British infantry and the Austrian infantry. Lastly the British Guards and the Hanoverian infantry and Hanoverian cavalry.

No sooner were the Allies well on their way than Noailles advanced on Aschaffenburg as predetermined. It occupied about three hours for the Allies to reach Klein Ostheim, where about 7 A.M. the retreating army had to make its passage by a narrow road.

When the cavalry in the van had passed through the place it was halted to permit the slower passage of the infantry. With this object, therefore, and to clear the road, it was drawn up between the road and the river and facing the latter. The Allies once through the village were now within the range of the guns so skilfully placed by Noailles, and the cannonade began. Not only this, too, but some guns in the rear also opened on them. These hitherto had been unable to come into action as the line of march of the French on Aschaffenburg masked them.

Of the fire of these rear guns the Allied baggage got the chief benefit, and much confusion ensued.

For more than an hour the retreating Allies were being industriously pounded while endeavouring to form in line of battle in a spot so narrow

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and contracted that any formation was almost an impossibility. At length the British artillery, which was not at first available, was hurried up to the front, and after a duel succeeded in putting the French guns out of action. All through this time of stress the baggage waggons and animals were being gradually withdrawn and were finally massed together on the other side of the road in a wood which, having boggy ground on either flank, seemed to promise security for, at any rate, a brief time. Moreover, too, it was out of the range of cannon shot. King George, whose personal exertions on the occasion were very considerable, managed at length to get his army drawn up in something like proper formation, but it was formation of by no means the regular kind. The troops were stationed as follows :

Left Front Line : 33rd Foot ; 21st Foot ; 23rd Foot ; 12th Foot ; 11th Foot ; 8th Foot, and 13th Foot. On the right of these an Austrian Brigade of Infantry, succeeded by the Horse Guards, the Life Guards, the 6th Dragoons and the Royal Dragoons. As a second Line, and immediately behind the extreme left, came in succession the 20th Foot, 32nd Foot, 37th Foot, 31st Foot, and the 3rd Foot.

The Second Line of Cavalry consisted of the 7th Dragoon Guards, the King's Dragoon Guards, the 4th Dragoons, 7th Dragoons and the Royal Scots Greys. It is to be noted that the extreme left of the British first line did not rest on the river, but left a gap of from 200 to 250 yards unoccupied. In front of the Allies the French under Grammont were drawn up also in two lines but with a reserve in addition in the rear. Their infantry was in each case in the centre and their cavalry on each flank, the extreme right being occupied by the cavalry of the ' Maison du Roi.'

We must now return to Grammont, whose orders were to await the Allies at the bridge. This he had proceeded to do, but wearying of standing, as he supposed, idle he had in disobedience to his orders crossed the bridge and advanced right through the village of Dettingen, and was at the moment of the formation in line of battle of the Allied Armies endeavouring to get his men also into some semblance of order. This disobedience of Grammont's caused or mainly caused the failure of the well-matured scheme of Noailles. King George awaited no attack, but attacked himself, and took every advantage of the fact that discipline in the French Army was slack, the officers incompetent and regiments and

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brigades in considerable confusion. Indeed it is stated that the French Household Cavalry never really took its allotted station but marched and countermarched in a meaningless way in front of the French infantry and between the lines of both armies. This they could safely do, as the lines being drawn so near together the French guns across the river were perforce silent for the moment.

The position was now this on the Allied left :

Opposed to the British infantry were huge masses of cavalry, and a gap between the extreme left and the river of some distance. General Clayton, who was in command, perceived this and despatched a request for cavalry to close this interval. The 3rd Dragoons were sent to him, and they and the 31st Foot had for some time to experience the effects of the destructive fire from the French guns which had now again got into action. But a small and weakened regiment of cavalry had a hard task ahead, which was nothing less than to cope with their numerous, fresh and heavily armed opponents.

The advance of the Allies was resumed. King George full of ardour well ahead of the line. Without orders some of the infantry opened fire, and this had the effect of frightening the white charger ridden by the King, which incontinently turned tail and bolted to the rear, despite all the efforts of its royal mount. It was, however, caught, and the King dismounting fought, and fought bravely, for the rest of the day on foot. Again the Allied line halted, loaded, redressed and again advanced. And now the French put themselves in motion on the right centre where the Infantry of the Guard were posted. They opened fire but did little damage. The British replied, not in a fitful or disorderly way, but with volleys regularly and precisely delivered ; reloading swiftly and displaying the utmost steadiness. Some cheering now took place, but this was checked, until by the signal, it is said, of Stair himself, who waved his hat, a simultaneous cheer burst out all along the line. Whether it was the effect of the volleys or that of the cheering who shall say, but the French Infantry of the Guard quailed and fell back to reform behind their cavalry.

The British still advanced, but another, a new and potent danger, was in front of them. Down on them came the cavalry of the 'Maison du Roi' ; and to meet them three regiments of infantry, one the 33rd which had already lost many men, and two squadrons, not by any means strong

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squadrons either, of the 3rd Dragoons. General Clayton at once discovered the peril in which his men stood, for he could not only be attacked in front but could be outflanked owing to his still improperly secured left.

But, notwithstanding, he ordered the 33rd and 21st and the 23rd and the 3rd Dragoons to face the music, and face it they did right nobly. Still, knowing that his extreme left was really unprotected and that it was open to a flank attack Clayton despatched urgent requests for a reinforcement of cavalry to secure it. This reinforcement at length came, but before it arrived much had happened. Down on the British infantry and the two squadrons of the 3rd Dragoons dashed the masses of the French cavalry. Out to meet them rode the 3rd Dragoons, and the odds were two squadrons of British cavalry that had been pounded by artillery, against nine squadrons of their enemy not only fresh but also clad in breastplates. The opposing forces met and at a brisk pace.

The 3rd Dragoons, despite all disparity, cut their way through their opponents, but not without heavy loss. It was then the turn of the 33rd, who had to withstand the onset of their mounted and protected foes. On rode the French, but were met with volley after volley—and down went horse and man. Another body of French cavalry took on the 21st and 23rd, firing on them with their pistols first and then in accordance with time-honoured custom flinging the empty weapons in the faces of the men prior to an attack on the ranks with the sword. It may be remarked that this custom was in vogue in England as far back as the days of the Great Rebellion. Again the French cavalry were met by a steady fire, and the fire prevailed, for they fell back somewhat in disorder. By this time other forces were at work to the detriment of the British. A French infantry regiment opened a flanking fire on the 3rd Dragoons and many fell. It looked as if the British left could be outflanked, and had this happened nothing but disaster could possibly have supervened.

The 3rd Dragoons were by this time in such a condition from casualties that further active participation could hardly be expected; yet, rallying their shattered force, they not only charged the French cavalry once again but twice, and cut their way through.

But now of their officers only two remained, and more than half their men had either been killed or wounded. Two of their guidons had been shot or cut to pieces, and a third had fallen from the hand of the officer who carried it, his hand having been slashed with a French sabre.

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It was then that a trooper in the Regiment, by name Thomas Brown, observing the guidon lying on the ground, dismounted to regain it. A Frenchman cut at him and severed two of his fingers; still he managed to regain his horse, but the animal bolted headlong into the French and through them to the rear of their ranks.

A Frenchman picked up the guidon and rode off with it. Brown saw him, and though wounded went in pursuit. He killed the man, and managing to grip the guidon he thrust it between his thigh and the saddle; then, alone and wounded as he was, by a desperate effort he cut his way back to the remnant of his corps. He saved the guidon, but in so doing received more than half a dozen wounds.

Trooper Brown recovered, and after some weeks was sent home, where a post was found for him in the Household Brigade. But the brave fellow did not live long to enjoy it, for he died the following year.

It has been told how reinforcements of cavalry had been applied for by General Clayton, and these were sent from the right of the British line. Headlong at a gallop the 1st and 7th Dragoons came up and dashed into the French cavalry, but the charge was not successful, probably because it was not delivered in regular line, and also it must be remembered that the breastplates and helmets of the French were no small protection both against sword and pistol. Shock tactics have their value, but they must be applied correctly to be effective. For a space the two regiments were repulsed and retired to rally. Following on them came the British Horse Guards, who shared a similar fate and from the same reasons.

Believing that they had thus disposed of the British cavalry, the Frenchmen now advanced for a second attack on the 21st and 23rd Foot, and this time with partial success. It was, however, but momentary, for though the cavalry had cut through their lines the British infantry stood firm, rallied, faced inwards, and having thus enclosed their adversaries shot them down without mercy. More British cavalry now came up, the 4th and 6th Dragoons, and also two regiments of Austrian cavalry. Twice these attacked the French and twice they could not prevail. A third attack now took place, in which the rallied squadrons of the 3rd, the Horse Guards, the 1st and the 7th joined. This was a last and supreme effort and the British finally were victorious.

It was altogether a curious battle, for on the right of the British line a French attack had been repelled with ease. The enemy, indeed, did

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DETTINGEN.

1743.

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not appear to care seriously to face the volleys of the British infantry. A strange episode, however, took place, and it was this.

Dashing between the opposing lines of infantry, and *en route* receiving the fire of both friend and foe, the French Black Musketeers charged from what was their station on the right of the French line and hurled their squadrons on the Royal Dragoons who were posted on the extreme British right. It was a mad enterprise at best. The chance now offered to the Allies was at once perceived by Marshal Neipperg the Austrian Commander. He ordered the British cavalry to make a frontal attack on the advancing Black Musketeers, while his own threw themselves on the flank of the Frenchmen. The French were caught thus between the two and cut to pieces. This achieved, the victorious cavalry turned its attention to the French infantry, whom it took in flank.

Declining to make a stand, the enemy fled, and this, as far as the left and centre of the French Army, was the end of the battle. On the British left all was not yet over. There the cavalry, though they had repulsed the French after so much strenuous fighting, had not yet done with their opponents, and pressed them again as hard as ever.

At this juncture the Royal Dragoons having disposed of the French infantry, who by this time had bolted, caught the remains of the French cavalry in flank, pressed thus as they were also in front. An utter rout followed, and the entire French Army was speedily in headlong flight towards the two bridges at Seligenstadt, and also to seek any fords they could discover. Many plunged into the river haphazard and were drowned. There was no pursuit: there should no doubt have been. Stair proposed it and the King refused to permit it. Hence the remains of Grammont's force escaped unmolested. Why Noailles did not hurry up his men and take the British in the rear is a mystery; but as a matter of fact he did not, as far as can be ascertained, even cross the river during the battle. There he remained at Aschaffenburg without doing or attempting to do anything, and with him were some 20,000 men. The French losses amounted to some five thousand men, killed, wounded and prisoners. The loss of the British was 265 killed and 561 wounded; and these casualties occurred mainly on the British left.

Several French standards and kettledrums were captured. Of the 7th Dragoons (The Queen's Own) Lieutenant Falconer, Cornet Hobey, one serjeant, ten privates, and twenty-two horses were killed. Lieutenant Frazer, Cornet St. Leger (who afterwards died of his wounds), one

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quartermaster, two serjeants, thirteen privates, and thirteen horses were wounded. General Clayton was also slain.

The Duke of Cumberland received a slight wound in the leg from a bullet. His horse, like that of King George, bolted, but in a different direction, carrying his rider into the middle of the French infantry. The Duke, however, managed to extricate himself from his somewhat dangerous and doubtless unpleasant predicament.

King George on the occasion displayed the greatest possible bravery and exposed himself recklessly. It is the fashion with some writers to laugh at his behaviour on the field at Dettingen, but of his genuine courage none can have any doubt. His remark when his runaway horse was captured and he had dismounted was characteristic.

'At least,' quoth he, 'I can trust my own legs not to carry me in the wrong direction.'

That night the Regiment remained on the field of battle, and unmolested by Noailles. On the morrow, leaving the wounded behind, it moved off to Hanau, and later encamped on the banks of the River Kinzig whither the Allied Army had already preceded it.

Early in August the King marched towards the Rhine, crossed it beyond Mainz, and advanced to Worms. The Regiment was then employed in West Germany, but there was no renewal of hostilities. Later in the autumn they repassed the Rhine and were marched back to Brabant and Flanders, where they went into the usual winter quarters.

Meanwhile, the King had returned to England, soon to be followed by Lord Stair. This veteran officer had not been well treated, and had good cause to feel more than hurt. There is a very lengthy paper in which he expresses in the plainest terms and in no uncertain strain his disgust at the scanty courtesy meted out to him, and in which he announces his intention to resign. Truly he had a genuine grievance, for was he not appointed to the supreme command, and despite that was he not prevented from conducting the campaign?

Still, such instances have occurred to other commanders before the days of Lord Stair, have occurred since, and probably will occur hereafter. It is a curious reflection, but we were still 'not at war' with France—for war was not formally declared until some months after the British, their Allies, and the French had been at hand-grips at Dettingen.

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When Stair resigned—for nothing could shake his resolution so to do—General Wade, now for the purpose being promoted to the rank of Field-Marshal, was appointed to the Command. Failing Stair, he was perhaps the most fit or the least unfit person available for the post, but compared with Stair as a military commander he was a long way the inferior soldier.

It will here be fitting to quote the notice of this campaign for the year 1743, as it appears in the Manuscript Regimental Record.

'1743. The Regiment embarked and arrived in Flanders and was present at the Battle of Dettingen 27th June new stile where it lost 17 Horses.'

The next entry mentions that in 1744 'Captn. John Guerin of Sir John Cope's Dragoons serving in Flanders, his Servants and Baggage to be taken on board at Dover.'

Extract from the returns of the Killed and Wounded, printed in the *London Daily Post*, No. 2730:

'The Queen's Regiment of Dragoons, Lieut. Falconner, and Cornet Hobby, killed; Lieut. Fraser and Cornet St. Ledger, wounded.

'The loss of Men and Horses not separately Stated, Cornet St. Ledger died of his wounds.'

This is the whole of the information to be gathered from the Manuscript Regimental Record for the years 1743 and 1744, and is typical of the singularly slender contents of that volume.

Practically the one fact of importance gleaned is that at any rate Captain Guerin was not with the Regiment at Dettingen.

Unfortunately there are no means of ascertaining with any degree of accuracy what officers were really present at the battle.

It may also be remarked that it was in 1742 and not in 1743 that the Regiment embarked for Flanders. In the various accounts of the battle of Dettingen the valuable services of the British Artillery do not appear to be sufficiently recognised. It is, however, an undoubted fact that when on arrival—tardy, it is true, but unavoidably so—they got into action and silenced the guns of Noailles, or a portion of them, their excellent practice was of the utmost importance to the Allies.

Let us consider the situation. Drawn up ever within range and for a

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protracted period, both the cavalry and infantry were exposed to a most heavy and galling fire, and a fire too that they were powerless to resist or to avoid, seeing that the river separated them from the French artillery. However heroically both the cavalry and infantry may have behaved, there is still room to award the just meed of praise to the British Artillery, and it should be ungrudgingly given.

From a letter to 'Mr. Urban,' the time-honoured *nom de guerre* of the Editor of the *Gentleman's Magazine*, vol. xiv., p. 30, we are led to believe that considerable friction existed between the English and Hanoverians throughout the campaign, and that allegations of misconduct had been made against the latter at the battle. Those who are curious may consult that useful publication thereon. Mr. Urban's correspondent warmly defends the Hanoverian troops, and not by any means in the most polite terms.

In volume xiii., pp. 434 and 435, there is a curious battle map, with a lengthy explanation, and stated to be 'Published by Authority.'

The map and explanation are here reproduced in facsimile.

From the *Gentleman's Magazine* we obtain a list of the French standards which were taken at the Battle of Dettingen. Details of six are given on p. 385, vol. xiii.

'1. A white Standard, finely embroidered with gold and silver, a thunderbolt in the middle, upon a blue and white ground. Motto, *Sensere Gigantes.* Both sides the same.

'2. A red Standard, two Hands with a Sword, with a Laurel Wreath and Imperial Crown at Top. Motto, *Incorrupta Fides et Avita Virtus.* On the other side the Sun. Motto, *Nec pluribus impar.*

'3. A yellow Standard, embroidered with Gold and Silver. The Sun in the middle. No motto.

'4. A green *Ditto* in the same way.

'5. The Mast of another tore off; but appears to have been red.


'6. A white Standard, embroidered with Gold and Silver. In the Middle a Bunch of nine Arrows tied with a wreath, all stained with blood; the Launce broke; Motto *Alterius Iovis altera Tela.*'

This was the standard of the Black Musquetaires. The cornet who carried it was buckled to his horse, and the standard to his body. A sergeant of Hawley's Dragoons captured it.

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PLAN *of the Battle of* DETTINGEN, *as publiſhed by Authority.*



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References to the Allied *Army.*

A The Incampment of our Army from the 16th, 17th and 18th of *June*, as it came up succeſſively to the 27th in the Morning, when it marched The *Engliſh* Troops being poſted near *Aſchaffenbourg* at N° 1. the *Hanoverians* at N° 2. and the *Auſtrians*, with their Right to the Woods and Marſhes, at N° 3.

B The March of the Army in two Columns, which halted at the Entrance of the Wood, where it drew up in Order of Battle, upon Advice that the *French* were paſſing the *Mayn* at *Seligenſtadt*, their Infantry over two Bridges, and their Cavalry fording it.

C Diſpoſition of the Army before the Battle, including the Batteries E. which at firſt made a continual Fire, and advanced towards the Enemy with the Lines about Noon, continuing to do ſo till near three a Clock, when the Enemy retired. The Infantry is diſtinguiſhed by Colours (ſmall) and the Cavalry by Standards (large.)

D The Independant Companies in a Corner of the Wood, to cover our Baggage, which had retired behind it during the Battle.

F A Body of Cavalry obſerving a Party of the *French* on the other Side of the *Mayn* at N° 10. who made a Shew as if they intended to ford the River.

G Three Batteries oppoſed to thoſe of the *French*, which they had erected on the other Side of the *Mayn* to gall our Troops in their March, and from the Firſt of which, N° 11, at about eight a Clock in the Morning, they began to play upon our Rear, compoſed of *Hanoverian* and ſome *Engliſh* Troops, having the King at their Head.

H The Village and Rivulet of *Dettingen*, which the *French* took Poſſeſſion of in order to attack us.

I The Attack of the *French* Houſehold Troops, which broke thro' the three firſt Lines of our Infantry, but were repulſed with Loſs.

L The Attack of the *French* Guards and other Infantry in Brigades, which took us in Flank, but could not break thro' us, becauſe our Infantry of the Wing, altho' it be not marked here, formed immediately a Flank againſt them, repulſed them, and forced thoſe who did not throw themſelves into the River and ſwim over, to retire along the River, to regain the Village of *Dettingen*.

M The March of our Army in Order of Battle purſuing the Enemy, in which the firſt Line of the Cavalry was ordered to take the Lead, and which kept before the Infantry till they arrived at the Place where the new Camp was marked out, and taken Poſſeſſion of.

N The new Camp where the Army paſſed the Night after the Battle, and from whence it began to march between nine and ten a Clock in the Morning, in order to reach the Camp between *Hanau* and *Franckfort*.

References to the French *Army.*

N° 4. The Camp of the *French* from the 16th and 17th of *June* to the 24th.

5. The Shifting of their Camp till the Day of Battle.

6. March of the *French* from Break of Day on the 16th of *June*.

7. March of five Brigades of *French* Infantry to attack the Head of the Bridge, and the Town too of *Aſchaffenbourg*, which they took Poſſeſſion of finding no one there to oppoſe them.

8. Paſſage of their Infantry over two Bridges at *Seligenſtadt*.

9. Paſſage of their Cavalry at the Fords.

10. Other Fords, before which a Party of *French* Horſe were placed. N° 10.

11. The firſt Battery of five Pieces of Cannon, from which the *French* play'd upon our Rear about eight in the Morning, which, (as has been before obſerved) the King led on in Perſon

12. The ſecond and third Batteries, which likewiſe took us in Flank during our March.

13. The fourth and fifth Batteries, which cannonaded our Army, whilſt it was drawing up in Order of Battle, and which continued cannonading it during the Battle, and till the Action was near over

* Plain where the *French* drew up, and advanced with the Battery of Cannon from which they only fired during the Engagement of the Houſhold Troops, and which diſappeared immediately, upon their and other Troops, as well Horſe as Foot, being repulſed.

16. Retreat of the *French*.

† Their Incompment after they had repaſſed the *Mayn* over the Bridges, and at the Fords, when a great Number were drowned, particularly of the *French* Guards. *& gros Veſheim*

N. B. *The Earl of* Stair *eſcorted by thirty Dragoons going from the Camp at* Aſchaffenbourg *to the other Side of the* Main, *in order to reconnoitre the Poſition of a Body of* French *that had advanced thither; a Party of them compoſed of about fifty Men coming out of the Wood* (4,) *where they lay in Ambuſh, attack'd the General's Eſcort and wounded in the Leg Mr* Littleton *his Aid de camp, the Earl of* Stair *himſelf having narrowly eſcaped a Ball which grazed his Head, and blew off his Hat.*

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CHAPTER VII

1744, 1745, AND FONTENOY

THE victory at Dettingen had this effect; the French were unable to reinforce their army in Bohemia, and it was not long before they were ejected from Germany.

The scene of the future conflict was therefore limited to the Austrian Netherlands. Marshal Saxe was nominated Commander-in-Chief of the French Army in Flanders, and found himself the leader of a powerful and fully equipped force with which he opened the campaign quite early in the year, and by the beginning of April he had concentrated 80,000 men on the line between the Scheldt and the Sambre. To oppose him Marshal Wade, who, as has been told, had succeeded to the command on the resignation of Lord Stair, had some 55,000 men: a mixed army of British, Austrians, Dutch and Hanoverians, of which the proportion of British was about 21,000, or an increase of 5000 men over the numbers engaged in the preceding year. But it was no easy task to get this composite force, or rather its leaders, to act in hearty co-operation. In fact Saxe, the finer soldier by far of the two, not only possessed a much stronger force but had the advantage of a command which was not hampered by the jealousies and selfish intrigues which still further weakened the striking power of the so-called Allied Army. The Dutch and Austrians were the chief trouble, for each desired and obstinately insisted on the protection as far as possible of their own frontiers, regardless of the general plan and conduct of the campaign as proposed by Wade on his arrival at the seat of war. But another serious drawback must be mentioned. Wade himself actually did not arrive until nearly six weeks after Saxe had concentrated his force. That Wade did not arrive was not, however, his fault.

It was not until the second week in May that he reached the Allied

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Army after a voyage retarded through contrary winds when he did actually embark, but a voyage at first delayed through the political events which were taking place in England; these, however, need not be particularised.

Reinforcements from England were sadly needed, yet they were not sent in any sufficient numbers.

The Queen's Own Dragoons, however, appear to have been more lucky in this respect than some other corps.

We read under date 5 March 1744/5 : '3 Officers, 40 Men and 60 Recruit Horses of Cope's Dragoons to March from Daventry to Barnett [Barnet].' Also 7 March 1744/5 : '3 Officers, 38 Men and 38 Horses to March from Barnett to Gravesend and remain till they can embark for Ostend.'

Again, on 25 March 1744/5 : '20 Men and 30 Horses of Cope's Dragoons to March from Barnet to Gravesend and remain till they can embark for Ostend.'

Cannon tells us that the Regiment was joined in the spring of 1745 by a number of men and horses, and this presumably refers to the drafts above named. He also tells us that the establishment of the Regiment had been augmented, but to what extent he does not state. Apparently the draft which actually went to Flanders amounted to three officers, fifty-eight men, and as many horses. The names of the officers again are not given.

The Allies concentrated in the neighbourhood of Brussels and had the pleasing prospect of endeavouring to hold not only Flanders and Brabant, but also Hainault and the line of the Sambre with a force far inferior to that of the enemy. For quite a month they remained in camp; meanwhile Saxe struck off to the west and then to the north, where he obtained possession of Ypres and Fort Knock, thus effectually blocking the Allies off from the harbour of Nieuport, which, with Ostend, constituted their two bases of operations on the coast. The British now could only land troops and stores at Ostend. Here there were huge magazines of stores, guns, &c., and it was an open question whether Saxe could not obtain possession of that port as well. It was also quite possible for him to attack Bruges or Ghent or both, or he might besiege Tournai. Slowly the promised re-inforcements reached Wade, and they had duly arrived by the first weeks of July. Meanwhile an

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important step had been taken. Prince Charles of Lorraine had crossed the Rhine, forcing his passage, and had occupied with his army a strategic position on the borders of Alsace. To him was now given the Command-in-Chief of the whole of the Allied forces.

A blow, and a serious one, could at this juncture have been struck at the French, and probably an energetic campaign could have been initiated, but it was not to be.

Prussia suddenly entered the field, and by threatening Bohemia with invasion caused the instant return of Prince Charles of Lorraine across the Rhine. Wade, who had already received from England most definite orders to immediately take the field and to act with energy, felt bound to obey, and, after consultation with the other commanders, crossed the Scheldt, hoping thereby to come to hand-grips with Saxe, who was now comfortably entrenched on the river Lys between Menin and Courtrai. Having, however, crossed the Scheldt, the Allied Armies proceeded no further but lay for weeks in camp. Various other schemes were proposed which need not be here particularised, for one after the other either leave to attempt them was refused from England or the objections of one or other of the foreign commanders prevented their accomplishment.

Finally, a move was made to the south, and the Allies marched as far as the plains near Lille. Here, as before, a halt was called, and more was not attempted. Near Lille the army did not remain long, and it was soon quietly marching back again. Thus matters rested through the months of August and September, during which period Wade repeatedly but vainly proposed scheme after scheme for the prosecution of the campaign. By October the season was too advanced, and after this parody of campaigning the troops settled themselves into quarters for the winter.

Wade had had enough of it, and no wonder; so, resigning his command, he returned home.

He was succeeded in the command by the Duke of Cumberland, who was also appointed Commander-in-Chief at home.

The new commander arrived in Flanders in April, succeeded in concentrating his troops at Soignies near Brussels by May 2, and actively took the field the next day, when his armies struck camp and marched off to the south.

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Saxe meanwhile had as usual taken time by the forelock, and after a final march which appeared to threaten Mons, had turned off, and by 30 April had opened his trenches and was regularly besieging Tournai. The movements of Saxe were swift and were executed with consummate skill. Through an extensive and masterly use of his powerful cavalry he so managed to conceal his real objective, Tournai, that no intelligence of his position or intentions was then received, neither did it become known to the Allies for some days. By 9 May Cumberland had arrived at Brussoel, having passed through Cambron, Maulbay, and Leuse. That evening he found himself face to face with Saxe.

Early on the morrow two troops of the Queen's Own Dragoons were employed in driving back the out-guards and piquets of the enemy, a prelude to the serious engagement which was to take place next day. Apparently there were no casualties—at least none are reported, nor indeed is the affair mentioned in the Manuscript Regimental Record, though it is duly recorded by Cannon in his History. These advanced posts of the French had been stationed in certain copses. A more particular account of the position here follows. The enemy were discovered drawn up in a very strong position. In their front the ground was much broken up by copses, small woods, and enclosed fields. These had been occupied by bodies of irregular troops, foreigners mainly. The employment of foreign irregular mercenary troops had been imitated by the French from the Austrians, who largely made use of Pandours and Grassins in their armies.

Pandours, it is stated, were so called because they were originally raised from the mountainous districts in Lower Hungary near a village called Pandur as Hungarian foot soldiers in the Austrian service. Campbell the poet mentions them thus :—

> 'When leagued oppression poured to northern wars
> Her whiskered pandours and her fierce hussars.'

The Grassins were a species of light militia, originally raised as the Arquebusiers de Grassin in 1744. Grassin was their first Lieut.-Colonel and had belonged to the Regiment of Picardy. Both Pandours and Grassins were expert foragers, intelligence purveyors, and scouts. Their services were of the utmost use to the French armies as well as a constant source of irritation and annoyance to the British and their Allies. Behind

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H.R.H. WILLIAM DUKE OF CUMBERLAND.




MARSHAL DE SAXE.

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these copses and fields the ground gently rose, and on the crown of the hill was situated the village of Fontenoy. The centre of the French position was here, and the village was fortified.

The right of Saxe's army rested on a village called Antoin, close to the river Scheldt and due west of Fontenoy. Here there was a castle and some fortifications and also on the other side of the Scheldt a battery of guns. The left of Saxe's army extended almost at right angles to



the line of the right as far as the Forest of Barry. Between Antoin and Fontenoy three strong redoubts had been erected, and between Fontenoy and the extreme left were two more, the nearer being known as the Redoubt d'Eu. Between Fontenoy and this redoubt there were also two lines of entrenchments. Roughly speaking, the French front occupied two and a half miles, and was, as will be understood, most strongly defended and as strongly held. It completely blocked the road to Tournai. In front were three villages, Vezon, Maubrai, and Bourgeon, which formed a triangle the apex of which, Bourgeon, was nearest to Fontenoy and distant about half a mile as the crow flies; the other

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two were about a mile apart, and were a mile and a quarter in the case of Vezon, and a mile and a half in that of Maubrai, from the same place. When the operations began, Vezon and the broken ground already mentioned were occupied, as has been said.

The night prior to the battle the Allies encamped at Maubrai. On the morrow the Pandours were dislodged, and as they retired to Fontenoy they set on fire the village of Bourgeon. Cumberland, accompanied by the Count of Königsegg, who was in command of the Austrians, and the Prince of Waldeck, who commanded the Dutch, then advanced to reconnoitre.

The disposition of the French Army was as follows. The two redoubts on their left were armed with cannon and commanded the ground between the Forest of Barry and Fontenoy. The double line of entrenchments was held by nine and eleven battalions of infantry, behind which were two strong bodies of cavalry. Further on the left and behind the forest was more infantry and more cavalry. Fontenoy itself was strongly held and the three redoubts between that place and Antoin were armed with cannon and protected by infantry and a strong body of cavalry. The entire French force totalled about 56,000 men of all arms.

As a supporting force to the Pandours and Grassins in the village, the copses, and the fields, twelve squadrons of cavalry were drawn up in front of Fontenoy and part of the way up the slope. These retired when the French outposts were driven in.

It was decided to attack on the morrow, but not without a difference of opinion on the part of the Allied commanders. Cumberland and Waldeck advocated this course; Königsegg dissented, but was outvoted. The attack was determined on thus: the British right should attack the French left, the Dutch the centre, and the Austrians the French right. The balance of strength was in favour of the French, even without the adventitious advantage of redoubts and entrenchments, as the Allies could muster no more than 50,000 men. At 2 A.M. on the morning of 11 May the Allied Army set itself in motion, the British marching on Vezon, the advance being led by fifteen squadrons of cavalry under General Campbell. Three hours later Campbell's men had passed through Vezon and had formed on the ground beyond it. Their duty was to cover the British infantry while it was forming to attack the Redoubt d'Eu and the double line of entrenchments which lay between it and Fontenoy. To Brigadier Ingoldsby with the following troops was

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assigned the task of assaulting the Redoubt d'Eu : the 12th Foot, 13th Foot, 42nd Highlanders, a battalion of Hanoverians, and three six-pounders. These were detailed to carry the redoubt, and Cumberland had no doubt but that they would succeed while he and the main body of British infantry advanced and at the point of the bayonet, if need be, had the task of clearing the enemy out of the entrenchments. To reach these entrenchments a considerable stretch of open ground had to be covered, and troops advancing were within range both of the Redoubt d'Eu and the guns at Fontenoy. On the appearance of Campbell's cavalry the French at once opened fire with their guns, and for an hour the squadrons remained stationary and exposed to it. Campbell was then wounded—his leg was carried away by a cannon-shot. Nobody appears to have known what plan of action had been arranged for the cavalry, and the men, after being exposed uselessly, as it turned out, to a terrible gunfire, were later withdrawn.

All this time the British infantry were steadily forming beneath a hail of cannon shots under the actual command of Lord Ligonier. Six British guns now came up by the order of Cumberland and were posted on the extreme British right. Here they rapidly came into action, and it is recorded that one of the first shots killed the Duke of Grammont. The battle was at present an artillery duel, but the French paid far more attention to the ranks of British infantry than to silencing the British guns, and from d'Eu and Fontenoy a terrific fire was directed against them. Meanwhile, what was happening in the centre and on the left ? The three attacks had been designed to be simultaneous. Ligonier was now ready and despatched a message to the Duke of Cumberland by his aide-de-camp, Captain Jeffery Amherst. The Dutch and Austrians were also reported to be ready, and a general advance at once began.

We must now return to General Ingoldsby. His instructions, one would imagine, were sufficiently clear to be incapable of misconstruction. He had but one objective, and that was the Redoubt d'Eu. This he was directed to assault and capture. What he actually did in that way was nothing, despite the fact that order after order was delivered to him from Cumberland, who was chafing at the delay. The result was that the redoubt, unassailed, still continued to pour shot into the British ranks. At length Cumberland proceeded to make his frontal attack on the two lines of entrenchments, just as if the redoubt had been

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non-existent, and Ingoldsby a phantom. But how had the Dutch and Austrians fared meanwhile? Both advanced, but coming, as they speedily did, under a heavy fire not only from the village but also from the three redoubts on the French right and the battery across the Scheldt which flanked them, could not be persuaded to advance far. The gunfire prevailed; both Dutch and Austrians fell back and took what cover they could get, but, worse than all, a body of Dutch cavalry, panic-stricken, turned tail and bolted from the field, riding in their headlong flight right into some of the British cavalry, nor did they check their wild flight until Hal was reached.

This was the serious position on the left of the Allied Army. On the right the attack which Ingoldsby had been ordered to make on the Redoubt d'Eu, as has been already stated, never took place, despite the more than once repeated orders of Cumberland. Weary of waiting, that General then initiated an attack on the entrenchments in his immediate front, without further delay. The British troops were drawn up in perfect lines, and their disposition from right to left was as follows:—

The first line:

Grenadier Guards, Coldstream Guards, Scots Guards; the 1st, 21st, 31st, 8th, 25th, 33rd and 19th regiments.

The second line:

The Buffs, 23rd, 32nd, 11th, 28th, 34th and 20th regiments, with the addition of some Hanoverian battalions on the left.

Each battalion was accompanied by two guns, to which the men harnessed themselves, and which by these means were dragged into position.

And now Ingoldsby, perceiving what was in progress, considered that the time had come to do something, though to obey orders even at the eleventh hour, and too late as it proved, does not appear to have occurred to him. What he did was this. He placed his troops in line with the advancing British, and thus the attack began.

Quietly and with as slow a step as if it were a parade movement the British lines moved on towards the entrenchments of whose existence they were fully aware but which they could not as yet see, as owing to the formation of the ground and the fact that the entrenchments were over the crest of the slope they were invisible. For half a mile their

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path extended, flanked on the right by the Redoubt d'Eu and on the left by Fontenoy. From the guns of both these posts a constant and terrific fire was kept up which crashed continually through their ranks. Still they marched calmly on with drums beating and muskets shouldered, closing up their ranks as the murderous fire made gaps therein. Now it happened that the second line had a more extended front than the first, seeing which the Hanoverian troops on the extreme left were gradually relaxed in their speed and took up such a position as to enable them to march on in what practically became a third line. On towards the redoubt and the village the Allies steadily proceeded. And now the enemy's guns, which had been turned inwards first, played directly down the lines, doing fearful havoc, and later when the village had been passed actually took the advancing British and Hanoverians in the rear. More and more fell, but still at the same pace and for ever closing up and with a constantly decreasing front the Allies continued their steady advance. On arrival at the crest of the ridge the enemy at length came in view. They were posted behind a breastwork, distant some hundred yards. Onward the Allies still maintained their advance, though their front was now sadly contracted, so heavy had been their losses. At fifty yards distance from the breastwork it is stated that Lord Charles Hay of the Grenadier Guards bareheaded saluted the enemy and, producing his flask with somewhat, as it seems to us in these days, theatrical courtesy, drank to the foe, hoping, as he shouted, that the enemy would wait for them and not run as they had at Dettingen. He also added a few stirring words to his own regiment. The Guards answered with a cheer, which was echoed, though by no means lustily, from the ranks of the enemy, whose officers advanced to the front to acknowledge both toast and speech. By this time barely thirty yards separated the hostile lines, and then it was that the enemy fired.

The time for the British had now arrived, and volley after volley was poured into the French. It is stated that no fewer than nineteen officers and 600 men of the French and Swiss Guards went down before the first fire. Another regiment, that of Courtin, was nearly exterminated, and the Aubeterre regiment lost nearly half its numbers. To sum up, the first French line was absolutely discomfited. And here it should be mentioned that the hand-dragged guns by frequent and well-timed discharges of grape-shot had played a most important part in this terrible struggle.

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In vain Marshal Saxe had brought up additional troops to endeavour to stay the advance of the Allied forces. He had posted the regiments of Couronne and Soissons and the Brigade Royal behind the King's regiment and the French Guards, but without avail. The British volley-firing swept them away, and the Allies pressed on and on till they reached the French camp, which was situated about three hundred yards in the rear. It looked as if, despite their terrible losses, victory would declare itself on the side of the Allies. Ligonier certainly at the time esteemed the battle as won, and it is pretty nearly certain that his opponent Saxe agreed with him in that view.

At any rate, Saxe despatched a message to the King, who with his son the Dauphin was watching the course of the battle from a windmill near which their sumptuous tent was pitched, in which he suggested their retirement across the Scheldt without delay.

Meanwhile Saxe busied himself in rallying his beaten or shaken troops.

The battle now entered upon a new phase. Cumberland, who evidently was ignorant of the failure of the Dutch attack on Fontenoy, when the first entrenchment was carried had detached two battalions from his left to, as he thought, assist in that attack by assailing Fontenoy and its defences on their right flank. Saxe, observing the movement and realising its danger, brought his cavalry into play, and by a charge of that arm these battalions were driven back.

One of these battalions then spread itself out along the left flank of the British. The effect of this movement, combined with the effect of the French guns, which had never ceased to play upon the Allies, was to press the British first into two columns and afterwards into one, the two being joined so as to present the appearance of a large solid though elongated parallelogram. This body was attacked by the first line of the French cavalry, which had been fetched from the rear of the Forest of Barry and came on at a headlong gallop. The French charge was, as usual, met by volley-firing and was practically shattered. To these succeeded the second line, only to meet with similar failure.

A third charge, in which the Household Cavalry of France—the celebrated 'Maison du Roi'—took part, succeeded the first two failures, and like them was beaten back with terrible loss.

To return now to Cumberland and the Allied right, whom we left

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in the French camp. Here the shot-torn ranks of the British were halted. Assistance, or rather support, from the Dutch under Waldeck was not forthcoming; for, as we know, his attack had failed. Lacking support, therefore, the British, who were still under the heavy cross-fire of artillery from the redoubts, slowly withdrew as far back as the crest of the ridge, where they were reformed with the intention of making a second attack. Cumberland, who had been in communication with Waldeck, on the promise of the latter to again endeavour to take Fontenoy, started for the second time at the head of the British.

Marshal Saxe, however, had not been idle. He had brought up his reserves which had been posted at Ramecroix and had also transferred the artillery from the French right to a position fronting the British advance. Among the reserves, it may be mentioned, were the celebrated Irish Brigade. Saxe also had rallied the remnants of the French Guards and the French first line which had been driven earlier from the entrenchment.

Cumberland was therefore in the presence of three distinct artillery fires, and was faced not only by the rallied troops but by large reinforcements of fresh troops. In the same method again the British advanced and with almost the same success as at first, for they penetrated nearly as far into the enemy's camp as before. It seemed as if nothing, not even the Irish Brigade, could withstand the steady volley after volley which the brave, heavily stricken but devoted men poured into the enemy's ranks.

Cumberland was, however, completely outnumbered by this time, so heavy had been his losses; and a new danger now threatened him. On both flanks the French infantry closed in, and this, added to the unceasing cannonade on both flanks and in front, rendered a retreat absolutely imperative. This retreat was not, however, in any sense a rout, but was conducted in the most orderly and regular manner, the Allies forming a square with their guns in the centre. As a preliminary Lord Ligonier despatched a couple of battalions to seize and hold the roads which led through to Vezon. Burning to achieve somewhat, for hitherto they had not gathered many laurels in the combat, the French Household Cavalry attempted to charge the rear just at the moment that the British faced about to retire. Their charge was met by the British Guards and some Hanoverians, who, turning again, poured

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in effective volleys at close range on the advancing foe. The French suffered very heavily, and it is stated that every officer of one regiment was either killed or wounded, while another regiment was well-nigh exterminated. As will be seen, Fontenoy was as much an infantry battle as Dettingen was a cavalry combat; in fact, the British cavalry, after clearing the coppices as has been already narrated, had during the engagement nothing to do. With the retirement, however, matters changed, and such few squadrons as were within call, among them being the Horse Guards Blue, hurried to cover the retreat, passing *en route* through the terrific cross-fire of the enemy's guns. The retreat continued at as slow a pace as the advance, broken only by the facing about of battalion after battalion at short intervals. Thus did the shattered remnant of the British to the end keep their pursuers at bay till Aeth was reached, beneath the guns of which place the wearied troops found shelter. Details as to the action of the British cavalry do not appear to be forthcoming. We are told that the total loss of this arm of the service in the battle 'exceeded three hundred men and six hundred horses.' The Horse Guards Blue and the Royal Dragoons suffered most.

The casualties in the ranks of the 7th (Queen's Own) were ten men and forty-six horses killed; Lieut.-Colonel Erskine, Captain-Lieutenant Ogilvy, Lieutenant Forbes, Cornet Maitland, Quartermaster Smith, thirty-five men, and forty-seven horses wounded; one man and two horses missing. This is the account given by Cannon in his History.

The Manuscript Regimental Record, however, differs, and we will give here the entire entry concerning the campaign, battle and casualties :—

1745
New Stile

11 May. The Regiment was present at the Battle of Fontenoy, where it had 67 Horses killed and the following officers killed and Wounded

Cornet Potts Killed
Lieut.-Colonel Erskine
Capt.-Lt. Ogilvie
Cornet Maitland
Quarter Master Forbes
do. do. Smith
} Wounded

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An extract from the *Daily Post* of Monday, 13 May 1745, is appended to this account, which confirms the death of Cornet Potts and also states the numbers of men and horses killed, wounded, and missing to be the same as given in Cannon.

It may be remarked that Lieutenant Forbes was also Quartermaster. Clearly the number of horses (sixty-seven) stated to have been killed must have been an error on the part of the man who wrote up the Regimental Record.

As will be seen from the above narrative of Fontenoy, the details concerning the Regiment are few indeed. Search has been made in many directions to obtain facts to supplement this account, but without avail. It would seem that nobody concerned cared to keep any detailed record. Mr. Skrine, in his interesting and careful work, 'Fontenoy and the War of the Austrian Succession,' has apparently found the same difficulty and is unable to assist us in any way. For the purposes of this history it was, however, needful to give an account of this celebrated battle, and why that account should prove to be so abridged has now been explained. It must also be remembered that a regimental history is in no sense a history of the British Army as a whole.

The official account given in the *Gentleman's Magazine* (vol. xv., p. 246) furnishes one or two other particulars. We learn that by the order of His Royal Highness, General Ligonier 'caused seven pieces of cannon to advance at the head of the Brigade of Guards, which soon silenced the moving batteries of the enemy.' The hostile guns in the entrenchments and redoubts are not of course referred to here. When the order to retire was given, the two regiments selected to hold the road were Lieut.-General Howard's and the Highlanders. The first was posted in the churchyard of Vezon and the second 'in the hedges where they had been posted the day before.' The baggage of His Royal Highness was sent off to Aeth at about 2 P.M. During the action it had remained at Brussoel. Marshal Königsegg, who had been hurt by a fall from his horse, also went to Aeth, but not until the retreating allies had passed through the defiles. He arrived there in the evening, but His Royal Highness remained with the troops and did not reach Aeth till 3 A.M. on the morrow. No colours, standards or drums were lost, and one standard was taken from the enemy. A gun was abandoned in consequence of the early flight of the contractors with the artillery horses.

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CHAPTER VIII

The Campaigns after Fontenoy, 1745–1749. Battles of Roucoux and Val

As has been already stated, the Allies made good an orderly retreat to Aeth. Here they rested for a space of five days, a period which was employed in reorganising the regiments which had suffered so heavily in the glorious but disastrous battle of Fontenoy. That there was no panic is witnessed by the calm tone of the General Orders. Returns of the killed and wounded were called for and obtained, the sale of the effects of deceased soldiers was ordered, and widows—for as of yore the wives followed the armies into the field—were sent back home.

The loss in horses too was duly registered. It appears that some of the officers had engaged French deserters as servants, and these, as possible spies, were ordered to be dismissed and furnished with passes to Brussels.

One man, by name Patrick Crowe, who was suspected of espionage and was stated to have come from Bavaria, was seized, summarily tried, and hanged. An officer of one of the cavalry regiments was accused of cowardice and tried by court-martial. For the honour of the service we are glad to record that he was acquitted, being able to prove in the most positive manner that his flight was involuntary, he being carried away by the cavalry panic which affected the Dutch cavalry and from which he was totally unable to extricate himself.

Meanwhile the enemy were not inactive, and it soon became apparent that Aeth was by no means an ideal rallying-point for Cumberland's army. Round and round the camp the Grassins and light troops of the enemy incessantly hovered, now cutting off stragglers and at times convoys. Four days after the battle it became needful for Cumberland to take active measures to rid the outskirts of the camp from this annoyance, and a force of 200 horse and 600 foot was detached under Brigadier

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Skelton to effect this purpose. Henceforth the Pandours and Grassins therefore were kept at a distance.

On 16 May Cumberland put his troops in motion and advanced to Lessines, which he reached after crossing the river Denaire, near that place, by means of a pontoon bridge. From this place some of the British regiments which had suffered most severely were sent into garrison, their places being taken by others that had not been so terribly cut up. At Lessines considerable reinforcements of foot joined the army from various quarters. Barrell's, now the 4th Foot, was the first to arrive, Fleming's (the 36th) arrived from Oudenarde, Ponsonby's (the 37th) from Bruges, Beauclerk's (the 31st) and Ligonier's (the 48th) from Ostend. Dutch regiments were also at once despatched by the States General.

There was, however, a great dearth, as usual, of British troops at home, and in consequence six battalions of Austrian infantry and twelve troops of Hussars were taken into British pay by agreement with the Empress Maria Theresa in the month of June.

The Austrian contingent amounted actually to 5600 men—8000 had been promised but were not supplied. From the Landgrave of Hesse also 6000 men were similarly obtained. By 11 June Cumberland could muster some 16,000 infantry and 4200 cavalry in his right wing, and this force he speedily organised into a condition of efficiency.

The total of the Allied Army was now, professedly at least, no less than 70,000 men, but in reality it did not nearly amount to this number.

The capture of Tournai was now the immediate object of Saxe. He remained with his army safely entrenched on the field of Fontenoy the night after the battle. On the morrow he despatched all the available Grassins to pursue and harass the rear of the retreating Allies.

By these a dozen guns were captured and a considerable quantity of stores for which there was no transport.

One detachment penetrated as far as Leuze, gathering in by the way some three thousand stragglers. The wounded to the number of 1200 which had been left at the Château de Bruffoel were captured, stripped and robbed by the Grassins, who, not content with this, served the surgeons in charge in a similar manner. This act of barbarity led to an interchange of letters between Cumberland and Saxe, in which the recriminations were mutual.

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Meanwhile Tournai still held out despite the strenuous efforts of Löwendahl, the French commander, who was entrusted with the task of capturing it. During the day on which Fontenoy was fought he pressed his attack, especially directing it on the horn-work which defended the Gate of Seven Fountains. On 15 May this defence was carried and on the 18th a practicable breach was made in the bastion close by. The garrison determined to capitulate. Negotiations were entered into with Löwendahl. It would appear that the Governor, by name General Baron Van Dort, and all principal officers under his command, with the single exception of Lieut.-General Leuwe, were determined on yielding the stronghold. The matter was referred to the States General, who returned two different decisions to Marshal Königsegg, their aged commander-in-chief. One paper authorised a surrender on the best terms obtainable, the other urged that the place should be defended as long as possible. As will be seen, the decision rested, or rather was laid, on the shoulders of the gouty and aged veteran.

He called a meeting of the other commanders to his bedside, where it was unanimously determined to hold out.

Instructions were therefore sent to adopt the second course. The admission of wounded men or any other useless incumbrances into the citadel of Tournai was forbidden, and an attempt to cut through by the besieged cavalry in the direction of Oudenarde was suggested, failing which they could at need fall back on their horses for food. Frequent sorties to annoy and retard the enemy as long as possible were similarly enjoined. It was, however, of no avail; the garrison were resolved to surrender, and the capitulation was signed on 20 June 1745. It was as a matter of fact a disgraceful affair. The surrendered garrison were conducted to Ghent.

The loss of Tournai had most disastrous results on the relations existing in the wings of the Allied Army. Bickerings, nay even actual quarrels, broke out between British and Dutch soldiers, so much so that none of the latter were permitted to enter Ghent citadel with side-arms, and all were rigidly excluded therefrom after tattoo.

The release of the besieging force gave a considerable accession of strength to the army of Saxe, and it was not long before he took advantage of it to resume the offensive.

On 30 June he despatched a force of three battalions and thirty-four

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squadrons under the Marquis de Clermont-Gallerande to occupy Binche. This place lay half-way between Mons and Charleroi, and consequently threatened both places. Now the possession of Mons and Charleroi was very dear to our Dutch Allies, and despite all that Cumberland could urge they took measures to secure them. To effect this the left wing of the army was weakened to a dangerous degree. Eight battalions were hurriedly sent to Mons, six to Namur, and detachments also thrown into Charleroi and Aeth. Cumberland had now hardly more than 40,000 men with which to take the field. The Dutch next urged a withdrawal from Lessines, declaring that it was impossible to hold it. Cumberland, though very unwilling, was practically forced to acquiesce, and on the day the French occupied Binche the Allied Army was withdrawn to Grammont. How great an error this was may be understood by what follows.

At Lessines the French would have been compelled to remain behind the Scheldt or else to have fought on ground chosen by the Allies, and on ground which was most favourable for cavalry action. Naturally this retreat delighted the French.

In vain Cumberland, who still possessed 40,000 British and Hanoverian troops, urged an attack. His actual proposition was to intermingle the troops of the four allied nations and then attack the enemy, a plan which of course differed considerably from that which had been employed at Fontenoy. The Dutch, however, would have none of it. And now the French advanced, after demolishing the works of Tournai—works which had been designed by the celebrated Vauban.

In six columns they marched on Leuze, pushing on the Grassins as far as Lessines, where they threatened the rear of the retreating army.

On the morrow the French advanced to within a league of Grammont and seemed about to attack.

Cumberland then threw six British battalions with twelve guns into the place.

Next day, after manœuvring for ten hours, the enemy encamped about Grammont at about a league's distance, but on the other side of the river.

It now remained for Cumberland to decide on one of two courses. He must abandon either Flanders or the city of Brussels. Still, he had some hopes of being able to save Ghent, and for this

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purpose despatched Lieut.-General Moltke to seize Alost with ten squadrons of cavalry and three battalions of infantry, the instructions to that commander being to watch the enemy and if necessary to throw himself into Ghent.

Moltke occupied Alost on 8 July. On the same day Saxe sent 15,000 men under Du Chayla in the direction of Ghent, with orders to reconnoitre the base of the Allies.

The Grassins moved eastwards, and, seizing the Château de Massenew, about eight miles from Alost, entrenched themselves there.

Moltke heard of the move and despatched the Royals (1st Foot) to dislodge them. The Royals surrounded the place. Fifteen volunteers were called for by Grassin, the colonel who was in command, to carry news to Du Chayla. Of these five succeeded in getting through. Du Chayla then threw his remaining troops across the embankment leading to Ghent and awaited the coming of Moltke. The Royals were unable to take the Château, being unprovided with guns, and rejoined.

Moltke proceeded to Ghent as instructed. On arrival near Melle Priory he came in touch with the enemy, of which a brigade was drawn up across the embankment, and the hedges and houses on either side were filled with troops. There was also a battery of twelve guns about forty yards on the left. The Royals, who led the column, charged the enemy in their front and routed them. They then captured the French guns, but it happened that the pontoons of the enemy had been posted in rear of the guns and behind them were two French brigades. During the infantry combat the British Dragoons (Rich's) and the Hanoverian cavalry made a dash for Ghent. They, however, found themselves opposed by a small party of the Berry cavalry under a Captain St. Sauveur, who in a most gallant manner succeeded in holding them for a sufficient time to allow of the arrival of another French brigade.

Moltke's force was now in a very tight place. It was outnumbered about three to one. Still the little force pressed on towards Ghent, despite the heavy fire poured into them on either side. With a loss of one-third of their number they, the Royals, Rich's Dragoons, and the Hanoverian cavalry at length reached their destination. Brigadier Bligh, who commanded his own regiment, Handyside's, and some Dutch cavalry managed to fall back on Alost, gaining that place through the

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woods and lanes; but with the loss of his tents and baggage, which were captured by the ubiquitous Grassins. From Alost he retreated to Termonde. His loss was 292 of the British. Fifteen hundred prisoners were taken by Du Chayla and a great deal of booty. At least 500 of the Allies fell, added to which Cumberland's despatches were captured. The enemy, however, did not escape without considerable loss, as nearly 1000 were either killed or wounded.

This disaster sealed the fate of Ghent. Saxe reinforced Du Chayla by 15,000 men under Löwendahl and the place was at once invested.

On 11 July it was summoned to surrender. The French Dragoons succeeded in swimming the moat unopposed and at the same time the Bruges Gate was seized by two battalions of grenadiers. The garrison, Dutch and British, the latter being the Welsh Fusiliers and the remains of Moltke's force, retired into the citadel. Moltke himself escaped at the head of the Hanoverian Cavalry. At Sluys he arrived that night, but was refused admission into the place. He wished to pass through and on to Antwerp. As the Dutch would not permit him to enter the gates, the unfortunate men, weary and war-worn, had to make their way to Ostend.

The citadel of Ghent was now besieged, the investment beginning on 14 July. The defenders do not appear to have offered any resistance of a strenuous nature. The batteries were about to open when the Dutch governor gave in, and, practically without striking a blow in defence of the place, surrendered.

A huge accumulation of military stores; the Dutch garrison, the Royal Welsh Fusiliers, and a number of Rich's Dragoons found themselves prisoners of war. The one redeeming exploit of this disaster was the gallant conduct of the quartermaster of Rich's Dragoons, by name Kelly. He managed to slip out of a sally-port before the capitulation was signed, at the head of four cornets and 160 men, and safely reached Antwerp. On arrival at the camp of the Allies it is pleasant to read that he was rewarded with a cornetcy.

Cumberland's position was now the reverse of pleasant. The enemy advanced on Mons and it became impossible for the Allies to continue at Grammont. They accordingly on 10 June retreated to Meerbeck near Ninove. The news of the fall of Ghent now arrived. Cumberland at once retreated to Brussels, and thence a few days later to Dieghem.

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On 24 July the enemy under the personal command of the King (Louis XV) advanced to Oordeghem, thus threatening to cut Cumberland off from Antwerp. In consequence he retired two days later to Saventhem, just outside Brussels on the south-east.

Cumberland's army was now in a position of considerable danger, and there is no doubt that he fully appreciated the difficulties of his situation. To keep the field he had no more than 34,000 men, while the enemy possessed a force of 70,000 troops concentrated at the King's camp, to which must be added a body of about 8000 men who were under the command of the Comte de Clermont-Gallerande. If Brussels fell it would be the immediate precursor of a terrible disaster.

If Antwerp was captured his communications with Holland would be cut and all means of subsistence for his army would be gone, which would mean starvation and surrender. Added to which the condition of Ostend was far from satisfactory. At this juncture Cumberland urged most strongly that of the two evils the loss of Antwerp would be the greater. His representations alarmed the British Government, who despatched, in the first place, Major-General Braddock to report on the condition of Ostend, to examine its defences, and at the same time they forwarded to that place an immense quantity of stores. Cumberland's proposal had been to cut the dykes, but this course was vetoed by the Austrian Minister in Flanders, by name Wenzelius, who later became Prince von Kaunitz. It remained therefore for the British to defend the place as best they might.

To add to the troubles of the British Government, at this juncture the rebellion in Scotland known as the ''45' now broke out. Prince Charles Edward landed near Moidart on 19 July 1745; but definite news of this event did not reach London for nearly a month.

This rendered the preservation of Ostend a matter of vital importance, as free communication with a seaport became an absolute necessity. A fleet was despatched to cruise off Ostend. The garrison there was reinforced by two regiments, viz. the Royal Scots Fusiliers and the 32nd Foot. An Austrian General by name Chanclos was sent to examine the defences of Ostend. His verdict was that the place might be held, but that a larger garrison was needed. Accordingly a combined battalion of the Guards was sent thither from London. On 7 August a fleet of British and Dutch transports entered the harbour with a large quantity

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of artillery and stores of all kinds. Cumberland two days later despatched thither from Antwerp the 18th Royal Irish. These defensive measures were taken none too soon. On the day of the arrival of the Royal Irish Löwendahl appeared on the land side with a force of 21,000 men and 6000 horses laden with fascines. He began operations by summoning Fort Plassendael to surrender, and the summons was obeyed. Owing to the refusal of the Austrians to permit the dykes to be cut the enemy were able to erect batteries on the shore, and these rendered the approach of the British warships well-nigh impossible.

Meanwhile Cumberland had removed his headquarters from Saventhem to Vilvorden, a place on the Antwerp-Brussels Canal and situated about seven miles north of the last-named city. Here he encamped in a line along the canal. His position was therefore somewhat nearer Antwerp, and he at the same time did not leave Brussels absolutely uncovered.

Towards the north as far as the canal-head on the Rupel the British and Hanoverians were posted, while the Dutch occupied the remainder in the direction of Brussels. Along this line a chain of redoubts and entrenchments was erected with all speed, and here Cumberland remained on the alert. In the army itself he had many disciplinary troubles. Desertion was rife, and various other military crimes such as marauding and robbery were of only too frequent occurrence; it is needless to add that, as was then the custom, offenders when detected were punished with the utmost severity. And now the main French Army under the immediate eyes of both Louis XV and Marshal Saxe put itself in motion. An advance was made to Alost, by which both Brussels and Antwerp were threatened. Their right was extended as far as Termonde, at that time held by a Dutch garrison and the British 48th Foot. Cumberland in vain endeavoured to increase the garrison by sending a reinforcement of some 600 men by boat from Antwerp, but the attempt failed, and unfortunately many lives were lost.

Saxe then laid regular siege to Termonde. Around the town the ground had been flooded, but the Marshal succeeded in draining off the water. After a twenty-four hours' bombardment the place surrendered on 13 August, and the captured guns were forthwith despatched to increase the artillery already employed in the projected attack on Ostend.

The siege of that place began regularly on the following day. A

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lucky and, it may be said, very plucky attempt on the part of the navy succeeded in removing such British cavalry as happened to be shut up in the fortress and, what was more to the purpose, managed to land as well a considerable addition to the stores besides certain reinforcements. The completion, however, of the heavy French battery on the sandhills near the shore prevented entirely any repetition of the exploit.

The bombardment now began, and was carried on continuously. General Chanclos, who was in command, had a task which was well-nigh impossible of performance in directing the defence. His Dutch troops were by no means in a state of discipline. True he had five British battalions to stiffen his force, but it will hardly be believed, though true, that these British were there shut up in the besieged fortress without one general officer of their own nationality. An attempt by Cumberland to send thither Lord Crawford and Brigadier Mordaunt at the eleventh hour was prevented by the French shore-battery aforementioned.

Meanwhile the main French Army drew nearer and nearer to Cumberland's position on the Antwerp-Brussels Canal. Louis took up his quarters at Lippeloo, Saxe at Opdorp, and their right wing extended as far as Steinhuffel. The course of events in Scotland now caused the British Government to suggest the despatch of troops from the seat of war in Flanders to that country for the purpose of home defence. To do this at the time was impossible. An agreement was, however, entered into with the Dutch Government to despatch to England the 6000 men which they were by treaty compelled to do.

George II was himself out of England at the time, though he was endeavouring to return there. Contrary winds, unfortunately, detained him at Helvoetsluys.

Ostend was now very hardly pressed. On 22 August, after a night attack, the besiegers succeeded in occupying the covered way, though not without suffering great loss. Two days later the place surrendered. By the articles of capitulation the garrison was permitted to evacuate Ostend with all the honours of war, and was then to be escorted to Austrian territory. Aeth, the sole remaining fortress in Austrian hands, was the next place to be besieged. After an eight days' bombardment it fell on 9 October. The garrison marched out with full military honours and joined the army of Cumberland. British troops were now returning to England in numbers. Cumberland soon followed them. Marshal

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Königsegg set forth for Vienna and Prince Waldeck took over the command of the remains of the Allied Army. These he as speedily as possible located in winter quarters.

Orders now arrived to send to England eighteen squadrons of British cavalry, four companies of artillery, and the field-train which had been quartered in Antwerp.

Such are the main incidents of this most disastrous campaign.

We must now state in order the few facts connected with this campaign which concern the 7th (Queen's Own) Dragoons. After the capture of Tournai the Queen's Own accompanied Cumberland's army and was encamped for some time near Brussels. The movements of the army in question have already been narrated.

After the fall of Ostend the Regiment went into winter quarters and there remained until February 1746. In that month orders were received for them to return to England. Accordingly they marched to Williamstadt and embarked on the transports which had been provided for them. As usual, contrary winds prevailed and the troops were delayed—one transport it is stated was stranded. The continuance of the bad weather then led to a change of plan. The men and horses were all disembarked and ordered to await a favourable opportunity for their voyage. Meanwhile the back of the rebellion had been broken, and the Government came to the conclusion that the presence of additional British troops in England was no longer needful, while their presence in Flanders was of greater importance. Accordingly the order for re-embarkation was countermanded. But though the Queen's Own Dragoons had not since Fontenoy been engaged in any actual active warfare, the Regiment would appear to have been considerably under its war strength. Accordingly, in March 1746 we find drafts ordered to be sent from home to the Regiment in Flanders.

On 25 March we read as follows :—

'102 men with 156 horses belonging to Lieut.-General Sir John Cope's Dragoons to march from Daventry to Gravesend, there to remain till they can embark on board the Transports for Flanders.'

This is succeeded by another order dated 28 March :—

'The Men, Recruits, and Recruit Horses of Cope's Dragoons upon their arrival at Barnet to halt till further orders.'

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On the next day we read that :—

'Three Officers and 55 Men with 120 Recruit Horses of Cope's Dragoons to march from Barnet to Dartford and remain till they can embark at Gravesend for Flanders.'

The date on which the embarkation took place and the date of the arrival of this draft in Flanders we are not told.

As will be understood from the facts narrated above, the opportunities offered to the cavalry to gain distinction in the campaign of 1745 were few; but the following year, though uniformly disastrous to the arms of the Allies as a whole, was from a cavalry standpoint one in which that branch of the service at any rate acquired distinction.

During the winter Saxe, until January 1746, had his quarters at Ghent. How his time was employed in that city is well known and need not be entered upon in detail. Waldeck lay at Malines with his army. Contrary to usual custom, however, Saxe towards the end of the month initiated a winter campaign. Brussels was invested on 30 January and capitulated after a siege of three weeks, Waldeck being quite unable with the forces at his disposal to either retard the catastrophe or to relieve the place. In consequence no fewer than 15,000 men—the garrison—became prisoners of war. Next Vilvorden fell, and with it practically the most important stores and artillery train of the Dutch became the spoils of the victors. Louis was now disposed to rest on the laurels his armies had gained in Flanders, and even opened negotiations for peace with Maria Theresa. These negotiations for peace, however, came to naught, the Empress declining to discontinue the war. Culloden had been fought and won; the rebellion in Scotland had been stamped out, and the British King was at length able to devote his energies to Flanders.

Following on the refusal of Maria Theresa to negotiate with Louis came the despatch of 50,000 Austrians under the command of Prince Charles of Lorraine across the Rhine. Saxe was again despatched to the seat of war as commander-in-chief—he had been in Paris for some time, where as a victorious commander he had been duly fêted.

His first act was to lay siege to Antwerp, and it surrendered on 31 May. Waldeck retreated to Breda from Malines and there entrenched himself while awaiting the advent of Lorraine. From England now came

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considerable reinforcements: troops which had been released owing to the crushing of the rebels in Scotland.

Six thousand Hessians and thirteen thousand Hanoverians reached the camp at Breda during the month of May. Thither also at the end of June came four British cavalry regiments, among them being the 7th Queen's Own, and six regiments of infantry, the force being under the command of Sir John Ligonier. Waldeck's army now numbered about 50,000 men, and, more than this, the Austrians under Lorraine had so far advanced as to be within four days' march. As to the events of this year, however, the manuscripts are silent. Ligonier landed at Williamstadt as the only available spot, since Ostend and Antwerp were both in the hands of the enemy. His infantry was not, however, in a condition to take the field, being destitute of powder, artillery horses, and baggage waggons. Added to this, the relations between the British and Austrian commanders were, to say the least of it, strained. Saxe now entered upon another period of activity. He detached the Prince of Conti to reduce Mons and St. Ghislain, and both these places fell. That commander then proceeded to lay siege to Charleroi.

Evidently Maestricht and Namur were the objective of the French campaign. It was not, however, until July that the Allies were able to move. In that month they shifted their camp to Terheyden, and here they remained until 17 July. At length an advance was made with a view to relieve Charleroi. Saxe, who had been lying with his main army near Antwerp, at once marched to the Dyle between Aerschot and Louvain. Lorraine after a terrible march arrived at Peer, then crossing the Demer at Hasselt in a southerly direction reached Borchloen on 27 July. It appeared now as if Namur could be saved and possibly Charleroi as well. On that very day, however, Charleroi surrendered. A complicated series of manœuvres now took place. At times the opposing armies were almost within musket-shot of one another, at others far apart. Battle was more than once offered and refused—nay, more, the opportunities for attack which were given on either side were disregarded. Muy fell to Saxe. Lack of forage and subsistence in the camp of the Allies was severely felt. Namur was besieged by the enemy and capitulated, after a siege of eleven days, to the Prince of Clermont. The Allies then fell back in order to protect Liège, crossing the river Jaar on 7 October. They took up a position admittedly bad:

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the river Meuse was in their rear and Saxe with an overwhelming force in their front and steadily approaching them with an evident intention of fighting. He crossed the Jaar on 10 October, and that night the Allies and the enemy faced one another with the prospect of a battle on the morrow.

The position was as follows: The Allies faced due west and were drawn up across two roads, both of which led to Liège. Their right rested on the river Jaar, where it was covered by three villages, Sluys, Fexhe, and Enick, which were occupied by the Austrians, who had strongly entrenched themselves. On the open plain to the south of Enick and stretching as far as a village named Liers the four British battalions and the Hanoverians were posted. On their left and in rear of Liers were the Hessians; next came the Hanoverian cavalry, who extended southwards as far as the village of Voroux; then came the 6th Dragoons and the 7th Queen's Own Dragoons, who filled in the interval between Voroux and Roucoux; lastly, the Dutch troops occupied the ground between Roucoux and Ance. As a position it was decidedly bad. Not only was it possible and indeed comparatively easy for the enemy to turn the left flank, but if the right flank were turned the line of retreat to Maestricht would be cut. Added to these, the Meuse ran in the rear and the presence of two ravines between the rivers Jaar and Melaigne in the centre allowed but one narrow means of communication between the right and left of the Allies.

Lorraine as well as Ligonier both appreciated the difficulties of the case. The former, however, held his right with as much strength as he could to avert the danger on that flank; and so matters rested on the night of 10 October. On the morrow came news that the French were masters of Liège. This compelled the Prince of Waldeck to denude his left of eight battalions from Roucoux and to post them on his left flank with cavalry supports to guard against any attack in that direction. Hence to the British, Hanoverians, and Hessians alone was left the defence of the three villages, Roucoux, Liers and Voroux, and they numbered but eight battalions. Obviously the left was the weakest, and on that flank Saxe at once advanced. He was superior both in numbers and in strategical position. His army amounted to 100,000 men, while that of the Allies was not exceeding 80,000, and of these fully 26,000 were safe behind the Austrian entrenchments on the extreme Allied right near the river Jaar.

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In dense columns he first assailed the Dutch on the Allied left, following this up by an almost simultaneous attack on the centre in which fifty-eight battalions in three columns were launched upon the three villages. Splendidly did British, Hanoverians, and Hessians answer to the call. More than one attack was repulsed, but each time Saxe sent forward fresh troops, and these at length prevailed, so much so that Roucoux and Voroux were perforce abandoned, though the enemy could not prevail at Liers. Ligonier, man of action as he was, rallied his men, and brought them back to the attack with the result that both Roucoux and Voroux were recaptured. Meanwhile the Dutch had lost heavily and were retiring from the left across the rear of the position. Then it was that Ligonier brought the British cavalry into play. First using them as a check to the enemy in order to permit the Dutch to make good their retreat, he next ordered the withdrawal of the British infantry, employing his cavalry in a similar manner as before. Having possessed himself of the villages, Saxe then ordered a general advance, practically a pursuit of the retiring British. On through the captured villages the enemy's battalions made their way, but they were not for long unchecked. At them were launched the Royal Scots Greys, the Inniskillings, and the 7th Queen's Own Dragoons. The advancing enemy wavered at the onset, their ranks were broken, and before the charge of the British cavalry they turned and fled. This gallant charge without a doubt was the main cause of the retreat being accomplished without a great disaster.

Ligonier in a letter thus briefly describes the action of the cavalry :

' . . . the Enemy's Foot with great Shouts Began to come out upon the plain in Great Numbers, butt on our marching upon 'em with the Cavalry at a Great Trot, sword in Hand, they run back into the villages much faster than they come on.'

There are no records of the loss of the 7th Queen's Own (if any) on this occasion. The History of the Royal Scots Greys does not mention Roucoux. The casualties among the Inniskillings amounted to three officers wounded, six men killed and seven wounded, one man missing, and fourteen horses killed, wounded, or missing. Cannon in his History of the 7th (Queen's Own) gives a brief account of the battle of Roucoux ; the Manuscript Regimental Record, however, does not mention either the battle or the campaign. In the upshot the British, Hanoverians,

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Hessians and Dutch crossed the Meuse by means of three pontoon bridges at Visé. The Austrians, who had been inactive during the combat, partly from the configuration of the ground and partly from the position of the French containing force, also retired in good order.

The Allied forces halted at Maestricht, and it being now the season for winter quarters they so disposed themselves in the country along the lower Meuse, Breda being occupied by the British.

The campaign of 1747 began slowly. In January a convention was signed with Holland by which that country agreed to furnish 40,000 men and to pay two-thirds of their cost. Hanover promised 16,400, Austria 60,000, and the British contingent numbered 13,800. On paper this amounted to 130,000 men, but as a matter of fact not more than 112,000 were forthcoming when in February the Allies concentrated at Breda.

The plan of the French was to carry war into Holland, and for this purpose two armies were formed: one, under Löwendahl, was destined to wage war in Dutch Flanders and to lay siege to Sluys and Port Phillipine; the other, commanded by Saxe, who was now styled 'Marshal-General,' would threaten Southern Holland and lay siege to Maestricht. Löwendahl succeeded in his designs: west Flanders being secured rendered the left of Saxe safe from any hostile movement.

The Dutch were in a state of terror, and a revolution took place which ended in the election as Hereditary Stadtholder of Prince William of Orange-Nassau, the son-in-law of George II. Meanwhile the Allies marched on Antwerp with the intention of besieging it. Löwendahl frustrated their design by throwing a powerful force into its citadel. In the event the Allies abandoned their intention and retired to a position in which they covered Maestricht. Here they suffered much loss of strength, as desertion was rife and, what was even worse, dysentery had broken out. Still Cumberland had even yet an army of 81,000 men with 250 guns, and ever and forcibly urged the active prosecution of the campaign. But here he found himself opposed by the commanders of the Dutch and Austrian contingents, and, outvoted at council, he had perforce to remain idle.

Louis XV was now expected to join the headquarters of his army. That army had been resting quietly on the borders of Hainault awaiting him. He reached Brussels on 31 May and reviewed his host—a host which numbered 140,000 men. On 22 June Saxe put his army in

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motion and advanced to Maestricht. Cumberland simultaneously endeavoured to shift his quarters to Tongres. On arrival there he found Saxe already in possession of the position and had in consequence to fall back on Maestricht. For the space of a week the opposing armies were occupied in manœuvring to obtain a strategic advantage one of the other.

The last design of the Allies was to sieze Herdeeren Heights, and thither they proceeded, only to find that again the wily Marshal-General had forestalled them; he had left ten battalions at Tongres, and with 120,000 men had rapidly advanced and seized the Heights, thus placing himself between Cumberland and Maestricht. On 2 July the opposing armies joined battle. This battle is for some reason or another blessed with no fewer than six names. In various authors it figures as Val, Vol, Keselt, Latal, and Lauffeld or Laffeldt.

The Allies were drawn up in three lines, the Austrians on the right, the Dutch in the centre and the British Hanoverians and Hessians on the left. Laffeldt was situated in their front. Saxe drew up his infantry in two lines on the higher ground with his cavalry in the plain beneath.

Louis in person, as at Fontenoy, was an interested spectator of the battle. Laffeldt, the key to the position, was first attacked. It was held by the British and German infantry. Three times the attack was successful and three times was the place recaptured, though fresh regiments sent up by Saxe were employed on each occasion. The Marshal-General made a fourth and this time a personal endeavour. At the head of the Regiment Le Roi and accompanied by six infantry brigades he returned to the charge; nor was this all, for he concentrated on Laffeldt the fire of many guns, the Royal Vaisseau and the Irish Brigade acting as supports to the movement. To assist the battalions in Laffeldt, who could with difficulty sustain this heavy attack, or rather who were unable to eject the enemy from the place in which they had managed at length to secure a footing, Cumberland brought up the whole of his left wing. Four of the infantry brigades of the enemy, however, took them in flank and they were driven back in some disorder.

Things looked badly at this juncture, but undismayed Cumberland ordered the Dutch cavalry to charge. Saxe perceiving them in motion, ordered a counter cavalry attack on the advancing Dutch. The latter

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did not await the onset but fled incontinently, and moreover in their flight threw into disorder five battalions of infantry that had been ordered up to recapture Laffeldt. On rode the French cavalry and unopposed pierced the centre of the Allies. This decided, or all but decided, the fortune of the day. A retreat began. The left and centre, hard pressed by the enemy's cavalry, moved off the field, but few indeed of them would have reached the River Meuse had not the veteran Ligonier, taking in the situation at a glance, given orders for a charge of British cavalry and thereby saving the Allies from total destruction.

Placing himself at the head of the Royal North British Dragoons, Rich's Dragoons, Rothe's Dragoons and the 7th Queen's Own Dragoons, he attacked the pursuing French cavalry. His charge was not to be withstood. The hitherto victorious French were rolled back in confusion and five of their standards were captured. Ligonier himself was taken prisoner in the *mêlée*, his horse having been killed.

The charge saved the Allies. They succeeded in passing across the Meuse by pontoon bridges as after Roucoux, and reaching Maestricht encamped beneath its walls.

The Austrians as if it were Roucoux over again were not engaged seriously. They made good their retreat in a northerly direction. In this fight the Allies lost 6000 men and 16 guns, while 2000 men were taken prisoners.

Cannon tells us with regard to this year that the Regiment was encamped for a short time in the spring near the banks of the Scheldt, and was subsequently employed in operations on the Great Nethe and the Demer, during which a draft of fifty men and remounts of one hundred and twenty horses joined from England.

The Manuscript Regimental Record for the year merely states that :

'The Regiment was present at the Battle of Latal, Sunday 2nd July (New Stile).'


Cannon tells us, and the Record corroborates him, that the Regiment 'lost several men and horses on this occasion, and had Cornet Bulmere, five men and ten horses captured by the enemy.' The actual number of wounded were eight men and four horses, and four horses were killed.

After the battle, Saxe returned to his previous quarters at Tongres. His next move was to detach a French force to capture Bergen op Zoom,

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in which he was again successful, Löwendahl being as usual in charge of the siege.

Negotiations for peace were now again mooted; and indeed as far back as 1746 endeavours in that direction had been begun, but only to be broken off. The meetings began in January 1748, and, as usual in such cases, the conflicting interests of the various States concerned were hardly conducive to unanimity of action. April arrived, and with it Saxe again took the field. This time his cherished design of capturing Maestricht was to be attempted to be put into execution. It was so attempted and it was successful. The siege began on 15 April, Maestricht capitulated on 10 May.



This concluded the long-drawn-out struggle. The Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle was signed by Great Britain, France and Holland on 18 October, 1748.

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CHAPTER IX

Home Service, 1748–1760.
The History of the Light Troop, 1758

When hostilities ceased for the winter of 1747 the Regiment was stationed in the province of Limburg, and remained there facing the enemy, but on the defensive practically until the preliminaries of the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle were agreed upon during the spring of 1748. This agreement caused a suspension of hostilities, and the strain of the situation being thus relaxed, the British troops were scattered in cantonments among the peasantry inhabiting various Dutch villages. On the signature of the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, which took place on 18 October 1748, orders were received for the immediate return of the British troops to their native shores.

Accordingly the 7th Queen's Dragoons marched to the coast. The exact port of embarkation does not apparently seem to be known, nor the exact date thereof; neither are any details of the voyage forthcoming. From the Manuscript Regimental Record, however, we learn that the 7th Queen's Dragoons on landing at Purfleet on 26 January were ordered to march to Avely, North and South Ockendon, and certain places adjacent, and after a halt of one or two nights to proceed as follows :—

One troop each to Colchester, Witham and Kelvedon, Chelmsford, Ingatestone, Brentwood, and Romford.

A detachment which had been left behind in Flanders under the command of Lieutenant Lumsden arrived at Lowestoft on 3 March, and received orders to march to Yarmouth. Three days later this detachment was ordered to march thence to Colchester.

The Regiment was now reduced to a peace establishment. This reduction took place between the dates of 6 February and 14 February.

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On 14 February their quarters were shifted, four troops proceeding to Norwich and two to Yarmouth.

A troop of the Regiment, however, mysteriously turns up on 21 February at Colchester from Chelmsford, having been despatched thither to aid the civil power in the preservation of peace. Cannon now tells us that detachments of the Regiment were sent (places unnamed) on coast duty—that is to say, against smugglers. On 14 March the 'Troop or Detachment' at Colchester was ordered to proceed to Yarmouth. The Regimental Record is here certainly rather vague.

Cannon is silent as to the events of the remainder of the year. The Regimental Record, however, tells us that 'the outparty of the Queen's Royal Regiment of Dragoons on the smuggling duty' was ordered on 14 November 1749 to join their troops, and that the Regiment was then to march from their present quarters to Exeter. The exact intended stations of the Regiment originally are not given, but from an entry dated 21 December we read that 'the two troops at Sherbourne (on the march to Exeter) to detach an escort with a deserter, on his way to London.' The next entry does not assist us. It is dated 1749–50, but no month is given or day specified, though it must have been before April :—

'The 6 Troops of the Queen's Royal Dragoons, now at Dorchester, notwithstanding former orders to march

Viz 3 Troops to Wells, 2 to Frome and 1 to Shepton Malet.'

On 10 April 1750 the Regiment was ordered to concentrate at Wells, there to be reviewed by Lieut.-General Campbell, and afterwards to return to their former quarters.

The country was at this time in a very disturbed state. In several districts serious rioting had taken place.

Around Trowbridge, Bradford and Melksham 'many hundred weavers having assembled in a riotous and tumultuous manner,' two troops of the Regiment were sent thither on 18 April to assist in preserving the peace. At Birmingham, later in the year, two troops of Honywood's Dragoons were most hastily sent to quell what was rumoured to be 'a great insurrection.' It was, of course, the outcome of the distress caused by the war which produced these disorders. It is seldom that during the war itself civil troubles are manifested in this country, but with

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a peace, and especially if a not remarkably honourable peace, the shoe begins to pinch; the excitement of the war is over, and sufferers have only their grievances and their poverty to occupy their minds. Hence then came the generality of civil troubles requiring armed intervention in those policeless days.

We have before spoken of the hardships inflicted on disbanded or reduced regiments. In the *Gentleman's Magazine* for 1749, page 132, a poem entitled 'A Reduced Officer's Complaint' appears. It is too long to quote, but those curious may well refer to it.

It may here be stated that the distinguished regiment of dragoons known as 'The Duke's,' and originally 'The Duke of Kingston's,' despite all its gallantry and services in Flanders, was just at this period ruthlessly disbanded. Side by side with the Queen's Royal Dragoons they had more than once fought, especially in the last campaign.

To return to the subject of the disaffected districts. Some of the proceedings of the riotous weavers savoured of the comic.

Having constructed several effigies of notable personages—one of these in fact representing the King—they proceeded to shoot them, and when considered sufficiently wounded or dead the dummy figures were decapitated. In various parts of England culprits were tried, but for a wonder the juries were lenient, few were convicted, in some cases juries disagreed and in others justice was professedly satisfied by binding the misguided men over to keep the peace.

How long the Regiment remained in quarters, or the date when the two troops rejoined, we cannot learn. This we do know, that some time between 18 April and 29 September the horses were at grass, for under the latter date we read 'the 6 troops of Cope's Dragoons (a return here to the old style) to march fourteen days after the horses are taken from grass to Gloucester, there to be reviewed by Lieut.-General Campbell.' This review took place presumably on 17 or 18 October, as after the review the Regiment received orders to march as follows: three troops to Worcester, one to Pershore, and two to remain at Gloucester. For six months we again lose sight of the Regiment, till on 13 April 1751 they received orders to concentrate at Gloucester again to be reviewed. The review took place on 26 April, the reviewing officer being Lieut.-General Onslow. After the review they, as usual, returned to their former quarters.

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1751

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From the painting at Windsor Castle.



1751

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On 1 July 1751 King George II issued the dress warrant of that year relative to colours, clothing, &c., of the army.

As this will be fully discussed in the special chapter on Uniforms and Equipment, there is no need to include it here, save in one respect.

By this warrant it was directed that the 'number of the rank or seniority of the regiment' was to be borne on the colours and appointments from this date. The Regiment, however, did not at once conform to the order as to the number '7.'

On 18 September we find them still styling themselves 'Cope's Dragoons.'

On this date their horses were at grass, and they were ordered to march fourteen days after the animals had been taken from grass to the following places: Two troops to Shrewsbury and one each to Stafford, Burton-on-Trent, Walsall, and Ashburn. These orders were countermanded on 10 October, and the new quarters of the Regiment were fixed as four troops at Worcester and one each at Pershore and Bromsgrove. Here they were to remain until such time as was needed for the whole Regiment to concentrate at Birmingham by 2 November. At Birmingham they were to be reviewed by Sir Philip Honywood, after which they were ordered to take the route given in the orders of 18 September. At the last moment, however, the troop for Ashburn was ordered to remain at Birmingham.

The colliers at Pembroke, Haverfordwest, and the adjacent places were now giving trouble, rioting in order to prevent the importation of corn. In consequence of this, the two troops from Shrewsbury were despatched thither on 29 February; the Birmingham troop was on the same day sent to replace one of the troops withdrawn from Shrewsbury.

On 9 April the troops were under orders to march 'so as to arrive at Litchfield on Monday the 21st.' At Lichfield they were to be reviewed by Lieut.-General Campbell, after which they were to return to their former quarters. On 14 April two troops detached at Pembroke and Haverfordwest were ordered to march immediately to Lichfield. The entire Regiment left Lichfield on 25 April and went into quarters as before.

On 12 October the Queen's Dragoons were ordered to assemble at Stafford by 28 October, there to remain until further orders. Here they remained until ordered to Manchester on 10 April 1753, to be reviewed by Major-General Cholmondeley. Until 4 October the Regiment

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remained in Manchester, Bradford, and the adjacent places. They were then ordered to proceed to Berwick-on-Tweed, where further orders as to their destination in Scotland were to be awaited.

On 25 October, when they had reached Durham, an order came directing them to halt until Major-General Cholmondeley should arrive to review them, after which they were to proceed according to their former orders. This is the last entry for 1753, but a note in faded red ink in the Manuscript Record states that: 'The Numbers of the Regiments were first used in Official Orders and Books in this Year.'

We have no information as to the exact date upon which the Regiment entered Scotland, as the next entry vaguely states that in April 1754 all the six troops were at Perth.

On 1 December we find one troop at each of the following places: Coldstream, Kelso, Dunbar, Dalkeith, Musselburgh, and Haddington; so far the Regimental Record, and Cannon's History gives us no more.

Dated from the War Office, 1 September 1756, we get the following letter:

SIR,—I am to signify to you, It is His Majesty's Pleasure, that you make strict Enquiry into the Conduct of such of the Private Men belonging to the Regiment of Dragoons under your Command, as have been in the Foot Service, and that you return to me the names of Three of those men p^{r} Troop, or the Number of Twenty-One from the Reg^{t}., (if so many are to be found,) whom you can Recommend as Proper Persons to be made Serjeants in the New Levies.

I am, Sir,
Your most humble serv^{t},
BARRINGTON.

To
The Officer
Command^{g}
Lt.-Genl. Sir John
Cope's Regt. of Dragoons at
Haddington.

From another War Office letter, dated 25 January 1757, we gather that several private dragoons from the Regiment were accordingly turned over to Major-General Holmes's and Colonel Leighton's regiments of foot (2nd Battalions) to be made serjeants and that £5 per man

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was ordered to be paid by the foot regiments in question to Sir John Cope's Dragoons.

The information derived from these two documents, which were unexpectedly discovered, is certainly of interest.

Great Britain was now engaged again in a war with France, the immediate cause of which was a quarrel with that nation on the subject of the boundaries between the possessions of Great Britain and France in America.

In consequence of this war the establishment of the 7th Queen's Own Dragoons was increased by 347 officers and men. In the struggle in America the Regiment was not called upon to engage. But on 29 January 1756 an important addition was made to the strength of the Regiment in the form of a Light Troop. This was raised by royal warrant, and consisted of one Captain, one Lieutenant, one Cornet, one Quartermaster, two Sergeants, three Corporals, two Drummers and 60 Light Dragoons. Cannon states that the number of Dragoons was 63. The name of the Captain was William Erskine, who had previously held the commission of Captain-Lieutenant. His date of commission was 25 December. It is noted that both officers and men were mounted on 'small horses.' Cannon tells us, but gives no date, that the Light Troop 'was subsequently augmented to upwards of one hundred officers and men.'

It will be remembered that in the year 1756 British Dragoons were first equipped as Light Dragoons. The first regiment to be so equipped was Eliott's, now the 15th Hussars; Burgoyne's followed—a regiment which that unfortunate and much-maligned officer was given the permission to raise 'on his own particular plan,' and of which the establishment presents some variations from that of other regiments.

It is not generally known that for no less than seven years Burgoyne, who had left the British Army with a captain's commission and was residing in enforced exile on the Continent owing to lack of means, was engaged in the careful and serious study of the methods then in vogue in the Light Cavalry of European nations, and that his subsequent successes at Belle Isle and in the Portugal-Spanish campaign a few years later with his newly-raised regiment (now the 16th Lancers) were the outcome of his thorough acquaintance with the subject. We shall later narrate in full, as far as the details are obtainable, the

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adventures and services of the 7th (Light Troop) of the 7th (Queen's Own) Dragoons. To return to the Regiment as a whole. In August 1756 we find that four troops were stationed at Musselburgh, two at Dunbar, and one at Haddington. In May the following year the Regiment was concentrated at Perth.

Between 1 September and 6 September we know that four troops were at Musselburgh, and one each at Dundee, Alloa, and Cupar. On 6 September three troops were moved to Dalkeith and one each to Kelso, Haddington, Dunbar, and Linlithgow.

By 3 March 1758 the various troops had been shifted as follows: two troops at Dunbar, two at Haddington and Coldstream, and three at Musselburgh, Leith, and Dalkeith, as on that date they received orders to march thence to Berwick and Kelso *en route* for England, their destinations being four troops to York, one to North Malton, and two to Pontefract and Ferry Bridge. This march was timed to begin on the 14th, 15th, and 17th of April, and they were to reach the above-named places on the 26th and 29th of the same month and 3 May respectively.

On 25 April the Light Troop received orders that on arrival at York it should forthwith proceed to Winchester so as to arrive at that city on Wednesday 24 May.

On the same date the remaining six troops were ordered south and stationed in Essex as follows: Three troops at Chelmsford and one each at Maldon, Brentwood, and Romford. Their march was to be timed so as to reach these places on 7 June.

The Light Troop, however, did not proceed to Winchester, as we read that these orders were cancelled two days later. It was sent instead to Petersfield, there to encamp on 13 May.

On 19 May the Maldon troop was sent to Ingatestone.

On 20 May the Light Troop received orders to hold themselves in readiness to embark at Portsmouth on foreign service.

The destination of this troop was France, where it formed part of an expeditionary force despatched to that country. On 7 June five troops of the Regiment were ordered to assemble at Chelmsford and one troop, that at Ingatestone, to remain at its quarters. A review was to be held at Chelmsford by Colonel Douglas, after which the various troops were to return whence they came.

On 3 July all the six troops were despatched to stations nearer London,

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viz. two troops to Epping, two to Hoddesdon and Hatfield, one to Barnet and 'Ricksend' (? Rickmansworth), and one to Hampstead and Highgate.

On 26 July the six troops were ordered to London to be reviewed and subsequently to march, four troops to Canterbury, one to Sandwich, and one to Faversham and 'Ospernage' (probably Ospringe near Faversham).

On 28 September two troops were ordered to Barnet, two to St. Albans, and two to Enfield.

The Light Troop had now returned to England, and, having disembarked at Portsmouth, was on the same date ordered to Hackney.

On 14 October the entire Regiment was removed to new quarters, three troops proceeding to Chelmsford, one to Witham and Braintree, one to Ingatestone and Chipping Ongar, one to Brentwood, and the Light Troop to Romford.

One of the Chelmsford troops was on 7 November shifted to Braintree and Bocking.

And here, if we may be pardoned a slight digression, we will narrate two really curious and interesting military episodes which had taken place in the locality during the first half of the seventeenth century. Our reason for this digression is the fact that the circumstances to which we shall allude are practically unknown to the general military public, but are surely of considerable interest to military readers as throwing side-lights on the conditions obtaining between soldier and civilian in those far remote times.

Our authority in both cases is to be found in the State Papers, Domestic Series, 1628 to 1640.

In 1628 Buckingham had brought over from Ireland a strong force of Irish infantry, which he proceeded to billet by companies in various towns and villages in England. These troops were generally alluded to by the polite designation of 'Buckingham's Blackguards.' Now the circumstances, though they led to most deplorable results, were such that there was much to be said on both sides. These men were practically unpaid, as their slender pay was most often months and months in arrear. The billeting money too was, if paid, insufficient to satisfy the requirements either of the men or the townsfolk upon whom they were billeted; but as, like the pay, it was ever far in arrear, the results may easily be conjectured. Having had the company commanded by a

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certain Captain Roy (or Roys) Carew (or Carey) billeted upon them, the inhabitants of Maldon exercised a privilege then common to everybody and frequently exercised. This was to forward a petition to the Privy Council for the removal of their unwelcome visitors. Thousands of petitions of this kind are extant, frequently on the most trivial subjects. The petition is headed in form 'The Poor Distressed Inhabitants of Maldon.' They complain therein of the 'insolencies and outrages' of the troops and state that the 'burden is intolerable.' They protest that the men 'command in our houses as if they were our lords and we their slaves, enforcing us and ours to attend them at their pleasure and to do the basest offices for them.' They state that 'not content with the diet proportional to the King's pay, they compel what they will and pay with violence.' The inhabitants declare that they are forced to stay at home to protect their houses and to guard their wives, daughters, and maid-servants from outrage. The Council was about to grant their petition and to remove Captain Cary's company to Witham, a neighbouring place, which the worthy burgesses of Maldon had slyly suggested was far better able to sustain troops than they were. The people of Witham heard of this and promptly lodged a counter-petition, in which, among other things, they suggested that the men of Maldon had on previous occasions ill-used soldiers billeted there. The Deputy-Lieutenant, through whom the petition was forwarded and who probably wrote it, added this cogent reason for the non-relief of Maldon: 'If' (he wrote) 'Maldon be freed from soldiers the Duke of Buckingham will find them (the soldiers) beaten wheresoever they are billeted.' The Maldon petition was accordingly refused.

On St. Patrick's Day 1628 the storm burst. This we learn from a despatch sent to the Council by the Deputy-Lieutenant on the morrow. He states that he had that day removed the men from Maldon to Witham on his own initiative, and for this reason: There had been a serious riot, in fact a small battle, at Maldon on the occasion of the Saint's day, in which no fewer than thirty men were either killed or wounded and Captain Roys Carew himself shot in the head; he adds, 'it is thought dangerously.'

The ostensible immediate cause of the riot was the tying of 'red crosses to the whipping-post and to a dog's tail.' We are not told whether they were the cross of St. George or that of St. Patrick. The townsfolk took up their arms, the country folk flocked in from the villages near

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with what weapons they could muster, and in the sleepy long street of Maldon a pitched battle raged for some hours. On the arrival of the soldiers from Maldon at Witham, similar scenes were witnessed, for the men of Witham rose in a tumult. The Deputy-Lieutenant endeavoured to pacify the enraged inhabitants and to get them to disperse. This he at last accomplished, but not until two soldiers were shot absolutely in his presence and he had been compelled to disarm the whole company, this being insisted on by the inhabitants. Now these riots were, one would suppose, so serious as to merit at least an inquiry. Nothing, however, was done. Nobody was arrested, nor as a matter of fact was anything further heard of the matter. The other case, which was an outcome of what was known as the 'Altar-rails' Question, took place in 1640. Throughout the Eastern Counties there was a strong leaven of puritanism with which even the soldiers were infected. A company of foot under the command of a Captain Rolleston was billeted at Braintree. The parson of Bocking—an adjoining village connected with Braintree by one long street—whose usual style is, as is that of the parson of Battle in Sussex, 'Dean,' presented these men with fifty shillings and a barrel of beer, possibly to ingratiate himself with them, he being a Laudian, pro-altar-rail cleric. The beer was consumed and the fifty shillings as well in all probability. More merry than wise, the men proceeded forthwith to Bocking, where, instead of cheering the Dean, they broke into the church, tore up the altar-rails, bore them off to Braintree in triumph, and made a bonfire of them before their captain's lodgings. Next they proceeded to Radwinter Church, where they tore down a statue of Christ and some heads of cherubim and seraphim, which they carried to Maldon and burnt in the high street, 'all as profane as the Sons of Belial.' On this occasion, however, the ringleaders were arrested and lodged in Chelmsford Gaol. Captain Rolleston in his report mentions a curious fact: that his men were 'most frequent in desiring their officers to take the Holy Communion with them.' Such things happened in the 'good old times': how different matters are now!

To return to the movements of the Regiment. On 6 June 1759 the various troops were shifted from their former quarters to Ipswich (three), Colchester (two), Sudbury (one), and the Light Troop from Romford to Yarmouth.

7 July, the Light Troop was ordered from Yarmouth to Maldon.

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On 31 July we find four troops at Chelmsford and Maldon, one at Ingatestone and Chipping Ongar, one at Romford, and one at Epping and Waltham Abbey.

A month later, one of the Chelmsford troops was despatched to Bocking and Braintree.

On 2 November the first division of three troops of the Regiment was ordered to assemble on 6 November at Newington, Islington, Tottenham, and Edmonton, and thence to march, one troop to Dunstable and two to Aylesbury.

The 2nd division of four troops was to assemble at Chelmsford on 5 November and to proceed as follows: one troop to Amersham, Wendover, and Risborough; one to Tring and Ivinghoe, and one to Berkhamstead and Hampstead: the Light Troop being sent to Hitchin and Baldock.

There is now a gap of over a year in the Regimental Record; the next entry being dated 24 November 1759, on which day 'one of the troops at Aylesbury' was ordered to march to High Wycombe and Beaconsfield.

The Adjutant must have been a very idle man as regards keeping his books posted, for we find no other entry until 5 February 1760, when a detachment of six Sergeants and 54 Private Dragoons were ordered to Wendover so as to arrive on 17 February. We are not told, however, where they marched from. The next entry is puzzling, as we have no clue to its origin:

'11 Febry.—The Drafts from the 7th Dragoons at Wendover to march to Watford.'

British troops were now about to be sent again to Germany on active service, and on 10 March we find that six troops were ordered to march so as to arrive on 26 March at Greenwich and Blackheath, Wandsworth, Fulham and Putney, and Kingston, preparatory to their embarkation. This order was followed on the next day by a change of route.

One troop to Watford, two to Aylesbury, two to Dunstable, and one to Edgeware and Stanmore. This entry is headed 'until they begin the march ordered yesterday.'

Two orders are dated 26 March:—

'The two troops ordered to Wandsworth, Fulham and Putney to

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proceed to Blackheath, Gravesend, Lewisham and Lee preparatory for their embarkation to Germany.

'The two troops ordered to Kingston to proceed to Wandsworth, Putney, Fulham and Clapham preparatory to their embarkation to Germany.'

What became of the other two troops is not mentioned, nor is the station of the Light Troop given.

Cannon says that the six heavy troops of the 7th Dragoons went to Germany, but the Regimental Record only records the departure of four. Possibly, however, this discrepancy can be explained later.

We will now narrate the story of the two expeditions to the coast of France in which the Light Troop of the 7th Queen's Royal Dragoons took part.

These expeditions were the idea of Pitt, who thought that by making a descent in force on the coast of France he would attain one or both of two objects:—

1. To draw off from either America or Germany any additional forces which were likely to be sent thither by the enemy.

2. To do as much damage as possible to the coast towns.

A costly armament was therefore equipped, consisting of thirteen battalions of infantry, three companies of artillery, a siege-train, and a composite force of cavalry under Eliott, which was made up of the Light Troops of nine dragoon regiments, the Light Troop of the 7th Queen's Royal Dragoons being one of the troops thus employed. The entire force numbered some 13,000 men. Charles third Duke of Marlborough was placed in supreme command, with Lord George Sackville as his second. A powerful fleet acted as escort to the transports, the latter numbering no fewer than 100 vessels. This large fleet set sail from St. Helens on 1 June, and arrived at Cancalle Bay, an indentation in the coast about eight miles east of St. Malo, on Monday, 5 June, where by the evening of the next day the whole force had landed. The disembarkation was but slightly opposed by the guns of a French battery which had been erected to protect the bay. The casualties only amounted to three seamen. Obviously it was easy for the guns of so large a fleet to silence the battery, and this they promptly did. Leaving a brigade of infantry to guard the landing-place the remainder of the troops marched forthwith on St. Malo.

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Here an attack was found impracticable unless by means of a regular siege, as the fortress and town were too strong. The Duke made certain dispositions to begin an investment in due form, but on receiving intelligence that the enemy were hastily and in great strength marching against him on every side, and that his retreat to Cancalle Bay would inevitably be cut off, promptly retired again to his ships. St. Malo, however, did not escape scot free. Under cover of night the Light Dragoons succeeded in reaching the harbour, where they burnt many of the naval stores, a man-of-war of fifty guns, one of thirty-six, all the privateers lying in the port, some of which had thirty, and several twenty and eighteen guns, in all numbering upwards of 100 vessels.

It may be remarked too that during the execution of this damage the Light Dragoons were throughout under the very guns of St. Malo.

On arrival at Cancalle Bay Marlborough found Commodore Howe fully prepared to re-embark the troops, so much so that four brigades and ten companies of Grenadiers were embarked in less than seven hours and unmolested by the enemy. By 12 June the entire force was again on board the ships.

A private letter from an officer on board the *Speedwell*, one of the men-of-war, a sixteen-gun brig, tells us that one transport was lost between Jersey and Sark through running on a submerged rock, but that there was no loss of life. The inhabitants of Cancalle appear to have fled, and to have left the troops in quiet possession of the town. One regiment was sent a day's march into the interior to the town of Dol, about fourteen miles from St. Malo, where they were well received. No opposition was met with on the march thither, and it was there reported that there were not 500 French troops in that part of the country at all. St. Malo, he states, was found to be very strong and its walls both lofty and extremely thick, so much so that at least a month would have been occupied in reducing the place.

There were two strong batteries on the sea-front; the entrance to the harbour was both very narrow and dangerous, and could not well be entered by the British war-ships without very considerable risk of loss.

Owing to contrary winds the fleet and transports were delayed in Cancalle Bay.

From another letter we learn that when the Regiment was sent to Dol, a part of the Light Dragoons accompanied them and advanced beyond

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that place. Here they fell in with the vedettes of a French camp. These fell back at once. The Light Dragoons gave chase, and after a long pursuit succeeded in taking two prisoners, whom they brought into camp. When the army was mustered on board the transports some thirty men were found to be missing, having been left behind. Several of these were afterwards brought off in French fishing-boats and exchanged for French prisoners to an equal number. The fate of the residue was never ascertained.

On the 14th there was some talk of disembarking the troops again, or at any rate a portion of them, and the Grenadiers and Guards were told to hold themselves in readiness for such duty and to complete their ammunition. The town of Granville was then reconnoitred on 14 June, but was found unworthy of attention. Two days later the fleet sailed, and after beating about against the wind till evening was compelled to anchor off St. Malo. The wind rose, some of the fleet drove and others parted their anchors. Next morning all the ships returned to Cancalle Bay.

Until the 22nd the weather continued tempestuous, but at length the vessels were enabled to sail. On the morrow they passed Jersey and Guernsey, on the 25th the Isle of Wight was sighted, on the 26th the wind veered round and carried them back to the French coast near Havre de Grace. Here a landing was at first designed, and the flat-bottomed boats were hoisted out for that purpose, but towards evening the wind became so boisterous that the boats were quickly hoisted in again, and the fleet stood out to sea. Next morning the wind moderated and the vessels again ran in to within a few leagues of the shore. The Duke of Marlborough then went in a cutter to reconnoitre, having given orders for four days' provisions to be served out to the troops in anticipation of a landing. Nothing, however, was done either on that day or the next.

On the 29th the fleet bore away to Cherbourg and anchored about two miles from the town. Some of the transports that lay nearer in were fired on from five or six different batteries, but no harm was done. Bodies of armed men were seen drawn up on the shore, some of whom appeared to be regular troops. In the evening orders were given for landing, but a contrary wind arising, it was impossible to execute them. On the morrow the fleet and transports weighed anchor and stood for England, arriving in the evening of the next day at St. Helens : so ended the first of

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the costly raids on the French coast. The second raid against the French coast left England on 1 August. This time it was under the command of Lieut.-General Bligh, the fleet being commanded by Commodore Howe.

The fleet arrived before Cherbourg on the 6th and proceeded to bombard the town. Early on the 7th they set sail for the bay of St. Marais, situated six miles from Cherbourg.

Here a landing was effected under cover of the fire from the frigates and bomb ketches, and despite the opposition of a large body of the enemy who were prepared to receive them. On the 8th, Cherbourg surrendered at discretion, as the enemy marched out and abandoned the place on the approach of the British. General Bligh then took possession of the forts of Querqueville, Homet, and la Galette. Next day the preparations began for destroying the basin then being constructed and two piers at the entrance to the harbour. There were about twenty-seven of the enemy's ships in the harbour and thirty pieces of brass cannon were captured. Cherbourg, as far as its basin, piers, harbour, batteries, forts, magazines, and stores were concerned, was then destroyed, and smaller places near were similarly treated.

To all this destruction the enemy were either unable or unwilling to offer any opposition.

The British force then re-embarked, carrying with them twenty-two fine brass cannon and two brass mortars; 173 iron cannon and three iron mortars were destroyed. Again tempestuous weather caused a long delay. It was not until 3 September that the fleet anchored in the bay of St. Lunaire, situated about twelve miles east of St. Malo.

Here the troops were landed on the 4th and 5th, though not without loss, as several were drowned. Morlaix was the place next designed to be attacked; and a storming of St. Malo from the French or land side was projected, but this was found to be absolutely impracticable. Meanwhile the elements were, as usual, against the expedition. It became impossible for the fleet to remain where it was; certainly it would have been impossible to re-embark the troops there. Commodore Howe (now Lord Howe, owing to his brother's death) found that the only available anchorage near was the bay of St. Cas, and proceeded there. Accordingly the army marched, and reached St. Gildan on 9 September and Matignon on the 10th. Here they came near the fleet. That evening news came

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that twelve battalions of foot and two squadrons of horse were on their way from Brest to attack the British. Bligh then retired on St. Cas and sent off an officer to acquaint Lord Howe, in order that all might be prepared for the embarkation. The British reached St. Cas Bay at 4 A.M., 11 September. Here the flat-bottomed boats were found ready drawn up on the shore. The troops immediately embarked. About an hour after the enemy appeared and opened artillery fire from the heights above the shore, but did not descend until all the troops except the Grenadiers were safely embarked.

These, forming as they did the rear guard, advanced to meet the enemy, and behaved with great bravery, till, being outnumbered and overpowered, they were compelled to retire to the waterside and defend themselves as best they might till the arrival of the boats to take them off. There was considerable loss, between 600 and 700 men being killed, drowned, wounded, or prisoners. General Drury was killed, Lord Frederick Cavendish taken prisoner, and at least ten officers were missing. Lieut.-Colonel Wilkinson was killed. After this disastrous end to a practically useless campaign the fleet and transports made sail for England, and reached its shores about 18 September.

Bligh had despatched his captured guns home directly after the taking of Cherbourg.

On 16 September we read that these trophies 'passed by his Majesty,' and set out from Hyde Park, through the City, and proceeded to the Tower 'in a grand procession, guarded by a company of matrosses' (artillery men) with drums beating and fifes playing all the way.

The guns, we read, were 'finely ornamented with the arms of France and other hieroglyphics, such as trophies, etc.' All the guns except six, we are told, 'remained spiked as they had been by the enemy before abandoning them.'

Each gun, it may also be added, had its name, exact weight, etc., inscribed on it or cast with it.

The names were some of the classical, such as Hecube, Nitocris, Antonin; among others were Téméraire, Insensible, Violente, Foudroyant, Impérieuse, and Diligence.

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CHAPTER X

Campaign of 1760—Battle of Warburg

As has been already stated, the 7th Queen's Own Dragoons were warned for foreign service towards the end of March 1760. Accordingly, the Heavy Troops, six in number, embarked in the river Thames early in April, their destination being Germany. The Light Troop, it may be remarked, remained at home, being stationed at Hitchin. For a wonder the Regiment had a prosperous voyage and a quiet passage to the river Weser, where, under the command of their Lieut-Colonel, George Lawson Hall, they disembarked not far from Bremen in Lower Saxony. At that time the British force on the Continent was under the command of the Marquis of Granby. Of the Allied Army, which included Hanoverians, Hessians, and Brunswickers, Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick was in chief command. His camp was situated on the heights of Fritzlar in Lower Hesse, and thither the 7th Queen's Own Dragoons proceeded, and reached their destination on 21 April. On arrival they were brigaded with the dragoons of Priceschenic, their brigadier being a Colonel Bremar.

On 5 May the Allied Army advanced into Hesse.

A detachment of the army was left in the Bishopric of Münster under General Spörcken to watch the proceedings of the French Army of Reserve which, under the command of the Count de St. Germain, was approaching from the Rhine.

Prince Ferdinand had garrisoned four towns, Cassel, Dillenburg, Marburg, and Ziegenhagen. Near Kirchain on the river Ohm the passes of that river were held by General Imhoff against the advance of the main French Army, which under the command of De Broglie was approaching from Frankfort.

Meanwhile, Frederick the Great had recalled the detachment of

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MARBURG.

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WARBURG.

1760.

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Prussian cavalry which had been attached to the main Allied Army. Ferdinand, with whom was Lord Granby, was now on the march for the heights of Hombourg near the river Ohm. De Broglie advanced. Imhoff, whether owing to imperfect instructions or to some other cause, did not oppose the passage of the Ohm, and De Broglie safely crossed, to the mortification of Ferdinand. Imhoff shortly afterwards resigned in consequence of the scathing condemnation of his supineness passed on him by his chief.

The passage of the Ohm by De Broglie had these results. He obtained the command of the river, the possession of Amöneburg and Marburg, and was also enabled to occupy the heights of Hombourg long before Ferdinand could possibly reach his goal. On the news of this check Ferdinand halted at Ziegenhagen and then retreated to Sachsenhausen, where he encamped. Hitherto the British cavalry had been in the first line of the Allied Army, but the ground being found most unfavourable for cavalry action, a change was made and they were transferred to the second line. This change was the outcome of a Council of War held on 27 June.

Meanwhile De Broglie was hastening his advance. He passed through Neustadt, Rosenthal, and Frankenberg, and arrived almost at the heights of Corbach, a position at that time held by General Lückner. The opposing forces were now separated by no more than a three hours' march. A series of small skirmishes took place, in one of which near Zielbach the Hereditary Prince nearly lost his life.

The Comte de St. Germain was now approaching with the French Army of Reserve, and the nearer he got to Sachsenhausen the more hazardous did the situation of Prince Ferdinand and the Allied Army become. True, his position was a strong one, but he was in constant danger of being out-flanked, and out-flanked too by vastly superior forces.

The Hereditary Prince was therefore on 10 July despatched with a mixed German and English force to Corbach, which St. Germain had already succeeded in occupying after driving out the meagre force under General Lückner which had been posted there for its defence.

Here the Prince met with disaster, though, owing to a gallant cavalry charge, his infantry was enabled to retire in order. The whole of his right brigade of artillery was captured.

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A force of the enemy at the same time threatened the outposts of the camp of Sachsenhausen, thus preventing Granby from giving any assistance to the hardly-pressed troops at Corbach. This unfortunate affair cost the Allied Army 800 killed and wounded and eighteen guns. The Hereditary Prince, however, amply revenged himself for this defeat at Emsdorf on 14 July.

De Broglie and St. Germain now effected a junction at Corbach, where, finding that though senior he was to act in a subordinate command to the former, St. Germain retired, being succeeded in the command of the French Army of Reserve by the Chevalier de Muy.

De Muy was now sent across the river Dymel and encamped with between 25,000 and 30,000 men, with his right on the town of Warburg and his left on the heights of Ossendorf. De Broglie remained at Corbach, where he occupied his time in harassing both the flanks of the Allied Army. The position taken up by De Muy too at Warburg threatened to cut Ferdinand's line of communications with both Westphalia and Hanover. There appeared no other course open but to retreat, and accordingly on the night of 24 July this took place, the destination of the Allies being Cassel. The retreat was carried out in perfect order and without any molestation on the part of the enemy. Lord Granby held the command of the rear-guard, having with him four Major-Generals, Schlüter, Honywood, Elliot, and Griffin.

Passing over the heights of Freienbergen the retreating army reached the plain of Kalle, which is situated about ten miles to the north-west of Cassel. Here they encamped, and then continued the retreat to Wilhelmsthal.

It will be readily understood that these continuous marchings involved much fatigue to the Allied Army; nor was this all, for the enemy, which largely outnumbered them, held positions which threatened them on all sides. What Prince Ferdinand desired to do was this, to keep the river Dymel open, as without it his communications with Münster, Paderborn and Osnabrück would be cut. Cassel was in his rear and Hesse required to be covered. How these objects were to be effected was thus. While apparently in force before Cassel, he meditated a stroke by which the Chevalier de Muy would be cut off on the river Dymel. Meanwhile De Broglie threatened the right of the Allies and Prince Xavier (the Comte de Lusace) threatened their left. If Ferdinand

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crossed the Dymel, Cassel must inevitably fall. Ferdinand, however, determined to proceed on his expedition.

Leaving Count Kilmansegge and General Lückner to cover Cassel, but with orders to retire on Münden if they should be attacked by superior forces, he ordered the Hanoverian corps under General Spörcken to proceed to Liebenau on the river Dymel. Following Spörcken he sent a force under the Hereditary Prince. This force was composed of the British Legion (a composite body mainly consisting of foreign auxiliaries), two battalions of grenadiers, made up of the grenadier companies from various regiments, the Highlanders, two squadrons of the 7th (Queen's Own) Dragoons and two of Conway's Dragoons.

The movement began on the morning of 29 July, 1760, when the troops crossed the Dymel and took up a position between Liebenau and Korbeke. Thanks to a dense fog the movement was carried out successfully.

Ferdinand himself left the camp at Kalle at an hour before midnight, on 30 July, and crossed the Dymel. At 5 A.M. on 31 July the entire force was drawn up on the heights overlooking Korbeke. Lord Granby commanded the right wing, which consisted of the British cavalry and three brigades of artillery. De Muy lay at Ossendorf.


The Hereditary Prince and Spörcken were now despatched towards Dossel with orders to turn the left of De Muy at Ossendorf. Again a heavy fog enabled this movement to be successfully carried out, and the Allied force was permitted to gain a valley and to advance unperceived by De Muy till it suddenly appeared at 11 in the morning.

Ferdinand and Granby followed them with the main army. The British cavalry were now posted in the second line and were commanded by General Mostyn.

The attack on De Muy began, and began successfully. His left was driven in on his centre and right. Time, however, was wanting to permit the infantry to arrive and, delayed by bad roads, they were still some distance from Warburg—some accounts say as much as five miles—when the action began.

Ferdinand remained with the infantry, but detached Granby with the British cavalry and artillery to press on in advance. At a trot the whole of the British cavalry advanced in order to accomplish the five miles which separated them from the town of Warburg. They

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duly reached Meine and formed up. Their appearance immediately caused the enemy to waver.

The details of the battle are as follows :—

The Hereditary Prince and Spörcken advanced in two columns—one, which included cavalry, artillery, and infantry, composed of the Royal Dragoons and the grenadier battalions, headed for Gross Eider and Ossendorf; the other, headed by the 7th Dragoons with the Highlanders of Keith and Campbell, followed them, acting as cover to the grenadiers in the second line. The artillery of the Hereditary Prince, posted on the outskirts of Poppenheim, opened fire at 1.30 P.M., and at the same time the grenadier battalions pressed through Ossendorf, certain French troops placed there to protect the left wing of De Muy retiring before them without offering any resistance. The Allies then advanced towards a steep hill in the rear of the enemy, and were evidently intent on seizing it; thereupon a French battalion belonging to the Regiment Bourbonnois faced about and returned, with the object of forestalling the Allies in the possession of this important position. It was in the nature of a race as to which party could first secure a lodgment there. Ten grenadiers headed by Colonel Beckwith advanced at a double, followed by the Hereditary Prince himself leading thirty more, and breathless they arrived first at the crest. On came the battalion of the Bourbonnois and were received by a galling fire. Ignorant of how strongly the hill might be held, the enemy halted and awaited the arrival of their second battalion, which had been sent to support them. A delay of about ten minutes thus took place, and this was a sufficient time to allow the remainder of the grenadier battalion to come up and to join the little band at the top of the hill.

Then the struggle began, a struggle be it observed which was maintained by one British battalion against two of the enemy. The fight was most strenuous, and undoubtedly in the end the disparity of numbers must have told against the British had not a battalion under Maxwell arrived to their assistance. Again the fight was resumed, the enemy stubbornly contesting for the possession of the coveted hill. They were, however, unable to prevail, and additional troops were in the act of being sent to their assistance. Nor was assistance withheld from the gallant band of British, who still, though with difficulty, maintained their hold on the hill. A battery of artillery was despatched to their

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aid, but in the passage of a defile near Ossendorf this in some way broke down and blocked the road, thus preventing the advance of the remainder of the column. For a brief time it looked as if the grenadiers would be overwhelmed, but by good luck or hard work the passage was cleared, and the remainder of the column gained the hill and entered into the fray. Almost simultaneously the advanced guard of the other column arrived, and taking the reinforcements which the enemy were hurrying up towards the hill in flank, put them into disorder. A charge of cavalry, in which the Royal Dragoons and the 7th Queen's Own Dragoons took part, completed the discomfiture of the already shaken enemy.

The cavalry in this operation slew many and captured a goodly number of prisoners.

The upshot of this was that the enemy's flank was turned, though whether De Muy could retrieve this reverse remained to be seen. Up to this period it must be remembered that the first column only had been engaged and the other column had not yet come into action. As a matter of fact it had not been able to arrive on the field as a whole. A portion was, however, in position and was threatening the left of De Muy. The Allied main body was still some miles away, struggling vainly to cover ground which was marshy and very unfavourable to troops already wearied by a long and toilsome march. It is stated that many fell by the way from sheer fatigue, for the weather was extremely hot. And then it was that Prince Ferdinand sent forward Lord Granby with the British cavalry and artillery, as has been already stated. This advance took place just in the nick of time, as they arrived on the field at the moment when De Muy was about to attempt to retrieve his reverse; also too, Granby's command appeared in the front of the enemy's line, and appeared still advancing at a trot. It is stated that the pace of the guns on this two hours' advance was a matter of astonishment to those who beheld it.

Immediately on arrival Granby halted momentarily to form his cavalry into two lines, and then his twenty-one squadrons hurled themselves on the cavalry of the right wing of De Muy. Hatless and with his bare bald head Granby rode at the head of the Horse Guards Blue, and straight at the enemy.


Only three French squadrons had the hardihood to await the onset; the remainder turned tail and made off. Granby's squadrons therefore

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wheeled and turned their attention to the French infantry, whom they took in flank and rear.

The three French squadrons before mentioned, however, behaved with great gallantry, and charging on the flank of a British cavalry regiment handled it very roughly, only in their turn to be cut to pieces by the Blues.

The fate of the French cavalry had its effect on the *morale* of their infantry, and it resisted not, nor indeed is that a matter of much marvel, for it was open to attack on both flanks and also in the rear. A disorderly flight ensued; following the fleeing cavalry, and indeed mixed with them, the entire French Army made for the river Dymel, into which they plunged, at fords if they could find them, elsewhere if they could not.



Arms were thrown away and a complete *sauve-qui-peut* ensued. A body of irregular French troops in the town of Warburg itself attempted to escape, but was caught by the pursuing cavalry and perished nearly to a man. To keep the retreating enemy on the run ten squadrons of British cavalry were despatched across the river after the British guns which had been brought down to the bank had done considerable execution on the fugitive French. As a victory, Warburg was absolute and complete. The fugitives continued their disorderly flight till they drew breath at Volksmissen, a distance of ten miles from the scene of the battle.

The losses of the Allies on this occasion amounted to about 1200 killed and wounded, a large proportion of which belonged to the grenadier battalions and fell while disputing the possession of the hill.

The cavalry suffered but little, except in the case of the regiment which was engaged with the three French squadrons previously noted. The casualties on the French side amounted to from six to eight thousand

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men killed, wounded, and prisoners; they also lost twelve guns. This is the estimate of Mr. Fortescue. In the 'Life of the Marquis of Granby' by Walter Evelyn Manners we read 'The Chevalier de Muy left 1500 on the field, besides 2000 prisoners, 10 pieces of cannon and his papers.' The latter seems in all probability to be a more accurate statement of casualties, and we prefer to accept it in preference to the other. Cannon does not give us much information on this battle; he writes:—

'The cavalry under the Marquis of Granby and Lieut.-General Mostyn arrived at a favourable moment; a gallant charge of the British squadrons decided the fortune of the day, and the French made a precipitate retreat across the Dymel. The Seventh Dragoons supported the infantry in the attack on the enemy's flank, and by a spirited charge towards the close of the action contributed to the success of the day. The conduct of the British Cavalry was commended by the Marquis of Granby in his public despatch, and Prince Ferdinand declared in General Orders, that "all the British Cavalry performed prodigies of valour." The Regiment being eager in the pursuit, had four men and horses captured by the enemy; three of the men, however, escaped and rejoined the regiment.'

The Manuscript Regimental Record is even more niggardly in the information it vouchsafes.

'31st July. The Regiment was present at the Battle of Warburg.

'Extract from the returns of Killed and Wounded inserted in the *London Gazette.*

'"Cope's Dragoons.

Killed, none—Wounded, none. One private and Four Horses Missing."'

In the Additional Hardwicke MSS. No. 35839, folio 203, will be found Prince Ferdinand's narrative of the Battle of Warburg.

The account is in French, and fills fourteen quarto sheets of paper closely written. We propose here not to give it in its entirety but to quote from it considerable extracts, not in the original language, but in English. He states that the battle was fought between the 'reserve of Chevalier du Muy, twenty-eight battalions and thirty-eight squadrons, and the reserve of M. de Spörcke, joined by a corps under the command of the Hereditary Prince of Brunswick, in all twenty-four

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battalions and twenty-two squadrons, sustained by twenty-two squadrons of the right wing under the Marquis of Granby.'

The account begins thus :—

'Marshal Broglie manœuvred to cut them off from Westphalia, and to force the King's Army to fight at a disadvantage in the *cul-de-sac* formed by the junction of the Dymel and the Weser ; or to pass the river to assure himself of the possessions of Hesse and to carry the war into Hanover.'

The Allies took fitting measures to upset this design. Liebenau on the Dymel was occupied by the British Legion on 26 July. On the same day Major-General Scheiter occupied the heights opposite Liebenau on the right bank, with three battalions of grenadiers to support the British Legion.

'Learnt on the 28th that Du Muy was advancing on Warburg with the reserve—on which M. de Spörcke, who was encamped with fourteen battalions and fourteen squadrons on the right of the army at Westuffeln, was ordered to pass the Dymel on the 29th and to camp between Liebenau and Korbeke. The Hereditary Prince of Brunswick joined him there on the night of the 29th or 30th with ten battalions of Grenadiers and *Montagnards* and eight squadrons, half German and half British.

'Lord Granby replaced General Spörcke with six battalions and four squadrons at Westuffeln, and the Prince of Anhalt occupied the camp of the Hereditary Prince of "Heckewhausen," whence he detached three battalions of Grenadiers to Oberʼvolmar to join Major-General Wolfe, who was there with four squadrons. News came on the 29th at night that du Muy was about to be reinforced. At daybreak on the 30th the enemy's advanced guards debouched at the same time in several places towards the army camped at Kalle and towards the corps posted on the flanks. This forced Major-General de Luckner *de se replier* with the light troops under his orders at Niederzweren sur Cassel. Winter Kasten was occupied by the reserve of Mons. le Comte de Lusace, who opened fire at once on Count Killmansegge, who was encamped in the entrenchment at Cassel. In the afternoon the columns debouched by the Duerenberg and Zierenberg towards Weimar and Furstenwalde. Shortly after this Wolfe's outposts at Weimar were driven in and the Duke sent supports from the 2nd Line to sustain them, and all the cavalry of the

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left wing marched out to support the Prince of Anhalt at Heckershausen. Several hundred cannon shots were exchanged, after which the troops returned to camp. The Duke no longer doubted that the enemy's whole force had either arrived or was on the point of reaching the environs of Cassel, which was a long march distant from Warburg. He resolved therefore without further delay to pass the Dymel and to fight Du Muy. On July 30 the army marched in eight columns at 9 P.M. and passed the Dymel before the enemy perceived what was in the wind. The Prince had reconnoitred Du Muy's position on the 30th; his right rested on Warburg, his left extended in front of the village of Ocksendorf, a camp large enough for "$\frac{20}{m}$" men. They had discovered a little camp on the right bank of the river Dymel in the Wood of Welda, but could not quite determine its position. This camp disappeared [was struck] in the afternoon, and news came that the troops there had crossed the Dymel and joined Du Muy, who had not altered his position. The Prince then made his dispositions for the attack and sent them to the Duke, who approved. Spörcke's reserve and that of the Hereditary Prince joined together made up twenty-four battalions and twenty-two squadrons, but the battalions had been much weakened by detachments which had been sent out, and only numbered in some cases fourteen effective men. They marched in two columns; on the right the infantry of the right. A brigade of heavy artillery was brought by Spörcke and passed by Borgenbuk, having Eissen on the right, Grossen-Eder on the left, and going through Necdern and Ocksendorf. The column was ordered to pass the tower which was in the rear of the enemy's left and to form on the two lines of foot and on a third line of cavalry. Lieut.-General de Zastrow brought the column from the left of the first and second line of the cavalry of the left and of two brigades of artillery. This column was ordered to pass by Coerbeke, Dinckelbourg, Kleinen-Eider, and Menne, to deploy in two lines of foot and a third of cavalry, with the left resting on Menne and the right extending to Ocksendorf. The Prince attacked on flank and rear with the reserve while the army itself advanced towards the front with its right on the Menne and its left behind the town of Warburg, against which place the British Legion was to direct a false attack. The heads of the columns debouched about 6 A.M. on the heights of Coerbeke, the passage of the Dymel having delayed them a little. They had hurried, but with all the

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will in the world to go quickly could not manage to arrive as early as had been intended. But in order to lose no time Spörcke's troops started at 7 A.M. and marched to their destination to turn the enemy's flank. *M. de Bülow qui avait été poussé la veille* with the British Legion at Desenberg was attacked there at daybreak. He retreated to the village of Rosbeck, where he received intelligence that the enemy was moving towards him. A thick fog which concealed us from the enemy also prevented our seeing what he was about. They were not troubled on the march except by a brook which had to be crossed and a marsh which had to be avoided. Still these obstacles caused delay. At 1.30 the Hereditary Prince began the attack with the reserve of Spörcke. Colonel Huth commanded the artillery and established a battery of four guns (twelve-pounders) on the right of the village of Menne, another of equal strength on the left of the village of Ochsendorf, to cover the *debouchement* by the village. A third battery was posted *en deça* of the village of Ocksendorf behind *une butte de terre, tout attenuante au village.* The two first pegged into the flank of the enemy and the last took them in the rear. Everything was going *à point nommé*, and the batteries opened fire the moment the head of the column entered Ocksendorf. The enemy's troops posted there replied on our arrival *sans lacher leurs coups.* They had some battalions posted on their left who were drawn up *en potence*, and when they saw that we were bringing up a considerable force on a *hauteur escarpée* which was on their rear they marched the Regiment de Bourbonnois to hinder them. Colonel Beckwith commanding the English Grenadiers, who were at the head of the column with Mr. Wargot the *Aide-Major* (Adjutant) of the Brigade, sent in advance *une dixaine* of Grenadiers, who brought the news to the Hereditary Prince that the enemy was pressing towards the height very briskly. On which the Prince himself pressed forward with a *peleton de* 30 *Grenadiers* on to the height to hinder them. The French, who were on the slope of the hill, could not see whether this *peleton* was supported or not, and halted for five or six minutes. This gave the battalion of the Grenadiers de Daulhal time to come up. The fire then got very hot, for at this moment the 2nd Battalion of the Bourbonnois Regiment joined the first. De Daulhal's men were then pressed hard and began to give way, when Maxwell arrived at the head of the 2nd Battalion of English Grenadiers, who came from the other side of the mountain, leaving the tower on their left. They gave time for de Daulhal's men to

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re-form and advance again, and this they did in good style, thanks to their officers and to the *entendement* and activity of Beckwith. Between the British Grenadiers and the Hanoverian Grenadiers a train of ten twelve-pounders came on. But in passing an *assez mauvais* defile by Ocksendorf, nearly half an hour had been lost before they cleared the village and the other battalion could join. They got up, however, at the most critical moment, just as the enemy was detaching other regiments to reinforce the Bourbonnois. The Swiss Regiments of Jenner and Lockmann formed this reinforcement and were charged by the 4th Hessian Guards, who headed the left column which was commanded by de Zastrow, who debouched precisely on the left flank of the enemy. The battalions got into action on arrival, *s'empara tout à fait de la hauteur de la tour*, and chased the enemy from one height to the other. The regiments of Conway and Cope's Dragoons (7th Hussars), profiting by this, fell on the fugitive infantry and made many prisoners. The Duke perceiving that the difficulties of the road would prevent the infantry, wearied as they were already, from getting ahead quickly enough to arrive in time, ordered Lord Granby to advance with the whole of the cavalry of the right: twenty-two squadrons of British. Count Schaumberg-Lippe was ordered to advance at the same time with the British Artillery. This he did with admirable promptitude. Lord Granby led the charge on the enemy's cavalry which was opposed to him. It wavered without awaiting the shock, with the exception of three squadrons which took Bland's Regiment in flank, at the very moment that the British Cavalry was taking the enemy's infantry in flank and rear—that is to say the infantry engaged with the men of the Hereditary Prince. Bland's Regiment was *dégagée* on the field by one or two squadrons of the Blues, commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Johnson, and the enemy's cavalry was *maltraité au possible*. The British Cavalry in its advance *tint l'ennemi en suspense*, and favoured by that the formation of the column of M. de Zastrow. It fell on with such good will that the enemy, finding themselves pressed on all sides, at once gave up the combat and retired in great confusion. The greater part both of infantry and cavalry rushed headlong into the Dymel, not crossing by a bridge but *à qué*, many throwing away their arms *pour v'alleger*. M. de Dulow, having attacked Warburg town with the British Legion, *en deburgna le corps de Fischer qui tombant ensuite* beneath the swords of the British Cavalry, was nearly annihilated. Count de la Lippe played on the

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enemy with the British Artillery during the retreat with great success and pursued them along the heights of the Dymel, and when they tried to re-form on a height near a wood not far from Welda, on the right bank of the Dymel. He kept them running, however, when once they had started. The Duke and Lord Granby now passed the Dymel with ten squadrons and twelve British battalions. The enemy retired on Volkmissen and Lord Granby occupied the high ground of Welda. The Hereditary Prince camped on the field of battle with Spörcke's victorious reserve. The army camped between Menne and Devenberg, the Prince of Anhalt and de Wagenheim at Liebenau and Lammeus. Eight officers and one hundred and ninety-four non-commissioned officers and men were killed, fifty-five officers and nine hundred and two non-commissioned officers and men wounded, one officer and seventy-seven men missing; so that our entire loss was but one thousand two hundred and thirty-seven men. One cannot too highly praise the willingness and determined resolution of the victors as displayed on this occasion. All did well, without excepting one single battalion or one single squadron. Fortune perhaps most favoured Maxwell's battalion, that of Bock, the Hessian Grenadiers, the 4th Hessian Guards, and all the British Cavalry. The artillery did what could not have been better from beginning to end: their shooting was most accurate. Twelve guns and twenty-eight ammunition waggons were taken. It is difficult to assess the loss in men [of the enemy], but it must be almost one thousand five-hundred killed and as many wounded, besides those drowned in the Dymel. There were also many prisoners taken.'

We think that our readers will agree with us that despite its length the above document is well worth its inclusion in these pages. Certainly among the accounts of the Battle of Warburg it is decidedly the best.

There is not one entry for the year 1761. The result of this brilliant victory was, however, discounted by the loss of Cassel and all the immense collection of valuable military stores which it contained. Prince Xavier advanced against Kilmansegge with a greatly superior force and compelled him to retire, first on Münden and subsequently across the river Weser. Cassel then fell. A detachment of French troops next laid siege to Ziegenhagen under the command of the Comte de Stainville. The siege lasted six days, after which its German garrison surrendered

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as prisoners of war. Here again there is a divergence of statement between Fortescue and Manners, as the former tells us that this siege lasted for ten days.

After the battle of Warburg, Prince Ferdinand remained quiescent on the Dymel, and here he was menaced by the main French Army under Broglie, who moved in an easterly direction towards Immenhausen. This carried the war uncomfortably near to the frontier of Brunswick. Ferdinand, however, being compelled to preserve the fortress of Lippstadt, could not move to the east bank of the river Weser without danger to the safety of that place, as its preservation prevented concerted action between the two French Armies, those of the Rhine and the Main.

Ferdinand now resolved on a new enterprise, as, finding the garrison of French troops at Wesel had been weakened, he determined to attack it. Making preparations therefore which consumed the earlier portion of September, he despatched a heavy train of siege artillery to Wesel and followed it up three days later by a force of 10,000 Hanoverians and Hessians under the Hereditary Prince. Broglie sent a force in pursuit of him under the Marquis de Castries. Ferdinand next despatched a reinforcement of British and Hanoverians to the Hereditary Prince consisting of both cavalry and infantry, but among the former the 7th Queen's Own were not included.

The Hereditary Prince laid siege to Wesel. Castries by a splendid march followed in hot pursuit, and *en route* was joined by reinforcements from Brabant. This was an awkward move for the Hereditary Prince, as, when allowances were made for the besieging force detained before Wesel, he found himself with numerically a very inferior force to oppose his now augmented enemy.

He must therefore either fight an unequal battle or raise the siege and utilise his entire force. He chose the former alternative. The battle of Kloster Kampen followed, but the story of it is in no way concerned in this history. After the battle the Prince retreated northward to Büderich, where the bridge having been destroyed by floods the river was impassable. His retreat was cut off and his ammunition was nearly if not quite exhausted.

However, he entrenched himself, in part using his waggons for that purpose, and repaired the bridge.

A crossing was effected on 18 October, and a junction with the besiegers

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of Wesel took place. The retreat continued, during which the Allies were energetically pursued by Castries. Eventually the Prince took up his quarters in Westphalia in order to protect Lippstadt and Münster. Thence he detached a force to assist Ferdinand, who was by this time in almost as dangerous a situation as himself.


The end of the campaign was now at hand. Ferdinand made an unsuccessful attempt to obtain possession of Göttingen and then went into winter quarters at Warburg.

The situation was now this. The French held Hesse, Göttingen, and the defiles near Münden, thus having the path to Hanover and Brunswick open to them, and their headquarters were fixed at Cassel. The 7th Queen's Own Dragoons were encamped for the winter in huts which were specially built for them near the banks of the Dymel; by which means they and their horses were protected from the severity of the weather. Later they went into cantonments in the villages in that part of the Bishopric of Paderborn.

Regimentally an important event took place in this year.

On 28 July the Colonel, Lieut.-General Sir John Cope, K.B., died, and was succeeded in the Colonelcy by Lieut.-General John Mostyn, who was transferred from the 5th Royal Irish Dragoons by the special wish of George II, and as a reward for his gallantry at Warburg, of which the mention in despatches had been most eulogistic. This transfer was somewhat out of the regular course, as the 5th was a royal regiment, was senior in the service, and was of a stronger establishment. Mostyn's personal view of his promotion is treated in Appendix III.

It is somewhat curious to note that by a vulgar error the 7th Queen's Own Dragoons, because their Colonel was Sir John Cope, have often been confused with Gardiner's Dragoons, who suffered defeat at Preston Pans, where Sir John was in supreme command. It is, however, hardly necessary to add that the 7th Queen's Own were not present at that unfortunate battle.



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CHAPTER XI

Campaign of 1761. Battle of Vellinghausen

We left the 7th Queen's Own Dragoons cantoned in the villages of the bishopric of Paderborn near to the River Dymel.

In this position they remained until February, early in which month Prince Ferdinand determined on the initiation of a winter campaign, hoping thereby to retrieve the unfavourable issue of the campaign of the previous year. On the 11th of the month he put his troops in motion, trusting by boldness to succeed in recapturing Hesse, the whole of which State at the close of the preceding year remained in the possession of the enemy.

The Allies marched in three columns. Spörcken, who commanded the eastern column, was despatched to the Werra and Unstrut to effect a junction with the Prussians and then to fall upon the Saxons. The Prince himself led the central column towards the Eder. The third or western column from Westphalia, and under the command of the Hereditary Prince, was ordered to advance against Fritzlar, while a separate force was detached with the view of gaining possession of Marburg.

Of these three projects only that of Spörcken succeeded, and that general gained a notable victory at Langensalza. Ferdinand and the Hereditary Prince both failed. True, Prince Ferdinand managed to drive the enemy out of Hesse, but he was unable to hold the territory, seeing that neither Cassel, Ziegenhagen, or Marburg had yet been reduced. The country had been devastated, the roads were impassable, and heavy falls of snow added to the hardships which the army had to endure. There had also been a great mortality among the horses owing both to the lack of forage and also to the inclemency of the weather. Ferdinand then attempted by marching southwards to gain some more

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MARSHAL DE BROGLIE.



THE MARQUIS OF GRANBY.



H.S.H. FERDINAND DUKE OF BRUNSWICK.

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hospitable region, and succeeded in reaching the Ohm. De Broglie, however, advanced northwards to meet him, and having arrived at Giessen it became advisable for Ferdinand to retire. He therefore fell back to the Eder on 20 March.

The enemy on the next day attacked the Hereditary Prince at Grünberg, and by sheer superiority in numbers forced him to retreat, during which he lost about 2000 prisoners.

This serious check to one of his columns compelled Ferdinand to raise the siege of Cassel and to retire with as much speed as possible, having De Broglie not only in hot pursuit, but possessed moreover of a force of numerically almost four times the strength of his own. Towards the end of March Ferdinand had regained his old quarters to the north of the river Dymel, and here he again sent his wearied troops to recuperate in cantonments.

The losses in men, horses, and stores in this campaign were extremely heavy on both sides, and a few weeks' respite from active hostilities was as welcome to the enemy as it was to the Allies.

The time thus employed was not wasted by France, for early in April the Prince de Soubise was despatched to the Lower Rhine and instructed to co-operate with De Broglie; his army now numbering 100,000 men. De Broglie, on the Main, commanded 60,000 troops. The task of Soubise was to advance against Ferdinand and force him to abandon Westphalia, Münster, and Lippstadt, while the French force in general rested and recovered from the toils of the winter campaign. If Ferdinand did not withdraw he must fight, and in either event he would be compelled to keep his men continuously on the move, while those of De Broglie remained quiescent and prepared for a projected invasion either in the direction of Hameln on the Weser or into the electorate of Hanover. Such a course, if pursued by De Broglie, would have necessitated the immediate opposition of Ferdinand, in which case the large army under Soubise would have been enabled unopposed to act in any direction its commander pleased. It must, however, he remarked that owing to Court intrigues the larger force had been given to Soubise, and also that no orders as to genuine co-operation in the campaign had been given. Consequently, the two French armies were acting independently. The situation was therefore this. Soubise, the inferior soldier of the two, commanded the largest force; while De Broglie, by far the more skilled

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commander, had at his disposal an army of not more than three-fifths of that directed by his rival. Ferdinand had a force which, while it was slightly inferior to that of Soubise, was numerically superior to that of De Broglie, for his numbers amounted to about 93,000 men.

Obviously speedy action on the part of the French was the proper course to pursue, but this course was not followed. True, Soubise reached Frankfort by 13 April, where he had a meeting with De Broglie, whom he had summoned for that purpose. What subjects were discussed, or what plans (if any) were formed on the occasion, is not known. One thing, however, is certain, that for the remainder of the month, for the whole of the next and until the beginning of June Soubise did nothing. When indeed he did make a move he selected as the field of his operations the country south of the river Lippe and between that river and the river Ruhr; his intention being apparently to join forces with De Broglie. Possibly, too, he felt considerable unwillingness to engage in a pitched battle with Ferdinand, for whose skill as a commander and for the fighting powers of whose army he had a wholesome respect.

Ferdinand on his part first detached a force under the Hereditary Prince to watch Soubise from a position a little to the westward of Münster. Meanwhile he toiled assiduously at the tremendous task of preparing both his army and his transport for the approaching campaign. This occupied the Prince for about ten weeks.

Soubise then advanced and crossed the Rhine on 13 June, penetrated as far as a place called Unna to the east of Dortmund by the 23rd, and there he entrenched himself.

Ferdinand, who had concentrated his army four days previously at Paderborn, advanced to the west to meet Soubise, but took the precaution to leave a small force of observation before Göttingen, and a corps of 20,000 men under Spörcken on the river Dymel to watch De Broglie.

Ferdinand marched on the 20th, and eight days afterwards fronted Soubise and pitched his camp. The Hereditary Prince, who had been also advancing, here effected a juncture with Ferdinand. Inspection of the French position showed that it was apparently too strong to be attacked with any reasonable success, and Ferdinand then determined upon a somewhat curious manœuvre. This was by means of a forced march round the left flank of Soubise to drive that commander into a junction with De Broglie.

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This march occupied thirty hours, and was made by way of Camen. Suddenly Ferdinand's army appeared full in the rear of Soubise at Dortmund. From this position he attacked that commander on 4 July, and without resistance from the enemy succeeded in his object, for Soubise, with the Allies in hot pursuit, made off for Soest, whither De Broglie at once proceeded for a second consultation.

Meanwhile Spörcken had been driven away from Warburg and the river Dymel by De Broglie, and in the operation had lost some guns.

De Broglie had then turned westwards, had occupied Paderborn, and it was from Paderborn that he proceeded to Soest. Here he was followed almost immediately by his army, and the joint commanders had then at their disposal 100,000 men. This largely outnumbered the troops of the Allies, who, even with Spörcken's corps of observation, which had rejoined Ferdinand from its post on the Dymel, could not muster more than 60,000 available fighting men. The odds were therefore heavily against the Allies; but Ferdinand notwithstanding maintained his ground. It was open to him to have crossed the river Lippe, but this would have delivered Lippstadt to the enemy. Undoubtedly the French desired him to take this course, and his refusal so to do was wise. Ferdinand therefore elected to fight, and in consequence manœuvred his army for some days until on 11 July he took up a definite position.

His main army remained encamped on the south bank of the Lippe. Spörcken with 8000 men was detached across the river at Herzfeldt to observe the movements of Prince Xavier of Saxony, who had been stationed near Paderborn.

Ferdinand's left wing was extended to Kirchdenkern, a village on the Ase, a stream without fords and only passable by means of bridges, which were few in number. His headquarters were at Vellinghausen, a spot half-way between the Ase and the Lippe and beneath a hill called the Dünckerberg.

We will now return to Lord Granby, who had left the Continent for England when the Allied Army first went into winter quarters.

He left England to return to his command on 1 June, and finding that travelling by the direct route from the Hague *viâ* the Wesel was not safe, was compelled to take a circuitous path thither, by way of Zwölle and Osnabrück, thus only arriving at Paderborn on 13 June.

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Here he found the British cavalry in good condition, though the number of sick in the entire army was large, and is stated to have amounted to 12,000 men.

Immediately on his arrival he was able to report that the British cavalry and the Brigade of Guards would be leaving their winter quarters for a camp near Paderborn, at a spot he had fixed on for his headquarters.

The Allied Army marched from Paderborn on 21 June, and proceeded to the west *viâ* Gesecke, Soest, and Wippringshausen. Granby led with the Grenadiers, Highlanders, the 5th, 12th, 24th, and 37th Foot, and Mausberg's Regiment of Infantry. His cavalry under Colonel Harvey consisted of the Scots Greys, the 7th Queen's Own Dragoons, and the 11th Dragoons.

Two squadrons of each of these cavalry regiments, it may be noted, formed his rearguard. They took part in the march and manœuvres which culminated in turning the flank of Soubise and menacing his rear, as has been related.

It is stated that the difficulties of Ferdinand's thirty-hours' march to effect this were greatly increased by the severity of the weather, for a tropical storm of rain burst on the troops and continued for some hours, rendering the roads almost impassable for artillery and baggage waggons. It was, in fact, morning before Granby's column was able to get clear of the camp.

Granby's force was now the left column of the five into which the Allied Army was divided. Soubise, who had chosen to consider that the movement was neither more nor less than a retreat, looked on and did nothing, yet Granby's own column actually passed within two or three miles of his camp, a fact which makes his inaction quite inexplicable. Looked at dispassionately as a manœuvre, this march was amazing: as bold a stroke, in fact, as any general had ever attempted. Thus matters stood when the Allies suddenly made their appearance on the Plain of Dortmund at 6 P.M. on the evening of 2 July. Astonishment at first possessed the enemy, but this soon gave way to activity.

Soubise attacked one column, which was commanded by General Wütgenau. To assist in repelling this four battalions of Granby's column were detached, and the enemy were repulsed. The Allies then went into bivouac for the night, and at dawn on the morrow formed up

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on the Plain of Dortmund. As a matter of fact they were too weary for serious fighting, and Ferdinand did not attack that day. Meanwhile Soubise hastily sent off his baggage to Werle. On 4 July the Allies advanced to the attack, this time Granby's corps leading on the right. Soubise did not await the onslaught, but retreated. That evening the Allies occupied the former camping ground of the enemy, and had the satisfaction of commanding the rear of their retiring forces.

For some time the retreat continued, till Werle was reached, in the castle of which a small post of the Allies had been left, and this post was behind the right flank of the enemy.

Here Soubise halted, pitched his camp on the very spot vacated by the Allies a few days previously, and proceeded to make his front as secure as possible. This he did by throwing up redoubts along the entire length of a ravine which extended along his front. It was a very strong position, and was one which had as a matter of fact been occupied years before by Marshal Turenne.

A few outpost affairs took place in which neither side gained much. A considerable cannonade followed, and then the Allies withdrew to their camp, Granby's corps being stationed on the extreme left at Hemmeren. The Hereditary Prince occupied the extreme right and at but a cannon-shot distance from the enemy. In his strong position Soubise might well have remained secure, but for some unexplained reason did not do so. Instead he retired by Rhüne to Soest, the Allies following him to Hilbeck.

On 12 July the Allied Army was thus posted. It was extended towards the river Lippe, Lord Granby's column being encamped at Kirchdenkern, his left in the direction of Vellinghausen, a place situated near the road from Lippstadt and Wesel, which there runs practically along the river Lippe and between that river and the Ase, which it crosses at its junction with the Lippe at Hamm.

The main body of the Allies were posted in a line, with the Salzbach in their front and with Hilbeck, Wambeln and Hohenover in their rear, counting from right to left.

The position held by Granby was evidently the most important in the disposition of the Allied Army, and it was therefore the point which De Broglie most desired to attack and, if possible, capture. During 14 and 15 July Lord Granby was occupied in strengthening his

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front by means of entrenchments. He also placed obstacles across the road to Hamm to block it as much as possible, felling trees for that purpose.

On the 15th De Broglie occupied himself throughout the morning in reconnoitring the position. It is also stated that the outposts more than once engaged in desultory skirmishes. De Broglie then withdrew to his camp and for a few hours both armies remained quiet. About four o'clock in the afternoon, however, a sudden and most strenuous attempt was made on Granby by De Broglie's force alone, for it appears that that commander had given no intimation of his intention to his colleague Soubise. Advancing in three columns along the Hamm road, De Broglie's advance guard speedily drove in the German light troops; meanwhile his centre attacked Vellinghausen, situated in the centre of Granby's position. In all haste Granby hurried to repel the attack, and by moving his left wing in an oblique direction towards the river protected the Hamm road.


The enemy at once opened fire with artillery on the camp, which was quite within range. Here the attack was opposed by the light troops, who had rallied, and who with the support of two battalions of Highlanders successfully withstood and then repulsed the assault, and, what is more to the purpose, captured a hundred officers and men of the enemy. On Granby's left, however, the position was serious, as De Broglie had succeeded in turning it, and in this direction strong supports were hurriedly sent forward by Prince Ferdinand, who had personally ridden across to Granby in order to obtain exact information as to the situation.

The Prince considered that the disposition of Granby's force was as skilful as could be hoped for under the circumstances, and ordering Vellinghausen to be held at all costs, he departed to despatch the supports or reinforcements already mentioned thither.

Accordingly, General Wütgenau was ordered to the extreme left, with an addition to his strength of three squadrons of Carabiniers; and these were posted on the Hamm road. The Prince of Anhalt, with General Elliot's cavalry, was directed on his right, and La Lippe Bückebourg, with artillery, was stationed on the left front of the centre of the army.

The combat was now most strenuous, and Granby's force, with

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which we have most to concern ourselves, as the 7th Queen's Own was included in it, was heavily engaged and fought, as even a French authority is compelled to confess, 'with indescribable bravery.' Some idea of what they effected may be gained by a knowledge of the fact that even before the arrival of General Wütgenau on the left the French outposts had been repulsed, and it only required the reinforcements of Wütgenau and Anhalt to complete their discomfiture; this, too, despite the fact that five strong regiments of the enemy had been sent forward to restore the battle.

The combat lasted for two hours, though spasmodic artillery fire continued till nearly ten o'clock at night.

The opposing forces passed the night thus, the French in bivouac behind a small woody hill near Granby's camp, which hill they occupied with numerous piquets. The Allies were busily engaged in making such changes in the disposition of the force as would render the centre secure should the battle be resumed, as was anticipated, on the morrow. For this purpose General Conway's command, all composed of the Guards, was brought from the extreme right of the army to the centre, while the left (Granby's) also received a very considerable accession of strength, both in cavalry, artillery, and infantry. Another factor was also brought into play to further secure the position. The column of General Spörcken, which had hitherto remained upon the other side of the river, was ordered to march till a crossing place was discovered, and then to take up a position in support of Wütgenau on the extreme left. Throughout the night, during which the outposts of the two armies were quite close to one another, continual collisions of small bodies took place.

At dawn De Broglie advanced against Wütgenau, and again without the active co-operation of Soubise.

From the woody height already mentioned a hot and galling cannonade was maintained on the extreme left of Granby's force. Granby replied with a heavy artillery fire, which did considerable execution on the enemy there, and then ordered his infantry to storm the hill. The fight for this position was short but severe, and in the upshot the height was carried. General Spörcken's command advanced and joined the troops of Wütgenau; the French attack died away, and a retreat began. Three French regiments formed the rearguard and covered the retreat; one, the Regiment de Rougé, was captured by the grenadiers under

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Lieut.-Colonel Maxwell; Colonel the Comte de Rougé himself, the colours, and the guns of his regiment all being the spoil of the victors.

A pursuit was continued for about two miles. Meanwhile all that Soubise did was to attack in a half-hearted way the troops of the Hereditary Prince. To strengthen the forces in this part of the field, though reinforcements were hardly needed, Ferdinand detached some artillery and Hanoverians, and despatched them thither. By this time Soubise, however, had learnt of the ill-success of De Broglie's attack and his subsequent repulse, and at once himself gave way. After the battle De Broglie retreated to Oestlinghausen, and Soubise with Condé, who commanded his reserve, withdrew to Soest.

The loss of the enemy was variously estimated at from six to eight thousand killed, wounded and prisoners.

Sixty-three officers were captured, nine guns (one account says nineteen), and eight pairs of colours. The loss of the Allies did not exceed 1600 killed, wounded and missing. After the battle General Spörcken again crossed the river and proceeded to Herzfeldt, his former post.

De Broglie from Oestlinghausen retreated yet further to Ervite. Soubise remained at Soest and employed the Prince of Condé to maintain the communications between his army and that of De Broglie.

The Manuscript Regimental Record omits all mention of this battle. Cannon in his History names it as Kirch-Denkern. Elsewhere it is called Vellinghausen. Considering that Vellinghausen was the chief point attacked by the enemy, it is more reasonable that the battle should go by that name rather than that of the less important place.

One thing is clear, that the credit of the victory was certainly due to Granby, and it is satisfactory to find that this was freely admitted by Ferdinand, who, laying aside all personal feeling, allocated the praise to his subordinate in the most generous way.

The site of the battle of Vellinghausen was very unfavourable to the employment of cavalry, as the ground was very much broken up into fields, and the hedges formed obstacles which, while enabling infantry to be engaged, precluded anything like cavalry charges. Consequently perhaps it is that we hear practically nothing of the cavalry engaged. In the immediate pursuit, which was not prolonged more than a couple of miles, we find that only infantry were employed, and

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hence it is that De Broglie was enabled to draw off his beaten troops with far less inconvenience and loss than otherwise would have been the case.

Little of interest now occurred for some short time. De Broglie continued to retreat by the way of Gesecke, Buren, Haren, and Paderborn, and was closely followed up by the Allies; the vanguard, commanded by Lord Granby, being particularly alive in this direction. The retreating rearguard of the enemy was continually subjected to most harassing attacks. The main army was joined by Spörcken, and the Hereditary Prince with General Lückner again crossed the river Weser at Hameln. The enemy now reassumed the offensive and made an attempt on the post held by the Allies at Horn. This was, however, unsuccessful, as on the approach of Granby the enemy retired.

Four days later (18 August), piquets of Beckwith's Brigade having too rashly pressed forward to attack one of the infantry posts in the rear of the enemy, got into difficulties from which they were extricated by the dashing charges of Elliot's Light Dragoons.

De Broglie, however, still continuing his retrograde movement, made a brief delay at Hoxter, which place he hastily fortified, and then crossed the river Weser, losing much of his baggage in the operation. He, however, garrisoned Hoxter, and left moreover two strong bodies of men to hold the high ground near that place. Ferdinand and Granby started to attack these, the former on the right, the latter on the left. The enemy made for the Weser and did not await the onslaughts, and Granby could do no more than open fire on them on the left, as they withdrew, while General Wütgenau paid them a similar attention on the right.

Hoxter itself next claimed the attention of the Allies, who were preparing to bombard it, Lord Granby's force being detailed for this purpose. Again the enemy did not show fight, for the garrison in some haste similarly withdrew across the Weser. The retreating Soubise had been followed up by the Hereditary Prince, with whom was General Kilmansegge. Soubise paused at Münster on 21 August, in a vain attempt to lay siege to it. The siege did not, however, take a definite form, but was converted into a blockade, and this blockade ceased on 4 September.

An attempt to bombard Hamm, for which service de Stainville was

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detached by Soubise, also failed. Finally Soubise was driven back towards the Rhine and de Stainville towards Cassel.

The Allied Army now rested on the heights of Hoxter, that is to say on the west side of the river Weser. De Broglie lay on the east side of that river fronting Corvey.

The only mention made of the 7th Queen's Own during this period of toilsome marching and constant skirmishing is that among other troops they had behaved very well in an unnamed affair on the river Dymel in the presence of Ferdinand, who, a spectator of the combat, had been pleased to express his approbation and to bestow his thanks on all concerned. Possibly this is the affair which is thus mentioned by General Lloyd (page 230, vol. iv.):—

'On the 24th of August, his Serene Highness, at the head of Lord Granby's corps, and all the British troops, except the guards, proceeded by forced marches towards the Dymel, forced all the enemy's posts in that quarter, particularly at Dringlebourg, where he made upwards of 300 men prisoners, and then crossed that river; and on the 26th encamped at Hoff-Giesmar, within six leagues of Cassel, pushing forward an advanced party to Winter-Kasten. During this excursion, he left General Spörcken behind at Hoxter with the remainder of the army, to secure that part of the Weser from Hameln to the Dymel.'

Meanwhile, despite the fact that he was being actively followed up by the Allies, De Broglie always managed to avoid a pitched battle.

He now turned off towards the east, and detached expeditionary forces in the direction of Hildesheim, Brunswick, Wolfenbüttel, and Hanover. Contributions were everywhere levied, and all the country traversed was pillaged.

How to protect Hanover and Brunswick from siege was most important, and to avert such disasters Ferdinand changed his plans. Instead of continuing to follow up De Broglie, as the latter apparently fully expected or hoped that he would, Ferdinand at once despatched a reinforcement to the garrison of Hanover and returned in the direction of the river Dymel and Cassel. By the Hereditary Prince a force was left under a General Oheim to watch Soubise, while he himself proceeded towards Warburg, a place to which Ferdinand and Granby were then marching. Hoxter was meanwhile still held by Spörcken.

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Now during the absence of the Allies from the Dymel, and while they were on the Weser, Stainville had occupied his forces in taking up a number of posts. From these he was speedily ejected. The Allies crossed the Dymel; Stainville retired before them, till Ferdinand and Granby reached Immenhausen, where on the heights near they took up a position.

This had the effect of drawing a goodly number of De Broglie's forces from the eastern side of the Weser and in the direction of Cassel, where they collected in considerable strength.

Ferdinand then returned to his old position north of the river Dymel. The movements of the contending armies are now of a very complicated nature and need not be entered into in detail. The only event of importance was the capture, not for the first time, by the enemy of the Castle of the Sabbabourg. The strategic movements it was hoped would culminate in the defeat of Stainville, who, having advanced to Geismar and Grebenstein (Gravenstein or Grobenstein) had again retired, this time to the heights of Immenhausen, which he in his turn occupied.

Here Ferdinand determined to attack him, and indeed could he succeed in so doing his chances of fighting a successful battle were by no means small, for the position of the enemy was certainly not a strong one. The only line of retreat towards Cassel lay through a narrow defile known as the Avenue of Wilhelmsthal, and here a retreating army could, if fairly caught, be smitten hip and thigh.

The Allies marched on the night of 17 September, crossing the Dymel in the early hours of the morning. Their design was to threaten each flank of Stainville's position with two advanced columns, these columns being commanded by the Hereditary Prince and Lord Granby respectively. The other six columns under Ferdinand (for there were eight in all) were to make a frontal attack. Again ill-fortune marred the accomplishment of the design. Stainville obtained information of the movement by some means at about 7 A.M., and this allowed him time to withdraw in safety through the defile, a manœuvre carried out by his troops in three columns; and he reached the outskirts of Cassel in safety, where he encamped at Kratzenberg. The Allies, however, not only annoyed his rear with artillery, but also captured some prisoners.

Ferdinand halted, making his headquarters at Wilhelmsthal, Granby's force similarly occupying Weimar. The Hereditary Prince next engaged

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in a cavalry raid into Hesse, and succeeded in capturing 150,000 rations of oats at Fritzlar. The war now spread in the direction of Brunswick, which place was actually besieged, and this event came about thus.

Soubise and Condé had advanced towards Münster, Monsieur de Conflans had been detached against Osnabrück and Emden, and the latter place being but slenderly garrisoned was at once evacuated. As a counter-stroke the Hereditary Prince and General Hardenburg were despatched towards Münster. De Broglie crossed to the east side of the Weser when Prince Xavier of Saxony took Meppen and Wolfenbüttel and then laid siege to Brunswick.

The wealthy inhabitants of that place, as well as the reigning Duke and the Landgrave of Hesse, who was there at the time, escaped to Hamburg.

Ferdinand and Granby now left their position, marching by Warburg and Hoxter to the Weser, where Granby crossed the river at Ohr by means of a pontoon bridge, and encamped at Gros-Hilligesfeldt.

Wütgenau and Anhalt followed, and Ferdinand was preparing to do so when the relief of Brunswick by General Lückner was ascertained. Brunswick relieved, caused Xavier to retreat; nor was this all, for the enemy at once evacuated Wolfenbüttel and retired in haste from that district.

As for the force under Soubise, it had effected nothing more than the destruction of some depôts of stores and the capture of Emden, a by no means notable military achievement. Soubise on the relief of Brunswick retired to the Wesel. The Hereditary Prince hastened to the Weser, leaving a watching force under General Ohaim to protect Hamm from any sudden attack and also to keep an eye on the movements, if any, of Soubise. He then, having obtained reinforcements from the camp at Ohr, marched to Hildesheim, where he took over the command of the troops of both General Wütgenau and the Prince of Anhalt. The prospects of the campaign had now brightened considerably, for the enemy had all been forced over to the east of the Weser, except a detachment of infantry under De Rochambeau, which still lay near Cassel. We have now arrived at the month of November, and the question arose, would there be a prolonged winter campaign, or would the opposing armies settle as usual into winter quarters? Ferdinand now made his final effort for the year.

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He advanced on Eimbeck, where he found De Broglie (as regards his centre at least) too strong for attack. Ferdinand then retired towards Alfeld, despatching Granby to Vorwohle and the Hereditary Prince to Immenhausen. Marshal de Broglie, who came to the conclusion that this movement was a retreat, gave chase to the Hereditary Prince, sending the Count de Broglie in pursuit of Granby.

On the night of the 7th, just as the wearied troops of the latter had succeeded in pitching their camp at the conclusion of the toilsome march of nearly eighteen hours, Count de Broglie came up with them and promptly attacked. The outposts of Granby were driven in, but the remainder of the force turned out and with great gallantry repulsed the enemy, and moreover chased them back to their camp.

Ferdinand now assumed the offensive and made an attempt on the left flank of De Broglie. Joining Conway's division to that of Lord Granby at Vorwohle, the force moved out of camp on 9 November to Waugelstadt, while the Hereditary Prince replaced them at Vorwohle.

The events of 7 November, as far as Granby is concerned, were repeated in an almost exactly similar manner on the evening of the 9th, and again the efforts of the enemy were completely frustrated; but more than this, the effect of the repulse was to completely turn the left of De Broglie and to compel him on the night of 10 November to abandon his position, to retreat in the darkness towards Cassel, and finally to close the campaign. Nothing loath, the Allied Army prepared to follow his example.

Eimbeck was first occupied, the quarters of Granby's troops being at Salzderhelden on its south side.

Eventually Prince Ferdinand settled down for the winter, making his headquarters at Hildesheim; those of the Hereditary Prince were fixed at Münster, while Lord Granby occupied Osnabrück. The regiments in general were spread about in these places, and also in Paderborn, Hameln, Eimbeck, and Lippstadt, practically along the line of the Lippe and Dymel and to the east through the Forest of Sollingar.

Both Lord Granby and General Mostyn, the Colonel of the 7th Queen's Own, at once returned to England for the winter.

The enemy was thus disposed: Broglie went into winter quarters from Göttingen to Nordheim, also thus along the Leine.

Cannon's History does not supply many details as to the part taken


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by the Regiment in the complicated manœuvres of this campaign. He tells us that after Kirch-Denkern (Vellinghausen) it 'was subsequently employed in operations which brought on slight skirmishes; but no general engagement occurred. In August it was employed on the Dymel.

'In the early part of November it was engaged in dislodging a French corps from a strong camp near Escherhausen, in the Duchy of Brunswick; and afterwards marched to Eimbeck, where another skirmish occurred. These movements were designed to surprise the French Army in dispersed quarters; but the enemy having gained time to assemble his forces, this regiment, with several other corps, marched during the night of 7 November through a heavy snow to Foorwohle, where another skirmish occurred, and the British Dragoons evinced signal gallantry. The 7th were encamped in the snow until the following morning, when the British had another skirmish with their opponents; and they subsequently marched to the heights between Mackensen and Lithorst. When the army went into winter quarters the regiment was cantoned in East Friesland.'

The Manuscript Regimental Record makes no mention whatever of the year 1761.

As to the losses sustained by the Regiment either in action or by sickness there are no numbers or lists available. Probably, however, the strength of the Regiment was very much decreased; it is an undoubted fact that, taking the Allied Army as a whole, more than one-quarter perished during the year. It is not that the actual losses in action were heavy, for they were admittedly light, but it is to hard work, hard weather, and disease that the terrible death-roll must be attributed. Another factor, though of course in a lesser degree, which must be considered was the prevalence of desertion from the ranks; this, however, was mainly to be found in the armies of our Allies, and not among the British troops.



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CHAPTER XII

Campaign of 1762. Battle of Wilhelmsthal.

We have now reached the final campaign of this war.

The Allied Army remained in its winter quarters unmolested until March, when on the 10th and 11th a body of 3000 French sallied forth from Göttingen and fell upon the line of the Allies at daybreak. The attack was brisk and sudden, and was not confined to one spot. The chief combat took place at Gittel, where a number fell on both sides. Kabelfeld was also attacked, but here the enemy were repulsed, losing one officer and six men prisoners.

In consequence a reinforcement of 3000 of the Allied troops was sent towards Eimbeck on the 20th, with a view to holding the garrison of Göttingen in check.

On 6 April Lückner detached 500 cavalry to Heilingstadt. The enemy becoming aware of this, issued from Göttingen with 1800 horse and 2000 foot to cut them off.

Lückner in turn becoming informed of the movement, putting himself at the head of 1600 horse, succeeded in coming up with the rear of the enemy's column while retiring on Göttingen, and attacking, killed thirty, took eighty prisoners and also captured one hundred horses. Several small affairs took place at this time, but these do not need detailed mention.

On 17 April, however, the Hereditary Prince assembled a body of troops at Unna and proceeded to Arensberg, to which place he immediately laid siege. The French Commandant offered to surrender on the 21st if he was permitted to march out with all the honours of war, and provided also that he was not relieved before that date.

These terms were refused, as it was known to the Hereditary Prince that powerful forces of the enemy were marching to relieve the place.

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On the night of the 18th all was quiet, but at 6 A.M. on the 19th the Allies opened both a heavy and destructive fire. At 9 A.M. the Prince offered terms which were rejected by the enemy, and firing was renewed. By noon both the castle and the town were in flames, and the place surrendered at discretion. Twenty-six cannon were captured in the castle.

This exploit caused considerable alarm in the French lines and resulted in the immediate despatch of a force across the Rhine from Cologne and Düsseldorf. This force consisted of 400 men from each battalion and 100 from each squadron. They marched on the 19th to Rattenburg, on the 20th reached Langenberg, and on the 22nd proceeded thence to Hardenberg to make room for a corps of 10,000 men assembled at Hattengen. Information, however, arrived that the Hereditary Prince had returned to his quarters, and the enemy then followed his example and retired.

The possession of Arensberg was of importance to the French for this reason: it preserved the enemy's communications between Wesel and Düsseldorf. Its capture by the Allies enabled them to raise contributions in the country of Berg.

The day after the capture of Arensberg Marshal Soubise arrived at Cassel, holding the command of the French Army on the Upper Rhine and Main in conjunction with Marshal d'Estrées. Four days later the Prince of Condé arrived at Düsseldorf to assume command of the French troops on the Lower Rhine.

On 9 May the Hereditary Prince started suddenly out to collect the contributions he had previously levied on the country of Berg. Marching from Unna with a large body of troops, he appeared at Elberfeldt before the enemy had obtained the slightest notice of his approach. Now in that neighbourhood the corps of M. de Conflans was posted, besides some other smaller bodies. The enemy retired with much precipitation, and not without loss. The Hereditary Prince then proceeded to Solingen, and having obtained hostages for the payment of the contributions, retired without any casualties.

On 18 May Prince Ferdinand, escorted by a battalion of Hanoverian Guards, proceeded from Hildesheim to Pyrmont, from whence the troops which had been quartered there had departed on the previous day.

General Lückner was then posted on the Huve to await the arrival

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of the pontoons which were then on their way from Hanover to the Weser. The Hereditary Prince next marched out and fixed his headquarters at Bulderen.

Meanwhile the French on the Upper Rhine had marked out several camps and were in motion to assemble between the Fulde and the Werra. The army of the Lower Rhine was encamped at Düsseldorf, Wesel, and Rees in three corps, under the command of Lieutenant-Generals Monteynard, Levi, and Saint-Chamaut.

On 24 May Lückner and Prince Frederick of Brunswick, whilst reconnoitring towards Göttingen, had a most successful little encounter with the enemy in which they captured eighty prisoners and 100 horses. M. de Lahr, the French commandant, also received a mortal wound.

During these marches and skirmishes the British troops had remained in their quarters; the time was, however, at hand for them to resume active operations in the field. Early in May transports with provisions, munitions of war, and reinforcements were despatched to Bremen from England.

Lord Granby, who it will be remembered had returned to England at the conclusion of the last campaign, now prepared to proceed to the seat of war. He was delayed by contrary winds for some days at Harwich, but sailed on or about 28 May, and arrived at the Hague on 1 June. The Marquis of Granby left the Hague on 4 May for Münster, where the Hereditary Prince then was; and afterwards proceeded by Brakell and Hoxter to the headquarters of Prince Ferdinand at the Palace of Corvey on the Weser.

On 18 June the Prince reviewed the army at Brakell, whence it marched for its old position on the river Dymel, and marched with Lord Granby's Corps as usual in the vanguard.

The first object which Prince Ferdinand had in view was to cut off the communications between the garrison of Cassel and the main French Army in that district from Frankfort. This when accomplished would render the fall of Cassel, Göttingen, and Ziegenhagen merely a matter of time; and when these strongholds fell the whole of Hesse would be clear of the enemy. Granby was therefore ordered to cross to the south bank of the Dymel and to push on to Wolfshanger. Here he dislodged some of the enemy and occupied the Heights of Volksmissen, the enemy on this occasion forming a part of De Stainville's troops. Almost simul-

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taneously an attack was made on Stainville's right by a force commanded by Lord Frederick Cavendish, which had been despatched thither with that object in view. Cavendish came into collision with the enemy near Gravenstein (Grebenstein or Grobenstein), and after nearly succeeding in capturing De Stainville himself, as well as the Duke de Cogni and De Castries, he proceeded to retake the Sabbabourg. Soubise and d'Estrées now advanced in force against Granby, who in consequence retired across the Dymel, having achieved the object he had in view, which was to disturb the enemy to the north-west of Cassel. A party was now sent to occupy the passes leading from the south of the Dymel into Hesse, and another to secure the communications with General Lückner.

At this time and until the night of the 24th of June the 7th Queen's Own had been in camp, first at Brakell and afterwards on the heights of Tissel. They were brigaded with the 11th Dragoons, and the brigade was commanded by Lieut.-Colonel George Lawson Hall of the 7th.

The only information to be obtained as to the strength of the Regiment at this period comes from a paper dated 1762, 2 June, to be found among the Stowe MSS. in the British Museum, and as the strength there given is probably that of the Regiment at the beginning of the campaign, at any rate on paper, of that year, it may well be inserted here :—

'7th Mostyn's. In Germany, Strength 28 Commissioned and Warrant Officers ; 24 Non-commissioned Officers ; 243 men fit for duty ; 16 Sick ; 311 Total officers and men ; 47 Wanting to complete ; 24 Contingent Men. Total 382.'

The same paper tells us that the Light Troop had 6 officers commissioned and warrant ; 6 non-commissioned officers ; 74 men fit for duty ; 2 sick ; total 88 officers and men ; 41 wanting to complete, 5 contingent men ; 134 total.

It will be remembered that the Light Troop had been left behind in England.

A fact in connection with this campaign, which the reader will hardly fail to have noticed, is the absence of Marshal De Broglie. The explanation is this : thanks to court intrigues mainly, and also to the mortification of the French, in consequence of their serious defeat at Vellinghausen, De Broglie, who, by the way, was admittedly the greatest soldier

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then possessed by that nation, had fallen under the severe displeasure of both the King and those surrounding him. The Marshal was, in fact, sent into exile, and Soubise would have shared the same fate had it not been for the powerful influence of Madame de Pompadour, with whom he was a great favourite. Thus the strong man and skilled commander was disgraced, while Soubise, his inferior in war, was continued in his command with Marshal d'Estrées appointed as his colleague.

The strategy of Prince Ferdinand had at length succeeded in drawing the enemy into a position which promised him an opportunity of fighting favourable battle. The French were now behind Gravenstein (otherwise Grebenstein, Gröbenstein, and Groebenstein). Ferdinand would have preferred perhaps that they should have occupied the heights of Immenhausen, but this he was unable to accomplish.

What he proposed to do was to fight, and having entangled the enemy in the pass or gorge at Wilhelmsthal, to destroy them.


He accordingly gave orders for the Allies to cross the Dymel early on the morning of 24 June. He had sent General Lückner across the Weser on the preceding night, leaving a part of his force behind near the river Leine in order to conceal his movement from Prince Xavier of Saxony. Having crossed, Lückner advanced in the rear of the French right, which was commanded by De Castries. The garrison of the Sabbabourg was strengthened.

Granby, who on this occasion commanded what was technically the reserve, crossed the Dymel on the morning of 24 June ahead of Prince Ferdinand, and posted his men on the Dürrenberg. Here, though he could have been hindered, if not prevented, from taking up a position, he was unmolested by the enemy; and awaiting developments Granby's force remained absolutely in view of the tents of the French camp. Ferdinand's main body marched at 4 A.M. on 24 June, with General Spörcken's command on its extreme left; it being intended that Spörcken and Lückner should act in concert. Ferdinand was, however, too late in arriving, and moreover did not proceed far enough before he formed in fighting line. Lückner appears to have timed his movement with great exactitude up to a certain point, and having arrived within striking distance of De Castries near Holzhausen and Mariendorff, attacked the enemy and drove them in on the French right. Granby set his troops in motion and also arrived to time at Fürstenwald. Here the

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guns of Lückner were audible, and believing, incorrectly, that they were those of Ferdinand and that the French centre was being assailed, Granby despatched a small body of men with two guns into the wood of Fürstenwald, and then with the remainder of his troops rapidly marched on to Wilhelmsthal, hoping to prevent the escape of the enemy.

This march was made quite close to the left flank of the French. Meanwhile the infantry of the enemy were already retreating, and retreating in haste, for finding Lückner on their right flank and Granby appearing at Fürstenwald on their left rear, they had taken alarm and



were now hastening towards Wilhelmsthal. Of course, had Prince Ferdinand been within a distance which would have permitted him to press an attack on their centre, a great disaster must inevitably have befallen them, but he was too far off to strike and strike home.

Granby by his rapid march by the left cut off a detached rearguard which was occupied in covering the retreat of the enemy into and through the pass.

These Granby was preparing to charge, when they in their turn by a rapid movement round the wood of Fürstenwald succeeded in gaining the flank of his reserve, and captured two guns and a grenadier company of an infantry regiment.

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Granby was now thus placed: in his rear was the rearguard of the enemy, in his front the whole of its left flank, though this left flank was in retreat, while nothing was either to be seen or heard of the Allied centre. Matters looked most unfavourable for Granby, that is to say if the enemy's left flank should rally. Granby, however, swiftly made up his mind as to what course of action he should pursue. Neglecting the enemy's left flank, he turned back on the rearguard, and after a strenuous conflict overthrew it. De Stainville was completely defeated, and was driven back on the right of Ferdinand's troops, which had by this time arrived or were arriving. The result was the surrender of three entire regiments to the 5th Foot, besides others which had already been captured. A general flight of the enemy took place. De Stainville, with a very small portion of his command, escaped; Soubise and d'Estrées were chased through the pass at Wilhelmsthal and right up to Cassel itself, with a loss of 6000 men, of whom 2700 were prisoners; 170 officers were captured, and also one standard, six colours, two guns and the whole of the baggage, &c.

On the left General Spörcken inflicted some loss on the enemy and took two guns.

The Allied Army suffered but few casualties.

With regard to the part taken by the 7th Queen's Own Dragoons in this battle Cannon writes as follows:—

'They left their camp before daybreak on the morning of the 24th of June, 1762, and, having crossed the Dymel, advanced against the French camp at Groebenstein. The enemy was surprised, and made a precipitate retreat upon Cassel, with the loss of their tents and baggage; and one division being surrounded in the woods of Wilhelmsthal, surrendered. The Seventh pursued the French in the direction of Cassel and took several prisoners; they subsequently encamped near Holtzhausen.'

The Manuscript Regimental Record is even more brief:—

'1762. The Regiment was present at the Battle near Gravenstein, 24 June.

'The Regiment does not appear to have sustained any loss in this Action, see return inserted in the *London Gazette*, 10 July, 1762.'

The losses of the Allies are estimated at 700 men, of which 450 belonged to the troops under the command of Granby.

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Officially, the name by which this battle is known is 'Wilhelmsthal.'

When the failure in part of both Spörcken and Lückner is considered, and the late arrival of Prince Ferdinand is remembered, the credit of any success in this somewhat disappointing battle assuredly lies with Lord Granby.

The remainder of the campaign, as far as these pages are concerned, may be passed over.

That the Regiment was for the next few months actively employed, chiefly on detached services which entailed continuous marches in every direction, we are told, but no details are given. There are no records that we have been able to obtain, despite careful search, to furnish even the briefest list of the places visited, the objects to be attained, or whether the operations were or were not successful in their issue.

The Preliminaries of Peace were signed on 3 November, though news of the signature did not reach Prince Ferdinand for some days. On 16 November the enemy began to march homewards, and three days later the Allies went into winter quarters in the bishoprics of Münster and Osnabrück, and along the frontiers of Hanover.

One event towards the end of the campaign alone need be mentioned, and that was the capture of Cassel, a stronghold that had been in the possession of the enemy since 1760.

According to a return furnished towards the end of the war the strength of the 7th Queen's Own Dragoons was 516 officers and men. It is, however, open to doubt whether this is correct, and in the face of there being no record of any drafts sent to reinforce the strength of the Regiment during the year, we are more inclined to accept the strength on active service given earlier in this chapter, as the numbers here given were obtained by adding together the totals of the troops with Mostyn 'in Germany' and of the Light Troop which remained at home. In all probability the efficient strength of the Regiment on this campaign was little more than 300 officers and men.



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CHAPTER XIII

Return from Germany; Home Service, 1764–1792

When peace was declared the 7th Queen's Own Dragoons received orders, in February 1763, to return to England. Accordingly they marched through Germany and Holland to their port of embarkation, Williamstadt, where vessels awaited them. The date of embarkation is not given, but the Regimental Record tells us that on 11 March :—

'The 7th Dragoons on arrival from Germany at Harwich or Purfleet to disembark and march as follows :

3 Troops to Chelmsford & Springfield
3 ,, to Colchester.'

Reductions in establishment were now the order of the day.

The Light Troop, which had been stationed at Canterbury since 7 October 1762, and had been employed in patrol duty from Dover to Hastings, was on 14 January 1763 ordered to be reduced to 1 captain, 2 lieutenants, 2 cornets, 3 sergeants, 3 corporals, 2 drummers, and 60 privates. This reduction was but a preliminary to its complete disbandment, for which an order arrived on 25 March, and the disbandment accordingly took place forthwith.

On the same date the remaining six troops of the Regiment were reduced to the strength per troop given below :—

1 captain, 1 lieutenant, 1 cornet, 1 quartermaster, 2 sergeants, 2 corporals, and 28 private men. Eight men in each troop were, however, equipped as light dragoons, while the remaining twenty remained as heavy dragoons.

On 23 April the troops at Chelmsford and Springfield were ordered to march on the 29th to Witham, Kelvedon, and Coggeshall and Braintree, while the Colchester troops on 11 May were ordered to proceed on

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or before the 23rd to Maldon, Halstead, and Thaxted and Dunmow respectively. Next day (24 May) the whole Regiment was ordered to return to its former quarters, the three former Colchester troops proceeding, however, to Chelmsford and Springfield, while the others went to the quarters that had previously been occupied by those at Colchester: it was in fact an interchange.

Here the three troops remained until the Chelmsford election in December, when they were ordered, as was then customary, to leave that place and to proceed during the election time to Colchester, and after the declaration of the poll they were to return.

When in due course the dates of the county election held at Colchester were fixed, the three troops there were for that time shifted to Sudbury, on the borders of Suffolk.

On 3 January, 1764, a detachment consisting of 1 captain, 2 subalterns, and 60 men, with a due proportion of non-commissioned officers, was sent to Ipswich on revenue duty.

On 9 April the whole Regiment was concentrated and proceeded to Hyde Park to be reviewed by King George III. His Majesty was pleased on the occasion to compliment the 7th Queen's Own on their appearance and discipline.

On the 14th the Regiment, which had returned to Chelmsford and the district, received orders to march on the 24th as follows: three troops to Worcester and three troops to Hereford.

But by a supplementary order it was notified that they were to go instead to Worcester and Pershore till 30 May. Here the Regiment remained till 7 March, when the Worcester troops were despatched to Hereford in consequence of the assizes being held in the former city, after which the Regiment was to concentrate at Worcester.

On 21 March the Regiment was ordered to march in two divisions to the south coast, two troops to Lewes and one to Brighton, two troops to Chichester and one to Havant. The march was to begin on 3 April and to be completed by 17 April.

On 5 April, however, these orders were varied as follows:—

Having arrived at Reading, two troops of the 2nd Division were ordered to Devizes, there to remain till relieved by the 1st Dragoons. The other four troops were to proceed as follows: one to Colchester, two to Lewes and one to Brighton. On 20 April the Devizes troops

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were despatched to Chichester and Havant. Six days later the quarters were again partially changed.

Two troops remained at Chichester, two at Lewes, one at Eastbourne and Pevensey, and one at Hastings. The Regiment was now allowed to remain quiet for a few months. On 19 October all the troops were concentrated at Lewes for review, and were afterwards ordered to proceed, one troop to Hastings, one to Brighton, two to Chichester, and two to remain at Lewes.

Meanwhile the detachment on revenue duty was still absent. It was, however, recalled on 14 March 1766, when the whole Regiment was ordered to Lewes and Brighton, to assemble at those places on the 31st.

On 11 April the Regiment was ordered to Lambeth, the marches to take place between the 22nd and 26th of the month.

At Lambeth the Regiment remained until 12 May, when it was again dispersed, two troops being ordered to Northampton, two to Leicester, and one each to Wellingborough and Loughborough.

On 18 December the Loughborough troop was withdrawn and posted at Northampton.

No further change occurred in the disposition of the Regiment until 16 March 1767, when the 7th Queen's Own were ordered to assemble at Leicester by Thursday the 26th.

Cannon tells us that during the preceding year while at Leicester and Northampton the drummers on the establishment of the Regiment were ordered to be replaced by trumpeters. It would be expected that some notice of this important change would have been met with in the Manuscript Regimental Record, but no trace of it is to be discovered therein. Similarly the order in 1764 for the Regiment to be mounted on long-tailed horses and for epaulettes to be worn on the left shoulder in lieu of aiguillettes and for the boots of the men to be of a lighter description than formerly, is also omitted, though given in Cannon.

The removal of Lieut.-General Mostyn in May 1763 from the Colonelcy of the Regiment to that of the First Dragoon Guards and the appointment of Major-General Sir George Howard, K.B., to succeed him in the 7th Queen's Own, is likewise unrecorded.

Sir George Howard had previously been Colonel of the 3rd Foot (the Buffs). General Mostyn had now obtained the command of the Regiment which he had for long most ardently desired, and for which

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he for some years had been waiting. Judging from his letters, we are inclined to think that Mostyn almost resented his appointment to the 7th Queen's Own, and accepted the Colonelcy most unwillingly. (See Register of Officers.)

For the years 1765 and 1766 some interesting particulars have been obtained, and are here inserted.

8 *October* 1765.—Among other regiments the 7th were ordered as follows at reviews: 'Regimental swords are to be used by the officers of Dragoons instead of fusils when the Regiments Dismount, or when they parade on foot. After the Word of Command "Dismount," before the Men face to the Left, the Swords of the Dragoons are to be fixed on the Saddle, by placing the Hilt on the pummell, and fixing it with the firelock strap, the point to be under the middle cloak strap. This is to be done without any word of command, and immediately after dismounting. In performing the Horse Evolutions, and in taking Ground by Squadron, or by Divisions, The movements not to be made on a Gallop, but on a "Brisk Trott," or Walk as Occasion Requires. No Galloping, except at the Charge, and which should not continue above 100 Paces. When Regiments march on foot by a Reviewing General, they are to march with fixed bayonets.'

22 *October* 1765.—It had been found that there was great want of uniformity in the honours with which 'the Major Generals' at reviews were received.

Among other regiments the 7th Dragoons were ordered (notwithstanding any former regulations) in future that the 'Drummers are to beat two Ruffles and all officers to salute (the Standards) excepted.'

December 1765.—The recruiting officer of any Dragoon regiment is forbidden to give more than 'a guinea and a crown' as bounty money.

For infantry the sum was fixed at 'a guinea and a half.'

On 17 *January* 1766 the order for Dragoon horses to have 'full tails without the least part having been cut off' was issued.

11 *March* 1766.—It was ordered that in the Review Returns in Dragoon regiments, 'for the Farriers, neither Firelock, Pistols or Swords are to be accounted for—and for the Drummers no other Arms but a sword and pistol for each.'

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28 *June* 1766.—On this date His Majesty gave orders that 'the Regiments of Dragoon Guards and Dragoons shall have Trumpeters to each Troop, instead of the Drummers.'

Two master trumpeters, by name Mr. Abingdon and Mr. Willis, were therefore appointed to undertake 'the perfecting of some of the present drummers of each corps in their Duty as Trumpeters, and a proper place at the Horse Guards and Instruments are procured for the purpose. The men who are sent by the Several Regiments are to be quartered in the neighbourhood of that place and to be under the Command of the Non Commissioned Officers who are Ordered to attend. The Masters are to receive 4 guineas for each man that is perfected in the Regimental Duty, as a Trumpeter. This is to be advanced by the Respective Regiments when Demanded and Charged in the Contingent Account.

'At present the Queens Regiment of Dragoon Guards is to send two and they may set out immediately. By taking a Copy of a Beating Order they will get Billets on the Road, and when arrived on Applying at the War Office they will receive further Orders.

'The Regiments are to subsist them as far as London and give Directions to their respective Agents relative to advancing them their Subsistence while continuing on this Duty. You will please let me know how many of the present Drummers you propose to keep as Trumpeters, and how many it will be necessary to discharge (as not being proper for that purpose) with the reasons.'

This order was sent to the 7th Queen's Own Dragoons among other regiments.

It was proposed to recommend the discharged drummers, if of good character, &c., for the bounty of Chelsea Hospital.

9 *October* 1766.—A letter about the Cavalry Review in the autumn is rather interesting. It is as follows:—

'SIR,

'His Majesty (to prevent the ill Effects to Horses from being too much heated by Violent Movements soon after they are taken up from Grass, and that they have only necessary gentle

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Exercise) Has given Directions to the Reviewing Generals that the Several Regiments of Horse, Dragoon Guards and Dragoons are not to practice any Manœuvres at the Autumn Review with Rapidity. E. H.'

'9 *Oct.* 1766.

A note as to the price of Commissions at this date is of interest.

31 *January* 1766.

PRICE OF COMMISSIONS

DRAGOON GUARDS AND DRAGOONS

Rank.	Price.	Difference.
	£	£
Lieut.-Colonel . . .	4700	1100
Major	3600	1100
Captain	2500	1100
Captain-Lieutenant . .	1400	250
Lieutenant	1150	150
Cornet	1000	1000
		£4700

All Commissions in the Dragoons were calculated at ten years' purchase.

	Half-Pay per Diem	Half-Pay per Annum	Half-Pay at ten years' purchase	Full Price of Commission	Difference
	s. d.	£ s. d.	£ s.	£	£ s.
Lieut.-Colonel .	10 0	182 10 0	1825 0	4700	2875 0
Major . . .	8 0	146 0 0	1460 0	3600	2140 0
Captain. . .	5 6	100 7 6	1003 15	2500	1496 5
Lieutenant . .	3 0	54 15 0	547 10	1150	602 10
Cornet . . .	2 6	45 12 6	456 5	1000	543 15

To return to the movements of the Regiment, which was now at Nottingham. On 7 May 1767 it was ordered to march to York, the date of the march being fixed for 11 May, and of arrival for 16 May.

At York the 7th Queen's Own remained until 15 February 1768, on which date orders to proceed to Durham were received, the march to begin on 26 February.

On 25 March they were ordered to march on 6 April from Durham to Berwick and to proceed thence to North Britain.

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We are not told where in Scotland the Regiment was quartered, either in Cannon or in the Manuscript Record, but we know that an order was received 28 February 1769 to the effect that on arrival from North Britain they were to march three troops from Coldstream to Coventry from 22 March to 14 April, and the other three troops from the same place to the same from 24 March to 15 April. We may conclude therefore that the Regiment had concentrated and was marched south in two divisions.

On 15 May three troops were sent from Coventry to Warwick, and on 23 October two of these troops were shifted to Stratford-on-Avon.

No other change of quarters took place until 2 February 1770, when the same two troops were moved back from Stratford-on-Avon to Warwick.

On 17 March we find that the whole Regiment was ordered south, the three troops at Warwick marching from 7 to 13 April and those at Coventry from 7 to 14 April; their destination being Newbury and its suburb Speenham Land. The stay of the Regiment here was but brief, as on 26 April they were ordered to proceed from 5 May to Dorchester, Axminster, Bridport, Blandford, Yeovil, and Sherborne; one to each place.

There is no other entry for 1770. A slight change of quarters, however, took place on 4 January, 1771, when the troops at Axminster, Bridport, and Yeovil were ordered to join the troops at Dorchester, Sherborne, and Blandford respectively.

During the month of February another slight change of quarters took place, one of the Dorchester troops being sent to Blandford and another to Sherborne.


This was; it would seem, a preliminary to the assembly of the Regiment at Salisbury, which took place on 12 March, after which the six troops were quartered at Salisbury, Fisherton, Harnham [?] and Milford, though in what proportions is not stated.

On 29 March the Regiment received orders to march on 2 April as follows: three troops to Henley and three troops to Maidenhead.

Within a month they were again shifted; marching so as to arrive on 30 April, two troops to Putney, one to Fulham, and three to Richmond. Here the Regiment remained till some time in June, when the entire six troops were ordered to Canterbury on coast duty, and were so engaged till April 1772—the exact dates are not stated.

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From a ***Miniature*** *in possession of* ***Mrs. Bland.*** *(By kind permission.)*



LIEUT.-COLONEL THOMAS BLAND.

1771.

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From May to October 1772 we find the Regiment in new quarters, and thus dispersed: one troop each at Daventry, Newport Pagnell, Wellingborough, and Market Harborough, the remaining two being at Boston. From November 1772 to March 1773 the Daventry troop was moved to Northampton.

On 10 March 1773 the Regiment, having assembled, marched to York, arriving on 22 March. Four days later they started for Berwick-on-Tweed, which they reached on 7 April. Here there is a gap until June, when we find all six troops at Haddington. From September 1773 to May 1774 the Regiment was stationed at Linlithgow, at the end of which period it again returned to England, for we read that in June all six troops were at Preston. There is absolutely no information in any detail of the movements of the Regiment at this period; we shall therefore be as brief as possible, merely recording the information obtainable from the Regimental Manuscript.

September 1774. Six troops at Manchester; December 1774 to March 1775, three troops at Manchester, two at Warrington, and one at Wigan.

April 1775 to March 1776, six troops at Worcester, Pershore, and Newcastle-in-Emlyn (Carmarthenshire); the numbers at each place, however, are not stated.

From May 1776 to July 1777 the Regiment was sent to Sussex on preventive or 'coast' duty, being distributed between Arundel, Lewes, Brighton, Chichester, and Havant. Coast duty in Norfolk and Suffolk followed from August to December 1777, three troops being stationed at Norwich and three at Ipswich. Whether the Regiment was moved thence in January and February 1778 we do not know, but it was back again in the same quarters in February 1778.

In the month of August of this year we find the Queen's Own Dragoons encamped near Bury St. Edmunds, five troops being at the Stow camp and one at Hengrave. Three other regiments of dragoons were also present and two battalions of militia, the whole being under the command of Major-General Warde. There were quite an unusual number of camps this year. A large one was formed near Cork on 25 July and 'others were forming in the most convenient stations throughout Ireland.' A second was formed at Winchester; where the troops were reviewed by the King with much pomp and circumstance on 29 September. A camp formed at Salisbury broke up on 7 October.

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On 10 October, after visiting Lord Petre at Thorndon Hall, Essex, the King and Queen were present at a review of the troops in camp at Warley. Lastly, on 3 November the King also reviewed the troops encamped at Coxheath near Sevenoaks, having visited Lord Amherst at Montreal prior to the review, and proceeding to Leeds Castle after its conclusion.

In March 1779 we find two troops at Newmarket, two at Hadleigh, and one each at Boxford and Lavenham.

During April the Colonel of the Regiment, Lieut.-General Sir George Howard, C.B., was removed to the command of the First Dragoon Guards *vice* Mostyn deceased. He was succeeded in the Colonelcy of the 7th Queen's Own Dragoons by Major-General Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. This promotion is not noticed in the Regimental Manuscript. In the same month a most important regimental change took place. Firstly, owing to the outbreak of the American War the strength of the Regiment was augmented. Secondly, in April the eight men per troop that had been equipped as Light Dragoons since 1763 were incorporated with detachments from the 2nd, 3rd, 15th, and 16th Dragoons into a separate regiment; which was numbered as the 21st Light Dragoons. This new regiment was the second cavalry regiment in the British service to be numbered XXI. The first was raised by the Marquis of Granby in 1760 and was known as the XXI. or Royal Windsor Foresters. It was disbanded in 1763.

The second was the regiment raised as already mentioned in 1779. The first Colonel was General Douglas. During its brief existence—for it was disbanded on 1 June 1783—the regiment served only in England, viz. for three years in the Midlands at Manchester in 1781, Colchester 1782, then at Lanham Camp at Canterbury from November 1782 till it was disbanded.

The third XXI. was re-raised in 1794, and after distinguishing itself on active service was disbanded at Chatham in 1819.

The fourth and last XXI., which still exists as the XXI. (Empress of India's) Lancers, was raised in India from the Bengal European cavalry after the Mutiny. This regiment was equipped as Hussars in 1862 and as Lancers in 1897.

The 7th Queen's Own were now sent to Scotland, though the date of their departure thither is not given. We, however, find that three troops were at Montrose and three at Kilmarnock in September 1779.

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In the following year all the six troops were assembled at Montrose in May and proceeded to Musselburgh in July.

From September 1780 to April 1781 the Regiment was concentrated at Haddington.

The 7th Queen's Own was now ordered back to England, and we find that from May 1781 to April 1782 the Regiment was quartered at Durham. In the following June they had marched into Wiltshire and were posted at Salisbury, proceeding thence to Marlborough in December. In June 1783 the Regiment moved its quarters to Newbury, and in December proceeded to Reading; where it remained until June 1784. At that date and until December it was quartered at Hounslow, then from January to June 1785 at Croydon.

It must here be noted that an important change in equipment took place in 1784 just prior to the stay at Hounslow, for the Regiment, hitherto Heavy Dragoons, was then equipped as Light Dragoons. The details of this change will be fully dealt with in the chapter on uniforms. For the present it is only needful to state that helmets replaced the old cocked hats, the boots, saddles, belts and other equipments were ordered to be of a much lighter kind of make. A carbine replaced the old short musket, and as a weapon, owing to the shortness of its barrel, it was by no means an improvement. In addition the standard of height both for men and horses was reduced. During its stay at Hounslow the Regiment was mainly employed in escort duty for the Royal Family, having detachments for this purpose spread about in the villages along the road from London to Windsor.

Before leaving Hounslow for Croydon in 1784 the Regiment was reviewed by the King. No details of this review are to be obtained, the *Gentleman's Magazine*, which usually reported such functions, omitting in this case to make any mention thereof. Cannon, however, tells us that the 'appearance and discipline' of the Regiment 'procured the expression' of the King's approbation. The Manuscript Record does not chronicle the review.

Apparently the Regiment only remained about six months in Croydon, and must have occupied billets, as the cavalry barracks were then unbuilt in that town. They were constructed in 1794 at a cost of £16,188 5*s*. 9½*d*., the contractor being a Mr. Thomas Tomlins. Hence probably it is that in the month of July the Regiment was sent on revenue

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duty to the south coast, being posted until March 1786 at Lewes, Chichester, and places in the neighbourhood.

In May 1786 the entire Regiment marched to Guildford, where it remained till July, when orders were received to proceed to Maidstone. The Regiment next lay at Canterbury and possibly occupied the old St. Gregory's Barracks, which were succeeded by the King's Barracks erected in 1798 at a cost of £31,175 3s., and built by William Baldock.

The Record states that the Regiment remained at Canterbury until March 1787. When it left that city is not clear, but it was at Greenwich in May, and at Norwich in June.

Here the Regiment remained for an entire year, when it moved to Nottingham and the neighbouring places, arriving in July 1788 and being quartered there till August. In October 1788 we find the 7th Queen's Own at Loughborough, and in December back again at Nottingham, where it remained till April 1789.

In June the Regiment was quartered at Staines, and from August 1789 to April 1790 at Hounslow.

Next came a turn of duty on the south coast, and from June 1790 to February 1791 they were quartered at Lewes. In April 1791 the station was Brighton, then from June 1791 to February 1792 Canterbury. Greenwich followed in April, and from June to December 1792 Nottingham again.


Foreign active service was now about to engage the Regiment, the history and events of which will be treated in the next chapter.



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DAMPIERRE.



PICHEGRU.



DUMOURIEZ.

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CHAPTER XIV

Campaign of 1793 in the Netherlands

It is no part of this history to enter upon a lengthy account of the events which had taken place in France, and of which the natural sequence was war between that country and Great Britain.

Those desirous of making themselves acquainted with the details of the situation are referred to the pages of Fortescue and other historians Suffice it to say that the French Revolution was an accomplished fact. Its accumulation of horrors and the dangers which it threatened to other States had alarmed and shocked Europe. Its effects were daily—nay, hourly—threatening the existence of thrones. France had declared war against Austria, but a first attempt against Belgium, then belonging to Austria, failed.

Prussia had been summoned by Austria to go to her assistance; and after haggling over the question of indemnities the former nation had at length embarked in the war, though in by no means an energetic manner. France was then invaded; Longwy and Verdun were occupied, only to be evacuated shortly after the Battle of Valmy, on which occasion the contending forces hardly put up little more than the semblance of a serious combat.

Dissensions in the Prussian ranks and distrust of their allies by the Austrians had their inevitable result on the operations.

France then initiated further warlike enterprises. Nice, Savoy, and the Ecclesiastical States of the Empire were invaded and preparations were made to attack Sardinia and Naples and also to excite the Turks against Austria and Russia.

Dumouriez, the French General, was now permitted to invade the Netherlands, and began with an attack on Belgium. Meanwhile Great Britain remained neutral; but the state of affairs here was by no means satisfactory.

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French emissaries had been at work in England, and there is no doubt that their endeavours to provoke a rebellion in the kingdom had met with some apparent success. Had such a rebellion taken place, and had it succeeded, the desire of the French was to ally themselves with the rebels.

The British Government, while apparently doing nothing, was, however, occupied in awaiting a favourable moment to strike. As a preliminary the militia was called out to the extent of two-thirds of its number. The country in general refused to rise against the King and the Government, and the attempt of the enemy ignominiously failed, so much so that Dumouriez, as a sop in the pan to British susceptibilities, was forbidden to invade Holland.

The precise reason for this lay in the fact that England both in 1788 and 1790 had guaranteed to Austria the possession of Belgium and to Holland the security of the House of Orange and likewise the free navigation of the Scheldt, and would have at once entered into the fray. And now the Dutch called upon England to protect Holland according to the pledges given. England admitted the claim and was prepared to give her support provided that peace was not previously agreed upon. France then (November 1792) despatched broadcast a polyglot proclamation in which succour and fraternity were promised to all nations who should choose to ask in the name of liberty. Pitt then took the step which has been already mentioned of calling out the militia. But in England things were, from a military point of view, in a very unsatisfactory state. There was certainly disaffection in the forces, nay, more, officers were found to be using treasonable language and even subscribing to the French revolutionary cause. Two of the offenders, Lord Sempill of the 3rd Guards and Lord Edward Fitzgerald of the 54th Regiment, were in consequence dismissed the service.

France now met with a repulse in two directions—namely, in Nice and on the Rhine. How Belgium was plundered is history. Next came the Polish question. Poland was entered by the Prussians, to whom a share of the spoils had actually been offered by Catherine of Russia. All efforts of Pitt to save Poland from partition were in vain. Then came the execution of the French King, and war with France at once inevitable. On 1 February 1793 the Convention at Paris declared war against England and Holland.

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Dumouriez then invaded the latter country, and the resistance of the Dutch was feeble, in fact practically *nil*. From a military point of view the situation was indeed singular.

Great Britain, France, and Holland were either through corruption or professional incompetence in an absolutely unprepared state for war on a large scale.

The French Army existed largely on paper and its officers and men were untrained. The Dutch Army was in a similar condition of inutility, and had moreover the handicap of disaffection in its ranks to a serious extent. The British forces also had been permitted to dwindle to a perilous condition of weakness.

Thus it was when Dumouriez started on his enterprise against Holland, and he found himself everywhere received by the populace with open arms. It was time for the intervention of Great Britain, but the question before Pitt was how to intervene.

On 20 February the British Guards received orders to prepare for active service abroad as far as their first battalions were concerned. Volunteers from the Brigades were also called for, and to a man they responded to the call.

On 25 February the three battalions at full strength were marched to Greenwich and hastily embarked on crowded transports under Colonel Gerard Lake and sailed for Helvoetsluys. The Guards landed at their port of debarkation on 1 March, and on 5 March proceeded to Dort, where Dumouriez had prepared to effect a crossing of the Hollandsdiep.

Meanwhile the successes of the Archduke Charles on the flank of the French and those to a lesser degree of Coburg checked any onward movement as far as Dumouriez was concerned. That general was then recalled and despatched to Louvain to endeavour to restore order and discipline in the defeated ranks of the French. He was succeeded in his former command by General Flers. Meanwhile fresh reinforcements of British troops were being despatched to Helvoetsluys; the Austrian armies and those of Prussia were also in motion, and it looked as if the force of General Flers would be cut off not only from France but from its base at Antwerp. Dumouriez then assumed the offensive and advanced to meet Coburg, who had with unaccountable inactivity remained quiescent for several days.

The opposing forces met on 18 March at Neerwinden, and there the

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French suffered a severe defeat, losing some 5000 men and three guns. Dumouriez fell back on Louvain, and, after several minor disasters, being recalled to Paris, took refuge with the Austrians—in fact, deserted. Of this campaign the result was that the French were driven completely out of the Austrian Netherlands. In England the declaration of war had been followed by feverish activity in recruiting and in the raising as usual of new forces, but the efforts in this direction, albeit energetic, were in details both ill-advised and ill-directed.

Into the causes and reasons for this misdirection of affairs it is not necessary to enter here. Suffice it to say that it was impossible to send any more infantry to the Netherlands, for the reason that there were none to send.

But troops had to be sent thither, and consequently a cavalry force was selected to proceed for that purpose. This force was composed of eleven regiments, one of which was the 7th (Queen's Own) Dragoons. But the inactivity of the last few years and the sweeping reductions in the strength of these regiments had so weakened their establishment that the command only totalled about 2500 efficient officers and men. It is stated that these 2500 men formed twenty-three squadrons.

Apparently the third squadron which was added to the 7th (Queen's Own) Light Dragoons early in the year did not accompany the Regiment, as we read that only four troops, i.e. two squadrons, embarked under the command of Major Osborne. We are also told that the Depôt of the Regiment was formed at Manchester. The command of the British Army was given to H.R.H. the Duke of York.

The position of the contending armies towards the end of April 1793 was as follows:—

At Furnes, Ypres and Menin 6000 Dutch and 3000 Austrians under the command of the Prince of Orange formed the extreme right. To these succeeded the British, some Austrians and Prussians under the Duke of York, who occupied Tournai, and numbered 5000 men in all. Then came 3000 Prussians, commanded by Knobelsdorf, who held a line which included Maulde, Lecelles, and St. Amand. These were succeeded by Clerfaye, whose command numbered 12,000 men and was stationed at Vicoigne, Raismes, Bruay and Fresnes, thus surrounding the fortified Condé on the south, while that place was blockaded on the north by 5000 men under the Prince of Würtemburg. The advance guard of the enemy

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lay at St. Saulve, while the main army rested at Onnaing and numbered 15,000 men. General Latour was at Bettignies with 6000 men, occupied in watching Maubeuge and keeping open the communication between Bettignies and Onnaing by means of a small force detached for that purpose. The Allies also possessed another army which numbered 30,000 Austrians commanded by the Prince of Hohenlohe-Kirschberg, but these were employed at Namur, Trèves and Luxemburg, and were not available.

Up to this time the British cavalry, numbering 2500, had not arrived, neither indeed had the Hanoverians nor the forces of Hesse.

Still, at that particular time the Allies were more numerous than the French, and, what is more, were in reality possessed of better troops.

That they might with advantage have initiated an energetic campaign at this juncture is indubitable, and that a campaign thus initiated would have proved successful seems more than probable; but April passed away and nothing was done. The only collisions which took place were between the outposts, a method of warfare which was all in favour of the enemy, as it gave experience to the French troops, who had hitherto had none. Hence, though the French suffered from holding a far too extended line with untrained troops, and though this line was cut by the Scheldt in two places, no advantage of these conditions was taken by the Allies.

Meanwhile the enemy carefully entrenched themselves all along their front.

Dampierre opened the campaign on 1 May and delivered a general attack on that portion of the Allied line between St. Amand and St. Saulve. His attack failed at all points, and he lost both guns and 2000 men. A week afterwards he made a second attempt, being urged thereto by orders to prevent the capture of Condé, now in considerable danger. Attacking the Allied centre in force, he also threatened the flanks of the Allied Army. He attacked General Clerfaye from Anzin and chiefly directed his efforts against Raismes and Vicoigne. After four repulses he succeeded at Raismes. Meanwhile one of his detachments had advanced towards St. Amand and had crossed the Scarpe, when after passing through the forest of Vicoigne, it arrived near the road from St. Amand to Valenciennes, and there proceeded to entrench itself, forming a redoubt and erecting batteries. This would have given an

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opportunity to bombard Vicoigne and thus cut the communication between Knobelsdorf and Clerfaye; it would also have given the enemy the command of the road to Valenciennes and have enabled them to join hands with the garrison of that place. The situation was, however, saved by the sudden appearance of the Duke of York at the head of the three battalions of the British Guards. They arrived on the scene at about 5 P.M. to reinforce Knobelsdorf.

The Coldstream Guards were at once ordered to attack, and did so with success, driving the French back into their entrenchments; but being unsupported by the Prussians they were unable to sustain the heavy fire from the redoubt, and fell back with a loss of nearly eighty killed and wounded.

Still, their opportune arrival and the gallantry they displayed achieved the desired effect. Lamarlière made no fresh effort. Dampierre, leading a last assault on Vicoigne, fell mortally wounded, and the fighting for that day then ceased.

On the morrow the newly erected batteries were stormed and taken by the Prussians, and their garrison of 600 men captured. The absence of the French guns no doubt rendered this an easier task, for the enemy had removed them on the preceding night.

By this time the Hanoverians and a brigade of British cavalry were approaching, and arrived within a few days. The cavalry consisted of the 7th, 11th, 15th, and 16th Light Dragoons under the command of Ralph Dundas.

The next event in the campaign was an attack on the entrenched camp of the enemy at Famars, a spot to the south of Valenciennes.

The French camp, familiarly known as the Camp of Caesar, was situated on two flat-topped ridges divided by the river Rhonelle, a deep, sluggish stream.

Both ridges were fortified by redoubts and flêches, at any rate on three sides. All passages across the river were defended by batteries and entrenchments, and where possible all fordable places had been rendered useless for that purpose. The river itself was deep and narrow. The attacking Allied Army was divided into eight columns, to each of which a specific objective was assigned. For the attack on the main portion the two chief columns were designated.

The first of these was placed under the command of the Duke of

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York, and was ordered to attack the right flank of the position from the heights between Maresches and Préseau.

This force numbered sixteen battalions, eighteen squadrons, and thirty-eight guns, besides those guns which belonged to the infantry battalions. The British troops which accompanied this column consisted of the brigade of Guards and eight squadrons of British cavalry : two each of the four regiments which composed the cavalry command of Dundas, and consequently included the 7th (Queen's Own) Light Dragoons.

The second principal column was mainly Austrian, and consisted of twelve battalions of infantry (three being British under Abercromby), twelve squadrons of cavalry, twenty-three guns besides battalion guns, and five pontoons, the whole being commanded by Ferraris, the Austrian General. The remainder of the columns were composed solely of foreign troops and were commanded by Count Colloredo, Clerfaye, Knobelsdorf, the Crown Prince, Prince Frederick of Orange, and the last of the eight was ordered to protect the left of the Duke of York and was commanded by General Otto. A small force was also detached to occupy the attention of the enemy on the River Sambre.

As we are only concerned with the 7th Queen's Own we shall restrict our account of the action to the services of the first column.

During the night of 22 May the column of the Duke of York marched. At daybreak, favoured by a dense fog, the force had succeeded in reaching Artres with but little opposition. Here they arrived at the river, where the enemy had erected five batteries, and it was found impracticable for the column to force a passage. The Duke of York accordingly left his thirty-eight guns and a portion of his force to oppose the enemy's artillery, and marched up the river towards Maresches. Here he was lucky enough to find a fordable spot, and after some difficulty the column, now reduced in strength by one-third, effected a crossing. This operation naturally delayed matters. Meanwhile the second column opened its attack on the eastern ridge, beginning by an artillery fire, while Austrian troops on the left and Abercromby's men on the right carried the entrenchments by assault with comparative ease, capturing the guns and taking more than a hundred men prisoners.

A cavalry combat here took place between two regiments of the enemy and some Austrians and Hanoverians (Hussars and Life Guards), in which the French were defeated, though they had the advantage of

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occupying higher ground than their opponents, who had to charge up a steep incline to come to close quarters.

Having won the position this column halted, expecting news from the Duke of York.

To return now to the proceedings of the first column. The Duke had been so far successful in his operations as to drive from their positions the occupants of sundry scattered defences of the enemy during the course of a somewhat protracted march by way of Querenaing, by which he designed to turn the enemy's position. By this time the day was closing in, 'the sun was setting, and the column of the Duke of York found itself beneath the steepest ascent in the whole of the enemy's position, at a place where the ground was not only disadvantageous for attack but was in addition fortified by no fewer than four redoubts.'

The column was weary after a march of some eighteen hours, and to attack at so formidable a spot hardly appeared expedient.

The Duke accordingly determined to postpone his operations till the morrow.

During the night, however, the enemy determined to evacuate the entire position, and withdrew to Bouchain. As the remaining columns effected hardly anything of importance, we need not enter into further details.

Brown in his Journal—he was an eye-witness—thus describes this combat :—

'It was a glorious sight to see the line of battle formed for an extent of several miles; in one place squadrons of cavalry were charging each other; in another the enemy was fleeing and ours pursuing, with the swift movements of the field artillery displaying all the skill and dexterity peculiar to themselves.'

We insert this passage for what it is worth and solely because it happens to be extracted from a well-known journal. The accuracy of the statements therein in this particular instance are, however, open to some doubt.

The French retreated in the night, as has been stated, and hardly warrant the belief that the events of battle occurred in the way stated by Brown.

The results of this engagement were as follows : Seventeen guns were

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taken and about 300 prisoners; but the most important fact was that a way was now opened to lay siege to Valenciennes, and a siege was immediately determined on. For this purpose a force of 14,000 Austrians was allocated, and the command of the operations was offered to the Duke of York and after delay accepted by him. The siege began on 13 June, and the town capitulated on 28 July. We do not enter into details of the operations, as the 7th Queen's Own was not actively engaged, forming as it did a part of the covering force. Neither need we more than mention a successful attack made on the Dutch garrison of Furnes by a force which issued from Dunkirk and which was commanded by Carnot, then only a captain in the French Army.

His intention had been to burn the British vessels, to serve the garrison of Nieuport in the same way, and finally, if possible, to seize Ostend. Unluckily, after obtaining possession of Furnes, from which the Dutch garrison fled incontinently, Carnot's men plundered the town, and finding therein a plentiful supply of liquor, were speedily hopelessly drunk.

The only result of this exploit was to direct the attention of the British Government to the practically defenceless condition of Ostend, and a few feeble fortifications were in consequence added to its defences. Two successes of the Allies also occurred at this time. Condé surrendered on 10 July after a severe cannonading, and Maintz unaccountably gave in to the Prussians on the 22nd, though the garrison was strong and the stores sufficient to last for three weeks at least.

At the end of May, it may be remarked, the second brigade of British cavalry arrived and disembarked at Ostend. It was composed of the Horse Guards Blue, the Royals, the Scots Greys, and the Inniskillings.

We have now reached the month of August 1793. The desire of the Duke of York had long been to capture Dunkirk, and its siege had been agreed upon, one condition of which being that Austria should furnish a force of 10,000 men to assist therein. However, after the fall of Valenciennes a season of intrigue set in which delayed the execution of the design. Ultimately it was decided that the siege should be undertaken, but that as a preliminary proceeding the enemy should be compelled if possible to fight a big battle.

The French, to the number of 60,000 men and commanded by General Kilmain, were in position near Bouchain, and the position was formidable. It was situated on the left bank of the Scheldt. A part of what were

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known as the Lines of La Bassée (Villars' old fortifications) formed the northern face. The Scheldt ran in front, the Agache in the rear, the heights of Bourlon on the right, and the river Sensée on the left. Entrenchments defended the crossing places of the Scheldt and the Sensée, the valley was flooded and elsewhere fortifications had been erected.

This formidable stronghold was to be attacked by the Duke of York, who was given 14,000 men for the purpose and directed to turn the position by the south. Another column of 9000 and a third of 12,000 were ordered to force the passage of the Scheldt, which, as has been already said, ran in front of the position; they were therefore frontal attacks. The Duke of York's force was lamentably weak in cavalry, despite the fact that he had earnestly requested more. Whether the 7th (Queen's Own) Light Dragoons were or were not engaged on this occasion it does not seem possible to decide. Neither Cannon nor the Manuscript Record give any information on the subject.

What, however, happened was this. The weather was extremely hot. The Duke of York's column after a fatiguing march of eleven hours arrived at the Scheldt at Massieres, but not in a condition to attempt the passage of the river. It was consequently halted for the night, and during that night the French retreated. On the morrow a pursuit began, but though the British cavalry present succeeded in capturing a few prisoners, the remainder of the enemy managed to escape and reached Arras in safety.

For the siege of Dunkirk the Duke of York then assembled his force, numbering about 37,000 men, at Marchiennes on the Scarpe on 13 August. The British cavalry with the Duke amounted to 1300 officers and men.

Two days later he started *viâ* Baisieux and Turcoing for Menin, having divided his command into two columns.

On arrival at Menin guns were heard in the direction of Blaton and Lincelles, where it transpired the troops of the Prince of Orange were engaging the enemy.

Issuing from Menin, they had captured the French posts at these places, and had then retired, leaving two weak Dutch battalions to hold them. The enemy returned and drove out the garrisons. Aid from the Duke of York was called for, and he despatched the Brigade of Guards thither, who had just arrived after a long and toilsome march.

How they retook Lincelles under General Lake is well known.

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The Duke now divided his army into two divisions: in one numbering 14,500 men ten squadrons of British cavalry were included; in the other, which numbered 22,000 men, the remainder.

The lesser division was destined to form the covering force for the larger while engaged in the siege of Dunkirk, and was commanded by Marshal Freytag, a Hanoverian officer.

Freytag left Menin on 19 August, and marching *viâ* Ypres on Poperinghe, occupied that place on the next day, while his advanced guard penetrated as far as Rousbrugge on the river Yser. On 21 August, by a clever manœuvre, some Hessian troops expelled the enemy from Oost Capel and Rexpoede, driving them for safety into Bergues, a fortified place, and capturing 400 prisoners and eleven guns.

Freytag then posted his men to cover the division employed in the siege, holding a line from Poperinghe to a point near the Bergues-Furnes canal. In the course of three days more he had further successes, and after capturing nineteen more guns he extended his line of posts.

The Duke of York with his division marched to Furnes on 20 August, and in the course of the next four days succeeded in driving in the French from their outposts and the suburb of Rosendahl, forcing them to take refuge in Dunkirk itself.

He then took up his position, and a most disadvantageous one it was, being partly sand dunes and the rest swamp, and liable to be inundated at pleasure if the enemy chose to raise the sluices at Dunkirk. Also the drinking water was almost if not quite unfit for consumption, and what was nearly as bad, the entire position could be overlooked from the lofty tower of the Cathedral. Meanwhile the British fleet and the transports carrying the siege artillery which had been expected had not arrived. One transport containing artillery-men but without guns reached the Duke on the 27th. Two days later a frigate and some gunboats appeared, and on the 30th Admiral Macbride without a fleet joined the army and proposed to concert measures for the conduct of the siege.

The enemy now began to take the field to raise the siege.

The garrison of Dunkirk numbered 8000 men and was commanded by General Souham.

By 24 August the enemy had 23,000 men entrenched at Cassel, 4000 more near Lille, and a body of about 14,000 approaching rapidly. General Houchard was in supreme command.

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Souham opened the sluices in Dunkirk and the inundation of ground occupied by the Duke began. Entrenchments in the sand dunes became impossible, and it was not until he had obtained heavy guns from a man-of-war at Nieuport that the Duke was able to open fire upon Dunkirk.

Meanwhile Houchard was advancing, though not without difficulty, and indeed loss, for in one place four guns were captured. Then the Dutch suddenly evacuated Turcoing and were with difficulty prevented from retreating as far as Tournai and Courtrai.

Houchard next attacked Freytag at and about Cassel; and after a severe struggle Freytag was compelled to retire upon Hondschoote. As a matter of fact the enemy succeeded in getting in the rear of Freytag's force, and this it was that compelled the Allies to retreat. The Allied posts about Bergues were also withdrawn to Hondschoote. During his retreat Freytag himself lost the road and was captured, and Prince Adolphus of Cambridge with him, both being wounded. Prince Adolphus was, however, rescued, and shortly afterwards Freytag himself was delivered by a force under General Wallmoden, who came to his assistance and stormed Rexpoede, to which place he had been removed.

The French were, however, too strong for Wallmoden, who in consequence of Freytag's wound had assumed command, and after severe fighting, when their ammunition had been exhausted and their left flank turned, the Allies withdrew to Furnes.

During the first day's fighting (6 September) the garrison of Dunkirk made a sortie which effectually prevented the Duke of York from going to the assistance of Freytag, and a second sortie on 8 September, directed against the suburb of Rosendahl, took place but was repulsed. Affairs were, however, in a very parlous state, and when on the afternoon of that day the Duke of York received news of the defeat of Wallmoden and his retirement to Furnes, it became impracticable to do other than to raise the siege.

In two columns, but unfortunately in considerable disorder, and with the loss of thirty-two heavy guns which had perforce to be abandoned, there being neither sufficient means of dragging them by land nor sufficient water in the now drained canal to convey them that way, the retreat began. By good luck only, in that the enemy offered but little opposition, the Allied Army escaped and, reaching the camp at

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Furnes, effected a junction with Wallmoden on the morning of 9 September. The losses of the Allied Army before Dunkirk were very heavy, for not only the casualties of active warfare had to be reckoned with but also the devastation caused by fever and what was probably enteric produced by the infected water supply.

Apparently on the retreat from Dunkirk the British cavalry formed part of the rearguard, and by their exertions in skirmishing with, and holding in check, a strong body of the enemy's cavalry which threatened to attack the retiring Allied Army did useful service.

After reaching Furnes the Duke of York left a detachment there under the command of Abercromby, and withdrew behind the Nieuport-Dixmude canal. Later Abercromby was ordered to Nieuport while the Duke proceeded to Thorout. Here he received an infantry reinforcement from England. His next move was to capture Menin, proceeding thither *viâ* Roulers. Fortune now smiled for a time on the Allied Army. The Austrians at Avesnes-le-Sec gained a brilliant cavalry victory over one of Houchard's divisions, and the Duke of Brunswick defeated the enemy at Pirmasens.

There were now some thoughts of a second siege of Dunkirk, but the design never matured. Maubeuge was, however, besieged by Coburg, who crossed the Sambre with a force of 40,000 men. Employing 14,000 men in the actual siege, the remainder of the Allied Army was used partly as a covering force and partly to protect Flanders. This portion was assigned to the Duke of York, who, in addition to the British troops and the foreigners in British pay, received 16,000 Austrians as an augmentation to his force. The line of country he had to protect was forty-five miles in length and extended from Nieuport to Cysoing. The Duke had certainly by no means an excessive force to effect this, yet it was actually proposed by the British Government to seriously weaken it in order to send reinforcements to Toulon, which was then being besieged.

A force of 45,000 men was now sent to raise the siege of Maubeuge. Coburg at once begged for reinforcements from the Duke of York, as otherwise he must abandon the siege. The Duke immediately hurried to his assistance, but in vain. The enemy now increased his 45,000 men to 60,000 and made a most determined attack on Coburg. The siege was raised on 16 October and Coburg withdrew to Bavai.

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On 22 October Maschiennes was attacked and taken, but was recaptured two days later. The Allied posts between Cysoing and Werwicq were also successfully assailed; Ypres was next captured by a force from Cassel, and Furnes by another from Dunkirk; finally Nieuport was bombarded. On 24 October Cysoing was retaken, and the enemy were repulsed with loss at Orchies, while Nieuport still held out, and was luckily reinforced on the 27th. To the assistance of Nieuport the Duke of York hurried with speed. We now obtain definite information as to the 7th (Queen's Own) Light Dragoons. On 28 October the Duke of York, who had arrived at a place called Camphin, situated a little to the east of Cysoing, ordered General Abercromby to march against a French post at Lannoy. His force consisted of two Austrian battalions, the 3rd Guards, the flank battalion of Guards, one squadron of the 7th Light Dragoons and one of the 15th. The enemy, having been driven from the town by artillery, were hotly pursued by the two squadrons of Light Dragoons. Great execution was done by the sabres of the men, for over 100 of the enemy were cut down. Fifty-nine prisoners were taken, as well as five guns and many tumbrils and baggage waggons. The Allied loss was but trifling, the 7th (Queen's Own) Light Dragoons having only two men wounded.

Brown in his Journal omits the 7th (Queen's Own) Light Dragoons and the Austrians from the list of troops at Lannoy, and only mentions 'some squadrons of the 15th Light Dragoons.' But he adds 'two howitzers and four field-pieces,' and these may have been the guns by which the enemy was driven from the town.

He states that 'about 12 o'clock we marched, and on arriving there the artillery advanced, covered by the infantry, and commenced a brisk cannonade on the enemy, which continued upwards of two hours, and was answered by the French; but finding it too hot for them, they abandoned the village, which General Abercromby, who commanded, perceiving, ordered the light cavalry to pursue them, which they did with a spirit and activity peculiar to themselves; killed about fifty, and brought back near one hundred prisoners, among whom were several officers.'

Cannon in his History of the 15th Light Dragoons tells us that after the French began to retreat 'Lieut.-Colonel Churchill led the two squadrons over abattis and other obstructions; the 7th passed to the right of the


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town ; the 15th on the left overtaking the enemy's rear, some desperate fighting took place : officers and men passing hedges, ditches and other obstructions, intercepted parties of the French in the fields, and numerous single combats took place ; one hundred Frenchmen were left on the ground and fifty-nine taken prisoners, when night put an end to the pursuit.'

Cannon in his History of the 7th (Queen's Own) Light Dragoons credits that regiment with cutting down ' one hundred with their sabres,' capturing fifty-nine prisoners and five pieces of artillery, besides tumbrils and baggage waggons, adding ' for which they were honoured with the approbation of Major-General Abercrombie, and of His Royal Highness the Duke of York.' The Manuscript Regimental Record gives no details whatever ; it merely mentions the engagement and that two men were wounded, and finishes its notice of the year by the statement that the ' regiment performed much hard service on outpost duty during the following winter.'

It appears that the enemy's force at Lannoy amounted to 1600 men. The Allies remained in the town till 1 A.M. on the following morning, when they returned to camp.

On 9 November the campaign ended. The brigade of guards, with several regiments of heavy cavalry, were ordered to Ghent on 11 December for the winter. The brigade of the line, and light cavalry with several other corps, remained under the command of General Abercromby, on the outposts.



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CHAPTER XV

Campaign of 1794. Beaumont and Willems

The Regiment remained in cantonments until 16 April, when it advanced to the heights above Cateau. Here it was inspected by the Emperor of Germany.

The British force, as regards cavalry, amounted to twenty-eight squadrons made up from fourteen regiments and was divided into four brigades. The 7th (Queen's Own) Light Dragoons were brigaded with the 11th, 15th, and 16th Light Dragoons and one squadron of the Carabiniers; and thus numbered nine squadrons. The brigade was under the command of Ralph Dundas. The squadron of the Carabiniers was commanded by Captain Stapleton Cotton, at the time only twenty years of age. Captain Cotton in later years was created the first Viscount Combermere.

On the day after the review the Allied Army advanced against the enemy in eight columns.

The French Army, under the command of Pichegru, numbered about thirty-six thousand men, and occupied an entrenched position with a front of about eighteen miles along the heights of Bohain and Nouvion, heights mostly wooded. This force fronted the Allies and was divided into three divisions. Fromentin's division held a village on the Sambre about four miles from Le Cateau. Ballaud's division held a position across the road from Le Cateau to Guise at a place called Arbre de Guise. Geguet's division occupied positions near Vaux, Prémont and Bohain. Fifteen thousand men were posted near Cambrai under Chappuis and thirty thousand lined the Sambre from St. Waast to Maubeuge. The eight columns of the Allies advanced to attack the enemy with the design of beating them in detachments. The British columns under the Duke of York and Sir William Erskine were ordered to advance

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against Vaux and Prémont respectively, and when this was accomplished and the entrenchments captured there as well as at Bohain, a further advance was to be made by the light troops upon Le Catelet.

The 7th (Queen's Own) Light Dragoons supported the artillery attack on Prémont and Vaux. The cavalry did considerable execution on the retreating enemy and with little loss to themselves, for of the Allies the casualties numbered less than seven hundred, while the enemy lost more than two thousand men and more than twenty guns. Of these guns eleven were taken by the British. On the morrow the Allied Army halted between Nouvion and Prémont, with detachments at Prisches, La Capelle, Fontenelle, and Garmouset, which covered the rear and left flank of the Army. The Prince of Orange, who had advanced towards Cambrai on the same day, then turned back to Le Cateau, and on the 20th attacked the posts of the enemy near Landrecies. Having carried these, though not without considerable loss (his casualties amounted to a thousand men), he laid siege to Landrecies. Several minor affairs took place at this time, in which Pichegru was uniformly repulsed.

The siege of Landrecies was now undertaken in due form, and the Allied Army covered the besieging force, occupying a wide half-circle, the 7th (Queen's Own) Light Dragoons being encamped at Le Cateau. They were not engaged in the affairs of 22, 23; and 24 April.

At daybreak, however, on 26 April, while a thick fog covered the fields and villages near the British camp, a few pistol-shots indicated that the outposts were engaged, and soon after the piquets were seen retiring before a large force of the enemy, whose movements were partly concealed by the fog.

The two squadrons of the 7th Queen's Own were speedily mounted and formed in front of their camping ground.

As the enemy approached the cannonade grew louder and louder. Presently the fog cleared off, and the Duke of York detached the cavalry of the right wing to turn the left flank of the enemy.

A hostile column was now seen moving from Prémont and Marets.

On this being observed, the cavalry of the left wing were then sent out to reconnoitre. This cavalry included the 7th (Queen's Own) Light Dragoons, the 11th Light Dragoons, and two squadrons of Austrian Hussars, the latter commanded by a Major Stepheicz. The Austrian Hussar regiment was known as the 'Archduke Ferdinand's.'

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The column of the enemy had advanced with its guns a little beyond Marets (Maretz or Maurois), but meeting with fugitives from another French column which had already been repulsed, halted and at once began to retire.

The British and Austrian cavalry immediately pursued them, and coming up with the rearguard in the plain of St. Celian, 'raised a loud shout and dashed furiously against the adverse ranks of war.' The rearguard of the enemy was driven in on the main body at a spot near Marets; nor was this all, for, continuing their advance a few miles further on, the victorious cavalry, who would not be denied, attacked and routed the main body also, capturing ten guns. It is said that no fewer than twelve hundred French casualties occurred in this part of the field alone.

The name of one officer of the 7th Queen's Own, Lieutenant O'Loughlin, has been handed down as that of a man who specially distinguished himself on the occasion by his gallantry.

Elsewhere in the field the enemy was equally unfortunate, especially at the hands of the Allied cavalry.

In the upshot the remains of the French infantry succeeded in reaching Cambrai.

The loss of the Allies in the whole battle amounted to about fifteen hundred men, that of the enemy being more than four times that number, and in addition forty-one guns were captured. The loss of the Regiment was one man and seven horses killed, nineteen men and six horses wounded.

Brown in his Journal writes that 'the Seventh and Eleventh Light Dragoons performed prodigies of valour on our left.'

The Duke of York in General Orders, after complimenting several other corps, added, 'Nor is the determined gallantry with which the Seventh and Eleventh Light Dragoons attacked the enemy on the left (notwithstanding their numbers) less worthy of every commendation.'

The official name for this battle is BEAUMONT.

By an Army Order dated 1 August 1909, His Majesty the King was graciously pleased to approve of the Regiment being permitted to bear upon its appointments

'BEAUMONT'

in recognition of its services.

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Landrecies was captured on 30 April, four days after the fight at St. Celian. The Duke of York was then at once despatched to the assistance of General Clerfaye, who, having failed to relieve Menin, had been forced back after a hard struggle. He began his retreat in good order, but later it degenerated into a regular flight, during which he lost two thousand men and twenty-three guns. He, however, managed to rally his defeated force at Dottignies.

Menin was now in much peril, but the commandant with great hardihood succeeded in cutting his way out to the north through the besiegers and, thus saving his force, reached Bruges *viâ* Thourout. Courtrai had already fallen, and Menin was of course at once in the hands of the enemy when its garrison had fought its way out.

We left the Duke of York about to start to assist General Clerfaye. The weather and the state of the roads, however, delayed him, and he did not reach Tournai until 3 May. Here he was joined by Erskine's command, and the combined British pushed on to effect a junction with Clerfaye. On 10 May the Duke was in an entrenched position between Lamain and Hertain. Here he was attacked by the enemy, who numbered thirty thousand men. The French made an attempt to turn the British left and failed. They then similarly attempted an attack on the centre. It chanced, however, that there was a gap in their line, by which means the right of their main body became uncovered. This did not escape the observation of the Duke of York,who with great promptitude ordered sixteen squadrons of British cavalry and two of Austrian hussars to advance into the plain of Cysoing and then to attack. This force was commanded by Lieut.-General Harcourt. The ground over which the force advanced was not favourable for cavalry, owing to the fact that though level and not cut up by fences it was used for the cultivation of cole-seed, which is grown in trenches; and this somewhat checked the advance. These obstacles having been surmounted, the cavalry drew near to the enemy's infantry, who, in lieu of running away as in general they did at that time when opposed to mounted men, formed squares and stood their ground firmly.

Nine times were these squares charged, and as many times the cavalry could not prevail; one factor against them being that the nature of the ground precluded pace.

The enemy, however, slowly withdrew in a southerly direction,

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followed by the cavalry. French guns posted on some rising ground near a village named Gruson now opened fire. A brigade of British infantry was then despatched by the Duke of York to support the cavalry between Gruson and Baisieux, and four battalions were also sent to follow up the line taken by the cavalry in their advance.

On this the French infantry and guns retreated towards the village of Willems, being covered by their cavalry. Meanwhile the British cavalry was awaiting a favourable moment to charge. The moment at length arrived; nor was this all, for an additional six squadrons had been despatched to strengthen their force. The Allied attack was then delivered on both flanks of the French cavalry, and the enemy were discomfited. Another attack was then attempted on the French infantry, but with no greater success than before.

At length the British battalion guns arrived within range and opened fire. The French infantry thereupon began to waver. Immediately the British cavalry again charged, and a square having been broken by the Scots Greys, the remainder of the enemy fled, but not before two more squares were broken. In the pursuit over four hundred prisoners were taken, thirteen guns were captured, and nearly two thousand of the enemy placed *hors de combat*. The British loss was thirty men killed, six officers and seventy-seven men wounded, ninety horses killed and one hundred and forty-four wounded or missing.

The official name of this battle is WILLEMS.

In an Army Order dated 1 August 1909, His Majesty the King was graciously pleased to approve of the Regiment being permitted to bear upon its appointments

'WILLEMS'

in recognition of its services.

We read in Brown's Journal that the following monetary rewards were given for captures from the enemy, by order of the Duke of York, and the order was dated from Tournai on 12 May, 1794 :—

'For each cannon or howitzer £20; for each pair of colours £10; for each tumbril £10; and for each horse £12.'

On 16 May orders were received by the Army to cook two days' provisions. This clearly demonstrated that some operation of magnitude was about to be initiated. It proved to be that a general attack was determined on by which it was hoped to drive the enemy completely out

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of Flanders. The army was divided into five columns; the two on the left were destined to force the passages of the river Marque at Pont à Tressin, Willems, &c., and to check the enemy at Lisle.

The centre column, which was composed of the Brigade of Guards, the 1st Brigade of the Line, the free corps of O'Donnel, some of the British light cavalry, artillery, &c., was to force the posts of the enemy at Lannoy, and then to proceed to Roubaix. The next column, which was commanded by General Otto, was to proceed through Leers, Wattrelos, &c., to Turcoing. The right column was to proceed towards Mouscron; and it was hoped by this disposition to cut off the enemy's main army from Lille.

At 9 P.M. on 16 May the tents were struck and the heavy baggage sent off to the rear of Tournai.

Two hours later the advance began. Apparently it took some time before the column under command of the Duke of York was able to start, as the Regimental Record states that the 7th (Queen's Own) Light Dragoons advanced 'at an early hour in the morning.' On arrival at Lannoy the column halted in order to wait till the thick fog had cleared. Lannoy had previously been occupied, as after a short but brisk cannonade the enemy abandoned the place.

The advance was then resumed towards Roubaix, which place was gallantly captured after a stout resistance; but here the enemy's guns escaped capture. At Roubaix the column rested until sunset.

General Abercromby was then ordered to attack with a detached force a village two miles distant and called Mouvaux. It was situated on rising ground, surrounded by palisades and entrenchments and protected by flanking redoubts. The French force here was a strong one.

The Brigade of Guards attacked the defences and the 7th Queen's Own were sent round to make a detour. Lieut.-Colonel William Osborne was in command. Following on the 7th came the 15th Light Dragoons, commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Churchill. The success of this detour was complete.

As the enemy issued from the houses of the village, having been driven from their defences by the British Guards, and as they attempted to escape in the rear, they were charged by the two cavalry regiments.

The 7th were in front and found themselves prevented by a cheveaux-de-frise from coming in contact with the retiring enemy. A few men

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dismounted, and though exposed to a galling fire from the French, succeeded in clearing from obstruction a sufficient space to permit the cavalry to pass through. This accomplished, the regiments charged, and having broken the French infantry completely, cut down many 'with a dreadful slaughter; capturing three guns.' On returning from the pursuit the 7th and 15th Light Dragoons passed the night in the captured village.

During the fight it was reported that Lieut.-Colonel Osborne had been taken prisoner, and it appears to have been the case. However, he was very speedily rescued by a small detachment of his men, who dashed forward for the purpose and, cutting down his captors, brought him safely off. It is stated that the Lieutenant-Colonel was much beloved by the Regiment, both as a gallant officer and a loveable man.

Unfortunately the other columns of the Allies had failed in their several attacks, and in consequence the British were left exposed to an onslaught from the main body of the enemy, who had been concentrated for this purpose.

Early on the morrow (18 May) the French opened a tremendous cannonade, and soon huge masses of the enemy composed of all arms were descried advancing on all sides.

General Abercromby now found his slender force in danger of being completely surrounded. From the Duke of York now arrived orders to retire to the heights behind Roubaix. Abercromby accordingly withdrew his men, but in so doing was compelled to fight every inch of the way. Even before he had cleared Mouvaux the enemy were pressing on his rear 'shouting and assailing the British with grape and musketry.' Passing through Roubaix the column proceeded towards Lannoy, still persistently pursued by the enemy, who greatly outnumbered them, and with whom they had, as has been mentioned already, to dispute every step.

Arrived at Lannoy they found, or believed, that the place was in the possession of the French. This is, however, open to question, and it is probably not correct.

The retreating British therefore took to the fields, 'passing over hedges and ditches and constantly fighting crowds of opponents,' their guide being, it is said, an *émigré* who knew the ground. During this retreat the 7th and 15th Light Dragoons were constantly engaged on

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the flanks and rear, in which operations Cannon tells us they evinced 'the most noble ardour and intrepidity'; and exhibited 'under accumulated disasters and difficulties the innate bravery of Britons, and the great value of light cavalry.'

Brown in his Journal gives a good account of this retreat and bestows the highest praise on the conduct of the light cavalry on this occasion. Among other points he writes, 'It was no uncommon thing to see one of them attack three of the French Dragoons at once, in order to rescue the prisoners they were carrying off. It was owing to their bravery that so few prisoners were taken, as well as the great numbers which they retook from the enemy.' Eventually the British reached the village of Templeuve, where they halted and formed. Thence they marched to occupy the former position in front of Tournai held by them on the night before. Despite the serious situation in which the British were placed and the strenuous and prolonged conflict during the retreat, the loss proved to be very inconsiderable as far as men were concerned. It was indeed almost a marvel that one man escaped from the enemy.

The casualties in the 7th Queen's Own amounted to four horses killed, six men and ten horses wounded, fifteen men and thirty-two horses prisoners or missing.

It is stated that during the retreat 'a squadron or two of some foreign hussars, instead of endeavouring to check the enemy, rode away at full speed, even through the midst of our own men, if they chanced to be in their way, and added confusion to confusion.'

Brown also tells us that the officers' bât horses and others, terrified by the gunfire, became unmanageable and threw off their loads. The women too who had followed the column were an unmitigated nuisance as usual.

Outside Lannoy some of the flank battalion guns which had been advanced too far without proper support were captured by the enemy's cavalry, and later in the fields some more guns and tumbrils had to be abandoned as they could not be moved over the hedges and ditches. It is gratifying to read that the conduct of the British under these most trying circumstances was highly commended by the Emperor of Germany, and that the approbation of the Duke of York for the valour and firmness of the corps engaged was expressed in very favourable terms.

From the 19th to the 22nd of May the British remained in their

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camp in front of Tournai. Upon that day, however, General Pichegru decided to make a combined attack on their position and took his measures accordingly. The battle began between six and seven o'clock on the morning of the 23rd, and was characterised by very severe and continuous fighting. One spot, by name Pont-à-Chin, was taken and retaken three or four times, and at length at about 6 P.M. was finally captured by the British. In the upshot the enemy were repulsed with the loss of seven guns.

The 7th (Queen's Own) Light Dragoons were not actively engaged on this occasion, as the fighting was confined to the infantry. They were, however, under fire and lost one horse.

The casualties among the enemy amounted to nearly six thousand men. The French Army was now being strongly reinforced, while that of the Allies dwindled daily. It became impossible for them to hold the Austrian Netherlands, and the army therefore withdrew into the United Provinces. Outpost duty occupied the 7th Queen's Own during the retirement; they were also employed in covering the movement, and in consequence were at that time frequently engaged in combats with detachments of French cavalry.

Nothing of importance, however, took place until the month of August, when the army was encamped near Breda. Here a smart little success was achieved by a piquet of the 7th and the 16th Light Dragoons, who surprised one of the outguards of the enemy's cavalry. At the first onset the Frenchmen fled, many of them leaving their horses behind in their haste to scramble over walls and other fences where cavalry could not act and thus to avoid pursuit. Seven of the enemy were, however, made prisoners, and forty horses captured. The last employment of the Regiment during the year's campaign was, it is stated by Cannon, in the month of November.

Nimeguen was besieged by the enemy, and on 4 November, the fourth day of the siege, General Wallmoden, who commanded the garrison, having previously withdrawn a large portion of his force to the northern side of the river, determined to make a sortie with the remainder. And here we come to a conflict of statements. Fortescue names the 15th Hussars as the only British cavalry regiment present, and forming part of the garrison. Cannon states that the 7th Queen's Own were there and were engaged in the sortie. The Regimental Manuscript Record does

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not mention the event at all. Brown in his Journal agrees with Fortescue. The balance of opinion is therefore in favour of the 15th Light Dragoons having been present on the occasion and that the 7th Queen's Own were elsewhere.

Captain Jones, in the 'Historical Journal,' who is quoted by Cannon, however, it is but fair to state, distinctly declares that the 7th were present on the occasion. He tells us that in order to destroy the works the enemy was raising 'a corps was formed, consisting of 2500 men, composed of the following regiments: eighth, twenty-seventh, twenty-eighth, fifty-fifth, sixty-third, and seventy-eighth regiments of British infantry under the command of Major-General De Burgh, and two Swiss Battalions in the Dutch service, supported by the seventh and fifteenth British Light Dragoons, the Hanoverian horse-guards, one squadron of the 2nd Regiment of Hanoverian Horse, one squadron of the 5th Regiment of Hanoverian Dragoons, one squadron of the 10th Hanoverian Light Dragoons, and the Legion of Damas in the Dutch service. The infantry drove the besiegers out of the works, killing many and also about 150 unfortunate civilians who had been impressed by the enemy to dig. When the French infantry retreated they were attacked by the cavalry, who charged them in the rear and cut them down with great slaughter.

On 9 November the garrison evacuated the place and the British infantry went into cantonments along the Waal; the cavalry, who could not be of much use there, were distributed in cantonments on the opposite side of the Lech.

The winter was exceptionally severe, and moreover a dreadful mortality prevailed in the British Army; the severe duty and unhealthy climate, with a contagious fever which prevailed among the troops, filled all the hospitals.

The story accepted at home, and repeated in the Press, that provisions and forage were lacking was not, however, true. Clothing was nevertheless much needed, and at Helvoetsluys the new clothing of most of the regiments had for some time been lying. This was sent to them, but being unmade, as the custom then was, and there being no opportunity to get it made up, the garments were perforce returned to Helvoetsluys. By the end of the year the underclothing, stockings, and shoes were al worn out and could not be renewed.

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Thus terminated the campaign of 1794. From a military point of view as far as actual warfare goes its story is not very satisfying, but as a record of hard marching, heavy outpost duty, and proved gallantry against great odds it is worthy to be remembered as belonging to a time when under most adverse circumstances the British troops engaged upheld nobly the traditions handed down to them by their predecessors.

It is worth notice that during the course of this campaign a most salutary order was issued by the Duke.

It was dated from the Head Quarters, Tournai, 23 May 1794. The order is given in full by Corporal Brown, and is to this effect :—

'It is his Royal Highness, the commander in chief's express order, that whenever the troops, or any particular corps, march without their camp equipage, no woman is upon any pretence whatever to be permitted to follow the column.

'His Royal Highness desires this may be considered as a standing order, and expects the commanding officers of regiments will take care it is most strictly complied with.

'It is necessary at the same time to warn the women and followers of the army, that the provost-marshal is hereby directed to inflict on every offender the most exemplary punishment; and if the offence deserves it, even to execute on the spot, any woman or follower of the army, of any description whatever, who by cruelty, plunder, or marauding may bring disgrace on the troops under his Royal Highness's command.'

This order was commanded to be read at the evening roll-call at the head of every troop or company in the army, on which occasions all women and followers of the army were ordered to attend, that none could plead ignorance of the severe punishment to which they might by disobedience become liable.

In the same order it is laid down that 'whenever it is possible all attacks should be made with drums beating and colours flying': this applied to our foreign allies and not to the British troops, as the custom already obtained in our service.

It is remarkable that a rule forbidding women to accompany troops in the field altogether should not have been issued—but it was not. In future chapters we shall meet with terrible instances of suffering which were undergone by these unfortunate creatures.

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CHAPTER XVI

Campaign of 1795. Home Service, 1795–1799

On 27 November 1794, the Duke of York was summoned home by the Government. He left matters in the Netherlands in a most unsatisfactory condition, and it appeared as if it would be almost impossible to carry on the campaign in the next year. When he left, the Duke committed the command of the British troops to Lieut.-General Harcourt and the Hanoverians to General Wallmoden, an arrangement which could hardly be expected to prove satisfactory.

The French were in cantonments, one division (Moreau's) on the west bank of the Rhine on a line from Emmerick to Wesel, a second (Souham's) near and in Nimeguen, a third (Bonneau's) between the Waal and the Meuse, and others round about Bois-le-Duc and Grave.

The Allied Army lay along the north bank of the Waal from Tiel to the Pannarden Canal, a canal which connects the rivers Waal and Lech. From the Pannarden Canal to Wesel thirty thousand Austrians covered the Allied left. The Dutch guarded the Bommeler Waert. Much rain had fallen in November and up to 18 December, but hitherto there had been no frost.

On 11 December an attack made by the enemy, who crossed the river Waal in boats, was repulsed.

Five days later Pichegru arrived from Paris and again assumed supreme command of the enemy. On 18 December a severe frost set in. It soon became apparent that it would be possible for the enemy to cross the Waal on the ice, and a retreat northwards by Harcourt seemed to be unavoidable.

Very soon the Waal became passable, though the Lech was not yet sufficiently frozen to bear artillery.

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On 27 December the French crossed the Meuse and drove out the Dutch on the Bommeler Waert.

The Dutch incontinently fled, but the enemy were checked by the Hessians under General Dalwigk at Meteren, not far north of Tuil. An affair now took place at Guelder Malsen, whither General David Dundas had been sent with a British force. Guelder Malsen is a small place not far from Meteren and north of it, and was occupied by one of the enemy's detachments. Dundas attacked the enemy successfully, capturing four guns and killing and wounding many, with but small loss to his own force. He was then in turn attacked, and had to retire with a loss of two guns. His reserves now came up and the British for the second time became the aggressors, and for the second time succeeded. The composition of the force under Dundas is discussed later on.

Throughout the month of December the frost had continued and was exceptionally severe on 3 January 1795. A two days' thaw on 6 and 7 January seemed to presage a slight improvement in the position, but on the 8th intense cold again supervened. Several affairs took place during this period with varying success to either side.

On 10 January the enemy crossed the Waal on the ice in three places and attacked in great force between Tiel and the canal. They failed on the right but succeeded on the left, and Wallmoden prepared to retreat behind the Lech, and did so. On the 14th the enemy made another heavy attack, but were repulsed with great loss; still, it was now obviously impossible for the Allies to hold their ground, and on 15 January orders for a general retreat were issued.

Into the terrible story of the sufferings of the retreating Allies: how discipline absolutely vanished, how thousands of men and horses died frozen amid the wreckage of baggage waggons, stores, gun-limbers, and even private carriages; nay, how even the survivors fought among themselves for such provisions as haply remained, we need not enter. Those who desire for details of this terrible disaster may read them in other pages where they are duly recorded.

For four days this retreat with its concomitant horrors continued till, on 19 January, such relics of the army as had survived reached the west side of the river Yssel, where they were cantoned along a line from Zutphen to the sea. Here they rested in a sorry plight until

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27 January, when the retreat was resumed, and, starving and exposed to the hostility of the people of the country, the remains of the Allied Army made, as far as the British troops were mostly concerned, for Osnabrück. One British detachment under Lord Cathcart was, however, sent in a different direction through West Friesland and along the borders of Gröningen.

On 5 February the Allies had reached the west bank of the Ems. The enemy were now advancing to take possession of as much territory as possible. The opposing forces came into collision several times.

On 27 February the detachment under Lord Cathcart was attacked at Winschoten, but repelled the enemy. The latter, however, succeeded in a second attack on 1 March, and the British were forced to retreat across the Ems two days later.

The remainder of the British followed to the east bank of the river and held a line from Emden to Rheine, with its headquarters at Osnabrück. On 11 March it was finally determined that the British troops should abandon the country and return to England, and for their conveyance transports were ordered to be despatched. The British began their march to Bremen on 22 March, but it was not until 14 April that the infantry and some of the artillery were embarked. The cavalry remained under the command of Lord Cathcart and General David Dundas, as also did the rest of the artillery.

During the retreat the 7th (Queen's Own) Light Dragoons were employed in covering the army, and had frequent occasion to skirmish with the advanced guard of the pursuing French. It does not seem possible to ascertain definitely whether the Regiment was attached to Lord Cathcart's force or not. That the 15th Light Dragoons were we know, but the records of the whole of this campaign are so fragmentary that it is a matter of great difficulty to decide what precisely did happen.

For instance, let us take the case of the affair at Guelder Malsen on 5 January. Cannon in his History of the 7th Queen's Own does not mention the engagement. The Regimental Manuscript is also silent on the affair, but Cannon in his History of the 15th Hussars writes as follows :—

'Several slight actions occurred; the Fifteenth were engaged at Guelder Malsen, on the 5th of January; they supported the Eighty Second Regiment and Seventh Light Dragoons, and afterwards charged

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a body of French Hussars with great spirit, pursuing them on the ice-bed of the river; they were, also, very instrumental on the recovery of the guns attached to the Light Brigade.'

Now another account enumerates the following infantry regiments as belonging to Dundas's force: the 27th, 28th, 53rd and 85th; and adds that part or the whole of these regiments were either engaged in holding Guelder Malsen or in reserve. Fortescue does not give the numbers of the regiments, but states that 'Wallmoden ordered ten battalions and six squadrons of British and Emigrants under David Dundas to Guelder Malsen, a short distance north of Meteren, in the hope of annihilating' the French detachment which in a rather reckless manner was holding that place.

Brown in his Journal omits all mention of the affair. Jones states that at Guelder Malsen the village was 'covered by the 42nd and 78th Regiments, and the 33rd took its place in the line of defence, the remainder of the troops being in reserve on the opposite side of the river Lingen.' In a list of casualties which he gives, he mentions losses sustained by the Artillery, the 11th Light Dragoons, and the 33rd, 42nd, and 78th Regiments of Foot.

To sum up these conflicting reports, we may therefore not make any undue claim if we decide that the 7th (Queen's Own) Hussars were engaged on the dates in question in the capture and recapture of Guelder Malsen.

While in Germany after the retreat, the Regiment, Cannon tells us, 'occupied quarters of refreshment' for several weeks; and 'during the summer they were encamped on one of the plains of Westphalia; and in November returned to England.'

The only other event of importance: nay, the only other event which is chronicled in the Manuscript Record of this year, is that 'on the death of General Sir Henry Clinton, K.B., His Majesty conferred the Colonelcy of the Regiment on Major-General David Dundas by commission dated 26 December 1795.'

The short period of home employment which intervened before the Regiment was again ordered on active service abroad passes unchronicled both in Cannon and the Manuscript Record. We read in the latter as follows:—

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'1796. The Queen's Own Light Dragoons occupied various quarters in England until the summer of 1799, when they were encamped near Windsor and were reviewed by the King, who was pleased to express in very gracious terms his royal approbation of their appearance and field movements.'

As at this period the Army Lists did not give any information as to the stations of regiments; and as the newspapers did not report the Royal Review near Windsor, no further details can be afforded beyond the meagre entries already supplied.

It is worth notice that the first training manual for the cavalry was issued just about this time, under the title of 'Regulations for the Cavalry,' and its intention was to establish 'one uniform and general System of Discipline' throughout the entire army.

The book, which is a large one of some four hundred pages, furnishes not a little amusing reading in places.

It is laid down that drill instructors must avoid swearing at the men, and the adjutant is to prevent this bad practice.

Private soldiers 'must behave to each other with decency and propriety and if anyone makes use of improper language to another,' the troop are enjoined to 'take it up immediately.' Dragoons are forbidden to give way 'to that abominable blackguard practice of swearing.'

Officers, as we have noticed elsewhere, are enjoined always to wear regimentals in quarters, and are only to appear in plain clothes, which the manual designates as 'coloured cloaths,' when going on leave, or when engaged in sport. When riding they must always appear in uniform in the neighbourhood of their quarters. Walking about in 'plain cloaths' is stigmatised as unmilitary and is therefore 'absolutely forbid by His Majesty's Orders.'

The trumpeters are specially singled out for cautions as to their sobriety:—'it is absolutely necessary that they should be sober people, for if they are the least in liquor, it is discovered in a moment by their sounding, and they never know when they may be called upon to sound the alarm.'

Rules are also given for the care of the horse by its rider, and horsemastership is wisely advocated.

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CHAPTER XVII

Campaign of 1799—The Helder

In 1799 France was in possession of Holland. During May of that year an attempt had been made to persuade King Frederick William of Prussia to join the Coalition against France. This course the King of Prussia refused to take.

Early in the month of June, however, it became apparent that Prussia was about to call upon France to evacuate Holland, and in case of refusal to at once invade that country. If Prussia took that line, England would immediately have been requested to co-operate and by sending a fleet to seize the Isle of Walcheren to render assistance to the projected design. England thereupon determined to collect a force, and the command of this force was given to Sir Ralph Abercromby. An alliance was then concluded with Russia for a joint invasion of Holland, and a treaty to that effect was signed on 22 June. By this stroke it was hoped that the hands of Prussia would be forced. The British troops to be employed, or promised to be employed, numbered 30,000 men, the Russian contingent amounting to another 18,000.

But where the 30,000 British troops were to come from was a matter of great difficulty, as not more than one-third of the promised number were available.

However, in the course of about a month, by some intricate jugglery with the Militia Act, a certain number were raised, though even as late as August the full quota of 30,000 was not prepared to embark, nor indeed did it seem as if such a force could, even if collected, prove efficient. Plan after plan for the conduct of the operations was proposed and negatived.

Abercromby considered that the mouth of the Meuse would be the

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best spot for debarkation; but the difficulties in the way proved insuperable.

Abercromby therefore suggested that nothing should be done until the arrival of the promised Russians. He was meanwhile encamped on the coast of Kent in command of a force which was largely augmented by volunteers who had been willing to join from other battalions and regiments, owing to the high bounty offered per man.

Now the Russians were not expected to arrive till late in August, and Pitt objected to delay action pending their appearance.

A descent on Walcheren was now proposed, and not for the first time; but this plan, unless the Prussians co-operated by invading Brabant, crossing the Rhine and Meuse for that purpose, could hardly prove successful, for several reasons.

To hold it a large garrison would be required, and the men were not forthcoming; also the place was notoriously unhealthy in the autumn, and moreover it would necessitate the employment of a large fleet to protect the army when landed there. Other propositions, such as a landing at Scheveningen, the occupation of Walcheren, Goree and Ameland, and another landing on the shore of Gröningen, were successively made and rejected.

Finally, after much discussion, and the adoption and abandonment of many alternative schemes, Abercromby, with a force of 10,000, set sail on 13 August. His precise instructions, however, left much to be desired as far as their definite purpose was concerned. He was apparently desired to go to Holland, but to what particular place he was to depart or what he was specifically ordered to do was not any part of the instructions before-named. It would seem that eventually Abercromby himself decided that the Helder would, of many bad spots to initiate a campaign, perhaps prove the least objectionable, and to the Helder therefore he departed. The usual ill-luck in the way of contrary winds and heavy gales protracted the period at sea, and what is more, delayed the arrival of the Russians.

The voyage, that is to say the time of the troops on board ship, lasted until 26 August, on which date the British were ordered to prepare to disembark on the following morning.

The circumstances were not, however, propitious, both provisions and water being nearly exhausted, and for debarkation purposes not a

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single flat-bottomed boat had been provided, while on the shore, behind a range of sandhills, lay a force of 10,000 of the enemy under the command of General Daendels, who was prepared to strenuously oppose the landing of the British expedition.

The 7th (Queen's Own) Light Dragoons did not embark with this portion of the expeditionary force, as will be seen from the following narrative.

This narrative of the events of 1799–1800, as far as the 7th Queen's Own are concerned, is derived from the manuscript Journal of Lieutenant John Hunt, who was at that time Adjutant of the Regiment. He later rose to the rank of Captain. The original manuscript is in the possession of the Royal United Service Institution, by whom its use has been kindly permitted to the writer.

As this is the first diary or journal which it has been possible to obtain for the purposes of this book, it is indeed welcome. That diaries, journals, and private letters concerned with the previous campaigns must exist can hardly be questioned, yet, despite search in many directions, even to running through likely portions of the lengthy Reports of the Royal Historical Manuscripts Commission, hitherto all efforts have been unavailing. Letters too, and not a few by any means, have been written in different directions asking for diaries, journals, information, documents, pictures, relics, &c., but the response has been practically unimportant. Also, the writer has regretfully to add that in frequent cases his letters failed to elicit even a reply.

He has, therefore, less hesitation in making a very full use of Captain Hunt's Journal, as therein we have not only that personal note which so greatly adds to the value of a Regimental History, but also a careful and graphic account of the campaign.

The Journal of Lieutenant and Adjutant John Hunt, 7th (Queen's Own) Light Dragoons.

'On Saturday the 31st of August I marched from Romford Barracks, with the first division of the 7th Light Dragoons, consisting of two squadrons, on our route for Holland; at Tilbury fort we crossed the Thames to Gravesend, in Barges towed over by Cutters and proceeded to Rochester, at which place we halted the next Day. On Sunday I made one of a party that went with an Officer of the Infantry (Ensign St. John) at Chatham, on board the *St. Peter*, a Russian 64 Gun Ship,

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which had undergone a thorough repair in the Dock Yard in that place and was then at Anchor in the River. The next day we marched to Sittingbourne and on the 3rd of September to Canterbury, where the other two Squadrons of the Regiment arrived on the 4th.'

This at once gives us information as to the whereabouts of the Regiment at any rate at the end of August 1799. The 7th (Queen's Own) Light Dragoons had evidently been occupying the 'New Cavalry Barracks' then but recently erected.

This is rather interesting. These barracks were only ready for occupation in October 1795, when the 1st Dragoon Guards, who had previously been billeted in the town, were ordered to take up their quarters in the 'New Cavalry Barracks.' In 1796 the 2nd Dragoon Guards were at Romford, and left for Wimbledon in 1797. From August 1797 to June 1798 the 6th Dragoons were at Romford. Thus it would appear that the 7th Queen's Own were the fourth cavalry regiment to occupy these barracks. It must be remembered that cavalry barracks in England and Scotland hardly existed before 1792–3. Prior to this date billeting was the rule. The Journal continues :—

'Whilst at Canterbury I saw the infantry which were encamped on Barham Downs (about 8000 men) Reviewed by His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales, who was accompanied by Secretary Dundas and Mr Pitt, they exhibited the Orange riband, and a *Feu-de-joye* was fired in consequence of the Dutch Fleet in the Texel having surrendered to the British under the command of Admiral Mitchel.'

The restoration of the Prince of Orange, it may be observed, was one of the objects aimed at by the expedition to Holland. The French had captured the country, but the Prince had been exiled through the action of his subjects and were from our point of view rebels.

'After the Review the Camp began to break up, and the Troops marched for Deal to embark for Holland; they consisted of the Corps as follows, Viz.

Brigades	Regiments
M. General Earl of Chatham	4th Regt. 3 Battalions 31st Regiment.
M. General H.R.H.P.W^{m} of Gloucester	5th Regt. 2 Battns. 35th Regt. 2 Do.
M. General Manners	9th Regt. 2 Do. 56th Regiment.

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'With the flank Companies belonging to the above, consisting of about 1700 Men was formed into two Battalions.

'I marched on Thursday the 5th to Ramsgate, where three troops which had arrived the preceding day embarked (from the Pier)—On the 6th the same number of troops and part of another also embarked and sailed to the Downs; the remainder of the Regiment with which I was ordered to stay, remained in their quarters for want of Transports till the 8th. On the 7th Lord Paget came from the Downs to Ramsgate and signified to me it was probable that the Troops which were on board would sail without waiting for those not Embarked, and ordered me to take a Boat in the Morning and get on board the first Cavalry Ship I could find, my Horses I was to leave with the Troops that was to follow.'

This sheds a curious light on the transport system of those days.

'Early on the Morning of the 8th I went down to the Harbour where I found a Boat from Deal, on asking the Master what I should give them for my passage he replied "nothing" as he was returning home, but after my Baggage was put on Board, he told me that he had not agreed to carry my Luggage and said he would not take it for less than a Guinea, which sum I was obliged to pay him, or not go. On arriving in the Downs and not finding the Transport I enquired for, was put on board the *Fortitude Success* in which was a Lieutenant (Stevenson) of the 7th, and a North Briton who was a Volunteer in the Expedition, his name was Cameron and he was commencing the Life of a Soldier of fortune, his Wardrobe which was not over large he carried on his back, and of its contents which he valued most was Two Letters of recommendation to Sir R. Abercromby and which I presume fully answered his purpose and expectations, for after the Action of the 19th Septr he was appointed to an Ensigncy.'

This officer appears to be identified with 'Volunteer John Cameron,' who was appointed to an ensigncy in the 92nd Regiment from the 55th Foot without purchase: *vice* Bishop, whose appointment does not take place,' 22 October 1799 (*vide London Gazette*, 21 December 1799).

'His Royal Highness the Duke of York embarked this day in the *Amethyst* frigate. On his quitting the shore a royal salute was fired from the castle and forts near Deal, which on his entering the frigate was returned by the ships of war (with yards manned) at anchor in the

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Downs. His Royal Highness sailed early in the morning of the 9th for Holland.

'The Deal boats were constantly employed from the 8th to the 10th in embarking the infantry. On the latter day a fleet joined us from Woolwich, with artillerymen, guns and ordnance stores on board.'

On the 11th he went fishing, and was very successful.

'About three o'clock in the afternoon I observed some Transports coming out of Ramsgate Harbour and with my glass could distinguish that men of the 7th was on board of them. On their coming to anchor I went in our boat with the Captain to them and found my horses (both well) in a small Brigg called the *Union*.'

This vessel, Lieutenant Hunt states in a marginal note,

'On its return from Holland was taken by the French and carried into Calais, with Lieutenant Pyrke, Cornet Villiars, Quarter Master Pope and about 20 men and horses of the 7th.'

Whilst he was on board the *Union* he 'noticed that several of the ships were getting under weigh and we immediately put off and went to the *Castle Douglas* which was our Agents ship, for information. Lord Paget was on board who told us they had no order for sailing. We returned to our vessel and soon after observed that the fleet bound to Holland was preparing to sail. Our anchor was weighed and we accompanied some of the leading ships. It was now dusk, and in the course of the evening we brought to, having the North Foreland in sight and I afterwards understood our situation was rather a dangerous one. The Anchors buoy was lost in the night. It was whilst at breakfast the next morning that I was informed by the Captain of these circumstances, for I had no Idea myself that the Vessell had been at Anchor since quitting the Downs.

'The 12th was a tolerable fine Day, but an unfavourable wind at S.E. We sailed on the starboard tack at about two and a half knots an hour. Before daylight on the morning of the 13th the wind shifted into the N.W. and the fleet sailed at seven and a half knots. At noon met a Swedish fleet convoyed by a sloop of war. Stiff breeze with rain and heavy sea. Close reefed sails. Speed five and a half knots. Towards

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evening the fleet lay to, but made sail again at 10 P.M. with wind still fair.' At daybreak on the 14th it was found that they had overshot their destined landing place by about three or four leagues and had to beat back for the Texel with an adverse wind. This took all day, and it was not till dark that they anchored off the Texel Point ready to run in early next day. On Sunday morning early, the weather being fine and the wind fair, they weighed anchor and stood for the Port, anchoring in the New Deep (Nieuwe Diep) about noon.

He describes the scene as 'most varying and grand.' First the ort of Kickdown, near which they anchored at about a cable's distance. Here too were several Russian warships which had brought troops. Next they passed Admiral Mitchell's fleet with the Dutch ships that had surrendered to it. They saw the greater part of the fleet at anchor and full of soldiers that came with them, and at the same time both Russians and British were disembarking by hundreds.

'The Dutch shore was lined by troops as they landed and was crowded with the inhabitants and Dutch Soldiers that had come over to the Prince of Orange whose standard was flying in the forts.'

When the vessel was moored Lieutenant Hunt landed from a boat, and found some of the 7th employed in disembarking their horses, 'which were hauled on shore in the slings on a Pier principally composed of seaweed and close to which the ships were lying. Our horses when landed were encamped in a field, the first between the New Deep and the Helder. I found my horses ashore, the mare not well, but on being blooded she soon recovered. Having no camp equipage at hand I slept that night on board a vessel in the harbour, the one I came in being at a distance. Several Battalions of Russians which had lain in the fields between us and the Town, marched up the country early on the 16th. Many of their sick which belonged to Corps that had moved forward previous to my arrival, were encamped close by the water side, and such objects I never saw before, their countenances were remarkably sallow, in their persons to the highest degree dirty, and the smell of them was intolerable. I particularly noticed their ammunition Bread, which is of a quality that could not be conceived by any Person who had not seen it, in its colour it resembled the oyl cake made use of in England for fatning of Cattle: notwithstanding, with this very inferior bread, a

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small quantity of Oyl or Butter, and a drink of water a Russian Soldier makes a contented meal.

'I heard a circumstance related, respecting a barrel of grease which was opened by our Artillery Men to be applied to the wheels of their Guns, &c., and it not being made immediate use off, the Russians in a few minutes, had stolen one half of it, to eat with their Bread, on the discovery a sentinel was posted to prevent the like depredations being committed. The days of the 16th and 17th we spent in landing our Men and Horses. The Infantry were likewise continually disembarking, and by Brigades and Regiments marched to join the Army. On the latter day about noon our left squadron with the Major's and Captain Vivian's Troops marched for the village of Callantsoog. In the afternoon I walked to the Helder in company with our Assistant Surgeon (Mr. Dunn), we got some indifferent coffee at an inn, and as I was not well probably made it appear more so to me. On our return I particularly noticed the respect paid by the Russian soldiers to their superiors. General Herman who was walking with the Officers of his Staff, was observed by a party of them who was standing (in conversation) with me, and at least fifty yards from their General. But the moment they saw him, their caps was off, a perfect silence and general steadiness followed. I slept this night in Camp, during which it rained and blowed very hard. I lay on the ground and for warmth had put my bed close to and on the windward side of the tent (resting upon the wall of it) not considering if it came on to rain as well as blow it would occasion the scrape in which I found myself, which was nearly afloat with the water that came in. About daybreak on the 18th, I was called up, being the only officer that lay in camp, and was presented with an Order to furnish six horses to take General Herman and his Staff to the Army. A Sergeant and party accompanied them to bring back the horses, but they returned with four short of the number sent, and which never after joined the regiment. About noon, the 7th was all landed with the exception of a Cornet (Denshire) Quarter Master (Pope) and some men and horses on board a small Brigg that returned to Ramsgate to get some damages repaired which happened on the first night we left the Downs. She arrived a week after we quitted the Helder. In the afternoon I marched with the last division of the Regiment, and towards the Close of the Day arrived at Callants-oog, a miserable village consisting

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of about forty houses, the best of which was an inferior sort of an Inn, in which Lord Paget had taken his quarters, the Houses in general were neat and built with a space between them and a garden behind, the street was wide and we found it covered with grass, but when we left the place, it was like the hills in the neighbourhood a body of sand. On my arrival I was acquainted with the orders for the 19th, agreeable to which the men was to parade with their Rum, three days bread and Horses corn; their Saddlebags and Regimental Baggage was to be left in Quarters in the care of a Quarter Master and a few Dragoons. Our heavy baggage was in store at the Helder. At midnight the Regiment turned out and having procured a Guide, with a waggon to carry out ammunition, we set off and at the end of the village crossed the sand hills which brought us to the sea shore, close by which we pursued our march (the most silent one I had ever before witnessed) for the village of Petten, distant about six miles, which we passed and arrived at a Battery about a quarter of a mile beyond it which extended from the water side to the greate dike or Sea Wall, here we were joined by a Captains piquet of the 7th which had occupied a large house near this post (on our troop first quitting the Helder). Their Videttes were pushed forward about a quarter of a mile in front of the Battery, leading to Camper-down. We halted in rear of the Battery for an hour or more, which interval and the objects about you, with what was about to take place, heightened by a particular gloomy night, a hollow sea roaring close by and excepting which, the greatest silence reigned throughout, you might have heard a whisper. You could just distinguish the Artillery Men who were standing at the guns with their lighted matches. On the beach between us and the water was a space that appeared darker than the other parts that surrounded you, this was produced by a body of Russian Infantry (about 4000) who were standing in a close Column of Company's. These circumstances combined, and to a person who had never before witnessed anything similar, produced scenes for reflection and crowded many imaginations on the mind.'

Lieutenant Hunt thus describes the action :—

'About four o'clock the Russian column and the right wing of the 7th (under the immediate command of Lord Paget) advanced along the beach leading to Camper-down, the left wing of the Regiment, commanded

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By Dighton Sen.



LIEUT.-COLONEL MICHAEL BARNE.

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by Lieutenant Colonel Barne, and which I accompanied filed to the left under the dike towards Crabendam. On our march we passed M-General Manners's Brigade, about which time (soon after 4 o'clock) I heard the first shot fired, (supposed by a French Vidette). The attack immediately commenced and soon became general with the heads of the right column of Russians and the one I was in rear of. I rode on the top of a dike with a Captain of the Regiment, where we had a view of the Blaze produced by a rapid firing of Small Arms, in the dawn of a morning not light enough to admit other objects being distinguished, the scene altogether was grand beyond conception. After marching about a mile under the dike we arrived at that part of it, where a temporary bridge was laid down by the Russians and over which they were hastily advancing. We halted till they had all passed and moved forward at the time they carried the third and last Intrenchment which the enemy possessed. At the commencement of the attack on the Slaper dike; which joined the one under which we had marched at right angles, in the last post at the extremity of the dike between the villages of Camp and Groet the French had a Howitzer, but each of the succeeding posts were carried by storm with that rapidity by the Russians, which rendered the gun during these operations of no use to them and it was not once fired. We afterwards found it near the village of Groet, about a quarter of a mile from whence it had been moved, with its carriage broke and a horse killed close by it. On arriving at the first entrenchment we halted for ten minutes whilst the ditch was filling up in order that we might pass, and for the first time in my life I witnessed one of the many direful effects produced by the havoc of War.'

This was a dead Russian officer and several of his men. In the course of two miles Lieutenant Hunt states that the Russian dead and wounded were nine times as many as those of the enemy that he saw, and concludes that the French removed theirs. Near Groote the 7th halted for some time awaiting news as to how the action had gone and momentarily expecting to be led forward. Having heard nothing to the contrary they concluded that the Russians were still successful,' untill one of their Hussars who was attached to General Herman came to us, going back on some message, and by whose countenance and action intimated that all was not well. He stopped and endeavoured to make himself understood, but to no purpose as no one among us could comprehend him, and we

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suspected (as was the case) a reverse of fortune had taken place. This man was one of eight or ten which General Herman had with him as a body guard and were certainly the finest men I ever saw. In their persons they were handsome, stout and well made, upon the average about six feet three or four inches high. They wore their hair plaited which was very dark and reached down below their waists, their clothing was white with handsome Hussar caps, sabretash &c. The one who passed us soon returned and repassed us. He carried a long horse pistol in his hand and I never saw a face that (to appearance) exhibited a more determined and resolute character. This brave fellow with some of his comrades perished in defence of their general at the time he was taken prisoner, and about which time the Russian Lieutenant General Gerebzoff was brought back on one of our horses mortally wounded.

'Whilst we remained in this situation I was observing the Troops commencing the action under the command of Lieut. General David Dundas, on the dike between Crabbendam and Schouldam. I could see the shells in the air thrown by the enemy and observed they frequently fell about the head of that column as they were advancing on the dike. The 7th at this time was standing in Line in a narrow Lane with their rear to the sand hills and looking towards the Centre Column, when we were unexpectedly saluted with a cannon shot which passed close by the Right of the Regiment. I was with some other officers, then on that flank, and am firmly of opinion that the ball went within two or three yards of us. A second shot instantly followed and in the same direction. Being exposed to this fire in a situation in which no Cavalry could move except along the lane in file, induced us to get out of their fire, and we quietly retired about 100 yards with our right behind a farm house, from which to the left the troops were covered by a wood in which were many young trees. They followed us with their fire (from which we were perfectly covered). I heard the balls continually strike against the house, and saw them knock down the corn which was piled in sheaf's in a field on our right, and in the wood they were flying in every direction. I afterwards understood that the Battery which annoyed us was in the course of the day in possession of our centre Division. It consisted of six guns, but they were not brought away. After the fire of this battery ceased from being directed at us, which lasted about twenty minutes

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'The Cavalry Journal.
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CAPTAIN CHARLES TAYLOR.

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and which did us not the least damage, we moved into that part of the lane we had left and formed as before.'

About 9 o'clock Captain Taylor, A.D.C. to the Duke of York, but for that day attached to the Russian column, rode up and inquired for Lord Paget. Lord Paget was on a hill at a short distance watching the action with his telescope. Thither Lieutenant Hunt conducted Captain Taylor, who delivered a message to Lord Paget that 'he would take the 7th to the rear (and in sight) of the Russians, but signifying at the same time that the situation would preclude us from rendering them any material assistance; adding they were completely defeated and all of them that entered (about 3000) Bergen were either killed, wounded or with their General (Herman) taken prisoners.'

So the 7th were immediately moved towards the hills and had to scramble up as best they could with the loose sand half-way up the horses' legs. Many fell, and Hunt himself dismounted and led his horse till he reached the summit of the ridge along which they were to advance. They marched on and were soon in sight of the enemy, and then 'formed in the best manner circumstances would admit, a formation in which my horses feet was in a parallel line with the head of the seventh or eighth man from me. Such was our line and upon ground where it was totally impossible for any description of Cavalry to act.' They could look on at the action on the lower ground beneath them in a place where the sand hills seemed to be few and small and the fighting was at the time 'very severe and decidedly to the disadvantage of the Russians, who were coming back in every direction and in the greatest confusion.' The exact scene was 'between the sea and Bergen wood.'

The 7th had hardly taken up their position when they were subjected to a severe artillery fire, but luckily without sustaining any casualties. Finding that they could in no way assist the Russians, 'not a Battalion of whom was compact or in the least regular order and having only one narrow road to retreat by, which road was already filled by the broken army,' Lord Paget determined to take the Regiment from the hills, as to remain there would merely sacrifice the men to no purpose.

Lieutenant Hunt continues 'We retired and in gaining the next ridge many cannon shot flew over us, but too high to annoy the troops. We arrived in the lane we had before quitted and were completely intermixed and crowded with several Corps of Russian Infantry all of whom

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were in the same disorderly state as when they first left the field. They seemed to have lost the high respect and obedience and subordination to their officers which I had before observed, and persisted (though many attempts were made to restrain them) in going back. They expressed themselves much dissatisfied with us in not having rendered them more assistance, or probably because we had not a greater share in their disgrace.'

The fact was that in no part of the country traversed by the Regiment that morning was there one single spot in which 'a squadron of cavalry could have been employed, the enclosures on our left, between us and the Centre Column (of British) were intersected with ditches, and on the sand hills immediately on our right it was impossible.'

The left wing of the Regiment was now ordered back to the post at Petten, and continued its retreat by the road it had traversed in the early morning, and did not get clear of the Russians till they had reached the Slaper-dike.

Passing this Lieutenant Hunt mentions the unpleasant scenes he witnessed of hastily and half-buried dead who lay between the second and third entrenchment. He states that several times during the retreat he saw the Russian officers attempt to rally their men and to get them into some sort of order 'by beat of drum,' but the men would have none of it and 'obstructed the drummers' in the performance of their duty.

The Russians scattered a good deal, plundering the houses; the beds were destroyed for the sake of the bed-ticks, the feathers being scattered all over the place. Skulkers who had avoided going into action were also seen stealthily throwing away their ammunition in order to avoid detection had cartridges been found on them. Many of the Russian wounded were left behind in the villages, and these of course later were taken prisoners. Lieutenant Hunt has praise for the way the Russian surgeons' assistants cared for the wounded on the field. He states they were dressed in red, carried a bundle of linen, some lint, and a canteen of water. They proceeded methodically and examined everybody who was wounded, but mortal wounds they wasted no time on but confined their attention solely to cases which might reasonably be cured.

When the Regiment arrived at the Petten Battery a patrol was sent out in advance towards Camper-down by whom the hussars of the enemy were soon discovered. Lieutenant Hunt considers the return of the

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Regiment to Petten to be 'a well judged and necessary movement as the Battery was only defended by a small body of Russians with two guns.'

Had the enemy been aware of this slender garrison they could have captured the place with but little opposition and loss. He however concludes that it is probable that all the available forces of the enemy had been engaged in the battle and that they had none to spare, 'as those at Egmont-op-zee were drawn towards Bergen and formed a part of the force that surrounded and took the Russians that entered that place.' Had the Russians maintained what they won at the beginning of the action the column under Sir Ralph Abercromby, which had marched on the evening of the 18th towards the Zuyder Zee and had possessed itself of Hoorn, would then have been rather in the rear of the enemy's right flank. Now Abercromby's force numbered from 12,000 to 13,000 men. They could have marched forward and co-operated with the columns of the right and centre. It appears that the object of this column was to push ahead and gain the Pass of Beverwyk before the enemy had got back to that place. If this was not the intention, Lieutenant Hunt adds it 'appears impolitic to have detached a force (to a quarter where the enemy was) and thus losing the aid of such a considerable British force as the one under command of Sir Ralph.' He further states that 'on their entering Bergen the Russians dispersed and began plundering, at which time their second line was completely intermixed with their first, their ammunition mostly exhausted or I may say in a great measure unnecessarily wasted before daylight and when they certainly destroyed each other.' At the last they 'resembled a mob or anything else more than a disciplined Army.'

Hunt describes the fate of General Herman, who, finding himself nearly surrounded, seeing the state of his troops and appreciating the error committed, succeeded in collecting a 'pretty considerable body of several different corps at or near Bergen.' For some time he offered a brave defence, but was at length overpowered and was with the greater part of this force taken. The remainder of the troops then fled in panic.

A British brigade consisting of the 9th and 56th Regiments under the command of Major-General Manners, however, stopped the progress of and held in check the enemy, who were driving before them some 8000 Russians. The 9th Regiment was mostly composed of Militia Volunteers who had never before been in action.

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Had they been more experienced troops they would doubtless have done better, but even as it was they did extremely well.

'Soon after 4 o'clock Lord Paget with our two (right) Squadrons, which had two horses killed joined us; about which time the firing ceased, and the forces retired to the position whence they had marched in the morning. Sir Ralph with his column was in consequence of the misfortunes of the day, recalled. The 7th stayed at the Battery till it was dark, when leaving a Captain's Piquet, the remainder went into the village of Petten, the horses were linked in the field in which we assembled previous to the action, and most of the men spent the night (which was wet and disagreable) with them. The Russians had before our arrival taken possession of most of the houses, stables &c. in the place, and the church was completely filled with their wounded. I was fortunate enough to get my horses under cover and upon quitting them left a small cane in the stable which I soon after recollected. I sent a dragoon for it who found a Russian soldier in the act of taking off the metal mounting which I suppose he thought was gold. I passed this night with some of our officers in a miserable cottage. My bed was a bundle of half dried rushes upon which I laid down more wet than the bed, and though much fatigued got but little sleep.' Lieutenant Hunt was as a matter of fact only then recovering from an attack of dysentery. In the morning they managed to get hold of half a pail of new milk, which with bread formed their breakfast. The Regiment remained at Petten till the middle of the next day, when leaving 100 men at the battery they marched back to Callantsoog. Nothing occurred till the 28th, when about midnight they returned to Petten. They arrived at Petten at 3 A.M., where they were joined by three squadrons of the 11th Light Dragoons and three troops of the 15th Light Dragoons; the latter had only landed a few days previously. 'This morning the whole army was assembled and a general attack was supposed to be the result; but about ten o'clock orders were given to return to their former quarters.' This was caused by the bad weather, which prevented the infantry from advancing between the sand hills and the sea in front of the battery at Petten.

On arrival no hay was to be found in the village, and it was needful to forage for that necessary in the neighbouring farms. Oats had also to be fetched from either Ondsluys or the Helder, the former place being four and the latter eight miles distant. Men who had been on twenty-four

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hours' piquet were often unavoidably sent on this duty before they had time even to change their wet clothes. The Regiment had no waggons and only two country carts, and these had enough to do to bring in the rum and biscuit from the magazines. One driver soon gave them the slip; the other, whose own horse and waggon was employed, stayed for a while, but later on he also levanted—horse, waggon and all. The other horse and waggon were soon rendered unfit for use from lack of care. Lieutenant Hunt mainly fed on biscuit, but not that made in the country, which, being mostly composed of rye, disagreed with those who ate it. Beef and mutton were both cheap and plentiful, but tea and sugar could not be obtained. Hunt, however, got some of both down from the Helder from a transport at a cost of 8*s*. per lb., and this price for those days was fairly reasonable. The sugar cost 3*s*. per lb. and 'the latter was of the worst quality I had ever seen,' he adds.

On 2 October the 7th returned to Petten and were again joined by the same troops of the 11th and 15th Light Dragoons. About half-past five they 'crossed the dike to the battery,' and there found Abercromby with 9000 British Infantry. 'At six our advanced guard (of which an officer sergeant and 12 men of the 7th led) began the attack, by driving in that of our opponents, and to appearance unexpectedly, as I saw many of their blankets and other things left where their piquets had been posted.' On arrival at Camper-down about a mile from the battery the infantry began to file into the sand hills, extending themselves to the left, and continued so to do by brigades as they advanced till within a mile of Egmont-op-zee. Here the most severe part of the battle took place.

The cavalry and horse artillery, except some parties of the former who were detached into the hills to patrol, continued to march along the seashore. After proceeding five miles a strong column of the enemy was observed retiring quietly on the beach.

'We gained on them till they were within reach of our guns which were immediately following the leading squadron of the 7th. The Artillery were ordered to prepare for action (the Cavalry opened to its flank), when they fired about half a dozen rounds, limbered up and we continued our March. It was visible the shot entered the column by the bustle you saw them in and they retiring much quicker than before.' A few dead and wounded of the enemy were seen there later. 'No serious resistance was shown by the French till we arrived in front of Egmont, a position we

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retained till the next afternoon, the only Infantry that accompanied us to this ground were the Granadiers of the Guards and the 92nd (Highland) Regiment. The latter were soon after led into action, which they entered in the bravest manner.' The 92nd was commanded by the Marquis of Huntly, who was wounded before the regiment was engaged. The 92nd lost several men in the attack and the Guards were then sent up in their support, and the action became general with the whole of Abercromby's infantry.

Lieutenant Hunt writes: 'I believe the case was similar with the Column commanded by Lieut.-General David Dundas which advanced by the road the Russians did on the 19th of September. The 7th had a squadron attached to this column.

'Our Cavalry and Artillery were the only troops that remained on the beach during the afternoon and night, but the hills on our left and close to us were lined by British Infantry, opposed to whom in front of Egmont and on the heights a little to its right, the enemy appeared in great force, and in a position remarkably strong. Another body, to appearance about 2000, presented themselves on the hills between that and Bergen.'

During the morning the dragoons of the advanced guard were occasionally skirmishing with the enemy's hussars, with whom at this time 'some of their riflemen had joined and acting with them and did us some mischief.'

One officer's horse was shot. 'The space between the sea and the sand hills seldom admitted during our march of a line extending beyond that of a squadron, and in such situation we were standing at this time in an open column, the one in front after remaining an hour was sent back to the rear where it immediately fed and again bridled up, and was replaced by the next to it, the whole at the same time moving up. This regulation continued during the day, towards the close of which it brought the troops of the 15th in front. For two hours after our arriving on this ground our front squadrons were exposed and much annoyed by a shower of mostly spent balls which came promiscuously from the hills where the Infantry was keeping up a most tremendous firing. Being at this time in front I heard the balls whistle in every direction and continually striking against the men's appointments, themselves and their horses, several of each went back wounded.'

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About noon the enemy brought up some guns and opened fire on the beach in front of Egmont. The cavalry were closed in to the sand hills and the British Horse Artillery replied. There was a smart artillery duel for two hours, when the enemy had had enough of it and retired their guns. The British Horse Artillery were commanded by Captain Frazer, and sustained several casualties, both men and horses. Lieutenant Hunt states that 'Bravery was never more conspicuous than that shewn by our Artillery Men.'

About 5 P.M. the infantry of the enemy were completely dislodged from the hills which covered Egmont, and driven into the town. At sunset, when the firing had for some time ceased, their cavalry in a most unexpected manner made a desperate attack on the British Horse Artillery, which had remained in its old position. For a few minutes the guns were practically in the possession of the enemy, 'or in fact they had rather passed them, when Lord Paget who was with the troops of the 15th then in front, between the hills and out of sight of the enemy, instantly attacked them, being aided by other squadrons in succession as they came up. The guns were immediately re-taken and before half of our cavalry arrived at the scene of action, and by time the squadron I was with had reached the place (which troops were only partially engaged) the enemy were driven back and their defeat complete.' Early next morning several of the dead Frenchmen were to be seen on the ground, and numerous hussar caps, but not 'one British Dragoon's helmet.'

Three men belonging to the 11th and 15th were shot and a few wounded. The British did not use their pistols but only their swords. The loss of the enemy was very considerable.

This cavalry fight concluded the day, during which the fighting had been long and hardly contested. But the cavalry were still in doubt as to what had occurred elsewhere. At this juncture a body of infantry was seen approaching from the hills on the left, and as distance and darkness combined to make identification hardly possible, an officer of the 7th with some men was sent to reconnoitre. He returned with the news that it was Colonel Macdonald with his brigade, which had been detached by General Dundas from Bergen, and that Bergen had been captured. Sir Ralph Abercromby's column passed the night, which was cold, wet and windy, on the field, the infantry on the sand hills, the cavalry on the beach.

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On the morning of the 3rd all was quiet, and a party was sent into Bergen for forage and obtained some hay. The men luckily had a day's rations of oats with them. Water was found between the hills about a quarter of a mile away, but the horses refused to drink it, though throughout the preceding day they had had none. During the morning rum and biscuit arrived for the men. Lieutenant Hunt took a stroll across the ground where the 92nd had lost several men, whose unburied bodies still remained lying where they fell. The Guards were resting in the same place, and he mentions that he saw one of the men immersed in a book which he was reading. On approaching, the book proved to be a Testament, which when he discovered Hunt immediately withdrew in silence.

About noon the mess man came up with his cart, bringing port wine, bottled porter, cold meat, &c.

'Myself and Major Walhouse took a bottle of each with something to eat which was certainly a great treat to us after having nothing but rum and biscuit since the evening of the 1st.'

But the difficulty was to find a spot in which they could eat and drink in comfort, as the wind was high and the sand blowing about in a most unpleasant way. They shifted from hill to hill, but all to no purpose. At last a suitable spot was discovered, but here they found two wretched wounded Frenchmen, who had lain there for some twenty-four hours unattended and unperceived, though not a hundred yards from the ground occupied by the Cavalry Brigade. Lieutenant Hunt did what we believe every other officer or man would have done; he fetched a surgeon and gave them something to drink, for both of which they were doubtless grateful.

One was shot through the leg and the other had a ball in the hip. Blankets were fetched and the two poor fellows were carried off and laid with our own wounded men.

About 3 P.M. the column prepared to move forward, and advanced towards Egmont in order of battle, 'expecting every moment the appearance and fire of the enemy.'

On arriving about half-way, when they were some 600 yards from the town a signal-gun (blank) followed by another was fired by some of the townsmen. It turned out that the French had evacuated the town.

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Thereupon the British took possession while the advanced guard galloped on about two miles, when they came in touch with the enemy's piquets. In front of these they established themselves for the night, and so remained till the British retreated.

The infantry were cantoned in the town, but the cavalry 'spent a wretched night round the boats on the beach.' Lieutenant Hunt tells us how he had twice during that night to make his way from the town to the beach in pitch darkness, with a high wind blowing the sand in a most unpleasant and painful way into his face, and compelled to climb or roll down 'places nearly perpendicular, with the sand halfway up my legs.'

Lord Paget went into quarters in the town, and as Lieutenant Hunt was Acting Brigade Major he went into the town also, but was not very comfortable. The first night he lay in his clothes in a bed which had that day been vacated by a wounded French officer. Early next morning a party was sent to Oude-sluys to purchase oats. The rest of the brigade then moved into Egmont and the horses were picketed in some small fields near the church.

But the infantry had already secured all the best billets, and the cavalry were but badly housed. Still the horses refused, or almost refused, the water: they had been sixty hours without; that is, since the evening before the march from Callants-oog.

'Before daybreak on the 5th the Troops assembled as usual at their respective alarm posts and remained under arms till 8 o'clock, when the piquets and the battalions in the sand hills were relieved. We sent a party to Alkmaar for corn and retired to our quarters as the infantry had previously done.'

In the course of this day Lieutenant Hunt was fetched to some poor people in a house opposite his quarters. There he found some women of the army taking the wearing apparel of the people of the house. Their defence was that they had wanted to buy potatoes, but had been refused, and to frighten the women had pretended to seize their clothes. Hunt ordered them out, and told them what the consequences would be if there was any repetition of this misbehaviour.

'During this day several men belonging to the Dutch Hussars deserted to us, they were remarkably fine fellows, indifferently mounted but otherwise most completely equipped. They signified that the greatest

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part of the Regiment they had belonged to might be expected to follow them; and to prevent which we afterwards heard they were sent by the French to the rear.

'In consideration our crowded and bad quarters and the horses standing at piquet, we were ordered back to Bergen, to which place after leaving two complete Squadrons (3 Troops of the 7th and one of the 15th Light Dragoons) we marched on the morning of the 6th, and arrived about 11 o'clock at which time the 29th Foot were marching out. We found but few of the natives in the place and scarcely a house but what had n some degree been plundered by the Russians. I took up my quarters in one that belonged to an attorney, but which the family had quitted. Some feather beds remained in it not the least damaged and among other things two cupboards of handsome china. The various writings in the office were all displaced and thrown on the floor, which was completely covered with parchments, books and papers huddled together, but I conceive none of these articles were pillaged as they could be of little or no value to any one but the owner. In company with two officers of the regiment I walked on the road leading to the sand hills. The lane was planted on each side with young trees, the whole of which bore evident marks of the action which took place, and was much contested on this spot between the enemy and the Russians on the 19th September and that of the 2nd October. Not a tree could be selected but what retained the marks of musket balls, many had lost some of their largest branches and others cut in two by cannon shot. Previous to our walk, about 3 o'clock, a cannonade had been heard for sometime, which we remarked and concluded to have been in the Zuyder-zee, but when we were about half a mile from Bergen, we heard a smart fire of musketry commence and which most rapidly increased. An action we had little doubt was the cause of the firing heard and I immediately hurried back to quarters, where at the instant I arrived I met an Orderly Dragoon galloping in from Alkmaar (Head Quarters) with written orders for Lord Paget. I took the letter, mounted the Dragoon's horse and set off for His Lordships quarters, about a quarter of a mile from the village. The purport was for the Brigade to march with all possible despatch to join the army in front, and then engaged. On our own troops quitting the place, some Russian soldiers were coming in and but slightly wounded, men who certainly ought to have remained with their corps. I was left to bring

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up a party consisting of a Quarter Master and thirty men that were gone to Alkmaar for corn. On their return they had to go to their quarters for their arms and saddles, and it was nearly dark before I could proceed. The firing had ceased for some time before, and on the road I could not meet with a single individual that could give me the least information of the event of the day. I made pretty good despatch and passing through Egmont-op-zee found the Brigade in the act of forming their piquet previous to their coming back. The action of this day was unpremeditated and originated in consequence of our advanced posts being pushed forward, and which object was attained, and would have ended without anything serious taking place had not the Russians been anxious in taking possession of a hill in their front to make their post more secure, which movement and I believe that only was the cause of the action which ensued, in which about two thirds of our force was engaged and produced a contest as severe as any that had preceded it.

'At the close of the day we went back to Egmont-op-de-Hoef, where we halted for about an hour, when it was left to the option of Lord Paget either to remain where we had stopped or to return to Bergen, but in either case the Brigade was to be at the advanced post of the army (about 10 miles from Bergen) at daybreak the next morning. It was determined on going back, as we were in a place of which we had but little knowledge, without forage or knowing where it was to be obtained, and at Bergen was left the oats before mentioned and hay sufficient for several days. It was eleven o'clock before we reached our quarters and after a march, the most disagreeable that can be conceived or imagined. The darkness of the night was such that prevented any man from having the least sight of the one that immediately preceded him although riding as close as possible to each other, nor could you distinguish your hand when held close to your face. The road was narrow, composed of sand, a great part of which was enclosed by hills on one side, wood on the other and frequently high trees on both. I was riding in front and by looking upwards could observe a glimmer where the top branches of these trees did not meet, which produced a contrast from the pitch darkness that surrounded us.

'I was directed to keep a Trumpeter with me who was to sound for the troops to turn out in the morning at two o'clock. I went to the lawyer's, my former quarters, but found it filled with Russians, went then to the

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Mess House where I supped, and had afterwards to envy several officers who were enjoying a short but desirable sleep. I gave the Trumpeter strict charge that in case he should perceive me inclined to do like them, he was immediately to rouse me, which he punctually promised and as ill performed, for in the course of two minutes after he was as fast asleep as those that were snoring on the floor. As the whole responsibility rested with me I did not disturb him, and in order to prevent my committing the same error I walked about the room (though much tired) for the greatest part of the three hours, and was much pleased when the hour arrived for the bugle's sounding, at which time the night retained its extreme darkness. I had procured a lanthorn and candle, which was of great service being carried in front, and at half past two we left Bergen for the post we were ordered to take up. About two miles on the road we halted at Colonel Grosvenor's quarters, who commanded the Granadiers of the Guards which battalion was then under arms in order to move forward. When we had proceeded about six miles and day was breaking, an officer came to the front saying that not more than one troop and half of another of the Brigade was present, and of the remainder, no person in the rear could give the least account. A few minutes before this report Lord Paget had ridden forward desiring me to continue at the rate we were then marching. I despatched the Sergeant Major to acquaint his lordship respecting the missing troops and taking a sergeant with me I galloped back to Egmont-op-de-Hoef, about two miles, at which place I could gain no tidings of them. I left the sergeant at this village, it being a cross road, and went on to Egmont-Maan-zee. On my way I met several of our own men's wives (going to Bergen expecting to find their husbands at that place) but on enquiry they could give me no information of the troops I was in search of. I proceeded to the town, in the streets of which several regiments of infantry were formed. By some officers I was convinced that our troops had not taken this route. I returned to the sergeant just at the time a Granadier of the Guards was passing by. I stopped him and asked if he had seen any Dragoons on the road. He told me they were halting at the same place we had done in the early part of the morning (by their quarters). I sent the sergeant to them, who met the troops coming on. I joined them and by quickening our pace we soon arrived at the advanced post where everything was quiet. This error originated in consequence of some men about the centre of the

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second Troop being asleep when at the time we moved off. Their sitting still caused everything in their rear to remain, and our moving, the road being sand was not heard.

'The ground we halted on during the day was the most open of any I had seen in the country. It was an extensive common and within a few miles of Beverwyk. Our videttes extended to near Wyk-op-zee. On the ground in our front was fought the principal part of the action of the preceding day, where a considerable number of the slain remained unburied. To inter them, a party of British (with a flag of truce) passed us about 9 o'clock.

'Most of the Infantry under the command of Sir Ralph lay about half a mile in our rear. Immediately on our right were the sand hills, on the other side of which were our two squadrons left at Egmont. On our left a squadron of the 15th, and on the left of them were the Russians and the 11th Light Dragoons, which Regiment parted from us on the 5th of October.

'In the course of the morning a vidette (an old soldier of the 7th) came in and informed Lord Paget that he had seen a column of the enemy advancing. On being questioned as to numbers he hesitated in his reply and was asked if it appeared as thousands or hundreds. He at last confessed they could not exceed fifty. He was instantly despatched to resume his post with a very severe and just reprimand, and his conduct produced an Order to prevent in future such unsoldierlike behaviour. About three o'clock in the afternoon I was much surprised by being informed by Lord Paget that the Army in the course of the night was to fall back. I was directed to take a Quarter Master with me to the rear with strict orders that he was not to communicate the intelligence to any person present and despatch him for Bergen, there to collect the people and baggage belonging to the Brigade and make the best of his way with such to our former quarters (Callants-oog) from whence it had but just arrived. A short time after the Quarter Master was gone, it occurred to me that in case any accident might happen to him, the intelligence would fail and probably the loss of our baggage would be the consequence. I therefore started an intelligent corporal on the same errand, who was of great service to him (the Quarter Master) in forwarding the business.

'From four o'clock till late in the evening a heavy and incessant rain

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fell, notwithstanding which many of our people, officers and dragoons, being unacquainted with the intended retreat, had formed small huts with their "Waterdecks"[1] and boughs, under which "wrapted" in their cloaks they were reposing.

'The infantry in our rear retired about ten o'clock, at which time many of them were busy in cooking, having been toward the close of the day supplied with some cattle and sheep. Our men had some of the latter but none of them were dressed.

'The infantry had no sooner quitted their station than it was noticed by some of the dragoons. Previous to their going we had a distinct view of them round their fires. Their leaving as I observed was soon noticed at our post, respecting which the observations of the men that came within my hearing was various and not uninteresting. One says "what the devil is become of the Infantry?" Another observes, "they are off somewhere, but I did not see them go." A third hints, "wherever they are gone its pretty sure we shall be at it again in the morning." Though neither had an idea of what had really taken place.

'In order to keep up the fires (at the station the Infantry had quitted) and to prevent the enemy from suspecting what was intended, detachments of our men were sent to keep them burning till we commenced our retreat, which remained a secret to every one except the senior officer then present and myself.

'The hour fixed for our departure was half-past twelve. The night was extremely dark, and in order to be punctual for the execution thereof, I kept a sergeant with me, making him frequently flash his pistol, by the light of which I could ascertain the hour by my watch.

'At the time appointed (leaving a Lieut. to collect our Videttes) we commenced our retreat, which was as ill conducted as a march possibly could be. The officer at the head of the column, who was acquainted

[1] A 'waterdeck' in those days was a painted piece of canvas made sufficiently large to cover the saddle and bridle, girths, &c., of a dragoon's horse. When the tents are not large enough to admit of these articles, in addition to the fire-arms and bags of necessaries, the water-decks serve to secure them from the rain, and are fastened with pegs to the ground. The name of the regiment is generally painted on the outside; and when the dragoon is mounted for service or a march it is strapped over his portmanteau.—James's *Military Dictionary*, 1805.

'Water-deck'—a waterproof covering for the valise, either made of india-rubber or fine oil-cloth.—G. E. Voyte, 1876.

Unofficially now used as a water-proof sheet.

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with the road, set off at a smart trot and continued at that pace, notwithstanding that in the course of the first mile, we were obliged to break into single file in order to pass a narrow lane. The consequence was, the rear was forced into a gallop in order to keep up with their leaders, which for a short time was effected, but with great difficulty (by the darkness of the night) and was soon totally prevented by our falling in with a Battalion of Russians in a narrow pass. The rear of which (the Russians) in order to avoid being rode over got close to the banks and some into the hedges, but at our arriving at their head, the commanding officer stopped us till his troops were clear of the lane.

'When we again moved on at a smart trot I was in front of the 7th, and with some difficulty kept up with the rear of the 15th who led. After much hard riding, and it beginning to get light, I noticed a house by the roadside which convinced me we were going wrong. I hinted my suspicions to an officer by me, who replied "certainly, that's the house we saw the Cossacks in on the 6th on our way to Bergen." This I immediately remembered and rode on to the front to stop the column, and was surprised in not finding more than half a troop of the 15th present. I stopped those and enquired what was become of the rest. The men replied that they had not seen them for some time past. We turned back for the Egmont road, which we had passed about half a mile, but before we gained it was stopped by some.Cossacks who were at the head of a Brigade of Russians, one of whom was near running his spear into my thigh. I enquired for their Commanding Officer, to whom I was conducted, when stating our case and our number being small, he consented to our passing them. In about half an hour we joined part of our Brigade, halted on the road close to Egmont-op-zee, and proceeded with them to the place of *rendezvous*, which was the beach occupied by us during the action of the 2nd Oct. Upon mustering the Troops we found one and part of another absent. These I was directed to go back in search of. I set off, and in passing through Egmont (which was now evacuated by the British) I was meditating on the commission I had to execute and the road I was to take, knowing no other than the one we came by, and that I thought the most unlikely to pursue. However as I was making up my mind respecting it and before I had cleared the town I heard some persons talking and I thought in English. It was not yet daylight, but I stopped my horse and exercised my faculty of hearing

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to its utmost pitch and was soon pleased to distinguish a voice which I knew to be an officer that was absent. We soon met, and were equally pleased at the event. On enquiring what number of men were with them, I found there were not more than eight or ten now missing. These went to Bergen and afterwards joined us at Callants-oog. This party belonged to our rear squadron and was separated from the Brigade by a column of Russians and detained till they were clear of them.

'Daylight was fast approaching when we joined the troops at the place I had before left them. We got into order and soon after regularly resumed our retreat (by the sea side) which was performed to the Battery at Petten without anything particular happening.

'We reached the Battery about nine o'clock and were here joined by the Lieutenant that was left to bring off our videttes. He returned with three men short of the number and a corporal he had sent in search of them, but the whole of them afterwards joined us, saying they remained at their posts till daylight, when seeing no Troops in their rear, and not having been regularly relieved they concluded what had happened and set off on their return.

'About noon, leaving the post at Petten considerably strengthened, we continued our march back to Callants-oog. The Hussars of the enemy made their appearance about an hour before we left the Battery. On our return before the Troops were dismissed for their quarters, an order was given that no officer was to take off his clothes for the night, horses were to remain saddled and the men to continue with them. This was my sixth day without being undressed, the third of being shaved or having shared the least sleep, and constantly wet. For the last six miles I had ridden in the most tired state, and on a horse that was equally so, which when I dismounted, it was as much as I could do to walk into my quarters. Here, I immediately stripped myself, washed my body, legs and feet with rum, put on dry things and after shaving I found myself much refreshed. I then waited on Lord P., agreeable to his direction, in an hour after our return. No alarm happened this night, and we did not turn out till an hour before daybreak next morning :— which was a standing order, and we remained at the alarm post till the arrival of a dragoon from the advanced guard, signifying all was quiet, when the Troops were dismissed. Three Troops of the 15th Light Dragoons arrived from England and joined us on the day of our return, which

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Troops relieved both the Petten and Crabendam piquets on the morning of the 9th. This day an inspection of horses backs &c. took place, when it appeared that to the number of one hundred and twenty seven of them were galled or swelled, which I conceive was occasioned by the saddles being constantly on them, as also the riders one half the time and the constant wet weather. But by attention and two or three days rest, the greatest part of them got well.

'Towards the evening of this day a considerable number of persons were seen to pass the enemys videttes and move towards Petten, the Captain of the Piquet was informed of it, but no one could form an idea who or what they were, till a flag of truce came forward and announced them to be about 150 of the soldiers wives that were left behind on our retreat, of which they had no knowledge till the arrival of the French in the villages they were in. They expressed no ill-treatment from the French except being pillaged of their rings, ear-rings and the little money they had with them.

'On the morning of the 10th (about eight o'clock) after hearing from the advance post, that all was well and the Troops were going to their quarters, the Captain of the Piquet came galloping in, with orders for us to advance with all possible speed, saying that the enemy had shewn themselves in great force on our right, in front of Petten. We immediately set off and soon arrived near the battery and halted behind some sand-hills that hid us from the French. I rode forward with Lord Paget to Sir R. Abercromby who was in company with the Russian General Essen. The troops were assembled behind the dykes except a few who shewed themselves on the sea beach in rear of the guns. We went on to our advanced guard and passed a party of Russian riflemen who had lodged themselves in a hollow dug in the sand of which they had formed a parapet. The enemy appeared, but in no disposition for advancing, were probably from 8 to 10 thousand men. On our return the Russians were pulling down a mill which stood on the dyke, in place of which an entrenchment was thrown up and a 24 pounder placed on it. This flank was now very formidable having ten pieces of cannon on a front of not more than fifty feet wide, commanding a beach a mile in front and in a straight line. The Battery was flanked on the right by the sea, on the left with marshes full of dykes over which no troops could advance. Such was the post which the enemy seemed to threaten, but to have

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carried it would have cost them two or three thousand men, with a great risk of their succeeding even by such a sacrifice, and they were not stimulated by the man[1] who commanded them at the Bridge of Lodi.

'In the course of the morning some shot were exchanged between our men and the French Hussars, by whom a horse or two of the 15th were wounded. We continued in sight of each other till about one o'clock, when they withdrew themselves, and we returned to our quarters. I never afterwards heard whether they expected an attack or meant one. If the latter, why did they not carry it into execution, it certainly was not meant by us. From this time we remained quiet in our quarters, but was much harassed in procuring our forage, the distance and difficulty in getting hay increasing every day. Salt was also become a scarce article, our men was at times totally without it, and after the cessation of hostilities took place, they when on piquet procured it in exchange for other articles from those composing the advance guard of the enemy. Having had no rations of wood supplied, we had by this time burnt all the garden fences and such like articles round the village for firing, which now was difficult to be procured. I noticed early one morning some of our men begin to pull down and carry away a certain convenient house in a very few minutes. The place which it had covered a bât horse belonging to an Infantry Regiment passing through one morning for embarkation before it was light fell into. It was left there by them and afterwards taken out by some of the 7th. On a high sand hill about a mile from the place was a watch house, signal post and a gun, the timber of which was all taken away for firing. Myself and our surgeon went one evening and brought home a pretty good load.

On the 17th I rode to the Helder to receive eighteen guineas allowed by a board of claims, for a bât horse which was destroyed by the Russians on our first march from that place. I had lent him to assist in drawing a cart with our saddler's and armourer's things. When about half-way on their road to Callants-oog where the road was narrow and bad, they were overtaken by some Russian Artillery, and as they did not (in fact could not) instantly get out of their way, one of the men drew his sword and in the most barbarous and savage manner cut the horse across the knee, completely dividing the tendon. It was of course left where the

[1] Napoleon.

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act was committed. A few days after, I got our Veterinary Surgeon to go and see him and report on the state he found him. He was standing on three legs grazing near the spot he was left when disabled. On being reported totally unfit for service he was shot, and I this day received the money allowed to replace him, which the service did not afterwards require. The fort at Kick-down, to which much had been done appeared in a complete state, several others making near the Helder for covering our embarkation were in great forwardness, and on which many of the inhabitants were employed. Communications through the fields (about twenty feet wide) were making from the infantry quarters in the front line to the rear, by levelling fences, filling up and throwing temporary bridges over the ditches, which circumstances indicated that our next movement would be to the rear. A General Order issued on the 18th, directing all heavy and superfluous baggage to be sent to the Helder and embarked, left but little doubt that we were preparing to leave the country. The Orders from Head Quarters of the two following days removed all doubt.'

The first is as follows :—

'HEAD QUARTERS, SCHAGERBRUG,
'*19th October* 1799.

'A suspension of Hostilities having been agreed upon betwixt the two Armies, His Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief thinks it right to acquaint all General and other Officers to whom the Duty of the Army is entrusted, that the same Line of Service is to be pointedly observed as heretofore. The situation of the Posts or Piquets is in this instance not to be changed or their force weakened. The Reserves for support will continue the same, and one half of the Troops according to existing order will be at their alarm Posts an hour before daybreak. No Individual is to be permitted between our Posts and those of the Enemy, except such as Commanding Officers on either side may direct for purposes of Duty. It is also directed that all acts of hostilities shall cease. The construction of field Works, throughout the position is to be suspended, and no further damage whatever done to the country for the purpose of defence. General and other Officers are held responsible for the punctual execution of these Orders. Every instance of irregularity in the conduct of the Troops towards the Inhabitants will meet the most rigorous punishment.'

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On the following day, another General Order appeared :—

'HEAD QUARTERS,
'SCHARGENBURG,
'*20th October* 1799.

'His Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief has the satisfaction to announce to the Troops, that it has been found advantageous to both Armies to enter into an agreement and cessation of Arms, the object of which on our part is the undisturbed evacuation of a Country, in which from the untoward circumstances of the Weather and lateness of the Season, it is found impracticable to carry on any longer offensive operations; and on that of the Enemy to prevent the execution of strong measures of severity and destruction, which it appears in our power to execute, but which are repugnant to British feelings and practice unless compelled to it by unavoidable duty and the pressure of self-defence.

'This agreement and cessation of hostilities being now completed, H.R. Highness is determined to see it executed on our part in the fullest and most liberal manner.


'The line of Duty to be observed by the Troops was pointed out in the Orders of yesterday, and Generals or Officers Commanding Brigades are desired to report Personally every Day at Head Quarters at 11 o'clock to the Commander-in-Chief, the regular performance of the Duty, also as to the regular behaviour of the Corps under their Command.'

Lieutenant Hunt's Diary thus continues :—

'As fighting ceased, so did the bad weather, and it continued fine during my stay in the Country, and so warm that I several times enjoyed sea bathing. Hitherto very little of the Harvest was brought in, which the Inhabitants round us were employed in doing. I noticed their method of threshing which was performed in a neat and clean manner. They collected from the sheaf as much as could be grasped in one hand, the ears of which was laid on a large Table, and with a single stick about the same length and size of the flail used in England, they beat out the grain, the straw not the least broke, and very expeditiously.

'In consequence of a General Order, limiting the number of Horses Officers were to take with them on embarking for England, I reduced my number to one only. Those above the allowed number were to be left at a specified place, from whence at a future time they were to be sent on

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THE EVACUATION OF HOLLAND.

1799.

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board, if any Transports were left to receive them, otherwise they were to be destroyed and a compensation allowed for them. I therefore sold one of mine in a lot of twelve which was permitted to be selected and purchased for the French General Brun and his Staff. I was also very fortunate with my remaining Bât Horse; (which were not of the least value as they were neither to be taken on board or allowed anything for). An Adjutant of an Infantry Regiment who was without any, applied to one of our Quarter Masters to know if he could recommend him where he could purchase one. I closed with him for a handful of Dollars, which amounted to about £7.

'It was at that moment not worth to me seven pence. Two horses that had been taken from the Enemy, and which no person thought worth their notice, I kept from starving, and on my quitting the Village I exchanged them with the Parson for three goates, two of which I brought to England.

'On the 21st I was sent to Crabendam to see if I could put our piquet under cover, but could not succeed, for every building immediately in the neighbourhood was occupied by the Russians.

'The rains, together with the extra passing of horses, waggons &c. had rendered the road for about three miles before I reached the place a complete Bog, being quite impassable for carriages of any description. How our heavy Guns were removed, I never heard. Probably it was improved, as I observed in the course of my ride the Troops at work in making fascines for the purpose, and working parties of the Infantry were daily employed in repairing the roads.

'On the 23rd, 100 Men and Horses with a proportion of Officers, from each of the three Regiments (the 7th, 11th and 15th Light Dragoons) marched to the Helder for Embarkation. On the following Day a like number of the Brigade were embarked and on the 25th fifty more of the 7th went on board.

'On the 26th I rode to the Helder and saw the Troops embarked under sail with a fair wind for England. About a league from the shore I could discern part of the *Nassau* a 64 gun Ship, which was lost on a sand bank a few days before with forty two of her crew. The *Blanche* Frigate had also been aground, which rendered her unserviceable, and she was now breaking up in the New Deep, for fire wood. We dined this day with a Purveyor (whom my friend knew) in a Chaple [Chapel] which he had

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converted to his storehouse. Our fare was a single course of Beef stakes fried with Onions,served up in a large brown dish, with Bottled Porter and Port Wine, both of which (for want of glasses) we drank out of half pint tin goblets. About dusk we set off on our return to quarters and started pretty fair, but after riding about two miles my Companion who probably had mistaken the Goblet for a wine glass, began to lose the entire use of his faculties, and before we got half way home I was under the necessity to take his horse's bridle in the hand with my own, and in order to keep him on, to hold him as fast as I could with the other. Notwithstanding this precaution (and having been concerned also in the goblet mess) he frequently tumbled, and at last became so completely helpless that often as I had got him up on one side (whilst mounting myself) he came down on the other, and I had the operation to repeat. To add to my troubles it got dark before we came to the road we had to pass through the sand hills to the Village. But, trusting to my Mare, she hit on the right track, though a hundred of the same appearance led you into the hills and there terminated. I always considered this a most extraordinary circumstance, and shews the uncommon sagacity of such animals.

'I went one day to the place where the troops first landed with Sir R. Abercromby.

'It was about half way between Callantsoog and the Helder. Between the sea and the meadows, in a large space and tolerably level (as I rode over it) I noticed the vast quantity of shot of many different sizes then lying on the ground. These were discharged from the Shipping in clearing the Beach of the Enemy and covering the landing of the Troops at that time. On the shore where this took place lay the wreck of the *Contest*, Gun Vessel, with her masts, sails etc. near the hull, none of which appeared to be missing, and covered over with a hammock were two British Soldiers who I conclude lost their lives at the landing. On my return I sent two Farriers from the 7th to bury them. I also remember seeing one of the Enemy on my first days march from the Helder, in a meadow near this place, lying dead, and who must have fallen at least three weeks before.

'After our retreat on the 8th we collected all the Cattle in front of our Piquets that were to be come at, and those near our front line; which were sent to the rear, in the fields near our Quarters. I should suppose there could not be less than fourteen or fifteen hundred head. This

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precaution seemed unnecessary, unless part of the army were meant at that time to have been left to winter in the Country, for not a tenth part of the number were required before we altogether had left Holland.

'About 100 of the 7th were yet to embark, exclusive of those who were to form a rear-guard. The horses belonging to whom, on their quitting the place were ordered to be destroyed, the worse having been selected for this duty. The greatest part of the Infantry were now gone and afloat. The Duke of York and Lord Paget had also left us, and it came to my turn on the morning of the 29th to march for embarkation, accompanied by a Captain, the Surgeon and fifty men with their horses. We set off on a very dark morning (with a candle and lanthorn) about three o'clock, when two vessels lay ready to receive us. I had every horse and man (the greatest half) aboard in an hour, and by three the *Pitt* (the Brig I was on board) was at anchor in the road.

'Early next morning with a fair wind we sailed in company with five other transports for Ramsgate, but during the night the wind shifted and was against our making that port. We therefore bore away for Yarmouth, in the roads of which place we were at anchor before six o'clock on the evening of the 31st. Our Captain expressed himself as much pleased in being safely moored, observing at the same time that it had every appearance of being a dirty night (his term for bad weather). His prediction was most correct, for a worse could scarcely be possible, during which it blowed a tremendous gale, and a most disagreeable night I passed. On my going on board I gave up my birth [berth], the only one to spare in the cabin, to an Officer of the 9th Foot who was wounded in the action of the 19th September and I was obliged to lay on the floor. Several times during the night I was drove from one extreme to the other, huddled together with every moveable (such as chairs table fire irons &c.) that was in the cabin. I had then in pitch darkness, and as sick as I could live, to right myself as well as possible against my next movement. The Doctor was swinging in a cot and laughing at my troubles. My constant prayer was for day light and the hopes in getting ashore.

'When the morning came I had the mortification to remain on board and witness as bad a day as it had been the preceding night, with a surge rolling in that no Boat without the most imminent danger could possibly live. Towards the close of this day a fleet appeared off the place, coming

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from Holland, all of which except three vessels tacked and stood out to sea. These three persevered to gain the roads, the other two made an offing by steering to the S. West and got safe into the roads. One of the three which was coming right over the banks in a line with us I observed our mate (who was reckoned a good seaman) noticing very attentively with his telescope. He signified much agitated that her Captain was either a very clever fellow or she was a lost ship. The observation was scarcely made, before we saw her strike on the sands and distinctly heard the cries of the people on board her. She continued to dash over the bank with every sail set as before she struck, and being a strong ship held together, cleared the sands and got into deep water. Some Men of War boats immediately went to her and found her in a sinking state. Their first attention was to save the people, which was but just accomplished before she went down, and two small trunks belonging to an officer was all the Baggage saved. She was an Ordnance Store Ship called the *Guernsey Lily* laden with stores and with some Artillery Men on board. About eight or ten feet of her main top mast could be seen at low water.'

Lieutenant Hunt landed on the shore about two miles from Yarmouth on the morning of 2 November 1799.

It had been proposed that he should return to the ship and proceed in her to Ramsgate, but this he declined to do. The discomforts on board and the bad food had quite disgusted him. A transport agent met the captain of the brig and expressed doubts whether it would be possible for the ship to enter the harbour as it drew too much water. In the event he had to wait until 7 November in Yarmouth, on which day the weather had sufficiently moderated to permit the men and horses to be landed, and this was accordingly done.

A detachment of the Regiment had already arrived in Yarmouth. Hunt's detachment joined these, and that officer then left for London accompanied by the surgeon, arriving there on 8 November.

In the General Order dated from Alkmaar 5 October 1799, Parole Alkmaar; Countersign St. George, the following passage occurs :—

'And thinks it no less his [The Commander-in-Chief's] duty to place on record the names of the following General Officers and Brigades of British who had an opportunity of contributing to the success of that

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distinguished Day [Oct. 2nd] Colonel Lord Paget, commanding the Cavalry, consisting of the 7th, 11th and 15th Dragoons.'

The following was also issued :—

GENERAL ORDER

'PAROLE, Portsmouth,
C. S., St. Peter.

'HEAD QUARTERS,
'SCHARGENBURG,
'*8th October* 1799.

'His Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief desires the Troops will accept His best thanks for the persevering Ardour which has so iminently distinguished their conduct during the whole Period, from the 2nd to the 8th Instant—Altho' suffering from the inclemency of the Weather and precarious supplies, necessarily originating out of the situation of the Army—From the former of these causes H.R.H. found it unavoidably necessary to withdraw the Troops from a situation where they must have been continually exposed to insupportable hardships, and which no efforts of an Enemy twice beaten could have effected.'

Cannon's History of the 7th and the Manuscript Regimental Record are copied one from the other ; and a portion only need be here given :—

'On the advance of the army on the 19th of September, the Seventh were attached to the column under Lieut-General de Hermann, which attacked the enemy at half past three in the morning, and by eight gained possession of Bergen, a large village surrounded by extensive woods ; but the Russians, overlooking the formidable resistance they were to meet with, had not preserved the necessary order, and they were driven back with the loss of many men, and Generals de Hermann and Tchertchekoff taken prisoners.

'In the attack on the enemy's position on the 2nd October, the Seventh formed a part of the Cavalry attached to the Column Commanded by Lieut-General Sir Ralph Abercromby, which advanced along the beach to within a mile of Egmont-op-Zee, where a corps of French Infantry was posted among the sand-hills, with a numerous body of cavalry and artillery on the beach. A sanguinary contest ensued, in which the heroic perseverance of the British was conspicuous. Late in the evening the enemy's cavalry made an attempt on the British Horse Artillery on the beach : but were charged with signal intrepidity by the Light Dragoons

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under Colonel Lord Paget, and driven back with considerable loss nearly to the town. The British established themselves among the sand-hills where they passed the night, and on the following day gained possession of Egmont-op-Zee. During the combat an instance again occurred of gallantry in a detachment having pressed forward in consequence of a report that Lord Paget had been taken prisoner: the report proved incorrect, but the zeal of the men of the Seventh and their attachment to their officers was on this, as on other occasions, strongly manifested; and although His Lordship felt it necessary to restrain this excess of ardour, he could not refrain from expressing his feeling of the good intentions of his brave corps.

'The Seventh in the battle had two men and four horses killed, and eleven men and twenty five horses wounded. Part of the regiment was engaged on the 6th of October, in driving the enemy from his position between Beverwyck and Wyck-op-Zee, which proved a sanguinary service; but the Seventh did not sustain any loss.'

In a letter to his father, dated Callante Ooge, 20 September 1799, Major Richard Hussey Vivian of the 7th Light Dragoons gives the following details of the battle of 19 September:—

'I can only say that the Russians, after advancing like a brave mob, retreated like a cowardly one. The slaughter was dreadful, and they made it worse by their savage acts of cruelty to the wounded French. Our left succeeded completely, and but for the "Russeman" the day would have been a brilliant one. The country was such that we could not act; narrow lanes bounded by immense sandhills; and woods, intersected by ditches. We had some cannon shot at us, but without effect, and a few horses wounded by rifle balls. I am just off piquet and am going to bed. We were on horseback from 11 o'clock on the night of the 18th, till 10 on that of the 19th. The action commenced at three in the morning, and ended at night. Our loss is dreadful; that of the enemy 3200 prisoners, but I should guess from what I saw, not near so many killed as we had. I should think our loss nearly 5000, if not more. The British have lost a quarter of their officers.'

During the retreat he wrote again from Callante Ooge on 13 October 1799: 'What we are to do they keep secret, but it is generally believed that we are to return. Advance we cannot; and if the frost sets in

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our retreat is cut off. The only alternative appears to be either to retire immediately, or become prisoners. Of this I am convinced—that if 20,000 men more are sent, we shall never be able to reach Amsterdam.'

In the Library of the Royal United Service Institution, besides the Diary of Lieutenant and Adjutant Hunt which we have here quoted, a packet of documents, thirty-nine in number, also exists. They consist either of documents and plans written by Lieutenant Hunt, or else documents written to him. The greater number refer to the establishment of the Royal Military College, and as such hardly concern this history. Still, it is worth while mentioning them, and making a few extracts. The first is a return of casualties, and giving the names of the killed and wounded is of great interest.

'HOUNSLOW BARRACKS, 10*th Mar.* 1800.

'Return of Men and Horses Killed, Wounded, and Missing of the Seventh (or Queen's Own) Regiment of Light Dragoons, in the late Expedition to Holland.

Dates	Men			Horses			
	Killed	Wounded	Prisoners	Killed	Wounded	Taken	Missing
19th Sept.	—	—	—	2	—	—	—
2nd Oct.	2	11	—	4	24	—	1
6th Oct.	2	4	—	2	6	—	—
7th Oct.	—	—	2	—	—	—	—
	—	—	—	—		—	—
Total	4	15	2	8	30	—	1

NAMES OF KILLED AND WOUNDED

John Lanad, Wounded, Died in Petten Hospital—Returned Killed, Oct. 2.
Wm Thomas do. do. do. do.
Wm Stockall, Killed, 6 Oct.—Left unburied at Egmont op Zee.
Josha Frith do. do. do. do.

Thomas Groves
Peter Monhaven
Jno Jones
Chas. N(?)arlelow
Wm. Moreton
C. Burton
Rt Honybourne
Wm Cooper Junior

} Wounded in Action 2nd October.

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John Howarth
Thos Cagill
Jas Leake } Wounded in Action 6th October.

Jas Lynton, Wounded in Action 6 Oct.—Taken prisoner at Egmont op Zee.

Robert Beeby (? Beely) Taken Prisoner at Egmont op Zee Oct. 7th.'

It will be observed that the numbers do not quite agree—still, we give them as stated.

15 *April* 1795.—From this letter we learn that Hunt was at that time quartermaster of the 7th Light Dragoons.

It was written by Covell the Adjutant, and is addressed to Quarter Master Hunt.

'MR. HUNT,

'As I have made up my mind fully on leaving the Regiment, I do not know a character more deserving particular notice, than yourself; as such, I have recommended you in pointed terms to Col Osborn [*sic*] to replace me in the Adjutantcy; and I have the pleasure to say the Colonel entertains a favourable opinion of you. Your succession thereto I believe is nearly certain. I have a perfect reliance in your ability for the situation, and a full confidence that your Conduct will be of that nature to confirm the Character already established. I think it needless to observe that at any time if I can render you service, I desire you will freely Command me: And believe me

'Your Friend,
'With best wishes for your
'Prosperity
'J. COVELL.'

'You will observe perfect silence, untill you hear from Col[l] Osborn.'

John Covell duly left the Regiment and became Captain and Captain Lieutenant in the 27th Light Dragoons on 25 March 1795, so that he had actually left the Regiment when this letter was written.

9 *September* 1798.—A letter from John William Egerton, and dated from Colchester, in which Lieutenant Hunt is asked to recruit men for the 14th (? Light Dragoons) as the ranks of the 7th were complete.

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A non-commissioned officer was to be sent to London to meet the quartermaster of the 14th in Grosvenor Square.

The case of a man Sorbie is mentioned who is to be taken 'on the strength of the 14th till I can provide for him.'

6 *February* 1799.—Major Le Marchant encloses to Hunt a long paper containing suggestions for economy in the arrangements of the Cavalry and Fencibles. It is a curious scheme, on which he desires Hunt's opinion, but it is too long to quote in detail.

A letter from Guernsey, 6 February 1799, asking for information as to 'wether the Officers of Dragoons in Camp or quarters are obliged to pay for the forage and what they pay, or if government allowes forage without payment to a certain number of horses of each rank. . . .'

It is signed 'CHARLES WRIGHT,

Major 6th hussars.'

What '6th Hussars' they were in 1799 is not clear, and how a major came to be writing to a lieutenant on the subject is strange; but the old Bath Post letter is perfectly genuine.

Croydon, 17 *March* 1799.—Lieut.-Colonel James Hay of the Queen's Bays writes to thank Hunt for the trouble he had taken to instruct a Sergeant Brew in military drawing.

Colonel Hay proposed to get Brew the adjutantcy of the Queen's Bays. He remarks that 'without compliment to you [Hunt] there is no adjutant in the Army I conceive so fully equal to give the necessary Instructions as yourself.'

Dated from Southampton, 21 *April* 1799.—A long letter from Major John Gaspard Le Marchant giving most elaborate directions as to the forwarding of his baggage and bedding from Guildford. How they are to be packed by his old servant 'Hamlet'; and sent by waggon to London.

Major Le Marchant was full of the new Wycombe Educational Scheme, and gives a list of the cadets', or rather students', linen which is curious.

'3 Shirts, 3 pairs of Stockings, 3 Pocket handkerchiefs, 1 Pair of Drawers, 1 Night Cap and 2 Hand Towels.' This was luxury indeed. A 'woman as Housekeeper' was to be allowed one shilling a day for each student for washing during term time, but from

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this allowance she provided the servants necessary for the laundry and also the coals. There were eight bedmakers under her direction who might assist in mending the linen, but not in the washing, but the housekeeper was not to have to pay the bedmakers.

This college was the origin of Sandhurst.

1799.—Lieutenant Hunt had been ill but was now recovered. Le Marchant writes to him about his plans for Wycombe, and in a postscript asks the following question:

'Do you think the Sergeant Major would make a good Adjutant, and that Lord P would part with him? I am offered the Adjutantcy of the 21st Dragoons. You must answer this faithfully.'

Apparently the appointment of adjutant to the 21st Dragoons was in Le Marchant's gift and he wished to fill it by promoting the sergeant-major of the 7th thereto.

Writing from the Military College, Wycombe, 24 *May* 1799, Le Marchant states of the students 'The College has begun its course of instruction, and I never saw officers more desirous of learning, and I can assure you everything goes on to my wishes.'

The next document is a very curious letter from the Duke of Northumberland, and we quote it in full.

'SYRON, 18 *September* 1800.

'SIR,

'Being here, I did not receive your Letter till just now. I shall undoubtedly always be happy to contribute to the Comfort of the 7th Regt. of Dragoons, of whose gallant and meritorious services I have often been an eye witness formerly, when on the heavy establishment. I have in consequence spoken to my Gardener; and find that the only species of trees, with which he can at present supply you, are firs, but of these he has a sufficient stock to plant out 200. If these will answer your purpose, you and the Regiment are perfectly welcome to them, for planting out on the heath, and they shall be delivered to you on your applying to my Bailiff, Mr. Browne.

'I have the pleasure to be, Sir,

'Your Obedient Servt,

'NORTHUMBERLAND.

'Lt. and Adjt. Hunt, 7th Lt. Dragoons.'

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Did this present of two hundred fir trees materialise, and if so, where were they planted? In 1800 the Regiment was quartered at Windsor and Hounslow. There is, we understand, a small group of fir trees which appear to be about the age on Hounslow Heath. They are locally known as 'Dick Turpin's Clump.' But that worthy involuntarily terminated his career in 1739. Still, the fact that these trees are so designated proves nothing, as the custom of tacking on to trees, buildings, &c., the names of persons either really celebrated or merely notorious was as common then as now.

Glasgow, 17 *June* 1801.—From Lord Blantyre.—A man was going to enlist in the 7th and Lord Blantyre had promised to recommend him. He had been for three and a half years in the Dumfries Fencibles as a sergeant. Could he be made a Corporal in the 7th? If so he might be of use to Lord Blantyre at Glasgow, as 'it is much against us that the Party (recruiting) is composed entirely of Englishmen.' He asks after his horse which has been left behind, and concludes by hoping that 'old Greenwood will succeed poor Q^r M^r Schaw.'

2 *June* 1802.—Royal Military College, Wycombe.—Colonel Le Marchant writes wishing Hunt could get a discharge for his old servant Hamlet as he has 'a comfortable Birth for him here.' If it is needful 'to write to Lord Paget on the subject, I shall be obliged to you to inform me.'

There appears to have been some trouble in which two officers of the Regiment were involved, but the details are not given.

In an undated letter: London, Tuesday.—'The account you give me of —— surprised me much, not on account of any conviction entertained of his good Qualities: but believing that he knew better how to keep out of a scrape. I never could have believed he would have so forgotten himself as you represent him to have done: and *Between Our Selves*, If —— (the other officer) is acquitted—I should think he will be obliged to take his leave of the 7th as —— did of the Service a few months ago and on the same grounds. You will oblige me much by letting me know whether the Court has met, and what progress the Prosecutor makes, &c., &c., &c.

'Most truly Yours,

'J. Le Marchant.'

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Ipswich, 6 *December* 1803.—Lieut.-Colonel Michael Barne writes to say that he has forwarded the recommendation for Sergeant Charlton to succeed on the next vacancy to the rank of sergeant-major, but doubts whether it will 'really be to the late sergeant-major to take the appointment he is trying to obtain.' He finds that at the last reduction they parted 'with too many Non-Commissioned Officers.' He also states that the Regiment feels the loss of Hunt as an adjutant. The Regiment is now again getting into a good order, but they are slow in obtaining recruits.

15 *January* 1805.—Lieutenant (now Captain) Hunt had, it seems, been offered some appointment which he had declined. In a letter from General Gordon he is told to be 'quite at ease' about the matter 'as his conduct upon this, as upon every other occasion, has been perfectly satisfactory to the Commander-in-Chief.'

18 *April* 1805.—Captain Hunt wished to exchange into the Infantry.

Worthing Barracks, 27 *June* 1805.—Lieut.-Colonel Sir Robert Wilson writes about a protégé of Sir John Moore—a Sergeant Honey. Wilson made him a sergeant, and Sir John Moore may rest assured, so he tells Hunt, that he will do all he can for the man, and that he is certain the man's conduct will justify protection and favour. Hunt had also recommended the man.

8 *July* 1805.—Captain Hunt is informed that his wishes have been complied with, and that his exchange to the Infantry will be notified in the *Gazette* of 9 July.

Canterbury, 18 *August* 1806.—Draft of Captain Hunt's letter to Lieut.-Colonel Gordon asking permission to sell out and retire owing to the state of his health. He had served for twenty-three years.

31 *March*, Sunday. Portsmouth.—Apparently a letter written to Captain Hunt just before the expedition sailed for the Peninsula for the first campaign.


'We are all ready here for to start as soon as the Wind Permits—I mean as far as the Army is Concerned—but the *Queen* Man of War is still in the Hands of the Caulkers. Colonel Bunbury and myself will I believe embark in the *Dragon* with Sir

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James Craig.' He encloses a draft to pay off any debts he may owe in Canterbury, and concludes 'Bulkely has just arrived as Extra Aid-de-Camp to Sir John Stuart.'

From a printed Abstract of Disbursements dated from Sandhurst, 31 July 1811, we gather that Captain Hunt was at that time Resident Commissary at that place.

Little apology is needed, we imagine, for the insertion of these documents as a fitting conclusion to this chapter; throwing as they do interesting lights upon the military history of the period.



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CHAPTER XVIII

Home Service, 1800–1808

The accounts given in Cannon's History and in the Manuscript Regimental Record for this period are very meagre. As has been stated, the Regiment on returning to England in December 1799 was quartered at Canterbury. In the following year they were moved to Hounslow and Windsor and were mainly occupied in escort duty.

The state of the country at this time was very restless; a certain amount of rioting occurred, and in many provincial towns there was much disorder, the excessive price of corn being the ostensible cause of the disturbances. Bakers and millers were the chief sufferers. At Norwich a great deal of meal was seized by the mob and sold at 2*s.* a stone, the mob having surrounded the mills and helped themselves. Attempts were also made to stir up the populace in London, and disorderly crowds collected around the Royal Exchange, seditious handbills being profusely distributed. At Nottingham and Birmingham serious riots occurred, which were only quelled by calling out the military forces.

On 15 May, during a review of the Guards in Hyde Park, a gentleman named Ongley was accidentally shot by one of the men, who had somehow loaded with ball instead of using a blank cartridge. As the King was less than twenty yards distant, it was at first supposed that an attempt at assassination had happily failed, but it was proved that the affair was purely accidental. That same night, however, just as the King entered the Royal box at Drury Lane a man in the pit rose and discharged a horse pistol at him. The would-be assassin was at once apprehended, partly by the audience and partly by the orchestra, who clambered over the partition. A great outburst of loyalty followed which terminated in an extra verse of the National Anthem being sung, after which the royal party left the theatre. The name of the culprit was James Hadfield,

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and he had once been a private in the 15th Dragoons, had fought at Lincelles among other places, and. owing to his wounds had been discharged. He was undoubtedly mad. It will be seen, therefore, that the considerable amount of escort duty over and above the ordinary which was required of the cavalry at this period was by no means unwarranted.

In 1801 the Regiment was quartered at Reading with detached troops in the county of Sussex—a strange arrangement and in every way inconvenient. Probably while quartered at Reading some at least of the officers were present at the performance of Henry IV, Part 2, which took place at Reading Grammar School. The play had been 'bowdlerised' by Dr. Valpy, the then head master, who, not content with the 'cuts' he made in the text, also inserted 'some new speeches, evidently alluding to the late circumstances of the country and tending to animate the exertions of loyalty and patriotism.'

From Reading and 'Sussex' the Regiment was transferred to Oxfordshire and Wiltshire.

In May 1801, owing to the removal of Lieut.-General Sir David Dundas from the colonelcy of the 7th Queen's Own to that of the Royal Scots Greys, the Regiment had a new colonel appointed. This was no other than their Lieut.-Colonel, Colonel Lord Henry W. Paget (later the Marquis of Anglesey). The appointment of Lord Paget was a 'special mark of royal favour, and approbation for his personal merit, and for the excellent state of discipline and efficiency manifested on all occasions by the corps under his orders.'

Meanwhile we were still at war with France. Peace, however, was proclaimed in 1802, the immediate result as far as the Regiment was concerned, being a reduction in its establishment. In November of this year Colonel Despard and thirty-two others, labouring men and soldiers, were arrested in Oakley Street, Lambeth, on a charge of conspiracy. The existence of this conspiracy was revealed to the authorities by a soldier of the Guards who had become privy to the plot. Colonel Despard had already been in prison in Coldbath Fields as a suspect, and was only just released when the more serious aspect of the affair was discovered. He was promptly committed to Newgate. The peace—at the best a hollow one—was not of long duration, and in 1803, the following year, a state of war again subsisted between Great Britain

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and France, war being declared by us on 16 May 1803. It will be remembered that immediately on this declaration of war all British subjects in France at the time who happened to be between the ages of sixteen and sixty were at once seized and detained as prisoners of war. These unfortunate people numbered nearly ten thousand persons. It was a most unjustifiable act on the part of Napoleon and, falling as it did on those who had been debarred for years from visiting France either for business or pleasure, was the cause not only of loss of liberty for years but in many cases absolute financial ruin. An immediate augmentation of the army took place. Disbandments which had already been ordered were countermanded and augmentations to other regiments were at once determined on.

Luckily the French navy was very weak, while our own, despite the fact that its numbers and equipment were far from sufficient for the purpose required, was nevertheless strategically placed and most gallantly handled.

Hence it was that Napoleon's grand project for an invasion of England was abandoned by January 1804, a great factor in his decision being the fact that he was entirely unable to procure the requisite number of boats (armed and otherwise) in which to transport his armies.

Fortifications to repel the enemy (professedly) and which were practically useless were undertaken in all kinds of places, and it is stated that the French General Dumouriez, who, having deserted to the Austrians, as has been already mentioned, was now a refugee in England, strangely enough was largely consulted by the Government on this subject, and more strangely, his advice was acted upon to a certain extent when given. He was not, however, permitted to travel about the country and to professionally inspect the projected sites for his fortifications. He is, however, credited, though not correctly, with the authorship of the Military Canal between Hythe and Sandgate. It was at this time that the erection of a chain of martello-towers along the coast was taken in hand. Some of these towers having survived the experiments made on their stability by Government explosives in recent years may yet be seen in not a few places.

During the period of the invasion scare in 1803 the 7th (Queen's Own) Light Dragoons were stationed at Norwich and Ipswich.

During the year 1804 a serjeant, Joseph Duncan, of the 7th Queen's

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Own died. He was buried by the Regiment and a monument was erected to his memory. He had only a few weeks before been the recipient of a regimental medal. It is curious to note that the expression 'worthy man' occurs upon both his medal and his tomb.

Monumental inscription in St. Matthew's Churchyard, Ipswich, to the memory of Sergeant Duncan, 7th Light Dragoons :—

'Joseph Duncan, Serjeant, died 25 May, 1804, aged 28 years.

'This Stone is erected by the Officers and Non-commissioned Officers, to perpetuate the memory of a worthy man.

'Reader, in time prepare to follow me,
As my route was, so thine will surely be;
The mandate of my God I did obey,
Kings and Dragoons when call'd must march away.'

The writer is informed that the tombstone is still in existence.

Sergeant Joseph Duncan's medal was sold at auction during the month of April 1913. It is thus described in the catalogue :—

'7th Regiment of Light Dragoons.

'Circular; engraved, beaded border and loop. Obverse: G. R. crowned, with wreath in centre of a circle inscribed 7th Regt. Light Dragoons.—Reward of Merit. Reverse: Presented to Serg. Jos. Duncan by the Officers of the Regt., a mark of esteem for a worthy man and a soldier.'

In the year 1804 we read that the establishment of the Regiment was augmented to ten troops. This was almost the last year of the Regiment as a Light Dragoon regiment.

In 1805 directions were received for the clothing and equipment of the Regiment to be changed for those of Hussars. With the changes which were thus effected in the uniform, &c., we shall deal in the special chapter concerned with that subject. The absolute change was not, however, at once carried into effect, for it was not until 25 December 1807 that the Regiment became in appearance an hussar regiment.

The order for conversion from Light Dragoons to Hussars is as follows :—

'Most humbly submitted to His Royal Highness the Prince Regent.

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'That the Regiments of Light Dragoons undermentioned be permitted to be clothed and equipped as Regiments of Hussars.

7th or Queen's Own Light Dragoons.
10th or Prince of Wales's Own Royal Light Dragoons. From
15th or King's. 25th Dec.
18th. 1807.

In the name and on behalf of His Majesty,

Approved

GEORGE P. R.'

This change of uniform and equipment necessitated an alteration in the style or designation of the 7th, which was hereafter and is still known by the title of the 7TH, OR QUEEN'S OWN HUSSARS.

Another regimental gravestone in Ipswich in the same churchyard is also to be noted.

It was to the memory of Private William Wilkinson, and is thus described:

Monumental inscription in St. Matthew's Churchyard, Ipswich, to the memory of William Wilkinson, a Private in the Regiment.

'In memory of William Wilkinson, a Private in the 7th Light Dragoons, who died 4th July, 1807, aged thirty-eight years.

'Erected by the Officers, Non-commissioned Officers, and Privates of the Troop to which he belonged, as a sincere testimony of their esteem. He served His Majesty nearly seventeen years; during which he was twice abroad on active Service, where, as well as at home, he was always distinguished by an inflexible punctuality in the discharge of his duty; he was a good comrade, and a steady faithful soldier.'

The illustration here given has a curious history. It has been reproduced from a water-colour drawing now hanging in the officers' mess, which was the work of the younger Dighton, a son of Dighton the caricaturist.

Of the work of the elder Dighton we elsewhere give seven examples, one representing Colonel Kerrison and the others Lieut.-Colonel Michael Barne, another of Lieut.-Colonel Barne when a Major, Major William Calcraft, who left the Regiment in 1803, a 'Mr.' Calcraft (also a William) and possibly the Cornet of that name who left the Regiment in 1805. Two others are not to be identified.

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IPSWICH BARRACKS.

October 1808.

Buying Pipes of Mr. Hudson.



EARL OF UXBRIDGE. LORD PAGET. H.R.H. DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE (afterwards King of Hanover). HON. BERKELEY PAGET. MR. HUDSON.

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But the story connected with the illustration 'Buying Pipes from Mr. Hudson' will best be told by printing here two letters, copies of which were kindly furnished to the author by Colonel Harold Paget, C.B., for the purposes of this book. The letters are as follows:—

(Copy of letter from Mr. Hudson, Tobacconist, to the Marquess of Anglesey.)

'132 Oxford St., *1st March* 1845.

'My Lord,

'I regret exceedingly that severe illness prevented my having the honour of waiting on your Lordship this morning to give you an explanation of the picture your Lordship took the trouble of coming to see.

'Your Lordship will perhaps recollect that in October 1808 you called at my house and said that the Hussar Brigade could not be quite perfect without the meerschaum pipes, and promised that if I could bring down a large collection of these pipes to Ipswich, you would do me the honour of introducing me to the Officers of your Brigade previous to the grand review of Cavalry and Infantry on Rushmore Heath, which I accordingly did and received your Lordship's kind recommendation to the Duke of Cumberland and all the Officers of your regiment and the 10th, 15th, and 18th Hussars, to whom I sold upwards of 500 pipes. Young Dighton was at Ipswich painting horses and dogs for the officers, and unknown to me was looking in to Mr. Berkeley Paget's room, as the scene in the picture represents, and made the drawing. Your Lordship's father was sitting by the fire, and although only your Lordship, the Duke of Cumberland and Mr. Berkeley Paget appear in the picture, yet your Lordship's brother, Sir Charles, General Gwynne and other officers had come out of the messroom, where I think the Dukes of York and Cambridge were present.

'I feel, my Lord, that on that occasion I owed much to your Lordship, and from the very high respect I am bound to entertain towards you I beg to say, that if your Lordship has the least desire to possess the picture, it is quite at your service, and I hope you

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will accept it as a small token of gratitude for past favours I have received at your hands, and that you may yet live many years and enjoy good health is the earnest hope of

'Your Lordship's obedient servant

'J HUDSON.'

Mr. Hudson was probably mistaken as to the month, which could not have been after July.

(Reply.—Marquess of Anglesey to Mr. Hudson.)

'Lord Anglesey is exceedingly obliged by Mr. Hudson's very kind attention. The picture brings fully to his recollection the scene alluded to in Mr. Hudson's letter, and he thinks the group and their occupation so exceedingly well adapted to Mr. H.'s smoking-room, that he cannot deprive him of it, but will always remember Mr. H.'s obliging offer of the picture.

'UXBRIDGE HOUSE,
'*March 1st* 1845.'

The interest of the picture and of these letters cannot be doubted. In these days it seems wonderful that a simple introduction should have led to such an extended sale of Mr. Hudson's goods.

These, it must be remembered, were then by no means cheap, and compared with the prices paid for pipes nowadays would cause a feeling of something like astonishment to the pipe smoker.

If we are to judge of the whole five hundred pipes by the specimens, large and heavily mounted as they are, in the picture, a sum in four figures would hardly represent the amount of the deal among the regiments concerned.

The Regiment remained at Norwich and Ipswich until July 1808, a stay of six years, when they were ordered to Guildford. The summer of this year was one of extraordinary heat throughout the country. This heat wave culminated in a most violent storm of thunder, lightning, and hail on the evening of 15 July. From every part of the country news of disasters arrived. At Bristol the damage was most extensive, the crops being laid low, fruit and fruit trees and others destroyed, and in one large building no fewer than fifteen hundred panes of glass broken.

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At Gloucester the Cathedral was struck, and two cows and many fowls and ducks were killed. Near Monmouth roofs of houses, barns and skylights were destroyed 'as if broken by a hammer and the boughs of trees were cut through.' At Salisbury just before the storm, where there was a confirmation, several young people were made seriously ill from the heat, and one girl died. Several agricultural labourers were killed in different parts of the eastern and midland counties. Two coach-horses fell dead between Grantham and Newark, and one of the Yarmouth coach-horses died immediately on being pulled up. Several more horses similarly came to grief, and two privates of the 2nd Queen's who were on their march from Ipswich to Harwich for embarkation dropped dead by the roadside, while a third on reaching the beach at Harwich also succumbed to the heat and expired.



By the kindness of the *Cavalry Journal* we are here able to give illustrations of the Cavalry Barracks at Norwich. One is a reproduction of a medal struck by the Queen's Bays, 1793. The other is from an old print of the period.



NORWICH BARRACKS

Whether the Regiment was at Norwich, where they would then be safe in the newly-erected barracks, or whether they were actually on the march, is not known; but they left Norwich and Ipswich in July. The only fact recorded is that on arrival at Hounslow they were reviewed by His Royal Highness the Duke of York on the Heath. A march from Norwich and Ipswich during this excessive heat could not but have caused considerable suffering to both men and horses when we remember the heavy marching order of those days. The stay of the Regiment at

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
Guildford was but short, for in the month of October, or hardly three months after leaving Norwich and Ipswich, they were again under orders for active foreign service, their destination being Portugal.

The military history of the Regiment and its services in its first Peninsula campaign will be narrated in the next chapter.

NOTE.—The state of affairs which subsisted in 1808 between England and Spain was peculiar. Technically, a state of war existed. Irrespective of this, and in no way as an ally of Great Britain, France was engaged in subduing both Spain and Portugal. The situation was therefore complex. In spite of this, the sympathies of Great Britain were entirely with Spain. On 4 July a Proclamation of Peace with the Spanish nation was signed 'At the Court of the Queen's Palace, by the King's Most Excellent Majesty in Council.' Next, delegates from Spain were sent to England to represent the grievous wrongs they had undergone at the hands of the French, and to beg for British assistance in their patriotic struggles to rid themselves of the invader. Their sentiments were excellent and, as verbally delivered, were both patriotically conceived and eloquently expressed. If only the deeds of the Spaniards in the succeeding years had equalled their professed intentions, the history of the Peninsula War would probably have been very different. Unfortunately, Spanish patriotism was heavily handicapped by military incompetence, over-weening conceit, fatal obstinacy and an abnormal jealousy, a jealousy which absolutely prevented anything approaching to a hearty co-operation with their self-sought British allies. Added to these unhappy conditions were the very serious defects which subsisted in their military system. Their armies existed largely on paper:—their troops, such as they were, lacked arms, training, clothing, transport and equipment; but, worst of all; discipline, as we understand the term, was almost non-existent. As regards ourselves, on paper or at public meetings, it read well or sounded well to profess that our object in proposing to spend money and blood in the Peninsula was to free its down-trodden inhabitants and to rid its soil from its foreign invader. It was in reality self-preservation alone that led the British nation to pour out its blood and its treasure in an endeavour to crush a dangerous foe. So it was that the Spanish delegates were received with open arms. Briton-like, almost the first action was to publicly dine and wine them; and this was most royally done. On 4 August, 1808, at the City of London Tavern, in the presence of some four hundred distinguished political, naval and military guests, the Spanish deputies were duly feasted. Naturally, following the custom of the times; countless loyal toasts were both proposed and honoured. Ferdinand VII, the by no means illustrious monarch of Spain; was enthusiastically eulogised; the 'Gallant Heroes of Spain,' unfortunately, their names have not been handed down to us; the Patriots of Portugal, the House of Braganza, the King of the Two Sicilies and the King of Sweden were all proposed and their healths were drunk with loud plaudits. The proceedings therefore were highly enthusiastic; and as far as the consumption of fluids, for those days, eminently British. And so we went to war.

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From the original painting.
By kind permission of
Major-General Sir Hugh McCalmont, K.C.B., C.V.O.



THE PENINSULA CAMPAIGN.

1809.

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CHAPTER XIX

Coruña Campaign, 1808–1809

The exhaustive narratives of the campaign of Sir John Moore are to be found in all their detail in the pages of Professor Oman, the Hon. J. W. Fortescue, and Napier. In certainly the two authors first named practically every fact connected with the services of the troops engaged has been sifted with care. Here and there the authors draw different deductions, but that can hardly be held to require notice in the present pages. It is not within the scope of this book to enter upon a lengthy and detailed narrative of the various intrigues which hampered the British commander, of the disappointments due to the action or inaction of the Spanish authorities, disappointments which hampered every movement in, at any rate, the initial stages of the brief campaign. Neither shall we particularise the alleged misdirection, or rather faulty selection of routes, when the advance at length began.

It will be sufficient here in the briefest manner to state the progress of the advance on Salamanca and subsequent retreat on Coruña which culminated in the battle, and the embarkation of the British Army.

But, concerned as we are simply in this book with the services of the 7th Queen's Own, we shall endeavour to give in as great detail as possible an account of the actual duties performed by the cavalry and the engagements in which they took part.

That many details have come down to us cannot in truth be claimed, but of such details as we have been able to trace and substantiate, these we shall here set down.

The position at the beginning of October 1808 was briefly as follows:

The combat of Roliça had been fought on 17 August. Vimiera

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followed a few days later on 21 August. On 31 August the misnamed 'Convention of Cintra' was signed.

By this Convention the French agreed to evacuate Portugal, with their arms, artillery, baggage and private property—the last being mainly loot. The port of embarkation selected for them was Lisbon, except in the case of the garrison of Almeida, which was to be despatched from Oporto. The enemy were to be embarked on British vessels and to be conveyed to France.

On 2 September the forts on the Tagus were occupied by the British. On 9 September the British Army entered Lisbon and the campaign in Portugal was concluded. Matters thus rested until 6 October, when Sir John Moore was appointed to the command of the British forces in Portugal, replacing Dalrymple and Burrard.

Meanwhile the Government at home had determined to enter upon a campaign in Spain.

Dalrymple had already been notified that he had a free hand in such an enterprise, but had not availed himself of the chance then given him. Nothing, or next to nothing, was in fact done. Roads were not surveyed and no provision whatever was made for the transport of an army. Dalrymple contented himself with sending two brigades under Hope to the frontier of Portugal, in order to bring pressure to bear on the force then besieging the fortress of Elvas.

To all intents and purposes the entire month of September was wasted, while the British Army lay inactive in Lisbon. When Moore took over the command, he found it impossible to obtain any trustworthy information as to whether the known roads were or were not capable of permitting artillery to be transmitted thereon.

Waggons for transport—British ones, that is—were non-existent from the point of utility. Those which were with the force proved too heavy for Portuguese roads, and native carts drawn by oxen were perforce employed. Mules too were engaged for the conveyance of baggage and food; and both these and the ox-waggons were hired haphazard from village to village. The difficulties in the way of the commissariat were immense. Such officers as there were, were not only without experience in the discharge of their important and arduous duties but as usual were unacquainted with either the Portuguese or the Spanish language.

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The Government design was that the British force should be sent forward in one body to the Ebro, there to co-operate with the Spaniards under Blake and Castaños.

Reinforcements on a large scale were to be despatched to Moore, and their selected port of debarkation was Coruña.

These reinforcements were under the command of Sir David Baird, and consisted of more than twelve thousand men. Of these, three regiments, the 7th, 10th, and 15th Hussars, were cavalry; and in the Peninsula British cavalry was at that time sadly needed.

Baird's army embarked on various dates during the months of September and October, at least the infantry did. The cavalry, who were the most important at that juncture, came later.

The first regiments of the three to embark were the 7th and the 10th.

The Manuscript Regimental Record tells us that 'Eight Troops, commanded by Lieut.-Colonel R. H. Vivian, and consisting of two lieut.-colonels (Vivian and Kerrison), two majors (Hon. Berkeley Paget and Hon. G. H. C. Cavendish), eight captains, six lieutenants, four cornets, four staff-officers, six quarter-masters, 717 non-commissioned officers, trumpeters, and privates, and 677 troop-horses, embarked at Portsmouth in October. On arriving at Coruña, in November, the horses were slung overboard, and they swam to shore.'

Cannon's account agrees verbally with this. No details as to the dates of marching to Portsmouth are recorded. The 10th Hussars had been stationed at Brighton, where they were reviewed in August. They later marched to Portsmouth, and embarked for Coruña on 17, 18, and 19 October. Contrary winds delayed them, and they only reached their destination on 10 November. At Coruña they remained for ten days. Professor Oman tells us that both the 7th and 10th Hussars reached Coruña on 7 November, and the 15th on 12 November. The History of the 15th Hussars (Cannon) gives 'the middle of November' as their date of arrival. The 15th also suffered from tempestuous weather and had, moreover, sustained a loss of twenty-two horses. One of their transports, on which Cornet Jenkins with twenty men and horses had embarked, was captured by a French privateer. The transport was plundered and then released, the men being put on parole not to serve until exchanged.

We now return to Moore. The army at that General's disposal

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started shortly after he assumed command, but by degrees. Most of it was advancing on 18 October towards Salamanca, the point selected for the concentration of Moore and Baird. It had been hoped that the concentration would have taken place by 13 November, but this proved impossible, for several reasons. First, the choice of roads for the advance into Spain was not wise. Moore had at his disposal three roads, those by Coimbra, Guarda, and Alcantara, and these he originally intended to employ, proceeding on his way to Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo. He was, however, compelled to use the road which passed by Elvas, where Hope's two brigades then were. There was also trouble in finding a practicable route for the artillery and heavy baggage, as already stated. For this purpose the Coimbra road would have been the best, but Moore was misled by erroneous information both from the Portuguese and such British officers as had been sent in that direction. All reported that neither the Coimbra road nor the Guarda road were practicable for artillery, and moreover were not particularly good for cavalry. These reports were accepted by Moore, and not until too late did he discover the worthlessness of the information. But it was then too late.

What Moore did was this. He despatched six batteries of artillery and his two regiments of cavalry, with four battalions of infantry, by a long and roundabout road *viâ* Elvas in the direction of Madrid. At Talavera this force was to turn off and proceed *viâ* the Escurial, Espinar, and Arevedo. The distance of this march was one hundred and thirty miles longer from Lisbon to Salamanca than the Coimbra road, by which his main force went. The Coimbra road, by the way, is nearly two hundred and fifty miles in length, so that the great difference in the distance to be traversed can easily be estimated. The advanced guard of Moore's main body arrived at Salamanca on 13 November, on which day or thereabouts Baird at Coruña had just landed his cavalry. The six batteries of artillery, two regiments of cavalry, and four battalions of infantry that were proceeding *viâ* Elvas and the Escurial did not arrive at Salamanca until 4 December.

We now return to the proceedings of Baird, with whose troops, the cavalry especially, we have to concern ourselves. Baird had not been without his own troubles, as on his first arrival at Coruña he had been met with a positive objection on the part of the Spanish authorities (the Galician Junta) to any disembarkation of a British army at that

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port. That body, it was suggested by the Junta, should land, regardless of military considerations, at some point nearer the French frontier, notably at Santander. Baird was also hampered by want of money, as the promised remittance of 500,000 dollars did not arrive till 9 November. This difficulty had, however, been previously surmounted to a small extent, thanks to a sum of £40,000 obtained from Mr. Frere, the new British Ambassador to Spain. He also borrowed 92,000 dollars from the Galician Junta.

By 22 November Baird had reached Astorga with three brigades of infantry and some artillery but no cavalry. Here the intelligence reached him of two important Spanish defeats, those of Belvedere at Gamonal and Blake at Espinosa, which had taken place on the 10th and 11th respectively. Of the position of the enemy he had no news beyond the fact that Soult was reported to be at Reynosa and Lefebre-Desnouettes at Carrion. If these reports were true, the enemy were perilously near him, as if he advanced to Salamanca he would of necessity have advanced across their front.

Hence Baird halted at Astorga, sending to Moore intelligence as to his position and having the intention of retreating to Coruña should the enemy advance. The enemy, however, by luck rather than good management, chanced to be ignorant both of the position of Moore and that of Baird. Soult, under orders from Napoleon, marched to Sahagun and Carrion, and Lefebre proceeded towards Madrid, his force being relieved by the 2nd Corps.

The state of affairs was now this. All the available British troops in Portugal were with Moore and Hope, except a body of some nine thousand infantry and possibly three hundred cavalry, which had been left to be commanded by Sir John Craddock, who was at the time on his way from England. Craddock's force was designed to guard the safety of Lisbon, Elvas and Almeida. We need not enter into the details of the various routes taken by the component parts of Moore's army, nor do more than mention that great sufferings were experienced by them from the inclemency of the weather and the failure of the food supply. Suffice it to say that the advance to Salamanca by Moore was carried out, and on 23 November almost the whole of the British force except Baird's and Hope's divisions were united.

On that day Hope was near the Escurial, Baird at Astorga, while

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Lord Paget with the 7th, 10th and 15th Hussars was advancing to join Baird, and had reached a point between Lugo and Astorga.

The events of the period between November 17 and December 9 are thus related by Vivian:

'A most cordial reception at Balandy, miserable town and food uneatable. Many brother officers with me, Colonel "Cholmeley," "Dickenfield," General Wildman and Dr. Davis.

'On 17th Nov. we marched to "Bamunda," roads very bad, country uncultivated and dreadful quarters. The artillery suffered greatly, continual complaints of lack of food for the horses, at last able to procure a mule at 111 dollars. On one occasion I was obliged to march the principal person in Sorento about, from house to house with an escort of dragoons, to procure bread for my men, and walk six miles round a hill, the men leading their horses to get more bread as they were starving. Feeling very ill I at last got further into the country, purchased some mules and left fifteen men and horses behind to gather barley and corn. It was with great reluctance that I had to break open doors to get hay and straw for the horses.

'Occupied the Bridge at Navanza, a famous position, but the fog impeded any movement and false alarms were spread in aid of the Spaniards.

'Dec. 9th passed the Bridge of "Benivenita," the longest bridge I ever saw, at least three times the length of Westminster Bridge; arrived at "Zomora" at 7 o'clock where we were well received, in fact if I had accepted everything the kind people offered I should have had more baggage than three mules could have carried. The "Marshall de Camps" offered me the use of his house in the event of my being wounded. The superstitiousness of the people is remarkable. Got a good billet with "Cholmeley" at the house of the Marquis of Santa Oxuta. The family had gone, the French having been there not ten days since, everything had been removed and drawing-rooms filled with wheat, upwards of a thousand sacks. Rumours from England that the French are in possession of "Maderia" [Madeira?].'

But the news of the enemy was serious. Milhaud with a strong body of dragoons had arrived at Valladolid; Lefebre was, as we know, at Carrion, and any advance by them on one side to Zamora or on the other to

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Avila would have prevented the possibility of a junction between Moore, Baird, and Hope. As the British forces stood they had, at any rate, lines of retreat, and fairly secure lines, on Coruña, Talavera, and Lisbon, in which case Moore and Hope ultimately might join hands at Lisbon and Baird could proceed thither by sea. Moore, therefore, was placed in a most serious position. That he distrusted, and on good grounds, the efficacy of any Spanish co-operation at this juncture is certain.

Moreover, too, much time would have been required to carry out such retrograde movements, and the effect produced, both on the Spanish nation professedly friendly, and the French armies acknowledged enemies as they were, would have been disastrous. The former would have been treated to the spectacle of a British force retreating without an attempt at fighting, the latter would have received a vast increment to their prestige that such a retreat would have assuredly produced. Moore, then, would appear to have been in a cleft stick as it were—a decision for good or ill must be made, and made immediately, and to come to a decision on so important a point was as difficult, mortifying, and perplexing as it was imperative.

He had to ask himself the following questions, and to answer them to his own satisfaction more or less with decision and promptitude: decision, for on him lay the onus of deciding; promptitude, for time, above all things, was a large factor in the case. The questions then were these: What Spanish troops existed capable of co-operating with him, and where were they? What intentions had the French, in all probability, as regards their movements during the next few days?

Assuming that Spanish co-operation was but a broken reed upon which to rely (and for such an assumption he had indeed grounds which were only too surely founded), it could not be expected that the thirty thousand British at his disposal, at the best, could bear the brunt of a conflict with the huge French force at that time in Spain, and prepared as it was to overwhelm him.

Talk of assistance on the part of the Spanish was generously, nay lavishly, bestowed, but of actual work and co-operation on the part of that nation there was so little that it may be said to have been nil. With but few exceptions, and save perhaps at Zamora and Alba de Tormes, the Spanish offered little if any resistance to the enemy. Apathy was everywhere. Levies nominally existed and were supposed to be training:

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they existed not. Magazines were announced to be collected in various places: they could not be discovered. And yet with such a chaotic state of affairs everywhere existing, the unfortunate British commander at the head of his comparatively slender force of delivering aliens was bombarded with requests from the do-nothing Juntas to advance and strike a blow for the liberation of Spain from the yoke of its foreign invaders.

Rightly or wrongly Moore came with sorrow to the decision that an advance was impossible and a retreat inevitable. On receipt of the news of the defeat of Castaños, which was conveyed to him on 28 November, his orders were issued.

Baird was commanded to return to Coruña, and there to re-embark his force and sail to Lisbon.

Hope was ordered to turn off and retire on Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida *viâ* Peñaranda, while Moore himself retired on Portugal.

It is said that his decision was a wrong one, that it was brought about by irritation and a feeling of almost despair of being able to effect any good object by remaining. It is said that the very presence of a British force at Salamanca acted as a wholesome check on the enemy, nay, more, that the French carefully abstained from anything like a near approach to that city. It is averred that even Hope's small body of men had been unopposed on their march, nay, had crossed rivers and had arrived at a point not more than seventy miles from Moore without let or hindrance.

But all this while it must be remembered that beyond a knowledge of the approximate strength of the enemy Moore had no more information. What they were doing, or whither they were proceeding if not stationary, he was absolutely ignorant.

That Napoleon knew not of the existence of a British Army in the field in Spain was but a chance; but it was a fact. That Moore commanded practically the only effective British force which existed at the moment, and a force which could not at that moment be duplicated—nay, more, could hardly have been effectively reinforced from England—has to be considered. For that force meeting with disaster what might not have resulted? Simply this: Spain would not have been delivered and Portugal would speedily have been again over-run.

Such then was the state of affairs on the night of 28 November when

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orders for the retreat were issued. How it came about that these orders were varied will now be told. Of the three columns involved, only that of Baird actually started on its return journey, and proceeded thus. Baird fell back to Villafranca, a distance of fifty miles, but left his Light Division and the cavalry—the 7th, 10th, and 15th Hussars—as a covering force at Astorga to protect his retreat. Hope was ordered to push on and unite with Moore if possible, provided that no French troops appeared to dispute his passage. Hope started with his infantry and guns *viâ* Peñaranda, employing his two cavalry regiments to act as a screen on his right front towards Madrigal. This cavalry obtained important news, to the effect that French dragoons had penetrated as far south as Olmedo and La Nava, places distant from their extreme posts about seventeen miles. The enemy were not however seen, nor indeed was the existence of the British known to the French at that time. Hope marched with the utmost precaution a distance of forty-seven miles in thirty-six hours, and encamped at Peñaranda. Next he reached Alba de Tormes after great difficulties owing to the intense cold. He was now about fifteen miles from Salamanca. Moore had not yet started. Hope was now ordered to turn off to the north and to join him. The junction took place on 3 December, and the united British force amounted to twenty thousand men in all. Moore now learnt from Hope two facts: one that the direction of the French march was ever southwards, and the other that apparently Segovia, where the Estremaduran so-called 'Army of Heredia' was established, was their chief objective. Clearly, therefore, the enemy were not advancing on Salamanca. This news completely changed the plans of Moore, and that he rejoiced thereat we cannot doubt.

On 5 December he sent off to Baird a message requiring his immediate return.

Napoleon was now at the gates of Madrid. From Madrid and from various other quarters came appeal after appeal to Moore to do something to help Spain, to save Madrid, to join with Romana's levies in Leon, the latter writing most glowing accounts of the condition of affairs in his command and holding out the highest hopes of energetic co-operation. It was therefore incumbent on Moore to do something other than to retreat to Lisbon, and what to do his was the responsibility to decide.

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His decision was arrived at and took the form of a sudden dash on Valladolid, by which means the French line of communications would be cut: nay, he might with luck penetrate even as far as Burgos. The effect of this movement would be to force Napoleon to raise the siege of Madrid, for he must either continue before that city or must hurriedly march northward against the British—and march north, too, with every available man he could muster to crush them. In the latter case Madrid would be saved, and if Moore was attacked by the entire French Army he would be compelled, of course, to retreat, but for that retreat the line to Vigo or Coruña would lie open. His supposition was based, however, on the news that Madrid was still holding out, and this opinion Moore entertained as late as 6 December. What he did not know was that Madrid had been surrendered two days earlier, and that Napoleon had at his disposal no fewer than two hundred and fifty thousand men.

Moore therefore marched on Valladolid. Baird was ordered down from Astorga, to which place he had returned, and enjoined to march on Valladolid *viâ* Benevente.

And now both Moore and Baird made use of their cavalry. That of the former was employed as a screen towards Alaejos and Tordesillas, while Baird's three regiments, the 7th, 10th, and 15th Hussars, under Lord Paget, hastened to Toro and spread out northwards of the river. Meanwhile Baird's infantry was making what speed it could to return, but this was no easy matter in the winter in those regions. Moreover, too, for six days it had been ever on the road from Astorga to Villafranca and back again. One brigade, that of General Leith, did not succeed in rejoining for nearly a fortnight.

Moore's march was intended to be as unencumbered as possible, and in consequence large convoys were sent back into Portugal with all the heavy baggage and sick—these last being very numerous, as out of four thousand, or nearly four thousand, invalids at that time at least fifteen hundred were despatched with the convoys as useless for active operations.

The escorts of these convoys of course weakened his force, but as some compensation, a regiment of British infantry arrived at Benevente from Oporto on 26 December. Three battalions had been sent from England, but the other two were unable to arrive, and in fact never joined the force.

The strength of Moore's army after allowing for all deductions would

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TORO.



VILLAFRANCA.

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be about twenty-five thousand men, of which two thousand five hundred or thereabouts were cavalry and one thousand three hundred artillery with sixty-six guns.

Moore was then about to start, and now it was that he heard of the fall of Madrid. Again he was forced to consider his position, and again to come to a decision. Should he abandon his dash on Valladolid and retreat into Portugal, or should he persevere? He determined to persevere. On 11 December his infantry advanced from Salamanca. A Reserve Division had been formed under General E. Paget, and this, together with Beresford's brigade of Fraser's Division, started for Toro, where Lord Paget with the 7th, 10th, and 15th Hussars was already in position, and prepared to cover their advance. These formed the left column. The right column started on the following day, and it was the cavalry of this column which drew first blood from the enemy.

That night, to the astonishment of a French cavalry patrol of the 22nd Chasseurs, the British cavalry attacked them and captured all but one man. The enemy, thus surprised, had not a notion that any British troops were anywhere in the neighbourhood, nay, more, they believed them to be well on the way in a retreat to Lisbon.

The advance now became general. On the 13th Moore overtook the column at Alaejos. The cavalry both of Hope's force under Stewart and Baird's cavalry under Lord Paget thrust themselves forward till at Tordesillas they came in touch with one another and separated only by the Douro. No opposition from the enemy was met with, and as things went it appeared as if 15 December would see the whole of Moore's army in the occupation of Valladolid.

One of the chances of war, however, now put Moore in a position of accurate information as to the enemy's movements, position, strength, and intentions.

An intercepted despatch was brought to him, having been taken from a luckless officer murdered by the peasants. It had been sent from Marshal Berthier to Soult.

From this document Moore discovered that Soult had but fifteen thousand or sixteen thousand men, and was posted at Saldaña and Carrion, his destination being the province of Leon. He was practically unsupported, and a blow successfully struck at him would be, as regards the north of Spain, a most effective counterstroke to French success

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elsewhere. Added to this the fact that Soult was in a position far more remote from Madrid than Valladolid was, it would take longer for any force of the enemy to attempt to succour him. Again the plans of the British commander required to be changed, and were changed. Hitherto the line of march had been towards the east. It was now deflected towards the north. With a screen of cavalry thrown out from Tordesillas to the banks of the river Sequillo, which succeeded in advancing close up to Valladolid as a covering force, the infantry crossed the Douro at Toro and Zamora.

The cavalry met with several detachments of the French dragoons, and these they smote, capturing over one hundred men, and in addition a colonel. Burgos was cut off from Madrid in consequence. By 20 December the infantry had arrived at Mayorga, and here Baird's column joined. The marches had been long, but as the frost was not too keen and the snow not deep, they were accomplished without great difficulty. The concentration of the army therefore was now complete.

At Mayorga an entire rearrangement of the army took place. The reason for this rearrangement has never yet been decided, and its purpose can only be conjectured. Briefly it would appear that Moore desired to reshuffle the units in such a way that, with every regiment or battalion that had seen service against the French in Portugal one or more of those that had so recently arrived from England at Coruña should be associated. But the manœuvre has the appearance of 'swopping horses while crossing a stream.' How this affected the cavalry is as follows: The three regiments, the 7th, 10th, and 15th Hussars, formerly commanded by Lord Paget, were handed over to General Slade as one brigade; the other, composed of the 18th Light Dragoons and the 3rd Hussars of the King's German Legion, were placed under the command of General Charles Stewart, the two brigades forming a division under the command of Lord Paget. Into the changes which took place in the infantry it is not necessary to enlarge here, but they were considerable. Romana now again entered into communication with Moore. He had been charged, it appears, with a projected retirement into Galicia, and this charge he denies. He states that he has twenty thousand men, but that two-thirds of them require clothing, proper arms and equipment. He complains that his compatriots in the most blameworthy way neglect to send him supplies, but asserts that as soon as Baird's troops make their appearance

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on the Benevente-Palencia road he will advance. Finally, he informs Moore that Soult has about ten thousand infantry near Saldaña, Carrion, and Almanza, and that that commander's cavalry was at Sahagun.

Clearly Romana could not move southward in these circumstances without great risk. So wrote Romana, but an officer who had seen his force gave a far less favourable account of the condition of this so-called 'Army of the Left.' They were, he said, to all intents and purposes useless. Still, Romana so far made good his promises as to bring forward a force of between seven thousand and eight thousand men—a motley crew it must be admitted, more or less armed and equipped, but of very little real fighting value.

By 20 December the British were at Mayorga. Soult was then still in his old position, his infantry at Saldaña and Carrion and his cavalry extended in front with its headquarters at Sahagun.

The cavalry of Lord Paget's division had been thrust forward, and now only twelve miles of country intervened between the opposing armies. Paget's advance piquets lay at the Abbey [Monastero] Melgar Abaxo, a spot distant about three Spanish leagues from the French light cavalry under Debelle. The main body of the enemy's cavalry occupied Sahagun, in front of which they had numerous piquets.

Being, however, at some distance from the main body of the French Army, it appeared practicable to Lord Paget to cut off the cavalry of the enemy, and to attempt to do so that gallant officer at once determined.

The Combat at Sahagun

Late on the night of 20 December or early in the morning of 21 December—for accounts vary as to the precise hour upon which Lord Paget started on his enterprise—at the head of the 10th and 15th Hussars that officer marched from Melgar Abaxo. In addition to these two regiments, twelve men of the 7th Hussars under the command of Captain Thornhill of that regiment accompanied the force.

It is necessary to emphasise this fact, as in some accounts the presence of this small detachment of the Regiment is omitted.

It is, however, definitely stated by Cannon in both his History of the 7th and the 15th Hussars and in the Manuscript Regimental Record. Cannon does not, however, mention the fact in his History

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of the 10th. Lord Londonderry omits it. The account given in Lord Vivian's Memoirs does not state that they were present. Fortescue states that 'Captain Thornhill and twelve men' were there, and adds 'Presumably they acted as Paget's escort, being of his own regiment.' Professor Oman, like Lord Londonderry, does not mention the presence of the 7th.

Whether the officer and twelve men furnished an escort to Lord Paget, or whether they had formed an outlying piquet and were picked up as the advance began, does not clearly appear. That, however, they accompanied the force is a fact, and in this connection it may be well to state that the clasp or bar for 'Sahagun' was bestowed on Captain Thornhill when a Lieutenant-Colonel in 1847, a fact which seems to place the matter beyond dispute.

We must now notice another circumstance connected with the composition of this force.

It is known that the British Horse Artillery was with the cavalry at Melgar Abaxo.

In vol. iii. page 324 of the 'British Campaigns in Spain and Portugal' it is stated that 'the Horse Artillery' accompanied Lord Paget. Professor Oman does not, however, mention the fact, neither does Lord Peterborough, nor is it so stated in the Memoirs of Lord Vivian. It is, however, recorded by Mr. Fortescue, who gives the number of the guns as four, and in Cannon's History of the 15th Hussars we read that 'the Tenth Hussars, and four guns, advanced direct upon the town.' Cannon does not, however, mention it in the History of the 10th Hussars—a strange omission, as that regiment would appear to have been actually acting with the guns in question. Hamilton (page 212) mentions the presence of the guns, but does not state their number. He also tells us that they accompanied the 15th and not the 10th. Fortescue allots two guns to Slade and two to Paget. Whinyates in 'From Coruña to Sevastopol' tells us (page 39), quoting Captain Evelegh's Diary, as follows:

'*Monday, 26th December.*—I began to retreat with the Cavalry. Main body commenced retreat on 24th. Arrived at Valderas, three leagues; went to old quarter. Found Lord Paget and "B" Troop there.

'*Tuesday, 27th December.*—Marched early for Benevente; dreadful

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road. "B" Troop marched in the column between the 7th and 18th Hussars. We followed the 10th, covered by the 15th. Arrived at Benevente at 6 P.M. Horses almost done.'

The combat at Benevente took place on 29 December, and both 'B' and 'C' Troops were present, but only 'B' troop was heavily engaged, though 'C' troop fired a few shots before they retired according to orders received. These extracts unfortunately do not help us much. It is a small point perhaps, but it is fitting that mention should be made of it. As an example of the difficulty there is in establishing the truth or falsity of a statement of a really simple kind, it may well be noted.

Paget started in the darkness of a bitterly cold night. Snow had fallen, and in some portions of the road the drifts were deep; nor was this all, for owing to the hard frost the ground was extremely slippery. Not a few horses fell and one man is stated to have had his leg broken when thrown. The troops were then ordered to dismount and lead their horses.

When rather more than half-way Paget divided his force; and either took two guns with the 15th, which regiment he led in person, or took all four guns, or took none. To General Slade he committed the 10th Hussars, and ordered them to march straight on Sahagun while he proceeded with the 15th and the piquet of the 7th Hussars to the east bank of the river Cea. As the time went on Paget's force drew nearer and nearer to the enemy. Between five and six o'clock his advanced guard came in touch with the French. Here again accounts differ. Some authorities state that the 15th fell in with the French Grand Guard —or main guard—that all of these save one man were captured, and that this fugitive galloped back into Sahagun and gave the alarm to Debelle and his cavalry. Another account calls the party a patrol. Londonderry and Neale support the one-man story, and so does Professor Oman. From the last-named we learn that Debelle 'had no vedettes,' and 'his main guard on the high road was suddenly surrounded and captured before it was aware that the enemy was near.' Cannon's Histories of the 10th and 15th Hussars call it a patrol, and in the first-named volume it is stated that 'it gave the alarm,' in the other that only five prisoners were taken, while in his History of the 7th the incident is unmentioned. Lord Londonderry states that a piquet

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was surprised, but that all but one man were cut down or captured. In 'Campaigns in Spain and Portugal' we are told that 'two or three men escaped and gave the alarm.' Vivian gives the number of the French captured as six and states they were half the party only. As the French in Sahagun were not unprepared for attack, their horses being ready saddled and the men sleeping by them, it did not take them long to turn out. Debelle with the utmost speed led them out of the east gate of the town and formed them on the plain outside. That the French were thoroughly aroused was patent to Paget from the sound of the bugles. With as much expedition as possible he pressed on towards the town, but found Debelle's men drawn up in an advantageous position, having a ravine or ditch in their front. With Debelle were two regiments, the 8th Dragoons and the 1st Provisional Hussars. It is stated that on the approach of Paget these were drawn up in a vineyard amid the snow. Paget essayed a charge, but the presence of the ditch or ravine checked this movement, and it was found impossible to come to hand grips with the enemy till this had been negotiated. Paget then moved down along the obstruction till a spot was discovered where it could be crossed. As he went the enemy changed front to meet his attack. The celerity of the British hussars, however, prevented the enemy from forming, or at any rate from completing their change of formation. Paget catching them thus while somewhat in disorder charged the 1st Provisional Hussars and discomfited them, driving them in on the 8th Dragoons. The latter were thrown into disorder, and at once broke and fled.

Another account of Paget's manœuvres tells us that when he came to the ditch or ravine he wheeled aside till he could find a spot to cross. Debelle then retired towards a bridge on his left, that is to say to the east, in the direction of a bridge over the river Valderaduey. Paget followed at a trot, in column of half troops, in the same direction, but parallel, and of course in the rear. Debelle endeavoured to cross the head of Paget's column with the evident intention of executing a charge while the British were engaged in forming line. Paget, however, upset this manœuvre by changing his direction apparently to the left, so that the flank of Debelle was open to attack. Debelle halted and drew up, as has been stated, in the vineyard. Paget continued his advance till he had cleared Debelle's left flank, and then having wheeled into line, charged, and charged home, with the result we have stated. It is recorded that in the *mêlée* Debelle was knocked down and trampled upon. Twelve

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FRENCH HUSSARS IN BIVOUAC.

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French officers and one hundred and forty-five men were taken prisoners, besides one hundred and twenty-five horses and some mules. Several were killed. The British loss was confined to two men and four horses killed, two officers, eighteen men, and ten horses wounded. Twenty-six other horses were missing, and it is supposed that they, being riderless, had accompanied the French in their retreat.

It is stated that the 10th Hussars took no part in the action, and this is corroborated by all the accounts that have come down to us. It appears that when they were detached under General Slade, with either two or four guns, they advanced straight on the town, and entering by the western gate—Debelle had already quitted it by the eastern gate—found the place practically deserted as far as an effective armed force of the enemy were concerned. The 10th passed through the town, searching for an enemy and finding none. The baggage and its guard, however, became their prey, as did also such men as happened to have been left behind in charge of various impedimenta. While they were in the town the engagement took place outside, and hence it was that by ill-luck they were precluded from being actively employed therein.

Two points more need a few words: the numbers of the enemy and the swords and busbies of the British soldiers. Most accounts state that the French greatly outnumbered the British, and extra credit has in consequence been ascribed to Lord Paget and his men. Mr. Fortescue, however, by a careful analysis shows that this was not the case. The total number of men, including those who were detached in different directions, at the disposal of Debelle was not more than five hundred; hence in the actual conflict less than that number of the enemy took part.

The returns of the strength of the 15th Hussars on 19 December gave a strength of five hundred and twenty-seven men, exclusive of officers. Probably the miscalculation arose from an acceptance of the reports of the Spanish peasants, who, with not unusual lack of accuracy, estimated the French engaged at seven hundred men. Nor is this all, for not only were the numbers of the enemy increased, but the numbers of the British in many accounts have been diminished, either from lack of accurate statements as to strength or to enhance the credit of the victory. Great complaints were made of the inefficacy of the British swords. We all know the type of weapon: broad, curved, too short and with

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an absolutely useless knuckle-guard—a weapon ill-balanced and most difficult to use with anything like proper effect. Throughout the Peninsula campaign the large number of wounds received in the hand by both officers and men owing to this miserable knuckle-guard tells its own tale. Once, however, the fact that an officer had thus been disabled proved the salvation of a gallant body of men. Had not Lieutenant and Adjutant Holmes, whose right hand was badly disabled in the first charge of the 13th Hussars at Campo Mayor, sent two dragoons galloping after his regiment to announce the escape of the French along the Badajos road, assuredly a disaster would have occurred.

The busby at that time worn by the British hussars was a species of headgear which left much to be desired. It was very tall, very uncomfortable, and possessed of an unhappy knack of falling off. Wearing it, little protection was offered, and without it the soldier bareheaded had no protection to his head at all.

The caricatures of those days, though doubtless exaggerated, give some idea of the absurdity of the 'fur cap' of 1808, though why the plume is always represented as standing up at the back instead of in front, and the back flap converted into a peak has never been satisfactorily explained.

The term 'busby' may be here explained. A 'buzz' was a kind of fuzzy, bushy wig. It is referred to in old English books and plays. The military headdress somewhat resembled a bushy wig, and hence probably the name 'busby.' In the old Hungarian military dress from which it was professedly copied there was a padded bag which was joined to the top or crown of the cap, and hanging down descended to the right shoulder of the wearer, to which it was affixed. This padded bag was supposed to act as a protection against sword cuts. The present busby bag is quite short and merely consists of two thicknesses of cloth.

The only point which needs to be mentioned from the Regimental Manuscript Record concerns the duration of the fight. It is there stated to have lasted twenty minutes.

The defeated French cavalry fled to Saldaña, where they were rallied by Debelle. Owing to their losses his command had dwindled from two regiments to one, and this one was composed mainly of the 8th Dragoons, so severe had been the effects of the combat on the 1st Provisional Hussars.

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Soult was speedily made aware of the disaster, and owing to an error in Debelle's report was led to believe that Moore and Baird either had united or were about to join forces at Astorga. The error arose in this way. Possibly to excuse his defeat Debelle reported that his opponents had in addition the 3rd Hussars of the King's German Legion and also a company of infantry. The only explanation of this is that the Hussars (King's German Legion) happened to be a few miles distant near Carrion, and a part of the 3rd (King's German Legion) was in a village about fifteen miles from that place. This body of men may have been seen by some of the fugitives, but the infantry were imaginary, and the guns which were there do not appear to have been mentioned by the French general. Soult now found himself in a position of some danger, and gave up for the time any idea of acting upon the offensive until he had received reinforcements. For this purpose he sent urgent messages to Junot for assistance in the shape of infantry and to Burgos for cavalry. He recalled his cavalry from Carrion where they had been stationed, and ordered Franceschi to remain at Palencia pending the arrival of the infantry of Junot at that place to relieve him.

On 21 December Moore arrived at Sahagun and there halted. His original intention had been to remain there for one day, but eventually he remained till the evening of the second day. He then purposed to advance during the night on Carrion and next night on Saldaña, where he hoped to try conclusions with Soult. Romana with his following was professedly ready to co-operate, and this he promised to do to the extent of leading ten thousand men.

Moore was prepared, nay, was on the point of starting, when news arrived from Romana that the enemy was on the march and had marched from the Escurial in a north-westerly direction. Other information came to hand, all of which pointed to an aggressive movement on the part of the enemy from Madrid. Immediately Moore's plans had to be changed. An immediate retirement on Astorga was ordered, and with Romana's co-operation it was hoped that Galicia would still be held. On 24 and 25 December the retreat began.

Everything depended on the amount of time at the disposal of the British commander. Unfortunately the amount of time was not sufficient. Had the retreat begun at the end of the first day's rest at Sahagun all would probably have been well, but the delay there for a longer period

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was the main cause of all the disasters attending the celebrated retreat to Coruña.

We will now confine ourselves entirely to the movements of the cavalry, for the full story, as far as it can be known, of the retreat to Coruña has been told and retold so often that it need not be told again in these pages.

The position of the cavalry on the day after the combat at Sahagun was as follows: The 18th Hussars and the 3rd Hussars of the King's German Legion covered the Right Wing under Lieut.-General Hope at Vallada; the 7th Hussars covered the Centre under Lieut.-General Frazer at Grajal, and the 10th and 15th Hussars performed a similar service for the Left Wing under Lieut.-General Baird. When the advance on Carrion was ordered, Vivian tells us 'The 7th being detached from the rest of the army, received orders to rendezvous at a particular spot, which I accordingly did; but to my surprise I found no other corps assembled, and I soon received orders to put up the regiment in such villages as I might find near me. I accordingly occupied that of Torremolinas, about two leagues in front of Sahagun, on the Carrion Road, and a small village of Lamote, in front of it, was occupied by Lieut.-Colonel Kerrison with the right squadron' (Dec. 22).

Here the Regiment remained the whole of the next day. In the evening it was reported that six hundred French occupied a village in front.

The strength of the 7th was about three hundred and eighty mounted men; no fewer than sixty sick horses had been sent away the night before.


Next morning the right squadron from Lamote was sent out on patrol to search for the six hundred French, being supported by the remainder of the Regiment. At Calcadela Kerrison fell in with the outposts of the enemy. This place is about a league from Lamote (Dec. 24).

Kerrison attacked; twelve of the enemy were taken and their officer killed. The arm of Kerrison was unfortunately broken during the affair. The story is thus told:

A Piquet Affair

'On the 25th of December, 1808, Lieutenant-Colonel Kerrison of the 7th Light Dragoons being stationed at Benevent, with a small advanced party of ten men, fell in with a piquet of the enemy's cavalry consisting of seventeen privates and an officer. Each party drew up

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A [illegible] AFFAIR

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A PICQUET AFFAIR

(Christmas Day, 1808).

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in order to charge, when the two officers singled each other out. The Frenchman made point at Colonel Kerrison, which by a skilful management of his horse, he avoided (though his jacket was torn by the blade); and, in the same moment he gave his antagonist so severe a blow with his sabre across the forehead as to bring them both from their horses, the Frenchman from the violence of the stroke, and Colonel Kerrison from the violence of action. The men in the meantime had been warmly engaged in a slashing conflict, hand to hand; but the French now fled, leaving three dead on the field and five prisoners behind them. The Colonel's men now came to his assistance, when on raising him up, they found his arm had been broken by a blow given by his adversary with the hilt of his sword; but the French officer lay dead beside him.'

Vivian joined at this juncture and found that a squadron of the 18th Hussars and one gun of the Horse Artillery had also come up. Prisoners reported that the cavalry of the enemy, for whom the search was being made, were in a village about a league further on, and an attack was at once determined on. Vivian ordered up the 7th Hussars, called the officers together and issued his instructions. It had, however, been reported that in addition to their cavalry the enemy had also some infantry and guns.

To ascertain this a patrol was sent out. Meanwhile Brigadier-General Stewart arrived on the scene. The hour was late, the Regiment was five leagues from its quarters, and had orders to march at 8 A.M. on the following morning. General Stewart did not consider himself justified in proceeding further. The following anecdote has come down to us. The date of the episode is not given, but the story may well be inserted at this point as it must have occurred about this time.

'The following instance of base treachery in a French dragoon, after being vanquished by a sergeant of the 7th Light Dragoons, and taken prisoner, may be relied on as a fact: Captain Dukenfield, of the 7th Light Dragoons, commanded a small detachment of that regiment, on a scouring party, and at the village of Palacios they fell in with a party of French light dragoons, whom they engaged. A serjeant of the 7th combated the Frenchman in question, and got him completely in his power; when the latter threw down his sword, and held his hand to shake with his adversary. The serjeant, with the true characteristic of

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an Englishman, took him by the hand, when the assassin drew a pistol from his holster at the moment, and discharged it, which blew the serjeant's hand to atoms and killed his horse. The assassin was instantly killed by the Spaniards and his body was consumed to ashes in a fire made for the purpose. Such was the disgust of the Spaniards, that in their vengeance they killed the assassin's horse.'

Accordingly the cavalry retired to Grajal, and thus, as far as the cavalry was concerned, the retreat began.

On 26 December they marched from Grajal to Saldaña, a distance of eight leagues, and arrived there very late at night. The march was not, however, without incident. Passing Mayorga a report was received to the effect that the enemy had arrived in that place. At this time the 18th Hussars were leading, and half of that regiment was at once ordered to advance against them. Vivian thus narrates what occurred: 'They fell in with the enemy's advance in the street, and after a little skirmishing, drove them out of the town into the plain beyond. Here they found a squadron of about 100 formed. Lieut.-Colonel Leigh, with a squadron of the 10th, immediately charged and dispersed them, killing, or taking about 80 prisoners. The remainder were taken by a baggage-guard of the 7th and the 18th Hussars who were marching by another route. This force of the enemy's cavalry had marched from Rio Seco the same morning, and were the advance-guard of Ney's force.'

On the 24th the general retreat began. Hope fell back by the Mayorga road, Baird by Valencia de San Juan to the ferry across the Esla. Romana undertook to guard the bridge of Mansilla.

On Christmas Day Moore with the reserve and light brigades followed Hope to Valderas. On 26 December Baird crossed the Esla at Valencia. Early that morning, when nearing the bridge of Castro Gonzales, the troops under Moore were molested by the scouts of the enemy and some baggage was captured. As the cavalry were still on the march from Sahagun and Soult was pressing on vigorously, the 2nd Light Brigade and two guns were left to protect the passage.

After passing Mayorga Lord Paget sighted a strong body of the enemy's cavalry which formed, it proved, a part of Ney's corps. They were drawn up 'on a swelling hill close to the road,' where the soil was deep and soaked with rain. 'Two squadrons of the 10th, riding stiffly against the enemy, mounted the hill, and notwithstanding the superiority

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of numbers and position, overthrew them, killed 20 men and took 100 prisoners. This was a bold and hardy action; but the English cavalry had been engaged more or less for twelve successive days, and with such fortune and bravery that above 500 prisoners had already fallen into their hands; and their leaders being excellent, their confidence was unbounded.' On the morrow the cavalry marched from Saldaña to Benevente, a distance of six leagues.

On 28 December there was an alarm in the town at the reported approach of the enemy. The French, however, did not appear until the 29th, but they then showed in force. Nearly six hundred men of the 'Chasseurs à cheval de la Garde Imperiale' crossed the water in the face of the piquets. They were led by the celebrated cavalry officer General Lefebre-Desnouettes. As the bridge was destroyed the enemy were compelled to ford the river, and the crossing place was deep and the current rapid. Several horses had to swim. The piquets retired before them and the town was much alarmed.

Lieut.-Colonel Otway was the field officer of the day, and in command of the piquets. He by messages alarmed and turned out the regiments in the town, but fearing that the enemy would arrive before the men were formed, determined to charge, though he had but a body of one hundred and thirty mounted men at hand. This checked the advance squadron of the enemy. Otway's men, however, were too impetuous, and in turn received a check from the supports of the French Cavalry. In their turn they then fell back. Brigadier-General Stewart then arrived with one hundred more men, chiefly Germans. A second charge took place, the enemy were again checked and halted, when some skirmishing ensued.

'In this situation of affairs, Lord Paget arrived and ordered them to keep them in check only whilst he brought up the 10th Hussars, who being nearest the spot, had just turned out. The 10th accordingly arrived, and soon after the 7th and 18th, with two pieces of light artillery. Upon seeing these the enemy retired at a gallop, closely pursued by the piquets, who chased them to the water's edge, killing hundreds, and making prisoners of about 100 of this elect corps of Buonaparte's, which was never before defeated, and which had in the preceding year in Poland broken through 30,000 Russians. Lieut.-General Lefebre was himself made prisoner by a private of the 7th and one of the 10th.'

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Another account claims the capture of Lefebre for one of the privates of the 3rd Hussars K.G.L.

'The artillery arrived just in time to give them three or four shots, which put their columns to flight after they had formed on the other side of the water. Had they arrived even a minute sooner, whilst the French were in the water, they must have been all destroyed or made prisoners.'

In this affair the 7th had five killed and sixteen wounded: of the wounded nine died.

The accounts of this combat in Cannon's History and the Manuscript Regimental Record do not add much to the story as already told. One fact, however, needs mention.

When the French Chasseurs of the Imperial Guard crossed the river and the British piquets retired, one, a piquet of the 7th Hussars, under Lieutenant Lowther, 'was sharply engaged and suffered severely, nearly every man being either killed or wounded.' As neither in the Manuscript Record nor in Cannon is it mentioned that General Lefebre-Desnouettes (Lefevre) was taken prisoner by a man of the 7th and one of the 10th, it is reasonable to suppose that Vivian is mistaken. Fortescue tells us that the unfortunate general was captured by a Hussar of the King's German Legion, but that 'an English Trooper of the 10th, laying hold of his bridle, carried him off before the German had realised the value of his prize, and was promoted sergeant for his pains.'

The account of the fight given by Mr. Fortescue differs somewhat from that given by Vivian.

He states that the French general, seeing no British in the plain of Benevente except some small parties of cavalry watching the fords, determined to cross the river, and did so.

He had with him three squadrons of Chasseurs of the Guard, and a small mixed squadron of Mamelukes and Light Horse, in all about five hundred and fifty men.

Colonel Otway was in command of the British piquets, and at once called them in, but they were slow in obeying. The leading squadron of Chasseurs pressed them so hard that they fell back hastily to within half a mile of Benevente. Otway, fearing the main body of the British would be surprised in quarters, determined then to make a stand, and

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took up a position in the suburbs, with his flanks protected by garden walls. Here he was joined by the inlying piquet of the 7th and 10th Hussars and by a small party of the 18th. His force now numbered one hundred and fifty men. The leading squadron of Chasseurs now halted, awaiting the arrival of the remainder. Otway charged them, killed their commander, and they broke. The second squadron now came up and reversed matters, the British being in turn compelled to retire with loss. To their assistance then came three troops of the Hussars of the King's German Legion. Lord Paget and General Stewart now arrived, and the latter took over Otway's men while Paget galloped off to fetch the 10th Hussars. Stewart advanced again to the charge while the French were re-forming. The ground was heavy and the British could not get up their pace. The French were not broken, and a sword fight ensued, during which the rear squadrons of the French arrived and drove the right flank of the British back to the walls of Benevente. Here the remainder of the German Hussars came to their assistance and checked the French. Lefebre-Desnouettes now had his whole force across the river, and having formed them in line advanced to attack.

The British had now rallied and Paget had prepared the 10th and 18th Hussars to fall upon the flank of the advancing enemy. This he did thus. Those troops that were in the open were withdrawn so as to lure the French on and on to ground more favourable to the British. On came Lefebre-Desnouettes, and the two lines were within a hundred yards of one another when Paget made his appearance at the head of the 10th and galloped down on the left flank of the French, the 18th following in support.

The French wheeled about and made at full speed for the river, with the British in close pursuit. It is stated that the whole population of Benevente had gathered on the walls and cheered wildly at the spectacle.

The French reached the river in fair order, but when they rode into the water itself something like a panic set in. From the bank the British opened fire with their carbines, and this was returned by the enemy as soon as they had reached the opposite shore. On the arrival of the British Horse Artillery the dispersal of the enemy was completed.

The differences between these two accounts appear to be mainly two. Fortescue increases Otway's force and decreases that of the enemy. He also appears to extol the services of the 3rd Hussars of the King's

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German Legion at the expense of the British regiments—possibly preferring the account of Beamish to that of Vivian and other British authorities.

Vivian's account proceeds as follows:

'This affair being over, the 7th were ordered to remain on the ground with two pieces of artillery. The rest of the cavalry returned to Benevente. No movement of consequence took place on the part of the enemy during our stay there, excepting that now and then the head of a column of cavalry would make its appearance, as if intending to cross the water, when a cannon shot or two stopped it.'


He then goes on to describe the advent of a general with a large suite on the hill immediately above the 7th, and 'from the number of attendants and more especially from there being some Mamelukes of the party, we had every reason to suppose it was Buonaparte himself. The officer of artillery wanted to open fire on them, but Vivian would not allow it, despising, as he says, 'a war of outposts.' He adds that afterwards he rather regretted having prevented the firing, as had the shot been successful what results might not have been produced! It seems more than likely that it really was Buonaparte. A flag of truce was now sent from the enemy across the water. The message concerned the baggage of the captive Lefebre-Desnouettes.

Vivian entered into conversation with several of the French officers, amongst them being Buonaparte's A.D.C. General Davosail and Colonel Count Grazinski of the Polish Guards. He gives a most favourable opinion as to their manners, appearance and opinions, and states that their uniforms were 'superb.' The Frenchmen freely expressed their bad opinion of the Spanish, as was natural, and praised the conduct of the British during the engagement that morning.

Vivian also crossed the river and found the difficulties of the passage very considerable. His horse had to swim, and Colonel Grazinsky, who afterwards crossed again, was nearly drowned, his life being saved by a soldier of the 7th Hussars who pulled him ashore.

On 19 December the 7th were relieved at sunset by the 18th Hussars. The enemy had brought up some guns and opened fire on the two left squadrons, but without effect. 'At 7 o'clock both regiments retired to La Vizana, where we bivouacked in a field for a few hours, and then

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BENEVENTE.



PASS OF MANZANAL.

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proceeded on our march to La Bañeza, whence we marched again at 12 o'clock, and arrived at Astorga the next morning.'

Here on 30 December Romana and his unfortunate rabble turned up. They were retiring hotfoot on Orense without having attempted either to make a stand or to assist the British. It is doubtful whether they could have done the least good even if they had made the attempt, as their condition of unpreparedness was simply pitiable.

On that day Benières crossed the Esla river. Thanks to the destruction of the bridge at Castro Gonzalo his force had been delayed. He passed through Benevente and made for La Bañeza. His force numbered nine thousand cavalry.

Romana appears so far to have been true to his promises, in that he left a division to hold the bridge of Mansilla de las Mulas. Franceschi, however, appeared there with his light cavalry, charged the bridge and captured all Romana's artillery there and half his division. Romana then abandoned Leon and the French possessed themselves of it.

The British cavalry retired from Astorga on the night of 31 December, their outposts at Celada being sharply pressed by the advancing enemy. They marched without a halt to Bembimbre, where they fell in with the division (the reserve) commanded by Major-General Paget. The other divisions of the retreating British having proceeded towards Coruña had halted at various villages. This march was very severe—eight leagues, a distance of thirty-two miles if the leagues were Spanish. The track lay over the mountain Manzanal. Snow had fallen and had been trodden hard by the infantry; it had then frozen and was so slippery that the men had to dismount and lead their horses. This greatly hindered the march, and in addition, abandoned baggage-waggons blocked the road. This alone caused a delay of two hours at the village of Manzanal.

At daybreak on 1 January 1809 the march from Bembimbre to Villafranca began. The rearguard was composed of the 15th Hussars, two companies of riflemen, two light guns, and the 20th Foot; and was commanded by Colonel Ross of the 20th. Constant skirmishes took place on the march, the 15th Hussars, who were in the rear, being actively engaged the whole time.

At Cacabellos the reserve with the 3rd Hussars (King's German Legion) halted. The 15th were halted in a village in front of it. The 10th were halted at two others between it and Villafranca, while the

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other brigade of cavalry halted at Villafranca itself. The remainder of the army proceeded on its march.


On 2 January the enemy again appeared and skirmished with the 15th. Towards evening the affair grew serious, and men of the rifle corps were posted in the village of Cacabellos to fire from the houses and from behind the walls. The British lost nearly one hundred in killed and wounded, the enemy probably as many if not more.

Meanwhile, on 1 January, Napoleon had occupied Astorga. His troops were concentrated there and numbered seventy thousand infantry, ten thousand cavalry, and two hundred guns.

Here, as is well known, he received the news that Austria had joined the European Confederacy and was preparing for war. Napoleon therefore started for Paris on 3 January, taking with him his Guards. To Soult and Ney he committed the pursuit of the British, who now numbered but twenty thousand men, and with Soult and Ney sixty thousand French were left to carry on the campaign.

Along the line of retreat discipline had unfortunately become slack in the British Army. There had been irregularities in more places than one, but at Villafranca matters came to a climax. The conduct of the troops there was extremely bad. It is alleged that the hold of the officers over their men had become loosened to a dangerous state and at a time, it being a retreat, when discipline of the strictest nature should have been preserved. The cause of this was twofold. Among all ranks in the army the fact of retreating was hateful—a feeling that was natural and praiseworthy in every respect. But for the officers to openly criticise and discuss the motives and orders of the commander-in-chief was not natural and was not praiseworthy. And this, unfortunately, is what took place to a large extent. There were, however, honourable exceptions in which the officers kept a proper hold on their men—notably those of the Guards and those of the reserve division, and it is a remarkable fact that amid all the horrors, trials, and losses of this disastrous retreat these particular bodies of troops suffered less than any of the others. Sir John Moore took prompt measures to prevent disorders as far as possible. He issued a general order in which he assigned the blame, and probably rightly, to the officers. He ordered the utmost rigour to be displayed towards offenders, and unfortunately the first culprits to be arrested belonged to the 7th Hussars. At Villafranca three men

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were discovered looting. Two of them had stolen some wearing apparel, of which probably they stood in dire need, and the third man was caught attempting to break open a box. All were condemned to death, with this reservation, that only one should be shot and the one to suffer should be chosen by lot. Vivian tells the story thus:

'These three poor fellows drew lots which should suffer death, and it fell to the lot of a man named Day, of Captain Treveake's troop, previously a very steady, good soldier.' (The correct name of this officer was Treweike.) 'He was shot in front of the brigade; and in justice to him, poor fellow, be it said that he met his fate with the most undaunted courage—I may say, with the most perfect sangfroid; and if it be of any service to relate it, be it recorded that ten thousand instances of more flagrant outrages occurred than that for which he suffered.' We can quite believe it. When it is considered that the 7th with the other regiments of cavalry had been actively occupied during nearly the whole of the period of the retreat in constant skirmishing to protect the rear, it is more than probable that Vivian's concluding sentence is based upon a right judgment.

Vivian's Diary continues:

'January 5.—From Villa Franca to Lugo, seventeen leagues (over a most immense mountain, on which several hale men were soon dead from the intense cold and fatigue, and on which guns, ammunition, and money were stuck and were destroyed), the cavalry marched at a rate almost incredible. The 7th were twenty-six hours only completing it, out of which they halted four; but this rate of marching had the effect of destroying the horses, which never recovered it. The infantry also began to be fatigued. Hundreds that would not come on, either died or were shot on the road; and several hundreds, who for want of shoes had dropped behind, others who straggled to villages for the sake of plunder, and others who were fatigued and in bad health, fell into the hands of the enemy—all together amounting to a very considerable number.'

On 5 January the commander-in-chief halted at Lugo. Next day the enemy came up and a skirmish ensued with the Guards, which 'occasioned little loss on either side although both parties fired some cannon shot.'

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On 7 January similar events took place. Little blood was shed, but the constant attacks were sufficient to harass and annoy the retreating army, and most successfully did these hostile attempts effect their purpose.

Next day Sir John Moore expected a general attack and disposed his force accordingly. 'General Hope's division on the right, next to the Guards, who had their right on the river Minho, which was impassable from the floods; General Fraser in the centre, and Sir David Baird on the left.

'The cavalry were disposed of in different parts of the line—the 18th on the main road in rear of the Guards; the 10th and 15th in rear of them (the 10th was afterwards detached to the bridge over the Minho, eight miles in the rear, and the 15th to Sir D. Baird); the 7th and Germans in the fields with General Fraser and in his rear.' The enemy, however, did not attack, and at night the retreat was resumed. It fell to the lot of the 7th to form the rearguard of the army, and to supply, by dismounted men, the piquets of the Guards who were close to the enemy; and there to remain at least two hours after the whole army had marched.

'This was a delicate and ticklish undertaking, but one which we most fortunately succeeded in without the loss of a man, and without, I believe, the enemy having had the slightest suspicion that the army was in motion.' The scenes of distress and confusion in Lugo during the halt were 'almost incredible, and beyond the power of description.'

The weather had been very bad; many men were sick and in such a state as to be unable to get on. No conveyances could be procured. Everybody was suffering from the greatest possible fatigue. Bread was scarce; no linen, no camp kettles, as these had been lost, and therefore most difficult for the men to cook what food they chanced to obtain.

'The cavalry, with their horses completely worn out; many of them (especially of the 18th Hussars) standing in the open streets, and dying by dozens. Others of all regiments so crippled as to make it absolutely necessary to destroy them, so that every ten yards you met with a dead or dying horse, and in many places ten, fifteen, or twenty together.' And here in this small and dirty town were for the time quartered between fifteen thousand and twenty thousand men.

The retreat from Lugo began on the night of 8 January. Straggling increased, and Vivian states that if he had difficulty 'in describing the scenes that presented themselves at Lugo; it is almost presumption to

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attempt to present those I witnessed whilst passing the rearguard of the army during the last part of our retreat.'

Commissariat stores were very short—only one day's bread had been delivered, and even this small allowance some regiments did not receive. To hunger also must be added want of rest, want of shoes, wretched roads, and heavy rain.

Vivian left the advanced posts, which were four miles in advance of the town, fully four hours after the retreat of the army, yet even then the houses on the outskirts of the town were full of stragglers. Many of these he succeeded in driving out by force or persuasion. Others were so ill and harassed that nothing could move them.

From this point the road presented one constant string of stragglers who could in no wise be driven on, and who were bound sooner or later to be taken by the enemy.

Every house was full of stragglers who had absolutely to be driven out into the road. Some, on being told that the enemy would certainly shoot them, replied: 'They may shoot us, sir, as you may shoot us, but we cannot stir.' Some were actually dying, some indeed already dead. Some would roll themselves up in straw and absolutely permit the cavalry to ride in on them without discovering themselves. These had literally to be pricked and prodded out with the swords of the men before they would stir. Some in the roads, shoeless and with bleeding feet, though really incapable of keeping up, were striving to the very last to join their battalions, and not a few such actually perished in the vain attempt.

'I myself saw five dead on the roadside, and two women, whilst every now and then you met with a poor unfortunate woman, perhaps with a child in her arms, without shoes or stockings, knee deep in mud, crying most piteously for that assistance which, alas! we could not afford her. One poor wretch of this description actually died with two children at her breast, one of whom was also dead and the second would have shared the fate of its—I may say, under the circumstances—happy little relative.'

On 9 January the reserve arrived at Mobiliano and Sir John Moore ordered Major-General Paget to halt in order to ease the stragglers. The first night from Lugo the cavalry regiments halted at Behamonde

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in heavy rain. The officers of the 7th and 10th crowded together in a wretched hovel, the men and horses in a field. They marched at nine o'clock with the reserve. The 18th Hussars had joined the 7th previously. During the halt, which lasted between six and seven hours, at least four thousand men straggled through the place, and how many more had fallen into the hands of the enemy nobody can tell.

Next day the enemy appeared, and immediately in their front was a body of stragglers, who for the last four miles had defended themselves strenuously from the attack of some four hundred cavalry.

The British cavalry now joined in the skirmishing till they retired to a position about seven miles in front of Betanzos, the reserve being about two miles in their rear.

At four o'clock, the enemy having attacked the advanced posts, the cavalry proceeded to Betanzos. Here the 7th passed through the reserve of infantry. Since leaving Grajal the saddles had hardly been off the horses' backs for above five or six hours at a stretch, and seldom so long. They had been constantly wet and without means of changing. The camp kettles had gone owing to the death of the mules that carried them. What meat they could obtain could only be rather toasted than cooked on the points of the swords.

On 10 January the rearguard of cavalry after the 7th had passed through consisted of a squadron of the 18th under Lieut.-Colonel Jones, and eighty men of the 10th under Major Lord C. Manners of the 10th.

All this time the enemy kept hanging on their rear, and skirmishes took place both at the bridge of Betanzos and that of Burgo. These were situated about two leagues from their journey's end, Coruña. These bridges had been ordered to be destroyed, but the lack of tools (those of the engineers had been abandoned) prevented more than a partial demolition.

On the evening of 11 January the whole army marched into Coruña, except the reserve.

The reserve occupied a position about two leagues in front of Coruña, having the village of Burgo, where a bridge crossed a small but deep stream which emptied itself into the bay of Coruña, on their left, and their right at another bridge near the river of Boa on the St. Jago road.

On 12 January a small skirmish took place at the bridge of Burgo without loss on either side.

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The next day there was another, which, being of a more serious nature, indicated an attack.

In the evening of 13 January Sir John Moore withdrew his advanced corps and took up a position about three miles in front of Coruña.

On 14 January the transports from Vigo arrived. Preparations for embarkation at once began. The cavalry horses were almost all destroyed and the greater part of the artillery, consisting of fifty-two guns, were embarked; eight British and four Spanish guns being alone reserved for use.

On 15 January about noon a small skirmish began and lasted till nearly dark. It was in this skirmish that Lieut.-Colonel McKenzie of the 79th fell.

On 16 January the battle of Coruña was fought.

That night the embarkation of the entire army began, and by the morning all except the brigades of General Hill and General Beresford were on board ship.

On 17 January the fleet of transports still lingered in the harbour, until the French guns opened on them. They at once set sail. That evening General Hill's brigade was embarked at a little bay to the north of the citadel, and about midnight General Beresford's, the rear brigade, was brought off in boats to the men-of-war that were protecting the embarkation.

No details of the voyage that have come down to us are of importance, save one which records a sad disaster.

'One of the transports conveying the troops on their return from Coruña, the *Despatch*, with a detachment of the 7th Hussars, consisting of Captain Treweike's and Dukinfield's troops, on board, was wrecked on the Manacle Rocks, off the coast of Cornwall. In this disaster Major Cavendish, Captain Dukinfield, and Lieutenant Waldegrave were drowned besides 8 non-commissioned officers, 60 men and 35 horses.'

There is reason to believe that the original Manuscript Regimental Record was lost then, as was also the old Regimental Plate.

Out of seven hundred and fifty-one horses which the Regiment took to Spain only about seventy returned to England.

The account of this disaster given in Cannon differs slightly from that derived from Vivian.

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From the Drawing in possession of
The Earl Waldegrave.



LIEUTENANT THE HON. EDWARD WILLIAM WALDEGRAVE.

(*Early Portrait.*)


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Cannon tells us as follows:

'On the passage to England the *Despatch* Transport, having on board Major the Honble. G. C. Cavendish, Captain G. Dukinfield, and Lieutenant the Honble. Edward Waldegrave, with 113 men and 44 horses, was wrecked near the Lizard, on the coast of Cornwall, and only seven men escaped.' From the *Gentleman's Magazine*, however, a few more particulars can be gleaned.

It appears that the *Primrose* sloop of war—eighteen guns, and outward bound—was wrecked at the same time and not a mile distant from




'THE MANACLES'

the *Despatch*. Both vessels ran on to the Manacle Rocks near Helston. The account, after giving details as to Captain Mein, Lieut.-Colonel George and Captain Nathaniel Tucker, two out of eight brothers, all of whom were either in the civil or military employ of the Government, and who were drowned in the wreck of the *Primrose*, adds as follows:

'Among those who perished in the *Despatch* Transport, from Coruña, which was lost at the same time, and within a mile of the *Primrose*, were the Honble. Major G. W. C. Cavendish (second son of Lord George Cavendish, and nephew of the Duke of Devonshire), whose body has since been found near Falmouth; Captain S. G. Duckenfield, eldest son of Sir N. Duckenfield and Lieutenant the Honble. E. Waldegrave, second brother of Earl Waldegrave. Besides these Officers, the *Despatch* had

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on board 72 men and 36 horses; all of the 7th Light Dragoons (Hussars, of course). Every soul on board perished, excepting 7 dragoons. Eight non-commissioned officers and about 60 privates of the regiment, belonging to Capts. Treweeke's and Duckenfield's Troops, with 5 women and 32 horses, were lost with them.' It was understood that the bodies of those who perished, or at any rate a large number of them, were buried in one grave in a neighbouring churchyard. In response to an inquiry directed to Mr. Perry, the superintendent of Lloyd's signalling station at the Lizard, we received definite information on this point. The



ST. KEVERNE'S CHURCH

bodies of the unfortunate men were buried in the churchyard of St. Keverne, Cornwall, near the scene of the disaster and about seven miles from the Lizard. A memorial was erected on the grave and still exists, but has been removed to the interior of the church. Curiously enough, the 'Annual Register' makes no mention of this sad tragedy of the sea.

By the kindness of the Rev. W. A. Diggens, the Vicar of St. Keverne, we are able to give a few more particulars of this sad disaster. He was good enough to forward an article on the 'Death Roll of the Manacles' reprinted from the *Western Morning News*, 30 April 1901. From this article we make two extracts with all due acknowledgments.

Writing of the churchyard of St. Keverne the paper tells us as follows:

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'Under date January 22, 1809, when William Whitehead was minister, we read of a startling tragedy:—

'"On Sunday Morning about half-past three the *Dispatch*, transport (Geo. Fenwick, master), having three officers and 70 men of the Seventh Light Dragoons, on her return from Corunna, was driven upon the rocks near Coverack, and all on board perished except seven private dragoons. The three unfortunate officers, who had survived a disastrous campaign to perish on the English shore, were Major Cavendish, Captain Duckenfield, and Lieutenant Waldegrave."'

The article proceeds to mention the wreck of the sloop of war *Primrose*, on board which there were one hundred and twenty officers and men as crew and six passengers. Only one poor lad was saved.

'104 bodies from these wrecks were buried in the churchyard of this parish (St. Keverne's) between January 24th and April 2nd.

'The *Despatch* victims are commemorated by a marble which was originally erected in the churchyard, but is now a mural monument within the church. Below the names of the officers and other particulars appear these striking lines:

'When Britain sends at liberty's command
Her ready youth to free a stranger land,
She bears her slain in triumph to the shore,
And the proud parent shows the wounds before.
But when her sons, each form of danger past,
Strain their glad eyes to view her hills at last;
If then the tempest rolls the foaming flood,
And her own ocean 'whelms her bravest blood,
When there a Dukenfield, a Cavendish here,
And youthful Waldegrave press a wat'ry bier;
Their mourning comrades feel a moistened cheek,
And bid the marble their dumb sorrow speak.
Tyrant! the barrier of thy rage, the deep
Aids thy fierce boast, and English mothers weep.'

The vicar of St. Keverne's informs us also that 'A parishioner of mine possesses a sword which is said to have belonged to one of the officers. Words have been engraved on the scabbard, but I have failed to decipher them.' These are probably the name of the swordmaker, as the name or crest or coat armour of the owner would usually be found on the blade only. 'On the sword blade beneath the hilt there is the Royal

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
Coat of Arms.' This was usual. A 'G.R.' surmounted by a crown would very likely be there also.

'On the other side of the blade is a figure on horseback with drawn sword.'

It is stated that a wild local tradition regarding this wreck still survives. It is to the effect that during the night of the anniversary of the disaster each year a ghostly roll of the luckless troopers is duly called on the wave-dashed shore.

One or two points in connection with the Coruña campaign alone remain to be noticed.

On arrival at Coruña the Regiment, according to Cannon, 'only mounted 250 horses out of 680 which had marched from that port about




two months before, and many of those which remained, were destroyed for the want of transport, which could be obtained only for the officers' horses and for about ninety troop horses.' These figures do not agree with those given by Vivian. Cannon also mentions that the Regiment suffered more from frost, snow, and a deficiency in the supplies of provisions and forage than from the swords of the enemy. He also adds that the want of horseshoes was a serious evil, and that it was caused by the impracticability of forge-carts accompanying the Regiment.

Referring to the events of the night of 8 January at Lugo, when the 7th Hussars were left behind to form the rearguard of the army, a service which Vivian describes as 'a delicate and ticklish undertaking,' Cannon tells us one other detail. The Hussars were 'left behind to keep up the bivouac fires and to cover the retreat,' and they were 'in the rear of the Army until it arrived within three leagues of Coruña.'

In this account of the retreat it will be noticed that any description of the battle of Coruña has been omitted. Coruña has been described over and over again, and if its details are not known to the student of military matters, they should be. At any rate they can be easily obtained.

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We have been concerned with the services of the cavalry in general and the 7th Hussars in particular, and it has been our endeavour to confine the account in these pages to the cavalry of Sir John Moore's army. Also, we have endeavoured to be just therein, and to avoid extolling the services of any particular regiment at the expense of the equally meritorious behaviour of their brave mounted comrades-in-arms.



CORUÑA

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CHAPTER XX

Home Service, 1809–1813

The details of the home service of the Regiment for this period given in Cannon and the Manuscript Regimental Record are very meagre.

Cannon's account occupies fourteen lines of print. The Manuscript Regimental Record allots rather over twelve lines to the subject.

These two accounts may be summed up as follows :—

On arrival in England—date and port of disembarkation not stated —the Regiment was quartered at Guildford, whence it proceeded to Weymouth, date omitted. Cavalry barracks had been recently built along the Radipole Road for the use of the troops quartered there on escort duty when the King and Queen visited that place. Two portions of these barracks still exist and are converted into dwelling-houses. Illustrations of their present state are here given.

1809.—In this year troop quarter-masters of cavalry were abolished on 24 June, and their duties were henceforth to be performed by the Troop Sergeants-Major.

In May 1810 the Regiment embarked at Liverpool for Ireland and was stationed at Dublin, with detached troops at Athy and Carlow. In 1811 the headquarters were removed to Dundalk, where they remained during 1812 and for a part of 1813.

The only information beyond what is here inserted which we possess as to the movements of the Regiment in 1811 is as follows :—

In February 1811 a detachment of the Regiment went to Spain and on 7 June of the same year two hundred of the men with, we presume, a due proportion of officers were sent from Ireland to Sheffield, to take the place of the 6th Dragoons, at the time quartered there but who had been ordered on foreign service. It is curious that neither of these facts is mentioned either in Cannon or in the Regimental Manuscript. In the 'Memoirs of Hussey Vivian' (page 134) they are given.

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Assuming, however, that the facts are as stated, it is to be regretted that the destination and strength of the detachment that was sent to Spain is not given.

Possibly it may have been sent to join the Cavalry Staff Corps in the Peninsula which was formed in the previous year, partly at Cadiz and partly elsewhere.

That a squadron of the 13th Light Dragoons under Captain Morres was thus employed between April and September 1810 we know. Records beyond the statement in Vivian's Memoirs of the similar employment of the 7th Hussars do not appear to exist.

In 1813 the Regiment embarked at Dublin for Liverpool and proceeded thence to London. They were stationed at Hyde Park Barracks, Hampton Court, and Hounslow, and performed 'King's duty' during the absence of the Household Cavalry on foreign service.

Unfortunately there are apparently no letters of Lieut.-Colonel Hussey Vivian which cover this period.

In the month of May 1809 Lieut.-Colonel Vivian as second to Lord Paget was concerned in the duel between his lordship and Captain Cadogan.

Lord Paget had eloped with Lady Charlotte Wellesley. Two sisters, Lady Charlotte and Lady Emily Cadogan, had married two brothers, Henry and William Wellesley. Lord Paget was himself married to one of the daughters of Lady Jersey, by whom he had a family.

Mr. Wellesley laid an action against Lord Paget in which he claimed damages.

Lord Paget did not defend the action, and damages to the extent of £20,000 were awarded to the plaintiff.

Captain Cadogan, the brother of Lady Charlotte, challenged Lord Paget to a duel, and the challenge was accepted: it could hardly have been otherwise.

Captain M'Kenzie, R.N., and Lieut.-Colonel Vivian were the seconds.

Attempts were made, as frequently happened where a hostile meeting was projected, to arrive at some settlement, but these failed. The parties to the duel arrived on the ground at 7 A.M., the spot selected being on Wimbledon Common, a noted place of meeting for duellists. The usual distance of twelve paces was marked off, and the combatants were directed to fire simultaneously. Captain Cadogan fired and missed,

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Lord Paget's pistol flashed only—at least this is the statement given in the official protocol which was subsequently drawn up. After the seconds had discussed the matter, it was decided that the actual discharge of one pistol and the flashing of the other should be reckoned as a fire. Another question, and an important one, then arose. Did or did not Lord Paget make any attempt to take aim?

Both the seconds decided that he did not, 'although the degree of obliquity he gave the direction of the pistol was such as to have been discovered only by particular observation.'

Captain M'Kenzie then stated to his principal that as it appeared to be Lord Paget's intention not to fire at him, he could not permit the affair to go further.

Lieut.-Colonel Vivian then asked Captain Cadogan whether he



WEYMOUTH—STABLES

had not himself observed that Lord Paget had not aimed at him, to which he replied in the affirmative. Captain M'Kenzie then declared his decision not to remain any longer in the field to witness any further act of hostility on the part of Captain Cadogan. It would have been, of course, legally murder had Lord Paget been killed under any circumstances, but no extenuation could possibly have been urged in the case of a second discharge, in which it was either known or suspected that one of the principals deliberately abstained from attempting to hit his man.

Captain Cadogan then stated that of course his conduct must be decided by his second, but that he had come to the meeting prepared for the fall of one of the parties engaged.

Captain M'Kenzie and Lieut.-Colonel Vivian then made known to Lord Paget that, as he evidently did not intend to fire at Captain Cadogan, the affair could go no further.

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Lord Paget replied: 'As such is your determination, I have now no hesitation in saying, that nothing could ever have induced me to add to the injuries I have already done the family, by firing at the brother of Lady Charlotte Wellesley.' Such is the story of this celebrated duel, and its happily bloodless conclusion.

The influence, however, of this most unfortunate affair on the military career of Lord Paget was this. It prevented him from meeting Lord Wellington. It would have been impossible for the two soldiers to have been in anything like close communion on service, or indeed on any terms whatever, and thus Lord Wellington was till Waterloo deprived of the services of the most skilled cavalry officer at that time in the British Army. It is possibly on this account that the 7th Hussars did not again proceed to the Peninsula until 1813.



WEYMOUTH—OFFICERS' QUARTERS

In the *Gazette* of 9 September 1810 Lieut.-Colonel R. Hussey Vivian was awarded the Peninsular Gold Medal for the actions of Sahagun and Benevente. There are no accounts given of the means by which the Regiment was brought to its full strength, but recruiting must have been energetically pursued. We know that on arrival in England from Coruña the strength of the Regiment had been so reduced as to greatly impair its efficiency, and it was practically without horses. Possibly on this account it was for the time quartered in Ireland, where recruits were to be obtained with comparative ease—and recruits, too, who made most excellent cavalry soldiers. Horses, also, of a good type were to be procured in that country, and this it will easily be understood was, in the circumstances, of the greatest importance. Be this as it may, we find the Regiment on its return to England at its full strength. It might have been expected that, considering the unsettled state of the country—

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for disturbances and rioting were not infrequent—that at some period between 1809 and 1813 the Regiment would have been called on to assist the civil authorities. This, however, does not appear to have been the case.

We have made passing mention of the Cavalry Staff Corps. During the few years that this unit of the service existed it would not appear that any consecutive records were kept. Be this as it may, in these days only scattered and slender details as to the services of the corps are to be found. It may be of interest if we here insert a sketch of the uniform of the Cavalry Staff Corps in 1813. Its details are as follows :



THE CAVALRY STAFF CORPS

Coat, red ; facings and plastron, dark blue ; buttons, lace, and shako lines, white ; shako, black, with broad white lace at crown, red plume, and a white cockade with a black centre and a white button ; belt, three of blue and two of red ; overalls, grey with a double blue stripe, which is continued down the booting ; shoulder belt, white and without a plate.

In the month of August 1813 the Regiment was notified that it was to hold itself in readiness again to proceed on active service abroad.

Its destination was again the Peninsula. Little of interest is, we fear, to be found in this chapter, but though to be regretted it is unfortunately unavoidable.

The services of the Regiment in its second Peninsula campaign will be dealt with in the next chapter.

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1813.

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CHAPTER XXI

The Second Peninsula Campaign—1813–1814

On 15 August the Regiment, eight hundred strong (eight troops), embarked at Portsmouth. Colonel Vivian sailed on the *Lord Wellington*, starting in August 1813. The breeze was fair, and it was hoped that the Regiment would reach its destination in six days. The voyage was not, however, so speedy. On 29 August half the Regiment had arrived safely at Bilbao, having lost only a few horses. The remainder of the 7th was expected to reach that port on the morrow. The expectation, however, was not fulfilled. Vivian and the half of the Regiment which arrived disembarked on 30 August. On 4 September two of the transports had not yet appeared. On board these vessels were fifty-one men and horses under the command of Roberts (? Captain Robbins) and Lieutenant Uniacke. It was not known what their fate might have been ; a guess was hazarded that unless they had put in at Falmouth it was quite possible that they might have been captured. San Sebastian had now fallen, a success which completely secured the left flank of the army.

On the day that San Sebastian fell Soult crossed the Bidassoa and attacked the Spanish and English forces near San Martial, meeting with a serious repulse.

On 11 September the Regiment still remained inactive at Bilbao, no orders having been received from headquarters. Mules for the carriage of provisions had however arrived, so it was assumed that a start would soon be made for the front.

Colonel Vivian was now likely to obtain the command of a brigade owing to the illness of Colonel Grant. The expected marching orders were received and the Regiment was ordered to Tafalla to join the Hussar Brigade under Lord Edward Somerset. The 7th was brigaded with the 10th and 15th Hussars.

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Vivian proceeded to Lord Wellington's headquarters at Irun on 18 September. Tafalla, the destination of the Regiment, is a place midway between Pampeluna and Tudela.

It was absolutely necessary for the cavalry to be posted near the river Ebro in order to obtain forage, which even in that district was by no means plentiful. Pampeluna at the time was being besieged and its fall was expected to take place early in October. The garrison of that place, however, gallantly held out until 31 October. Colonel Vivian proceeded to Irun and returned to Bilbao *viâ* Los Passages on 30 September. On that day he heard of the arrival of the missing ships and the fourth squadron at Los Passages.

This port is not far from San Sebastian, and was at this period greatly used by the British as a port of debarkation. The harbour, which is landlocked, is beautifully situated.

On his return to Bilbao he found the Regiment as he had left it.

The march was ordered to begin on 2 October, the first halting-place being Durango. Here they were to rest for two or three days and then to proceed to join the Hussar Brigade at Tafalla and Olite, the latter place being chosen for the headquarters of the Regiment.

On 9 October Lord Wellington determined to cross the Bidassoa.

The health of the Regiment was at this time good, though Vivian records that 'they get sadly drunk now and then, for which I have tickled a few of them; but in general they have behaved admirably well. Wine is so cheap, it is really no wonder that they get drunk. It is sixpence a quart only, and very strong.' All other provisions were very dear indeed.

By 25 October the Regiment had arrived at its destination and joined the brigade of Lord Edward Somerset.

An advance into France, it was now known, would immediately follow the fall of Pampeluna. For that advance all things were prepared. Luckily the horses, which had at first suffered from the climate and the change of diet, had by this time recovered and were, as Vivian tells us, 'nearly in as good order as at Hyde Park Barracks.'

The health of the men, too, was in general good. Two only had died and eight only were sick. Most of the invalids seem to have been found among the officers' servants.

The officers, however, suffered from fever. Lieutenant Grenfell had

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From an Oil Painting by G. Carpenter, circa 1835.



LOS PASSAGES.

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been left behind sick at Bilbao, Moffat (Dr. James Moffitt) at Hernani, and Captain Hamlyn (*alias* Williams) was laid up at Tarifa.

Pampeluna fell, as has been stated, on 31 October. The order for marching was received the same day. The brigade started on 1 November and reached Salines de Pampeluna and Noain. On the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th they were expected to reach Berrioplano, Arraix, and St. Estevan and then to enter France by the Maya Pass. Fifty-six horses and ten men had to be sent to the rear sick, as also was Captain Hamlyn, this officer being despatched to the hospital at Vittoria apparently suffering from typhoid fever, of which terrible complaint there had already been another case.

After two forced marches, which knocked up the horses and almost killed the mules, the Regiment reached Buenza and was about to start next morning for St. Estevan when an order to halt arrived.

Apparently Buenza is situated on high ground, as Vivian writes:

'So here I am, in the clouds, with Edward's [possibly Edward Keane's] and Robins' [Robbins] troops.' These marches had been very trying. 'I say "thank God" we halted, because another such day's march as we had yesterday and the regiment would have been *hors de combat*. No description that I can give you, nor can the worst roads that you ever heard of or saw, at all enable you to form an idea of the mountain paths we climbed yesterday. The worst goat path in all Wales is a garden walk compared to it; and they tell me that we have eight leagues more into France of still worse roads! When I tell you that we were yesterday on horseback from seven till past six, and only accomplished three leagues of good roads (from Pampeluna until we turned into the mountains), and three leagues of bad afterwards, you may suppose what a march we have in view. After we get into France I hope, at least, that the roads will be better.'



ST. PÉE

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He describes the situation of the village as most romantic and the country in general as beautiful. Food was, however, very scarce and the Regiment was in a state of semi-starvation. Forage for the horses, too, could hardly be obtained. Wheat formed the chief supply of corn, and this had to be forcibly seized from the peasantry, whose supplies had been requisitioned first by the French in their retreat, then by the British in their advance, then by the French again, and then by the British. Since that time troops had been continually passing and repassing, so the supply could hardly have been ample.

It appears that an order had been sent to Olite to countermand the march, but that the cavalry had started before its arrival.

While halted the Regiment was quartered in the villages of Buenza, Ciganda, Borasain, Aristigue, Musquiz, Garrons, and Erize, all of which lay within two miles one of the other. At Buenza the headquarters of the Regiment were established. During this period, as we have stated, both the food for the men and the forage for the horses was very scarce.

On 7 November, after a six hours' scramble rather than march 'over mountains and roads, if possible ten thousand times worse' than before, half the Regiment, with Vivian in command, arrived at St. Estevan. On the road in one troop alone no fewer than twenty horses lost their shoes, and so covered with rocks and loose stones were these so-called roads that it was impossible for the shoeless horses to proceed.

The farriers were hard at work in the rear, and the road between St. Estevan and Arriaz was 'full of the 7th' in consequence.

An advance early on the morrow of the rest of the army was expected, and an immediate engagement in this case was probable, but being seven leagues from the position of Wellington's army the cavalry could not expect to be actively employed. Moreover, after a long march across such impossible ground the horses would hardly have been in any condition for a battle. As a matter of fact the British Army was then at Sarre in front of St. Pée, and the battle expected was that of the Nivelle.

The route appointed for the Regiment was towards Vera *viâ* Echallar or Lesaca along the banks of the Bidassoa.

The headquarters of the Regiment was expected to be in one of these two villages, Lesaca, as having been the headquarters of the army for so long, being the most probable site. The headquarters of the army were now at Vera, from which place France was in sight.

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On 8 November the Regiment was still at Buenza anxiously awaiting orders to advance.

Fighting at the front was reported to be in progress, but at a distance of eight leagues, owing to the direction of the wind, no sounds of artillery could be heard.

Colonel Vivian appears to have ridden forward and was personally a spectator of the greater part of the battle, of which he gives a description.

On 12 November the 7th Hussars were at Sarre and Vera, the advanced squadron under Colonel Kerrison being at the first-named place, the remaining three being at Vera. The village of Sarre had suffered much during the battle—the houses had been deserted by the inhabitants and plundered. They were now full of wounded men. The country



SARRE

had improved in character but was still unfavourable for cavalry operations.

Colonel Vivian was now promoted to the command of a cavalry brigade, and appears to have felt the greatest regret at being therefore compelled to leave his old regiment, the 7th Hussars.

His command was posted between Cambo and Laressore, and formed a portion of General Hill's division. Laressore is situated on the river Nive, between Cambo and Ustarits. On leaving the 7th Colonel Vivian wrote a valedictory letter to the Regiment. To this letter he appears to have received a reply which caused him, from the coldness of its expression, considerable pain.

The British cavalry at this time was employed in covering the rear towards Navarreux, Oloron, and Pau, where the French cavalry was posted. Three British brigades, viz. those of Vandaleur, Alten and Vivian, were stationed there, but they were weak in strength and all told only amounted to two thousand men. Cannon, referring to this period, tells us that two additional troops joined from England in October.

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These appear to be the two belated troops of which Vivian writes, and of whose whereabouts and fate he had felt some anxiety.

Cannon continues as follows :—

'After the surrender of the Castle of San Sebastian the Regiment advanced, and having joined the army, supported the infantry at the passage of the Bidassoa, and advanced as far as Vera on the borders of France.'

When Colonel Vivian was appointed to the command of a cavalry brigade, the command of the Regiment devolved on Lieutenant-Colonel Edward Kerrison. After advancing as far as Vera the Regiment 'subsequently retired through the Pyrenees to the vicinity of Pampeluna, which fortress surrendered on the 31st of October.' The Manuscript Regimental Record says the same, and then proceeds :—

'After occupying village cantonments near Pampeluna for several weeks, the Seventh Hussars marched through the Pyrenees and joined the army in France. On the 18th of December they took the outpost duty at Cambo, a town eight miles from Bayonne, where the French Army, under Marshal Soult, lay in a fortified Camp.'

On 23 December Vivian writes: 'The 7th are now at Hasparren. From Fellows I hear that they have already been three days without bread—literally starving—and two men have shot themselves.'

Vivian's brigade was now changed and he was placed in command of the 18th Hussars and the 1st Hussars of the King's German Legion. He was in hopes of being able to get an exchange made by the substitution of the 7th for the German Hussars, but this did not prove possible.


On 31 December the Regiment took outpost duty on the road leading to St. Jean Pied de Port, where a French division was stationed.

On 1 January Colonel Vivian took over the command of his new brigade at Hasparren. Two days later the 7th were also placed temporarily under his command, though why this took place we are not told. He was, however, 'delighted to see them'; and for the last two days to have dined Thornhill, Fraser, Kerrison, and Lowther—dinners to them probably very welcome, as stores and provisions of all kinds were extremely lacking.

It appears that at Hasparren the Regiment went into cantonments for the winter. Hasparren is in Gascony and is situated about thirteen miles from Bayonne. Forage for the horses was, as usual, extremely

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scarce, and the animals suffered in condition accordingly. Three pounds of oats per diem was all the corn that could be allowed. Hay was not to be procured, and as a substitute the Regimental Record states that 'chopped gorse' was employed. In all probability 'pounded gorse' was meant. This was used by many regiments in the Peninsula campaign. We believe that pounding gorse for feeding cattle is Irish in its origin and was possibly introduced by Irish soldiers. Half a century ago in Ulster there was often to be seen outside a cabin a rough half-circle of stones against a wall, or a circle near, in which gorse used to be pounded by means of a block of stone through which a hole had been bored for a long wooden handle. Pounded gorse, however, is a very bad food for horses, as more than one regiment discovered to its cost. While at Hasparren foraging expeditions were frequent in the direction of the French lines. During these excursions skirmishes on a small scale were by no means rare. Usually there were no casualties, or at any rate no mention of casualties, save once, is to be met with, when Captain Peter Augustus Heyliger was wounded. On the question of forage, Vivian writes as follows: 'At present we are much crippled also by a want of forage; but when the grass begins to grow, the valleys of this country are so fertile that they will afford us excellent green forage, and get up the horses that are not starved between this and then; and we shall then, I conclude, think of moving on. I expect it will be by marching towards Dax; but much is to be done between this and then. Instead of saying we are crippled for want of forage, I should have said that our cavalry are literally starving: neither hay nor corn! The country is exhausted by the number of troops that are feeding on it.'



OLD ROMAN BRIDGE, ST. PÉE (ON THE NIVELLE)

The health of the officers of the 7th during the second week of January

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appears to have been very bad. Vivian tells us that 'Churnside [Chermside], I am sorry to say, is seriously ill still. Lowther has been in bed for six days, but writes me word this morning that he is better. As soon as he is able to move he is to come to my house to stay. . . . Pipon has been very ill and still looks dreadfully so. Uniacke is in hospital in the rear, and Kerrison and Thornhill have been ailing. Old Irvin is more altered than any man I ever saw.' On 28 January Lowther is reported better and residing with Colonel Vivian.

Of the campaign of 1814 Cannon writes as follows: 'The weather having become more clear, the army advanced in the middle of February, and on the 24th the Hussar Brigade proceeded to the bank of the Gave d'Oléron, in the expectation of being engaged. Captain Fraser and twelve men of the 7th passed the river under a heavy fire, and were followed by Captain Verner's squadron, for the purpose of supporting a body of infantry which had crossed the stream and were seriously engaged; but the enemy being in force, and the ground such that cavalry could not act, the squadron was recalled. The enemy abandoning his position, the Regiment crossed the river in pursuit and halted at the village of Boren.' The Manuscript Regimental Record agrees with this account *verbatim*.

The forward movement of the British and their allies began on 13 February.

On 24 February Wellington determined to cross the river Gave d'Oléron. Vivian gives details of the crossing of the river which tell us more, but do not as far as numbers are concerned agree with Cannon.

'Lord Wellington yesterday passed the Gave d'Oléron above Sauveterre with the 2nd and Light Division, and a Portuguese and Spanish Division, and my old brigade of Cavalry. He had no fighting. At Sauveterre was the 3rd Division, with Lord E. Somerset's Brigade of Cavalry, with orders to threaten a passage there, but not to cross.

'Somehow or other through Sir S. Cotton or Picton, the Light Companies of John Keane's Brigade passed, and, not being supported, they were driven back with the loss of five officers and forty men killed and wounded. . . . There were very high words between Picton and Cotton on the disaster happening, and I expect some inquiry will follow. . . . I must tell you how gallantly our friend Fraser behaved; and I beg of

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you to write the account to Lady Fraser, from me. It will so delight her—Sir William at least. Sir S. Cotton called for a subaltern and six men of the 7th to lead the way across the river in order to show the ford to the Infantry; and, no subaltern being immediately in front of the regiment, there was a trifling delay of sending to the rear of a Squadron for one; upon which, Sir S. Cotton reflected on the slowness of the Hussars, and said he wished he had one of the old brigades there. Fraser was by, and heard this, and he most gallantly said, " Subaltern or captain, it is no matter which, I will take the six men over, and lead the way across." And this he did through a most difficult and deep ford (so bad that several infantry were drowned), and under a very severe fire of the enemy's infantry from a house on the other side, and he was the first man that landed. As God's mercy would have it, neither he nor any of his men were touched. How they escaped is wonderful!'

Cannon continues as follows :—

'Marshal Soult concentrated his forces behind the Pau at Orthes; the allies advanced to attack him; and the Seventh Hussars, having crossed the river, were engaged in driving the enemy from his position on the 27th of February. About 10 o'clock the regiment was ordered to cover the Sixth Division and the guns; and when the French gave way, it dashed forward in pursuit, and by a brilliant charge overthrew a body of opponents, and took sixty prisoners. Shortly after the regiment was again ordered to charge, and being led forward by Colonel Kerrison with signal gallantry, it was once more successful, and sixteen officers, with about 700 men were made prisoners. The Marquis of Wellington observed in his public despatch: " Lieutenant-General Sir Stapleton Cotton took advantage of the only opportunity which occurred, to charge, with Major-General Lord Edward Somerset's Brigade in the neighbourhood of Sault de Navailles, where the enemy had been driven from the high road by Lieutenant-General Sir Rowland Hill. The Seventh Hussars distinguished themselves upon this occasion and made many prisoners." The Regiment had four men and five horses killed; Major William Thornhill, Captain P. A. Heyliger, Lieutenant Robert Douglas, nine men and eleven horses wounded.'

Vivian adds a good deal to this account: 'After about three hours' very severe fighting the enemy began to give way on every point, but still

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retiring regularly and defending their ground from position to position until towards five o'clock, when they were completely *en déroute!*

'The ground was altogether excessively unfavourable for cavalry; but towards evening our old friends the 7th were fortunate enough, with three troops—Heyliggen's [Heyliger's], Lowther's and Elphinstone's—to get in among their broken infantry. Kerrison and Thornhill were of the party. Nothing, I understand, could have behaved better than the dear old regiment.

'Thornhill charged an officer with a colour, who, with the pike at the end of it, struck him in the stomach, but not severely, and he secured both the colour and the officer, and walked back (for he was in too much pain to ride) with his trophy, and met Lord Wellington, who was much pleased; and I hope it will secure him the rank of Lieut.-Colonel. Poor Heyliggen is again wounded severely, in the thigh.'


It is somewhat strange that this gallant act on the part of Major Thornhill should have been unmentioned in the Manuscript Regimental Record and in consequence probably in Cannon. That Colonel Vivian is correct in his statement cannot be doubted. It is of interest, however, to endeavour to decide what sort of 'colour' it was that with its bearer was captured by Major Thornhill. Now it was not an 'Eagle,' for the 'Eagles' captured were but few and their history is known. Moreover, too, Colonel Vivian would certainly have designated an 'Eagle' by its official name: its capture would have been a very important matter both regimentally and in a wider sense. What was it, then? Probably the 'guidon' of one of the French Provisional Regiments. These possessed pikes at the end of the staff and also a miniature axe-head. An 'Eagle' had no pike-head, neither had it an axe-head. In the Museum of the Royal United Service Institution are two examples of these French provisional regimental guidons. The very accuracy of detail, therefore, contained in Vivian's letter helps us to determine a means of reconciling statement with fact on this point. Unfortunately it has not been possible to ascertain the fate of the captured colour, and it is to be feared that it has disappeared. The guidons alluded to above belonged to the 22nd and 62nd Provisional Regiments and were captured at Salamanca.

Colonel Vivian also tells us that 'Douglas had his horse killed and Robbins his wounded.'

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
The loss of the British during the day was about three thousand men; that of the enemy much greater, besides a considerable number of prisoners and guns, &c. Another account gives the British loss as two thousand three hundred, and that of the French four thousand in killed and wounded and six guns.

From Alison we get a detail of the charge made by the 7th Hussars: 'Cotton charged on the only occasion that presented itself, at the head of Somerset's Dragoons and the 7th Hussars, three battalions of the enemy, which he broke, and made 300 prisoners, but although 2000 more threw down their arms in an enclosed field, the greater part contrived to escape across the river which was not far distant.'



Another version is as follows:—

'Sir S. Cotton then, breaking with Somerset's Brigade through a small covering body opposed to him by Harispe, cut off about 2000 men. The 7th Hussars cut them off in an enclosed field, but some confusion occurring, the greatest part, recovering their weapons, escaped. The pursuit ceased at Luy de Béarn.'



Whatever happened, it is clear that the 7th distinguished themselves particularly on the occasion, for in the concluding passage of Wellington's despatch we read: 'The charge made by the 7th Hussars, under Lord E. Somerset, was highly meritorious.' It will be observed that except in Cannon and the Manuscript Regimental Record there is no mention of the fact that the 7th Hussars delivered two charges during the battle and that they captured prisoners in both.

Cannon continues:—

'After the battle of Orthes the Seventh Hussars were employed a short time at Villeneuve de Marsan, in the Department of the Landes;

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also at Roquefort and Captieux, in protecting the rear of the army from the depredations of parties of brigands. From these quarters the regiment advanced, and rejoining the army near Toulouse, supported the infantry in the action at that place on the 10th of April.'

The early days of March were most unpropitious; the frost and snow were excessive. On their way to Captieux the Regiment suffered considerably. The route lay over sixteen miles of sandy desert; the road was a dead flat and destitute of houses.

It is in this district that the inhabitants make a large use of stilts. Raised about four feet from the ground, their appearance caused much astonishment to the troops when first seen. It is said that Buonaparte himself evinced considerable alarm at his first view of what he took to be strange monsters.

Early in March—that is to say, prior to 15 March—Major Thornhill suffered a misfortune. He was surprised in bed by some partisans (Vivian calls them gendarmes), but they were in fact brigands acting for the French. Thornhill was taken prisoner, but managed to escape while the rogues were employed in taking his horses out of the stable. One of his men was, however, captured, as well as the horses and all his wardrobe.


This took place at Villeneuve de Marsan. Commenting upon it, Vivian writes:—

'He was sleeping in the very bed in which I had slept before. He fancies they took him for me; but they would not have caught me so! It is a bad business; very disgraceful to the regiment, and not creditable to Thornhill—I fear it will cause a serious inquiry. There never was a post so easily guarded as Villeneuve. At a bridge, at the entrance of the place, which I barricaded, and where I had a picket, he had none. The old fool!'

Soult, it appears, having failed to raise the country against the British and their allies, had established these partisan corps in their rear.

One of them on 17 March captured four officers and thirty men between Orthes and St. Sever; and a second destroyed a brigade of mules between Mont-Marsan and Villeneuve. These were the men who captured Major Thornhill *pro tem.*

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It appears that it was to watch these very partisans that the 7th Hussars and a Portuguese corps had been left in the rear.

On 28 March we find the 7th Hussars with the Hussar Brigade watching the two great roads leading from Auch and Boulogne.

The affair at Croix d'Orade took place the same day, but as the 7th were not engaged we need not do more than mention it.

On 3 April Lord E. Somerset's Cavalry Brigade, then at Colomien, accompanied by Vivian's Cavalry Brigade and the 3rd, 4th, 6th and Light Divisions, marched at 11 P.M. Their destination was Grenade, where it was purposed to arrive at daybreak and throw a bridge across the river Garonne. This was done in three and a half hours, and the troops began to cross at 9 A.M. on 4 April.

The crossing was in this order: The 4th Division, Vivian's Cavalry, the 6th Division, half of Lord E. Somerset's Brigade, the 3rd Division, the other half of Lord E. Somerset's Brigade, and lastly a brigade of Heavy Dragoons, though how these last came to be with the force is not mentioned previously.

The Spaniards, the Light Division, and the Germans crossed on the 5th.

The weather was extremely bad, and the men after a long and heavy night march were drenched to the skin and up to their knees in mud.

The crossing was unopposed by Soult. A few small bodies of French cavalry were sent out by him to observe the British, but these were soon driven away. As a matter of fact, Soult missed a great opportunity of dealing a smart stroke against the British. Why he did not attempt to do so has never been accurately determined.

The heavy rain rendered the pontoon bridge impassable, and the communication was not re-established till early on the morning of the 8th, when the bridge was again laid down and Frere's Spaniards and the Portuguese crossed.

Wellington's army was then united and he was enabled to advance to Fenoulhiet, a place within five miles of Toulouse.

Peace, so long expected, was now on the point of being proclaimed.

When the French withdrew from Toulouse, the Regiment moved forward and was employed on outpost duty.

At length came the abdication of Buonaparte and the restoration of the Bourbons; and then peace was proclaimed.

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With peace the Regiment went for a month into cantonments in various villages. On 1 June it began its march for Boulogne, and on arrival embarked for England.

In connection with the Peninsula Campaign and as a testimony to the gratitude felt by the officers of the 7th Hussars to both Lord Vivian and Colonel Kerrison, whose distinguished services had done so much for the Regiment, during the month of August 1814 handsome presentations of plate were made. The letters referring thereto and the replies received are here given. The officers at that date must have been very wealthy men.

A Piece of Plate

Presented to Major-General Vivian by the Officers of the 7th Hussars.

'Romford, *29th July* 1814.

'Sir,

'Your promotion to the rank of Major-General having removed you from the command of the 7th Hussars, it is the anxious wish of the Officers to express to you their acknowledgements for the services you have rendered that regiment during the ten years you have been at the head of it;—and they have deputed us to request, in their names, your acceptance of a piece of plate, of Three Hundred Guineas Value, as a token of the esteem and respect which they feel for your character; of the high sense they entertain of your exertions for the welfare of the 7th Hussars; and of your merits as an officer; they beg to assure you, that it will be their constant endeavour to maintain the regiment in that excellent state of discipline to which your unremitting attention has brought it; it is with sincere pleasure we execute the task deputed to us, being, by long experience, convinced of your value, and of the loss we shall sustain by being deprived of your society. Allow us to subscribe ourselves, Sir,

'Your very faithful and obedient Servants,

'Edward Hodge, Major,
'Thomas Pipon, Captain,
'J. Robins, Captain,
'S. O.'Grady, Lieutenant,
of the 7th Hussars.

'To Major-General Vivian.'

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The reply of General Vivian :—

'WEYMOUTH, *3rd August* 1814.

'GENTLEMEN,

'I am unable to express to you as I could wish how much flattered I feel by the very handsome manner in which the Officers of the 7th Hussars have, through you, requested my acceptance of a piece of plate, of three hundred guineas value: this extraordinary mark of their favour was not, believe me, necessary to endear me to the remembrance of a corps, to be separated from which occasioned me the most sincere regret. I accept it with pleasure and with gratitude; it conveys an immediate and most gratifying proof of the esteem of those whose good opinion I value so highly; and it will hereafter, should I ever reach that period when time shall have obliterated from my memory the days of my youth, remind me of those friends in whose society I passed the happiest of them, and of that regiment in the command of which I experienced the proudest. I beg of you to assure the officers of the 7th Hussars, that it was owing to their zeal and attention, to the support I invariably received from them, and to that unanimity which ever existed, more than to any merits or exertions of mine, that the regiment whilst under my command, preserved the high character it had previously established; and I am confidently persuaded that they will by persevering in a similar conduct, continue to maintain its discipline and uphold its reputation. For yourselves, Gentlemen, permit me to thank you for the very kind expressions of your partiality, with which you have conveyed the communication of your brother officers, and to subscribe myself,

'Your very obliged and very faithful Servant,

'R. H. VIVIAN, Major-General,

'and Lieut.-Col. 7th Hussars.

'To Major Hodge, Capt. Pipon, Capt. Robins,
and Lieut. O'Grady, 7th Hussars.'

PIECE OF PLATE

Presented to Colonel (now Major-General Sir E.) Kerrison.

The officers of the 7th Hussars, in 1814, presented a Piece of Plate, of

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two hundred guineas value, to Colonel Kerrison of that Regiment, with the following letter :—

'SIR,

'The Officers of the 7th Hussars, anxious to express their admiration [of the manner] in which you led that Regiment on the 27th of February last, at the battle of Orthes, have deputed us to request your acceptance of a piece of plate, of two hundred guineas value, which they trust you will receive as a token, not only of the highest respect excited by your conduct on that day, but also as a mark of the regard and esteem which they feel for your character as a private individual. Permit us, Sir, to assure you, that it is with unfeigned pleasure we execute the task assigned to us by our brother officers, happy in the opportunity of paying a tribute of our esteem where it is so justly due.

'Believe us to be, Sir,

'Your very faithful and obedient Servants,

'EDWARD HODGE, Major,
'WILLIAM VERNON, Captain,
'J. D. ELPHINSTONE, Captain,
'S. O'GRADY, Lieutenant,
'7th Hussars.

'To Colonel Kerrison, 7th Hussars.'

To which letter Colonel Kerrison replied in the following terms :—

'ROMFORD, *3d August*, 1814.

'GENTLEMEN,

'With heart-felt pleasure, I have received your letter, expressing the intentions with which my brother officers have honoured me. So gratifying a pledge of their esteem I accept with pride; but let me request to assure them, that if in the discharge of my military duty at the battle of Orthes, I merited their approbation, I shall ever attribute it to the gallant and highly meritorious manner in which my endeavours were seconded by every officer and private in the 7th Hussars. Justly may I exult in the assurance of the regard and esteem of friends beloved by me—a feeling which I trust no distinction on either side will ever forfeit—and justly will I appreciate so flattering a testimony of their good opinion. Allow me Gentlemen, to express my thanks for the very

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handsome manner in which you have conveyed the sentiments of the regiment; and I beg you will be assured of the sincere regard of

'Your most obliged and obedient
'Humble Servant,
'EDWARD KERRISON,
'Col. and Lieut.-Col. 7th Hussars.

'To Major Hodge, Capt. Vernon, Capt. Elphinstone, and Lieut. O'Grady, 7th Hussars.'

With regard to these handsome presents it may be remarked that their bestowal on General Vivian and Colonel Kerrison was entirely in defiance of an order dated 18 January, 1810.

18 *January* 1810.—Presents of plate, swords, &c., from officers, non-commissioned officers and men being under command or who have served under the command of any officer had been forbidden, 18 January 1810. This order was the subject of a reiteration on 16 October 1839. As will be seen above, the order was apparently disregarded in the case of Lord Vivian and Colonel Kerrison.

Through the kindness of Lady Bateman we are enabled to insert the following interesting particulars regarding the life of Sir E. Kerrison and also an account of his chargers and their fate.

Born 1774. Enlisted in a regiment quartered near his home and remained in the ranks for six months, when his father purchased him a cornetcy in the Inniskilling Dragoons.

Served in Flanders. Present at Bergen [? Bergheim] and Alkina [?]. 1808, Spain with Sir John Moore. Fought at Leon and Coruña. [?] In latter badly wounded: arm broken in two places.[1] Sent on board ship *Tonnant*. His charger 'Blake' went down in *Despatch* transport and all his kit. Married same year. He now had the rank of Lieut.-Colonel.

Close of 1810 again ordered abroad to Peninsula. Ships delayed at Portsmouth. Great sea-sickness. Sailed from Stokes Bay to Yarmouth. Disembarked on Spanish coast. Present at Badajos, Salamanca, and Orthes.

'At this latter engagement he had full command of the regiment

[1] Elsewhere we give an account of this occurrence, which took place during the retreat and not at Coruña itself.

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COLONEL SIR EDWARD KERRISON, K.C.B., M.P.

1818.

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and won the admiration of his brother officers by the able way in which he acted, and they stated that the credit of the victory was due to him.'

After he had recovered from his wounds received during the campaign, and was again in London, his brother officers knowing that his name had been omitted in the despatches relating to the Battle of Orthes, invited him to a dinner at which they had previously requested Lord Anglesey to preside and to present Colonel Kerrison with a gold cup, a copy of the Warwick Vase, bearing the following inscription :—

Presented by the Officers of the
7th Queen's Own Hussars
to
Colonel Sir E. Kerrison in token of the respect
excited by his conduct at the Battle of Orthes,
February 27, 1814, and as a mark of the regard
and esteem they feel towards him.
August 1814.

'On the memorable occasion of the Battle of Waterloo Colonel Kerrison had three regiments under his command, and the cannon ball which struck the Marquis of Anglesey wounded Sir Edward Kerrison severely in the leg and killed his horse under him. He, however, remounted and continued to lead the troops until the end of the battle, when he was removed to Brussels for surgical treatment, but he never recovered his walking powers after this accident.

'Sir Edward Kerrison during his military career, had both arms, both legs, a collar bone and other bones broken, but entirely recovered from all his wounds with the exception of the injury to his leg which contracted and compelled him to retire from his military career in 1819. He was then raised to the rank of Major General, and later to that of full General, and was given the Colonelcy of the 14th Light Dragoons.'

He did not accompany the 14th to India, of course. Many Indian sporting trophies were, however, presented to him by the officers of the Regiment on its return to England, and these are still preserved at Oakley Park, Eye, Suffolk.

King George IV sent for General Kerrison to his private apartment

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in order to invest him with the Star and Badge of the Guelphic Order, and said :—

'Remember, my good fellow, we are old acquaintances, and your merits and conduct on all occasions in your profession have been observed by me, and it gives me as much pleasure to hand you these marks of my esteem as it can give you to receive them. You can write to your father and say I placed them on with my own hands.'

Queen Victoria personally invested General Kerrison with the Order of the Bath.

General Sir E. Kerrison unofficially visited Napoleon at the Tuileries during the Hundred Days and conversed with him.

A monumental cross was erected to the memory of Sir Edward Kerrison's chargers in Oakley Park by Lady Kerrison. It bears the following inscription :—

'To the Memory of the Favourite Chargers of Lt.-General Sir Edward Kerrison, Bart., K.C.B., G.C.H., &c.

'"Forrester" carried the young soldier in 1799 and 1800 at the Battles of Bergheim and Alkma, and in the succeeding actions of the 2nd and 6th of October.

'"Blake" was first Charger in the Campaigns of 1808 and 1809 in Spain, where Sir Edward Kerrison was very severely wounded, and he afterwards followed his disabled Master on a long and harassing march, from the plains of Leon to Coruña, where the British Army embarked for England.

'In consideration for the Lieut.-Colonel's wounds, the Admiral in command gave him a passage home in H.M.S. *Tonnant*, while poor "Blake" shared a harder fate with the Officers, Men, Crew, Horses, &c., who were all wrecked in a crazy transport, and perished in sight of the English shore. Thus died this noble and faithful steed, so remarkable for beauty, action and speed, that, when on the point of embarkation for Spain, H.R.H. The Prince Regent offered to purchase him at the price of 500 guineas.

'"Harlequin" replaced this loss. He was trained at a very early age by his Master, and carried Sir Edward Kerrison when commanding a Regiment in the Campaigns of 1813 and 1814; led the very Gallant Charge of the 7th Hussars at the Battle of Orthes; and was also in the

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actions of Toulouse and "Sandeterne" [Sauveterre], &c. &c. "Harlequin" then had the honour of serving in the Netherlands after the return of Buonaparte from Elba, where his fine training and docility were the means of saving his Master's life; in an attack of French Lancers on the 17th June 1815, a wound received on this day, disabled "Harlequin" from bearing a part in the glorious Battle of Waterloo, where Sir Edward Kerrison's second charger ("Gift") was shot under him by a cannonball, which also wounded his master. "Harlequin" returned to his native land, and enjoyed a long life of repose and liberty in Oakley Park, where he died at a very old age, and is buried under a chesnut tree near this spot.

'"Rufus," the last of the Chargers, was buried on this terrace in 1842.

'Grateful for Life, preserved for Glory won
On many a field from Tagus to Garonne;
Remembering those whose speed the Warrior bore
To Strife and Conquer on that Foreign shore;
Whose honest Heart was all their Master's own,
Who moved, who lived, who died, for him alone
To them a Wife this votive Tablet rears,
Thankful for past, Hopeful for coming years.'

It is seldom that so complete an account of the favourite chargers of an officer can be obtained.

We conclude this chapter with the Peninsula Medal Roll, derived from the original documents in the War Office. It is, of course, to be understood that the list only contains the names of those officers, non-commissioned officers and men who were surviving in 1847, the year in which the medal was awarded, it being minted in 1848.

THE PENINSULA MEDAL ROLL.—OFFICERS 7TH HUSSARS.

Names.	Clasps.
Blake, Andrew	Orthes, Toulouse
Chermside,	Nive, Toulouse.
'Cholmley,' George	Sahagun and Benevente.
Davis, T. B.	Sahagun and Benevente.
Descars, The Duke	Orthes ('Corunna for D'Escars'), Toulouse.
Edwards, William	('Orthes?') 'not found, see correspondence, says he was a sergeant at Orthes, report being on command, disallowed.'
Elphinstone,	Orthes, Toulouse.
Goodwin, F. G.	Sahagun and Benevente.
Grenfell, Wm.	Orthes, Toulouse.
Guillamore, Visct. } Standish O'Grady }	Orthes, Toulouse.

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Names.	Clasps.
Hamlyn (Hamlyn-Williams)	Orthes, Toulouse.
Heyliger,	Orthes, Nive.
Kerrison,	Sahagun and Benevente, Orthes, Toulouse.
Long,	Sahagun and Benevente.
Lowther,	Sahagun and Benevente, Orthes, Toulouse.
Moffit, Dr. Jas.	Orthes, Toulouse.
Pipon,	Sahagun and Benevente, Orthes, Toulouse.
Robeck, Baron	Sahagun and Benevente.
Robins (Robbins), T. W.	Orthes and Toulouse.
Shirley, Wm.	Orthes, Toulouse.
Stone,	Sahagun and Benevente.
Thomson, J. C.	Orthes, Toulouse.
Thornhill, W.	Sahagun and Benevente, Orthes.
Trewicke (Treweike), Geo.	Sahagun and Benevente.
Uniacke,	Orthes.
Verner, Sir W., Bart.	Sahagun and Benevente, Orthes, Nive, Toulouse.
Wildman, John	Orthes.
Wildman, Thomas	Sahagun and Benevente, Orthes, Toulouse.

PENINSULA MEDAL ROLL.—NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS AND PRIVATES arranged by Troops, at least as far as the Official Manuscript Lists in the War Office permit.

1. Those the names of whose officers are given :

Name.	Officer.	Clasps.
Onion,	Thornhill	Orthes (' remark ' not at Sahagun)

[It will be remembered that only twelve men of the Regiment, under Captain Thornhill, were at Sahagun.]

Staples, James	Thornhill	Orthes, Toulouse.
Johnson, John	,,	Sahagun and Benevente, Orthes, Toulouse (died before issue).
Robinson, John	,,	Sahagun and Benevente.
Seaman, Thomas	,,	Sahagun and Benevente, Nive, Orthes, Toulouse.
Atkin, Robert	,,	Sahagun and Benevente, Orthes.
Hewitt, Wm.	,,	Sahagun and Benevente, Orthes.
Lenton, Jas.	,,	Sahagun and Benevente, Orthes, Toulouse.
Bales, Wm.	,,	Sahagun and Benevente.
Dean, James	,,	Sahagun and Benevente.
Booth, James	Brewer (evidently an error)	Orthes.
Brown, Wm.	Verner	Orthes, Toulouse.
Bagnall, Thos.	,,	Sahagun and Benevente.
Eggleton, Wm.	,,	Orthes.
Hufton, John	,,	Orthes.
Leadle, Matthew	' Vernon ' (Verner)	Sahagun and Benevente, Toulouse.
Woodley, Wm.	Verner	Orthes, Toulouse.
Binfield, Wm.	,,	Orthes, Toulouse.
Finck, Wm.	' Vernon ' (Verner)	Nive, Toulouse.
Wigan, Rupert	Verner	Nive, Orthes, Toulouse.
Reed, Francis	,,	Sahagun and Benevente.

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Name.	Officers.	Clasps.
Reeves, John, Corporal	'Vernor' (Verner)	Orthes.
Smith, Robt.	,,	Sahagun and Benevente.
Skinner, Josiah, Sergeant	,,	Orthes.
Sawteel, Jas.	Verner	Orthes, Toulouse.
Passmore, Thos.	Fraser	Orthes.

[Fraser was in the 7th and a captain in 1813, but his name does not appear in the Officers' Medal List.]

Tuckwell, Jas.	Fraser	Orthes, Toulouse.
Wilkins, John	,,	Sahagun and Benevente, Orthes.
Bridges, Wm.	,,	Orthes.
Jacob, James	,,	Toulouse '(? Vittoria and Badajos)'
Gerrard, Thos.	Dukenfield	Sahagun and Benevente, Orthes and Toulouse.

[Captain Dukenfield was drowned on return voyage from Coruña.]

Jervis, Thomas	Dukenfield	Sahagun and Benevente, Orthes, Toulouse.
Making, Richard	,,	Sahagun and Benevente.
Ferriday, John, Corporal	,,	Sahagun and Benevente.
Rawnsley, Robert	,,	Sahagan and Benevente, Orthes, Toulouse.
Piggott, William	Denshire	Sahagun and Benevente.
Whitesmith, Geo.	'Denshaw' (Denshire)	Orthes (granted but apparently not issued—probably died).
Lambley (or Lamley) Thos., Sergeant	,,	Sahagun and Benevente.
Bozier, John (not in final list)	,,	Sahagun and Benevente.
Dickenson, Robert	,,	Sahagun and Benevente.
Parrender, Thos.	Lowther	Orthes (? 'Toulouse' as is thus in revised list).
Smith, John, Sergt.-Major	,,	Orthes, Toulouse (died probably before issue).
Hambleton, George	,,	Orthes, Toulouse.
Berry, Thomas	,,	Toulouse.
Elsome, John	,,	Orthes, Toulouse.
Foxlow, Thomas	,,	Sahagun and Benevente, Toulouse.
Gregson, Wm., Sergt.	Hodge	Sahagun and Benevente.
Foster, Wm.	,,	Sahagun and Benevente.
Simpson, John	,,	Orthes, Toulouse.
Pick, Thomas	Elphinstone	Orthes, Toulouse.
Stace, James	'Elton' ? Elphinstone	Sahagun and Benevente, Toulouse.

[James Stace 'was found prisoner at Sahagun and Toulouse.']

[Against the name of this man is written 'Sahagun' instead of the clasp being merely marked IA with 'A' for allowed. Can it be that he was the sole survivor of the twelve men who were with Captain Thornhill at Sahagun ?]

Yapp, Wm.	Elphinstone	Orthes, Toulouse.
Ellington, Richard	,,	Sahagun and Benevente, Orthes, Toulouse (died before issue).
Minor, Thomas	,,	Orthes, Toulouse (died before issue).
Nightingale, Thomas, Troop Sergt. Maj.	,,	Orthes, Toulouse.
Trotter, John	Wildman	Orthes, Toulouse.
Ralf, Samuel	,,	Toulouse.

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Name.	Officer.	Clasps.
Worrall, Wm.	Wildman	Orthes.
Collins, Chas.	,,	Orthes, Toulouse (died before issue).
Salter, Edward, Sergeant	,,	Sahagun and Benevente, Nive, Orthes (died before issue).
Chandler, Robert	,,	Sahagun and Benevente(died before issue).
Jackson, Hammond	,,	Orthes.
Inwood (or Hinwood) Robt., Corporal	,,	Orthes, Toulouse.
Nicholson, Wm. Sergeant	,,	Sahagun and Benevente, Orthes.
Hall, Edward (? Edwin)	Treweike	Sahagun and Benevente, Orthes, Toulouse
Trindley, Wm.	'Cane' (Keane ?)	Orthes.

[This is a doubtful entry. There never was an officer of the name of 'Cane' in the Regiment. It may, however, stand for Keane. Trindley's name is not in the final revised alphabetical list, and he probably died or disappeared between the date on which his claim was allowed and that of the issue of the medal. Keane died before the issue of the medal also, as his name is not found among the officers on the list.]

Rawlings, William	Keane	Nive, Orthes, Toulouse (also died before issue).
Mason, Peter	,,	Orthes, Toulouse.
Holland, John, Sergt.	'Cain' (? Keane)	Orthes.
Hessey, Jas.	Pipon	Orthes, Toulouse.
Hooper, Wm., Sergt.	,,	Sahagun and Benevente, Nive, Orthes, Toulouse.
Lilley, Richard, Sergt.	,,	Toulouse.
Lee, Thos.	,,	Sahagun andBenevente(died before issue).
Beswick, Jas.	,,	Nive,Orthes, Toulouse(Nive and Toulouse subsequently disallowed).
Brillard, Wm.	,,	Orthes.
Bateman, Wm.	,,	Sahagun and Benevente (died before issue).
Brien, Jas., Sergt.	,,	Orthes.
Castles, Wm.	,,	Orthes.
Eastwood, Wm., Corpl.	,,	Sahagun and Benevente,Orthes,Toulouse,
Carter, Henry	,,	Nive, Orthes (died before issue).
Smith, Robert	,,	'Sahagun and Benevente' (?Nive,Orthes).
Stewart, John	,,	Orthes, Toulouse
Shinton, John	,,	Orthes, Toulouse.
Walker, John, Corporal (afterwards Troop Sergeant-Major)	Lovelace	Orthes.

[Lovelace was a captain, but left the Regiment in 1810.]

Chatterton, Jas.	Lovelace	Sahagun and Benevente ('pris. of war').
Deaton, Samuel	,,	Sahagun and Benevente.
Wilkins, George	Robbins	Toulouse (died).
Watson, Henry	,,	Orthes, Toulouse (died).
Davey, John	,,	Sahagun and Benevente, Orthes, Toulouse (died).
Plant, Jas.	,,	Sahagun and Benevente (died).
Bennett, Henry	,,	Orthes, Toulouse (died).
Dennett, James	,,	Sahagun and Benevente, Orthes, Toulouse.
Cooper, John	Heyliger	Orthes, Toulouse.

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Name.	Officer.	Clasps.
Walker, John, Tp. Serg.-Maj.	Heyliger	Orthes.
Wylde, Joseph	,,	Sahagun and Benevente, Orthes, Toulouse (died).
Hinson, Sykes	,,	Orthes (died).
Long, Samuel	,,	Orthes, Toulouse (died).
Knight, Francis, Corporal	,,	Orthes, Toulouse.
Noble, John	,,	Orthes, Toulouse.
Hall, Thomas	,,	Orthes.
Robinson, James	,,	Orthes, Toulouse.
Torr, John	,,	Orthes, Toulouse.
Crowe, George	Maddison	Orthes, Toulouse.
[Maddison retired as a lieutenant.]		
Collinsworth, Samuel	Cholmley	Sahagun and Benevente.
Clewley, Thomas	,,	Sahagun and Benevente, Orthes, Toulouse.
Lumley, Thomas	,,	Orthes, Toulouse (died).
Rising, Thomas, Sergeant	,,	Sahagun and Benevente.
Taylor, John	,,	Toulouse.
Cockrell, Chas.	Crawford	Sahagun and Benevente, Orthes, Toulouse.
Niell, Robert	,,	Sahagun and Benevente.
[The name of this officer should be Crauford.]		
Jackson, Edward	Roebeck	Sahagun and Benevente, Orthes, Toulouse.
Mason, John	Campbell	Orthes, Toulouse.
[Captain Campbell left Regiment February 1809.]		
Mortimer, John	Robinson	Orthes, Toulouse.
['Robinson' probably an error. No officer of this name was in the Regiment after 1757. Possibly intended for Robbins.]		
Hallsey, Thomas	Kerrison	Toulouse (died).
Hatherley, John	,,	Orthes (died).
Beswick, James (Sergt.)	,,	Nive, Orthes, Toulouse (died).
Charlwood, George	,,	Orthes, Toulouse (died).
Weaver, Samuel, 'Capt.'	Waldegrave	Orthes, Toulouse.
[Never a captain, drowned as a lieutenant after Coruña.]		
Walker, John	Vivian	Sahagun and Benevente.
Drake, Henry	,,	Orthes.
Roadley, Samuel	Hamlyn (or Hamlyn-Williams)	Orthes, Toulouse.
Davis, John	'B' Troop	Sahagun and Benevente, Nive, Orthes, Toulouse.
Devereux, John	'I' Troop	Orthes, Toulouse.
[It is not quite clear whether this man's claim to 'Sahagun and Benevente' was admitted or disallowed.]		
Payne, James	'A' Troop	Orthes, Toulouse (died).
Roddle, Robert	'B' troop	Sahagun and Benevente, Orthes, Toulouse.
Roberts, Alexander, Tp. Sergt.-Maj.	'I' Troop	Orthes, Toulouse.
Shaw, Edward (? John)	'B' Troop	Sahagun and Benevente.
Fielder, Thomas	Cav. Staff Corps	Sahagun and Benevente, Nivelle, Nive, (died)
Hasleum, Wm.	'F' Troop	Toulouse (died).
Miller, Benjamin	'I' or 'H' Troop ?	Orthes.

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Name.		Clasps.
While, Robert, Sergt.	Pay Sergeant	Orthes, Toulouse (? Toulouse).
Hitchen, John	Pay Dept.	Sahagun and Benevente (died).
Phillips, John	Cav. Staff Corps.	Sahagun and Benevente, Toulouse (died).
Wilson, Richard	'F' Troop	Orthes, Toulouse.
West, William	'H' Troop	Nive, Orthes.

These have neither Officers nor Troops :—

Name.	Clasps.
Gutterage, George	Orthes (died).
Holt, William	Sahagun and Benevente, Orthes.
Leach, Joseph	Sahagun and Benevente (died).
Bailey, George	Orthes, Toulouse.
Burrows, William	Sahagun and Benevente.
Freeman, James	Sahagun and Benevente, Toulouse.
Fish, William	Orthes.
Clare, James	Toulouse ('joined 9 March 1814').
Cotton, Edward (M. St. Jean, Belgium)	Orthes, Toulouse.
Day, John	Orthes, Toulouse.
Gibbs, Richard	Orthes.
Harris, George	Orthes, Toulouse.
James, Joseph	Orthes, Toulouse.
King, Charles, Sergt.	Vittoria ('pris. 5 April 1814, Bat. on 10th').
['As a private.'	He was the only King in the Regiment.]
Mountenay, John	Sahagun and Benevente, Orthes.
Lock, Henry	Orthes, Toulouse.
Oates, Stephen	Orthes, Toulouse.
Munt, William	Orthes, Toulouse.
Parsons, Henry	Orthes, Toulouse.
Saunders, Estridge	Orthes, Toulouse.
Walker, Thomas	Sahagun and Benevente.
West, Ephraim ('forgets')	Orthes.
Hooper, Jas.	Sahagun, Benevente, Orthes.
Hog, Robert ('New South Wales')	Orthes.
Hunt, James	Orthes, Toulouse.
Marshall, Elias	Sahagun and Benevente, Orthes.
Blunderfield, Wm.	Sahagun and Benevente.
Boice, Jeremiah	Sahagun and Benevente, Orthes.
Becket, Thomas	Toulouse.
Sage, Samuel	Orthes.
Robson, Wm.	Sahagun and Benevente, Toulouse.
['Private at Benevente :	Sergeant at Toulouse, ? Salamanca and Vittoria.']
Wright, Henry	Sahagun and Benevente, Orthes.
Finch (? Finck of Captain Verner's Troop), William	Nive, Toulouse (died).
Johnson, John	Sahagun and Benevente, Orthes, Toulouse.
Lumley, Thomas ? (Lamley, a Sergeant.)	Orthes, Toulouse.
Long, Samuel	Orthes, Toulouse.
Trotter, John	Orthes, Toulouse.
Tovey, Joseph	Orthes, Toulouse.

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A tradition has existed that a small detachment of the Regiment was present at the battle of Vittoria. A medal is stated to be in existence belonging to H. Lock and with the four clasps, Sahagun and Benevente, Vittoria, Orthes and Toulouse.

H. Lock never claimed either Sahagun and Benevente or Vittoria. He did claim Orthes and Toulouse, and both claims were allowed.

In all eight surviving men of the 7th laid claim to Vittoria, and in no single instance was the claim allowed.

Robson, William, claimed Vittoria and Salamanca: both were queried and neither allowed; Gibbs, Richard, 'Vittoria': not allowed; Finch, William, and Piggott, William: similarly. Patrick, John, claimed Salamanca; Roddle, Robert, Talavera, Salamanca, and Vittoria; Smith, Robert, Vittoria; Jacob, James, Vittoria and Badajos. Not one of these claims was allowed. The Manuscripts are at times rather amusing: evidently there were a good many bogus claims sent in—'Confesses he was not present'; 'Was in hospital'; 'Was in command,' &c., &c., are frequently met with under the heading of Remarks.



THE MEDAL OF THOMAS SEAMAN (7TH LIGHT DRAGOONS)

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CHAPTER XXII

HOME SERVICE—1814–1815

CANNON and the Manuscript Regimental Record coincide both in the brevity and the lack of interest in the account of the affairs of the 7th Hussars between their arrival home in 1814 and their departure on foreign active service again on 25 March 1815. We will give the account as it stands. 'After landing it marched to Romford and in September to Brighton. Its services were subsequently rewarded with the honour of bearing the word "PENINSULA" upon its appointments.

At the historic review held in Hyde Park before the Allied Sovereigns on 20 June 1814, the 7th Hussars were represented by a detachment consisting of four officers and eighty-one non-commissioned officers and men. This detachment must have been furnished from the depôt, as the Regiment only started on its homeward march across to Boulogne on 1 June, and on landing in England marched to Romford direct. The various regiments engaged were drawn up by 11 A.M. The review began at 11.30 and terminated at 3.30 P.M. The crowd, which was very great, required the employment of cavalry to keep a sufficient space clear for the troops. The proceedings were as follows: the Prince Regent, who rode between the King of Prussia and the Emperor of Russia and followed by Marshal Blucher and a brilliant staff, first rode down the lines. The several regiments then passed in review, and a *feu-de-joie* brought the function to a brilliant conclusion.

'1815.—Riots having occurred in London towards the end of February and in the beginning of March 1815, in consequence of the introduction into Parliament of a bill to regulate the importation of Grain, the Seventh Hussars were suddenly ordered to proceed thither from Brighton.'

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'THE CAVALRY JOURNAL.'
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THE ALLIED SOVEREIGNS REVIEWING THE TROOPS.

HYDE PARK. — 1814. — LONDON.

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As a matter of fact rioting did not actually occur in London until 6 March.

The absolute cause of the outbreak, which was of a most serious nature, was the re-introduction into Parliament of a Bill to prohibit the importation of corn, except when it had reached a price considered by the great body of consumers as exorbitant. The introducer of this Bill was Mr. Robinson, and the price to which corn was permitted to rise before importation was allowed was no less than 80 shillings a quarter. What took place was this. About the usual hour for the meeting of Parliament various groups of persons assembled in different parts: from George Street to Abingdon Street. The groups were not at first numerous, though their discussions on the proposed law were both hostile and noisy. The names of those members of the House who were known to favour the measure came in for no little abuse.

Previously a greater number of people than usual had congregated in the lobbies of the House, and constables had been called in and posted there to control them.

About 1 P.M. the doors of the gallery were opened and that place was immediately filled.

The passages, too, were choked, and were cleared only after great trouble. Westminster Hall was closed and guarded by constables; only the portico passage opposite to Westminster Abbey being left open. No strangers were permitted to pass. The people who had been turned out of the House then took up their position outside, and as the Members drove up, accorded them a favourable or a hostile reception according to the political opinions they were known to hold, or were supposed to hold.

The mob now raised the cry 'No Corn Bill,' and their shouting was distinctly audible in the House. They next began to stop carriages and to compel the occupants to walk through the hooting and hissing crowd. The civil power was then deemed insufficient for the protection of the Members, and the magistrates, having applied to the Speaker, received an order to call in the aid of the military to act under them and to preserve order.

The Attorney-General, Mr. Croker, and Sir R. Heron fared rather badly at the hands of the mob, and the coat of the latter was torn off. By this time the troops had arrived, and they soon cleared the ground

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near the House and suppressed the tumult there, but the populace at once repaired to other parts of London.

About 10 P.M. that night Lord Eldon's house in Bedford Square was wrecked. Troops that had been quartered at the Museum were sent for and got into the house by the back way, but too late to save the furniture. Soon after 11 P.M. a detachment of the Horse Guards arrived and dispersed the mob. Two prisoners were taken in Lord Eldon's house. Mr. Robinson's house was next attacked, every window was broken, the door was burst in, the implements used for that purpose being the iron railings outside the area; the pictures were cut and slashed, much valuable furniture destroyed and the rest thrown out of window. The houses of Lord Darnley, Mr. Yorke, Lord Hardwicke, Lord Ellenborough, Mr. Wellesley Pole, and of a Mr. Brown, a tax-gatherer, were injured as far as their railings and windows were concerned.

The troops employed on this day appear to have been the Royal Horse Guards and the three regiments of Foot Guards, the latter having twenty-four rounds of ball cartridge served out to each man. Measures were at once taken to forward troops to London from the provinces.

The 7th Hussars marched with rapidity from Brighton.

On the morrow the crowd re-assembled in considerable strength near the Houses of Parliament, and also around the dwellings of Members who were known to support the unpopular measure. The appearance, however, of the troops, who repeatedly patrolled the streets, kept the mob tolerably quiet. About 7 P.M. the windows of Lord Castlereagh's house in St. James's Square were broken. Mr. Robinson's house was this night occupied by some troops. The shutters to the smashed windows were all closed, and these the mob bombarded with large stones. From the house seven shots were fired, five being of blank and two of ball cartridge. A man in naval dress was killed, shot through the head—the mob, of course, bolted. About nine the house of the ex-M.P. of St. Ives, a Mr. Samuel Stephens, in Baker Street, had its railings demolished and windows broken. Next No. 38 Harley Street, a house occupied by an inoffensive old gentlewoman, was similarly treated. The mob then moved on to Portland Place; but here the troops were prepared for them, and the rioters turned off to Wimpole Street, where they smashed up the windows, &c., of Lord King and Sir William Rowley.

It appears that the rioters never numbered more than about fifty

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in a gang, but the gangs were numerous, and while the troops were engaged in routing one lot the others set to work in some other direction. In Mansfield Street the houses of Lord Bathurst, Lady Denny Floyd, and Mr. Thomas Hunter received similar treatment. The trouble now spread to the City, where a mob collected near Finsbury Square. They at once proceeded down Chiswell Street to Whitbread's brewhouse. Here they destroyed the windows with stones, and would have done more mischief had not a rumour reached them that the military forces were at hand, on which they fled. The House of Commons now adjourned. Down to the House *viâ* St. Martin's Lane marched the rioters, and gathered strength as they went. Having arrived at the House, and hearing that the adjournment had taken place, they set to work on the windows of the House itself, being disappointed in not being able to meet with and attack any obnoxious Members. The constables here were, as usual, powerless, and the Horse Guards were summoned. At sight the mob fled into St. Margaret's churchyard, whence they hooted the soldiers and cursed the Corn Bill with equal fervour. About 10 P.M. the work of devastation began again. Lord Castlereagh's house was attacked once more, but the cavalry (the 7th Hussars) dispersed the mob. The rioters then adjourned to Mr. Ponsonby's house in Curzon Street and did much damage to windows and railings, but from the inside of the house the inhabitants proceeded to fire ball cartridge through the door. This was not to the taste of the scamps who were endeavouring to break it in, and they made off. The house of Mr. Quintin Dick next door also suffered somewhat, though it is suggested that it was not intentional, but owing mainly to bad marksmanship on the part of the rioters. The cavalry (7th Hussars) had been hastily sent for to Mr. Ponsonby's house, but before they arrived the mob had made off and scattered. The scattered units, however, joined up again in Grosvenor Square, where they cheered before the house of Sir Gilbert Heathcote, an opponent of the bill, and then collecting in front of the Earl of Derby's mansion, having torn down the railings were just about to begin operations when the cavalry (7th Hussars) arrived, with the usual result.

The next place attacked was a house in Baker Street belonging to a Mr. John Morris, one of the directors of the Honourable East India Company. Now this house was only three minutes' walk from the cavalry barracks in King Street, yet so speedy was the mob in its work

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of destruction, that before the men of the Life Guards could mount, every window was smashed and the rioters had vanished.

In the house of Sir Joseph Banks much damage was done before the soldiers reached the spot—in this case the valuable private papers of the owner were thrown out of window and scattered in the street and in the area.

The printing-office of the *Morning Herald* now suffered, and then some houses in Lincoln's Inn Fields. Here in one house some blank cartridges were fired at the mob and they at once made off towards Bedford Square. Here they wished to find out and attack the house of Mr. Meux, the brewer, but did not succeed. While endeavouring to do so some cavalry (7th Hussars) appeared, and the mob fled. During that night Mr. Robinson's house, or what was left of it, was most strongly guarded. It seems that the Horse Guards were employed on patrol duty in and around the neighbouring streets and at a smart pace for many hours.

The back of the outbreak was now broken. Little or nothing occurred on the night of 9 March, except a slight attempt at disturbance in Holles Street, where a window was broken. A shot fired from the house, though it did not hit anybody, instead of stopping the window-breaking, increased it. More shots were fired and a boy was slightly wounded in the neck.

Great numbers of troops were now in London, and at length all rioting came to an end.

Elsewhere in England attempts to follow the example of the London mob were made, notably at Canterbury, but beyond the breaking of a few windows and the burning in effigy of an unpopular peer nothing happened. Two rioters were arrested.

Thus came to an end the Corn Law riots of 1815, riots in which much damage was done, but in which the loss of life was happily small. It should, however, be added that a coroner's jury returned a verdict of murder against two soldiers in the only cases in which deaths of rioters followed on the discharge of muskets or carbines. Swords, it may be observed, do not appear to have been brought into use.

Meanwhile the political situation was as follows:

The Congress of Vienna was sitting and was employed mainly in wrangling over the division of the spoils, as is the wont of Congresses in

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By Horace Vernet.

A GALLOPER.

1814.

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general. Napoleon, Europe hoped, had been safely caged in Elba, surrounded by his mimic court; though of the security of the bars of his cage few of the members of the Congress felt assured.

Among the members of the Congress was Lord Wellington.

By February 1815 Napoleon had determined to make an attempt to regain what he had lost. By 1 March he had landed at Cannes, and by 20 March Louis XVIII, the restored Bourbon King, had fled from the Tuileries and the Corsican usurper was installed there again. The Congress at Vienna, on hearing the news, is said to have burst into a roar of laughter and then to have broken up.

Europe was immediately in arms on receipt of the news of Napoleon's adventure. Wrangling and dissensions ceased in the presence of the common danger. It was determined to crush the common enemy, but this time effectively, and England immediately set about providing the one hundred and fifty thousand men which, in conjunction with Russia, Austria, and Prussia, she was pledged to send into the field.

The illustration of a galloper of the 7th Hussars is reproduced from a coloured print after a drawing by Horace Vernet, the eminent French artist.

It is of course a caricature, but on that account is not the less interesting. It has, moreover, something of a historic value, as it shows the appreciation of the practical value of the British galloper; a value which to Wellington and his lieutenants was very great, especially in the latter portion of the Peninsula Campaign. To the French commanders the British gallopers proved as much the objects of admiration as of despair. Mounted on valuable blood horses, single British officers could and did watch and accompany the armies of the enemy:—and at a safe distance. Such was their speed that they could penetrate almost anywhere with impunity, could cross the lines of march and hang on the flanks, thus obtaining most valuable information. If the enemy attempted a chase, it proved perfectly futile; the better mounted British officer with his cross-country hunting traditions easily outstripped his pursuers and vanished for the time, but only to reappear again on perhaps some distant hill, whence, safe, he calmly renewed his operations, note-book in hand. A strong testimony to the value of the British galloper is to be found in the pages of the 'Memoirs of Baron Marbot.'

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CHAPTER XXIII

The Campaign of 1815—Genappe, 17 June 1815

We will begin this chapter by quoting from Cannon's History. The account there given is meagre in the extreme, but we shall supplement it by information culled from various other sources.

'War was resolved upon, and on the 25th of March, three Squadrons of the Queen's Own Hussars, commanded by Col. Sir Edward Kerrison, marched from London for foreign service; they embarked at Dover, landed at Ostend, and after marching a few stages up the country, went into cantonments, and were formed in brigade with the Fifteenth Hussars, and Second Hussars of the King's German Legion, under the orders of Major-General Sir Colquhoun Grant, K.C.B. On the 29th of May they were reviewed with the other brigades of the cavalry, by Field Marshal his Grace the Duke of Wellington, accompanied by Marshal Von Blucher, the commander of the Prussian Army.'

The whole of the cavalry was under the orders of Lord Uxbridge (afterwards the first Marquess of Anglesey) and the British portion was kept united in cantonments.

Lord Uxbridge arrived at Brussels from England on 26 April to take up his command.

The 7th (Queen's Own) Hussars marched from their cantonments on 2 May and arrived at Ninove. The brigade took up its quarters there and in the villages on the left bank of the river Dendre.

Out of from eight thousand to nine thousand cavalry with the army the British numbered three thousand five hundred. Vivian, however, tells us that more were expected.

On 4 May he writes from Ninove thus: 'Inspected my brigade in watering order, and found a dreadful number of sore backs; especially in the 7th and another regiment.'

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'THE CAVALRY JOURNAL.'
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THE KING'S GERMAN LEGION.

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Two days later Lord Uxbridge inspected the brigade in mounted order and found twenty-nine of the 7th dismounted on account of sore backs and eighteen in the other cavalry regiment before alluded to. Two other regiments (not hussars) were subsequently inspected; in one there was no case of a sore back and in the other only one.

Vivian at some length gives his detailed reasons for this, and complains justly of the hussar saddles, to which alone he ascribes the trouble. He concludes his remarks as follows:—

'The very subject makes me wretched. I feel persuaded that a service campaign will destroy every horse's back in the brigade. These opinions, here recorded, have been ten thousand times expressed.'

An extract from *The Times* of Tuesday, 21 September 1813, gives the following information which, though only a trade advertisement, bears upon this point.

'TUESDAY, SEPT. 21

'(Advertisement).—We are authorised to state to M.M. that it was 13,000 hussar saddles, bridles, shabraques, velieces complete, that Mr. Laurie, saddlers, Oxford-street, made in ten weeks for the Commissary in Chief; and, at the same time, he not only fitted out for service that regiment of heroes, the 7th hussars, but is now equipping the depôt with his improved saddles, which are much easier for officers and men, and more safe for the horse's back.'

Vivian's opinion did not apparently coincide with that of Mr. Laurie.

At this time the 7th Hussars were in Vivian's Brigade; a few days later they were transferred to that commanded by Sir Colquhoun Grant, and served under that officer in the fighting which took place on 17 June and at Waterloo.

On 15 May Vivian exercised his brigade in a meadow near Schendelbeke. That evening a large party of the 7th dined with him.

On 20 May he went to Brussels, where he met Sir Colquhoun Grant, with whom he dined.

At this time Grant's Cavalry Brigade consisted of two Dragoon regiments and one of Hussars. Later the brigade consisted of two Hussar regiments and one of Dragoons. The 7th Hussars being transferred to

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Grant, their place in Vivian's Brigade was taken by the 1st Hussars of the King's German Legion. This change took place between 20 May and 29 May, for at the review already mentioned by Cannon the forces present are thus detailed by Vivian :—

'May 29.—The Duke of Wellington, Marshal Blucher, two Princes of Orange, General Gneisenau, the Duke de Berry, and a multitude of the general officers of all nations, came to see the review of the British Cavalry and Horse Artillery. There were present in the field the 1st and 2nd Life Guards (two squadrons each), Blues (two squadrons) King's Dragoon Guards (four squadrons), Lord E. Somerset's brigade; Royal Dragoons, Greys and Inniskillings, Sir W. Ponsonby's brigade; 11th, 12th and 16th Light Dragoons, Sir I. Vandeleur's brigade; 13th, 15th Hussars and 23rd Light Dragoons, Sir C. Grant's brigade; 7th, 10th and 18th, Sir H. Vivian's brigade; and six troops of Horse Artillery and thirty-six guns; and a force in more perfect order never was seen. The Duke merely passed down the line and saw them march past.'

On 2 June Sir H. Vivian was entertained at dinner by Sir E. Kerrison, the Colonel of the 7th Hussars.

There is no further allusion to the Regiment until 17 June, when Vivian, briefly describing the retreat from Quatre Bras, writes as follows :—

'The enemy pressed us very severely in the centre, and in one instance did very considerable mischief to the 7th Hussars, and by a cannonade killed several of the Blues.'

Hooper however writes thus: 'In the centre were the Heavy Cavalry and the Union Brigades, and on the right Grant and Dornberg.'

We will now endeavour to give as clear an account as possible of the events mentioned in the last two paragraphs. The best method of approaching this phase of the history of the Regiment appears to be to make extracts from documents written either by eye-witnesses or by those who may be reasonably held to be in a position to afford information as to the events which are now under consideration. We shall begin with the first portion of a letter written by Standish O'Grady, at the time a lieutenant in the 7th Hussars. His letter is addressed to his father, Chief Baron O'Grady, who was afterwards the First Viscount Guillamore.

A certified copy of this document was kindly furnished to the writer

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by Colonel Harold Paget, C.B., D.S.O., and is dated 'Croissy, 31st July, 1815.' It begins :—

'My dear Chief,

'I have just received your letter from Limerick, I am sorry you did not receive the letters I wrote to you after the Battle, but I can never be at a loss to recount all our transactions, so very deeply have they been imprinted on my memory. Verner and I went in to Brussels on the 15th of June to the Duchess of Richmond's Ball, and we were on the eve of taking out our partners when *the Lord* [underlined in original] ordered Lord Uxbridge and the Prince of Orange immediately to repair to their respective stations where they would find routes waiting for them, as the French were advancing. He gave them his orders quite loud, and seemed highly delighted.' [This last sentence is of interest in view of the fact that it has so often been stated that the order for the withdrawal of officers from the ball was issued with great quietude, and was indeed almost unknown to the guests in general.]

'We accordingly started, and just came up with the Regt. at Grammont, and marched that day, the 16th, to Quatre Bras where we arrived too late to have any share in the battle fought that day. We bivouacked that night on the field of Battle, which was covered with dead, particularly Cuirassiers. We remained in position until the afternoon of the 17th, when we received the very unpleasant intelligence that the army was about to retire, and shortly after received orders to cover the retreat. The army moved off and we took our measures the best we could to protect them.'

'We' of course implies the cavalry as a whole.

'I had the command of the supporting skirmishers, poor Hodge and Elephant [evidently a nickname for Elphinstone] were in advance of me. The French the moment they perceived we were really retiring gave 3 cheers and advanced in very great force against us : we well knew the danger and difficulty of the task allotted to us, and every Officer and Soldier exerted himself to the utmost of his power to support the Honor and Reputation of his Regt. Thus we continued disputing the ground by inches, until near 5 in the evening, when the enemy called in all his skirmishers, and appeared determined to avail himself of our being obliged to pass through the village of Genappe, in order to attack us, a

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defile of any kind being in favour of the pursuers, as the pursued must gallop through it. We fought them until the Regt. passed through the village, and then their main body, from 14 to 20 squadrons, coming up, we were obliged to gallop for it, and we joined our Regt. at the other side of the village without losing a man or horse: thus far the retreat was brilliantly conducted. Lord Uxbridge then came to us, thanked us for our conduct and said he was determined to charge them as they came out of Genappe. We halted therefore for them, and when the Head of the column showed itself, Lord Uxbridge gave us the word, and with one squadron of the Seventh we charged the head of their whole cavalry. Their front were lancers. Their flanks were protected, for they were in the street, and the mass of cavalry in the rere was so great, that I defy them to go about. They therefore stood firm: we killed the officer who was in front, but we could not reach the men, as the lances of the front and rere rank kept the men at bay. We did not however relinquish our efforts, even after every endeavour had become useless, and I shall ever esteem it the greatest Honor I can boast; to have belonged to that Squadron who died in their ranks, rather than relinquish the attack when success was not even possible. Major Hodge was killed. The Adjutant [Myers] was killed. Elphinstone, Peters, I. Wildman and Grenfell and Gordon taken prisoner: their horses having been shot; or themselves wounded: and then Lord Uxbridge gave us the word to go about, when the Squadron, the command of which had devolved on me, retired as well as it could, and formed in the rere of some Lt. Dragoon Regts., mounting about 19 men, out of upwards of a hundred who composed the Squadron when we made the charge. The French pursued us near ½ a mile, in which they were repeatedly charged by other Squadrons of the 7th but they were too strong for us, we however killed a great many, and got out of the road at last to let Lord Uxbridge charge them with the Life Guards. They never waited to be charged, but went about, and the Life Guards galloped into them and gave our prisoners an opportunity which many of them availed themselves of, to escape. They did not advance any more that night, and we continued skirmishing with them till dusk, by which time we reached the ever memerable position of Waterloo.'

Our quotations from the remainder of this letter which refer to the

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From an old engraving in possession of the Sergeants' Mess.



GENAPPE.

1815

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same event and also 18 June and the battle of Waterloo will be renewed hereafter.

Of the events at Genappe, Vivian writes as follows :—

'The French army remained quietly looking on, opposite to us, until about 2 o'clock. We then perceived an immense column of cavalry making their appearance on our left, and we commenced our retreat at the instant that the most tremendous storm came on I ever witnessed.'

All accounts mention this terrific storm. In one it is stated that it began the instant that the British guns opened fire.

In another letter Vivian writes rather more fully.

'It then became necessary for us to retreat, for it was obvious that Buonaparte would bring all his forces against us. Orders were given accordingly, and the cavalry left to cover the retreat; the Hussars in front, Grant's brigade on the right, mine on the left.

'We remained quietly on the ground till about 2 o'clock, when immediately on my left I observed a great dust, and by looking a little nearer, I discovered an enormous column of *Cuirassiers*, *Lanciers*, *Hussars*, &c., moving over a hill into the high road, which was on my flank. My pickets were soon engaged and driven in. A brigade of the enemy trotted up the road and formed opposite to me, a little ravine separating us. I opened upon them with my horse artillery, and they very soon returned the compliment with theirs, and knocked over a man of the 10th and a few horses. A large body also moved up the road to attack our centre, where General Dornberg was posted with the 7th Hussars and the 23rd. The line of Heavy Cavalry and Light Dragoons in our rear had by this time received orders to fall back, and we in advance were to do the same.

'This I did very *contre gré*; for at this moment a brigade of *Lanciers* and *Chasseurs-à-Cheval* were about to attempt crossing the ravine in my front, and my fingers were itching to have a hit at them. However we retired quietly enough. They cannonaded my rear squadron, until we crossed a little river (the Dyle) which runs by Genappe, and there I formed the 10th to support my rear guard, and they molested me no more. Not so the poor 7th, who were in the high road parallel to me on my right. The principal body of cavalry pressed down the road with Horse Artillery, &c., and some very severe work they had. Poor Hodge,

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Mayer, [Myers] and Elphinstone, gallantly leading a charge of the Regiment, were wounded and made prisoners. The report was that both Hodge and Mayer were killed. The Regiment suffered very severely, and I believe things were not exactly what they ought to have been owing to some mistake; the officers were all broken-hearted about it.'

This is evidently a reference to certain rumours which were flying about.

On this day Lieut.-Colonel Thornhill, of the 7th Hussars, acted as aide-de-camp to Lord Uxbridge. It may be well to note that a Lieutenant Smith, of the 10th Hussars, was sent across to the main road, and was present at the affair between the 7th Hussars and the French *Lanciers*; during which, at considerable risk to himself, he saved Lieutenant Gordon of the 7th, who was wounded, from capture or death, by dismounting and lending him his horse to carry him to the rear till he could meet his own led horses. Lieutenant Smith escaped being taken by leaping over the ditch off the *chaussée* till the *Lanciers* being driven back, he got his horse again.

Again we can quote from a letter of Lieut.-Colonel (at the time Lieutenant) O'Grady:—

'Early in the morning of the 17th, the army was drawn up to show a front, and soon after the Infantry began to move to the rear. When they moved off, leaving the Cavalry, Sir C. Grant called the Field Officers together, and spoke to them for some time. When Major Hodge (who was in command of the right Squadron, to which I belonged) returned, he called me aside, and told me that the Prussians had been beaten and obliged to fall back, and that we must make a similar movement to prevent the two armies from being disunited; that our Brigade was to retire by Regiments from the left, and that the 7th had the post of honour, the main road to cover and protect; that Sir William Dörnberg was to take charge of the skirmishers of the Brigade and that our Squadron was to skirmish. There was at this time no appearance on the part of the Enemy of an advance, and we were to hold our ground until driven from it. We did so and (though I cannot pretend to accuracy in point of time) I think it was twelve before their advance put us in motion. We through out the right Troop to skirmish, and Major Hodge went with them. I held the high road with the left Troop, and had

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from time to time to send them assistance, and frequently to advance to enable them to hold their ground, as their movements were difficult through ploughed fields so soft that the horses were sunk up to their knees always, and sometimes up to their girths.

'Whilst I was so employed Sir William Dörnberg joined me. Thus we continued to dispute every inch of ground until we came within a short distance of the town of Genappe. Here Sir William Dörnberg told me that he must leave me; that it was of the utmost importance to face the Enemy boldly at this spot, as the bridge in the town of Genappe was so narrow we must pass it in file; that I should endeavour if possible to obtain time for the skirmishers to come in, but that I was not to compromise my Troop too much. Sir William had been riding with me some hours, and when he bid me farewell he shook my hand, and I saw plainly he never expected to see me again. I then called in the skirmishers and advanced at a trot up the road. The troops opposed to me went about, and as I followed them they did not stop so soon as I did. I continued advancing and retiring alternately, until I saw all my right Troop safe on the road in my rear, and then I began to retire at a walk, occasionally halting and fronting until I turned the corner of the town of Genappe. I then filed the men from the left and passed through the town at a gallop, no enemy in sight. When I arrived at the opposite entrance of the town I found the 7th drawn up on the road in a column of divisions, and having re-formed our Squadron we took our place between those already formed and the town.

'Here I met Sir William Dörnberg, who appeared surprised to see me, and asked me how we had effected our retreat, and if we had saved any of the skirmishers, and when I told him we had not lost a man or a horse, he exclaimed, "Then Buonaparte is not with them; if he were, not a man of you could have escaped." Here we remained drawn up about twenty minutes before any of the Enemy appeared, and then only a few stragglers, some of whom rode into us and were found to be quite drunk. As well as I can guess, the Cavalry Column by which we were pursued, and which moved slowly, but shouting loudly along the high road, were about fourteen Squadrons. Occasionally I was able to count them, but not accurately. They might have been eighteen. And this column now showed its head within the town. This head consisted of a Troop of Lancers, all very young men, mounted on very

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small horses, and commanded by a fine looking and a very brave man. For about fifteen minutes they remained in the jaws of the town, their flanks being protected by the houses; and the street not being straight, and those in the rear not knowing that the front were halted, they soon became so jammed that they could not go about. In this state of affairs Lord Anglesey gave us orders to charge them, which we immediately did. Of course our charge could make no impression, but we continued cutting at them, and we did not give ground, nor did they move. The Commanding Officer was cut down, and so was ours (Major Hodge), and this state of things lasted some minutes, when they brought down some Light Artillery, which struck the rear of the right (the charging) Squadron and knocked over some men and horses, impeding the road in our rear. We then received orders to go about from Lord Anglesea, who was up with us, but not on the road during all this time. The Lancers then advanced upon us, and in the *mêlée* which ensued they lost quite as many as we did, and when at last we were able to disengage ourselves they did not attempt to pursue us. We retired through a Regiment of Light Cavalry, and the first pass we found off the road we took and formed in the field by the road side. I then got the remnant of the right Squadron and moved them down towards the town of Genappe to look after any of our wounded, whom it might be in our power to save. When I saw the ground upon which we had charged it was strewed with men and horses, but I saw very few fighting men of the Enemy. In the meantime the Light Brigade having been removed from the road where they were when we passed through them, the Life Guards came down the road and charged into the town. I could not, of course, see what they did, but I believe they fell upon the rear of a retiring Column, impeded by the narrowness of the bridge, and did their duty manfully. The Enemy did not again attempt to molest us, and we reached our position without further interruption, except some piquet affairs in taking up our respective Lines, in one of which Captain Heyliger of the 7th made a very brilliant charge with his Troop, and when the Duke of Wellington sent to stop him he also desired to know his name.

'I thought at the time and I still think, that when we charged the Enemy at Genappe their entire Column was in the town, and that being the case it is clear that as soon as they found the head of their Column

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engaged, they commenced clearing their rear out of the town. If this be the case it is obvious that the success or failure of the 7th in their charge was simply a matter of time. A little delay and they would not have had to charge, but to pursue. This as well as I can recollect was Sir Wm. Dörnberg's opinion at the time when he objected to charging before their flanks were open to us. I feel however that I have no right to pursue this, and satisfy myself that I have given you, as well as I can now recollect them, all the facts as they came before me. A few minutes before we charged, one of the heaviest showers of rain I can remember fell, which, as it wet everybody and everything, rendered fire-arms useless, and though the French fired a few pistol shots, I don't think they did any damage; our engagement was therefore one of sabre and lance.

'I have only to add that we lost our Commanding Officer, Major Hodge killed, and Captain Elphinstone, who commanded the right Troop, wounded and taken. Our Adjutant [Myers] was killed also, but not in the charge, but as we could never find either Major Hodge or Adjutant Mayer [Myers] I only say they were killed. . . . In answer to a flag of truce that evening they said that they had taken a Major a Captain, an Adjutant, and an A.D.C., which latter was Captain Krockenberg, A.D.C. to Sir William Dörnberg. You will perceive that the right Squadron under Major Hodge was the only one of the Regiment engaged, and that it was Captain Elphinstone's Troop, which had been engaged skirmishing throughout the day, that charged afterwards at Genappe.'

This account was dated from Hampton Court, 10 April, 1837. It is clear, level-headed, and bears the unmistakable stamp of absolute truth. Comparing it with the extract of Lieutenant O'Grady's letter to his father, already quoted, the main facts stated in both absolutely agree; but more details being given in the document of 1837, it is certainly only proper to insert both accounts here.

Lieut.-Colonel A. T. Maclean, of the 13th Light Dragoons, writes regarding Genappe as follows:—

'I was the officer who commanded the rear guard on the 17th, and held the approach to Hougoumont on the 18th.' His reference is of course to the 13th Light Dragoons. He continues:—

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'I am not aware that you make any mention of the 7th Hussars and their fight on the 17th at Genappe, when they so gallantly checked the Enemy's advance by repeated charges when it was impossible for them to penetrate the dense column that pressed them through the narrow long street of that village, flanked by a nasty marshy ravine hardly practicable from the torrents of rain that fell at the time. I witnessed the charge made by the Life Guards when the 7th made way for them, thus allowing the French Cavalry to clear the village and form up in its front, when they were more easily vanquished than when checked by the 7th.'

This, it will be observed, is a direct expression of opinion and comes from an officer belonging to another regiment.

Lieut.-Colonel Maclean's testimony is absolutely unimpeachable. His distinguished military career and excellent service combine to render his opinion on the subject of the greatest value.

The conclusion to which we must come as to there having been things which, according to Vivian, 'were not exactly what they ought to have been,' is this. The charge was made at a time and in a place which was unsuitable and moreover unlikely to be successful.

Genappe was a village possessed of but one narrow street. French guns were posted on the left of the village and had opened a heavy fire. At the time the British artillery was not available to reply, being considerably in front, though later it was brought back. The retreating British cavalry had passed through the village and were outside.

Outside the village the *chaussée* was paved, was raised above the level of the land a foot and a half to two feet, and had deep ditches of water on either side. A little farther on, however, the ground rose, and when the Life Guards charged the Lancers the latter were actually going uphill, the former downhill. However well the French may have withstood the charges of the 7th while their flanks were protected by the houses in the narrow street, they did not care to await the onslaught of the Life Guards in the open, and bolted before contact. Fearfully were they cut up in consequence.

Lord Anglesey (Uxbridge) in writing of the affair states that the charge of the 7th was made most 'gallantly, but they could not penetrate the Lancers. In their turn these now advanced and drove

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the 7th upon their reserve. Here the 7th rallied and again drove the Lancers to the town. Again the Lancers, being reinforced, rallied and drove the 7th; and again the 7th rallied; and thus a determined see-saw was kept up for a considerable time. At length, after the 7th had lost several excellent officers and men, I withdrew them.' But the 'see-saw' had this result, that the Lancers were then through the village, and hence the Life Guards were enabled to make the most of their opportunity to punish the enemy, and did so very effectively, as was to be expected.

One thing appears clear, that the 7th Hussars in the narrow street of Genappe were called upon to engage an enemy armed with a weapon comparatively new to them. In fact, though careful search has been made to ascertain the truth or the reverse of this matter, the writer has failed to trace any previous occasion on which the swords of the 7th were opposed to lances.

There is a statement—unsubstantiated it is true, still we give it for what it is worth—that the pennons on the French lances, which were not then removed before an action as they now are, being waved in front of the horses, caused no little confusion. This may be so, still it hardly affects the question; but we shall allude to it again later. It is far more pertinent to remember that in 1815 there was not one single lancer regiment in the British Army.

A most excellent account of the fighting at Genappe will be found in 'Cavalry in the Waterloo Campaign' (pages 102 to 107), by Field-Marshal Sir Evelyn Wood. For reasons which will appear hereafter, we do not quote therefrom. Certain statements regarding the Regiment at Genappe having been made, which it will be our duty to discuss, and as the key to one of those statements may be gathered from Sir Evelyn Wood's narrative, the curious reader is referred to the pages above mentioned.

The Memorandum of Lord Anglesey, No. 4, page 4, to be found in the 1891 edition of Siborne's 'Waterloo Letters,' also may well be studied as it throws a clear light upon the controversial point which we discuss hereafter.

From a memorandum dated 15 April, 1837, written by Brevet-Major John Banner, 93rd Highlanders, who in 1815 was a lieutenant in the 23rd Light Dragoons, we gather the following extract:—

'The Enemy's Cavalry, having entered Genappe, began to press

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upon our rear guard, the last division of which had scarcely quitted the town when the Earl of Uxbridge came to the rear to reconnoitre, and placing himself upon the elevated ground on the right of the road leading from Genappe, perceiving the boldness of the French, directed the 7th Hussars to charge in order to check their advance; the 7th Hussars, being animated by the presence of their Colonel, rushed on the enemy with the greatest spirit and intrepidity, and drove the French advanced divisions back into the street of Genappe upon the main body of their cavalry which occupied the town, where the most obstinate conflict commenced, each party fighting with the utmost desperation. The French being backed by a long dense Column of Cavalry flanked by the houses on each side of the street, were enabled to make a most formidable resistance; notwithstanding this numerical superiority, it was only when menaced by such a heavy force pressing forward that the 7th Hussars were obliged to retire, but although they fell back the fault did not lie with them, nor was it in consequence of the lightness of their horses, as has been insinuated. The conduct of this Corps on this occasion was heroic in the extreme; their spirit and ardour was universally admired and acknowledged by all who witnessed the gallant affair.'

Coming from an officer of the 23rd Light Dragoons, this clear statement is one of great weight.

Major Banner then goes on to narrate the events as far as the Life Guards and his own regiment were concerned.

A curious statement bearing upon the fight at Genappe is made by Count d'Erlon in his autobiography. We quote from Ropes.

'The Emperor never quitted the head of the column of the advance-guard, and was even engaged in a charge of cavalry in debouching from Genappe.'

It would be interesting to know to which charge of cavalry this statement refers.

We will now quote from 'The History of the Household Cavalry,' vol. ii., pages 602–3. Writing of Genappe, Sir George Arthur tells us as follows:—

'Having crossed the river by the bridge, the Household Cavalry Brigade and Artillery halted on the *chaussée* about 700 yards beyond the gates of Genappe. The 7th Hussars, with the 23rd Light Dragoons

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'The Cavalry Journal'
(By kind permission.)



A POLISH LANCER
AND
CHASSEUR À CHEVAL.

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in support, were halted only 250 yards from the town. Presently the French Lancers appeared out of the town, and the 7th were ordered to charge them, which they did " most gallantly," as Lord Uxbridge testified. The French lancers, however, drove the British hussars back, and the 7th, though twice rallied, each time found the enemy, who was now reinforced, too strong for them.'

It may be well perhaps to state that the ' French ' Lancers were as a matter of fact Napoleon's celebrated Polish Lancers, whose handsome red uniforms differentiated them from the rest of the French Army.

Sufficient has now been said on the services of the 7th Hussars on this occasion. It is, however, to be regretted that almost immediately rumours began to be circulated to the effect that at Genappe the Regiment failed to acquit itself as it should have done. Vivian in one letter hints at something of the kind, as we have already stated. That charges of some kind were being made a further quotation from the letter of Lieutenant Standish O'Grady makes perfectly clear. He writes as follows :—

' I have now detailed everything that the 7th have been engaged in, and have neither added nor taken from them : you have the truth and nothing more. Judge then our feelings when informed that a report to our disadvantage had spread itself in London ; and I perceive from your question about the flags on the lances having frightened our horses, that it had already reached Dublin. To contradict it would look as if there was truth in any story that might have propagated itself injurious to our reputation, we were therefore obliged silently to submit our cause to time, which alone could clear our characters from any stain that ignorance or malice could for a moment put upon us. Lord Anglesey wrote us a letter, which he has since put into the public papers, and I cannot express to you my grief that he should have thought we required any public vindication of our conduct. Any regiment that has stood as the 7th have ; so long at the head of the cavalry, must be fortunate indeed if Envy could not afford it an enemy. We can however say, that these reports have not originated in, do not, nor have they existed with the army under Lord Wellington ; and for myself I am perfectly satisfied that no regt. could have acted better, and few as well as the 7th. I shall not hesitate to hold my head higher than ever before.'

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The letter addressed to the Regiment by Lord Uxbridge, to which Lieutenant O'Grady alludes, is as follows. Lord Uxbridge, it will be remembered, at the time of writing lay wounded.

BRUSSELS, *June* 28 1815.

'MY DEAR BROTHER OFFICERS,

'It has been stated to me, that a report injurious to the reputation of our regiment has gone abroad; and I do not therefore lose an instant in addressing you on the subject. The report must take its origin from the affair that took place with the advanced guard of the French cavalry near Genappe, on the 17th instant, when I ordered the 7th to cover the retreat. As I was with you, and saw the conduct of every individual, there is no one more capable of speaking to the fact than I am. As the Lancers pressed us hard, I ordered you (upon a principle I ever did, and shall act upon) not to wait to be attacked, but to fall upon them. The attack was most gallantly led by the officers; but it failed: it failed because the Lancers stood firm, had their flanks secured, and were backed by a large mass of cavalry. The regiment was repulsed, but did not run away. No—it rallied immediately; I renewed the attack. It again failed from the same cause. It retired in perfect order, although it had sustained so severe a loss; but you had thrown the Lancers into disorder, who being in motion, I then made an attack upon with the Life Guards, who certainly made a very handsome charge, and completely succeeded. This is the plain honest truth. However lightly I think of Lancers under ordinary circumstances, I am of opinion that, posted as they were, they had a most decided advantage over the Hussars. The impetuosity, however, and weight of the Life Guards carried all before them. And while I exculpate my own regiment, I am delighted in being able to bear testimony to the gallant conduct of the former.

'Be not uneasy, my brother officers, you had ample opportunity, of which you most gallantly availed yourselves, of revenging yourselves on the 18th for the failure on the 17th; and after all what regiment, and which of us individually, is certain of success? Be assured that I am proud of being your colonel, and that you possess my utmost confidence.

'Your sincere friend,

'ANGLESEY, LIEUT.-GENERAL.'

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The Despatch of Lord Wellington makes no allusion to the Regiment, but it is interesting to note that Lieutenant O'Grady was almost immediately promoted Captain, an event which would hardly have taken place had there been any reason for withholding it.

The date of this promotion was 20 July 1815. On the same date Captain Verner was promoted to a majority. Regarding this, Lieutenant O'Grady writes in the same letter from which we have already quoted :—

'I have to congratulate you on my promotion. I saw a letter from the Adjutant-General to Colonel Kerrison to acquaint him that Lord Wellington had received the Duke of York's approval to the recommendations he forwarded for Verner and myself, I expect therefore that the next Gazette will have our names in it. It is some satisfaction to think that one has not been knocked about for nothing.'

With this we conclude our narrative of the events of 17 June 1815. Unhappily, however, we are compelled to draw attention to a recent statement in print detrimental to the Regiment on the occasion of the retreat through Genappe. What we shall have to write on the subject will, we hope, definitely set the matter at rest at once and for ever.

In the course of this chapter we have endeavoured to give as full and particular account of the services of the Regiment during the memorable days 16, 17, and 18 June 1815, as possible.

It is, however, now our duty to draw attention to certain statements which occur in the 'Historical Records of the Royal Scots Greys,' a volume written by Mr. E. Almack, F.S.A.

Mr. Almack quotes a letter written by Lieutenant Macmillan, the Adjutant of the Royal Scots Greys at the period.

This letter is to be found on pages 71 and 72 of Mr. Almack's History, and refers both to Genappe and Waterloo.

The passages to which we specially refer are two in number, and these we here quote :—

'Colonel Hankin's horse also fell with him twice on the 17th, when we in our turn covered the retreat of the British Army, which was done under a most tremendous fire of cannon from the enemy, the First Dragoons only lost one man, that was all, Lord Uxbridge's Hussars * (the 7th) were to have been the last and were

'* This Regiment no longer exists.—E. A.'

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so placed, but for some cause or other, behaved not very well, indeed his Lordship said in front of the First Life Guards, that he must call upon them to advance *for that his own regiment had deserted him.* The Life Guards charged a mass of Lancers on the *chasee* [*sic*] and which they turned over like rats and the road covered with them and their horses.'

In a previous paragraph of the letter, with regard to Waterloo we read the astonishing statement that 'the Hussars and Light Dragoons had little or anything [*sic*] to do except look on.'

Now this letter is undoubtedly genuine. We know by whom it was written. It was addressed to Major-General Balfour of Balbirnie, Fife, N.B., and is presumably still in existence. Whether, however, its publication was justifiable is another matter.

The letter being in manuscript it would be interesting to know how the words '*for that his own regiment had deserted him*' came to be in italics. Underlined they might have been, but in that case the fact should have been stated. If they were not underlined, then we can only assume that they were placed in italics after due deliberation by Mr. Almack. Are the words '(the 7th)' which appear in brackets after 'Lord Uxbridge's Hussars' to be found in the original or are they not?

The asterisk which draws attention to the footnote, 'This Regiment no longer exists.—E. A.,' gives us indeed remarkable information—remarkable, that is to say, as regards its accuracy!

A perusal of the casualty lists of the Hussars and Light Dragoons present at Waterloo negatives the statement that they had little to do 'except look on.' We had imagined that the gallant services of these regiments and their repeated charges were too well known to admit of such an extraordinary statement being thus reproduced in these latter days in print, and in drawing attention to both extracts we feel bound to deprecate the publication of these portions of Lieutenant Macmillan's letter by Mr. Almack.

After the fighting at Genappe the British retreat continued, skirmishing and artillery fire accompanying them the whole distance, until the position in front of the village of Waterloo was reached. There the already rain-sodden troops passed the night—a night during which the storm continued to beat down on them.

The morrow was the day of Waterloo.

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From the painting in the Officers' Mess.



THE MARQUESS OF ANGLESEY, K.G.

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CHAPTER XXIV

Waterloo, 18 June 1815

Throughout the night of 17 June the 7th Hussars snatched what rest they could obtain on the rain-sodden ground upon which they had taken up their position after the retreat from Quatre Bras. The morning, despite the fact that it was the middle of June, broke wet, dull, heavy and sombre over the Allied Army, which had bivouacked on the muddy ground. It is stated that by 8 A.M. the rain had ceased. The position allotted to Grant's Brigade was in the rear of the right division ; and it may be noted that the regiment of Hussars of the King's German Legion, which formed a portion of this brigade, had not then been brought up to Waterloo, as they had been left in occupation of a line of posts on the French frontier, extending from Courtrai, through Menin, Ypres, Loo, and Fürnes on the North Sea ; this line they had held since the end of March. Consequently, of course, they had been absent from the engagement of Genappe.

To be exact as to the position of the Regiment : It was posted behind a ridge as nearly as possible half a mile due north of the buildings of Hougoumont ; on the road from Nivelles to Louvain and facing north-east, Dörnberg's Brigade was stationed about two hundred yards to their left, but not quite on the road ; and facing the same way, which was practically the line of the road.

The infantry in their front was drawn up along a side road which ran from the Nivelle-Louvain main road to the Charleroi-Waterloo road. This side road was in their front and ran due north-east. It lay along a slight ridge some one hundred and fifty feet higher in its centre than the lowest part of the ground.

The infantry brigades of Byng, Maitland, and C. Halkett were here posted, reckoning from right to left.

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The 7th Hussars were stationed about three hundred yards in the rear of Byng. Six guns were also posted with the infantry, two on the right rear of Byng, two on the right of Maitland and two between Maitland and C. Halkett. As the hours wore on the weather seemed gradually to improve.

Such was the situation of affairs, as far as the 7th Hussars are concerned, until the battle began.

Cannon and the Manuscript Regimental Record agree verbally in their accounts of Waterloo, and the account given, which is precisely the same in both cases, is equally unsatisfactory: still it must be quoted. It is as follows:—

'On the following day the hard contested and sanguinary battle of Waterloo was fought,—a battle memorable in the annals of Europe,—where the fate of empires was decided by the sword, and the British troops acquired immortal honour! During the early part of the action the 7th Hussars supported the infantry, and towards evening they were ordered forward. Moving from Hougoumont, they acted nearly on the reverse of the enemy, and by a series of brilliant charges, most nobly executed, contributed to the final overthrow of the French Army.

'On this occasion the officers and men proved their resolution to support the high character which the Regiment had so long borne; and their conduct was publicly noticed and attested in the strongest and most unequivocal terms by the commander of the cavalry, Lieutenant-General the Earl of Uxbridge, who, after having gone through this arduous day, received a wound at the close of the action by which he lost his right leg.

'The loss of the regiment on the 17th and 18th of June was, one serjeant, fifty-five rank and file, and eighty-four horses killed; Captains I. W. Robins, W. Vernor and P. A. Heyliger; Lieutenants R. Douglas, E. Peters, and R. Beattie with nine serjeants, one trumpeter, eighty-three rank and file, and one hundred and sixteen horses wounded.'

This last paragraph is clearly erroneous, the name of Major Hodge being omitted among others, and it is extraordinary that even the casualties could not be correctly stated in the official account of the services of the Regiment.

The casualties of the 7th Hussars in the two days' fighting were much heavier. On the morning of the 17th they numbered twenty-four

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officers and three hundred and fifty-two of all other ranks. On the evening of the 18th no fewer than twelve officers and one hundred and fifty-one of all other ranks were either killed or wounded. These are the numbers stated by Sir Evelyn Wood.

Tomkinson puts the strength of the Regiment at Waterloo as three squadrons—three hundred and twenty men.

Another estimate of the casualties during the campaign is as follows: seven officers wounded, three missing, sixty-two non-commissioned officers and privates killed, one hundred and nine wounded, fifteen missing; total, one hundred and ninety-six. It may be observed that in a list of the casualties we find that all the officers' wounds were severe save in the case of Captain Fraser, who acted as aide-de-camp to Lord Uxbridge.

Also it might have been mentioned that in the absence of the Hussars of the King's German Legion, the 13th Light Dragoons were attached to Grant's Brigade and did duty with it not only on the 17th at Genappe but on 18 June at Waterloo.

At Genappe a troop of the 13th covered the retreat of the brigade, moving parallel with the 7th on the left of Genappe and being most actively engaged.

There is also a discrepancy in the various accounts of the regiment of the Hussars of the King's German Legion belonging to Grant's Brigade at Waterloo. It is certainly stated by more than one writer that they were not present at the battle, but it is only fair to say that, on the authority of an officer of that regiment, the Hussars were summoned from their stations between Courtrai and Fürnes, arrived at Brussels on the morning of the 18th, and reached Waterloo in time for the battle.

In an account of Grant's Cavalry Brigade contained in Siborne's 'Waterloo Letters' we read as follows:—

'In the retreat of the 17th the Brigade, with the exception of the 7th Hussars, formed part of the right Cavalry Column. The 7th furnished at first the rear-guard to the centre column, which held the enemy in check until the other troops of the Column had passed the bridge and town of Genappe, when it also retired through the same. On the Enemy's advanced Guard of Lancers appearing at the other entrance of the town, the 7th charged it, and an obstinate conflict ensued, with great loss on both sides. At length the 7th were withdrawn, and the Enemy's

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Column, the rear of which was already beginning to retire from the town, was driven through it by a charge of the 1st Life Guards. A brilliant charge was made in the evening by a Troop of the 7th Hussars, as the two Armies were taking up their respective positions at Waterloo.'

This last statement is worth record.

We will now give extracts from various accounts of the events of this memorable day, some derived from officers in the Regiment, and others from officers of different corps.

Of the battle of Waterloo Lieut.-Colonel Thackwell, writing on behalf of Sir Colquhoun Grant, tells us as follows:—

'Between three and four P.M., the 13th Light Dragoons and the 15th Hussars were ordered to the right to attack a body of Lancers, who were menacing that quarter, and in the meantime the 7th Hussars (with other regiments) charged and repelled the French Cavalry attacking the Infantry Squares in front. Grant, observing that these attacks were being repeated in great strength and that the movements of the Lancers were a diversion to draw him away from them, returned to this original ground, leaving a Squadron of the 15th in observation as before. The Brigade was then employed in charging and repelling the French Troops attacking the Allied Line, and, with alternate success, according as the French were driven back, or, bringing up strong supports, forced it to retire.'

This account, though devoid of detail, gives in a clear manner the general scope of the operations of the brigade.

In another paper Lieut.-Colonel Thackwell enters into greater detail, but mainly concerns himself with the operations of the 13th Light Dragoons and the 15th Hussars.

Regarding the 7th he states:—

'The 7th Hussars were very weak, having suffered most severely on the debouch of the French Cavalry from Genappe on the preceding afternoon. . . . The 7th Hussars and the 13th Light Dragoons were also most actively engaged, and on the General Advance the Regiments of the Brigade made several attacks on Cavalry as well as Infantry, in one of which Colonel Kerrison of the first-named Regiment had a horse killed under him. . . .'

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Painted by H. Alken, under the immediate direction of some of the Staff Officers of the Duke of Wellington's Army.



A CHARGE AT WATERLOO.

1815.

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The prompt, judicious, and fortunate movement of the brigade, from the designed attack of the Lancers to that of the Cuirassiers, restored confidence to this part of the Line, which seemed to be in some danger, and may justly be considered an event of the utmost importance.

Captain Robbins (afterwards Lieut.-Colonel) gives us a very interesting account of the movements of the Regiment, until the time that he was rendered *hors-de-combat* by a wound.

'On the first advance of the French Cavalry on our position (on the left of Hougoumont), I conclude between six and seven o'clock, I was wounded and fell. When I was able to rise, my own Regiment was gone, the Enemy we had been opposed to was gone, and some close Columns of Infantry, I think one of them was a Battalion of Guards, had changed their ground also. . . . On the night of the 17th the 7th Hussars bivouacked on the left of the high road leading to Genappe, above La Haye Sainte. . . . Early on the following morning the Regiment was moved across both the high roads and there remained dismounted, until the commencement of the action. On our way we passed many Regiments of all arms moving to their places in position. . . . I recollect on our left was a mound or hillock. . . . A little in our rear was a hedge, and a rather hollow roadway.'

Here the Regiment remained for some little time and was then moved. In the new position they came under a heavy fire of shot and shell, yet saw no enemy. Many men and horses were lost. Again the Regiment was moved and took up a position in line under a bank. This spot had been occupied by the guns of the British Horse Artillery, but the cannon of the enemy at Mon Plaisir having got the exact range and having much galled the Royal Horse Artillery, the latter had been withdrawn. He continues:—

'At the alarm that the French Cavalry was advancing up the hill on the left of Hougoumont, the 7th were mounted, and rapidly moved from their left; then wheeling into line they almost immediately charged the Enemy. They (the Enemy) came on in three distinct lines. In this charge I fell, and from that time am unable to state anything that occurred.'

Captain Robbins commanded the centre squadron of the 7th.

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Elsewhere we have given some account of Cornet Jeffs, afterwards of the 7th (at Waterloo then a Sergt.-Major in the 18th Hussars).

Sir H. Vivian in one letter mentions his name in connection with one of the charges.

'To the 18th I said: "Eighteenth, my lads, you will, I know, follow me"—on which the Sergeant Major, Jeffs (afterwards Adjutant of the 7th), who was near me, answered: "Yes, General, to hell if you will lead us."'

The reference to Waterloo in the letter of Lieutenant O'Grady, from which we have already quoted in the last chapter, is as follows:—

'At daybreak on the 18th we were ordered to the extreme right of the army. We were close to the road where the hardest fighting was: and had an opportunity of seeing almost the whole of this tremendous battle. In every fight I had ever seen we had acted on the offensive, but here we were attacked by double our force: we maintained our position until five or near six in the evening, repulsing every effort to break our lines and covering the field with dead. The 7th had an opportunity of showing what they could do if they got fair play, and we charged 12 or 14 times and once cut off a Squadron of *Cuirassiers* every man of whom we killed on the spot except the two officers, whom and one *Maréchal de Logis* I sent to the rere. About 7 o'clock Lord Wellington gave us the order to advance, and put himself at the head of the Highlanders, cheering them with his hat in his hand, and we advanced under the most horrible fire of grape and canister, round shot and musketry that can be imagined. Our ranks were thinning fast but we went too quick to perceive it, and after having charged every species of troops, infantry, artillery and cavalry, we halted about ½ a mile in rere of the French position, and there found, tho' of the 7th and 15th there remained only 35 men, Colonel Kerrison and four officers. We were too weak to act any longer as a Brigade, so we joined Vivian's Brigade and acted with the 18th and 1st German Hussars for the rest of the night. During the battle, when Buonaparte made that tremendous attack on our left centre, which he owns to have supported with 80 pieces of cannon, we were ordered to charge them; and had the honour of lending our aid to destroy three columns of Cavalry to whose flight Buonaparte attributes the loss of the action. We had most of our officers wounded, by cannon shot, i.e. grape canister &c. Robbins was

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WATERLOO.

1815

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run through the body by a lancer and Beatty was struck by a musket ball; tell Walter that at the moment I was going to shake hands with Irvine of the 13th he was knocked off his horse by a grape shot. Gregory safe.'

In another document Lieut.-Colonel Standish O'Grady writes as follows, evidently in answer to some query :—

'I believe, however that the time you fix is that when the last attempt to force the British position was made by (I think) Ney on the Brussels road. If so, the 7th were ordered from the right to assist in repelling that attack, and consequently were on the right centre at that time, but from the general confusion that prevailed consequent on the flight of some Belgian Dragoons, who ran through our ranks, I find it very difficult, and indeed, except by guess, to fix upon the precise spot we occupied.

'The 7th, who were in advance of the left centre on the night of the 17th, were moved very early on the 18th to the ground above Hougoumont, and occupied various positions there during the day, and assisted by the 15th Hussars and the 13th Light Dragoons, drove back the French Cavalry, who attacked the Squares of British and Brunswickers immediately above Hougoumont, and rather late in the day. If your query has reference to that charge I think I could place the 7th accurately for you. The French Cavalry were in the first instance Cuirassiers, and in Squadron, but they soon became mixed with Cavalry of all arms, and acted in masses of more or less size. After clearing the front of our position we were ordered to our left to assist in repelling the last attempt of the Enemy to which I before alluded. After that we moved to about midway to our former position, from which we moved at the General Advance, and sweeping the ground to Hougoumont, entered the Enemy's Line on his left, and charged down his Lines until we met Sir Hussey Vivian at the head of his Brigade. The 7th having in these various encounters lost a great many men, and being reduced to a Squadron, and having separated from the 15th Hussars and the 13th Light Dragoons, joined Sir Hussey and continued to act with him until the next morning, . . . You will perceive that as we occupied the ground above Hougoumont no infantry penetrated to us, though we were perpetually menaced, and often attacked by the Enemy's Cavalry, who advanced in Column and formed Squadrons of Attack.'

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In another letter Lieut.-Colonel O'Grady tells us :

' On the occasion of our last advance at Waterloo I believe we commenced it from the right centre of our Line, and consequently we left the house, &c. of Hougoumont on our right. None of our Cavalry were during the day on the ground beyond (or at the Nivelles side of) Hougoumont. The road to Nivelles was stopped by felled trees and the 51st Regiment protected it.'

This, then, is the story of the services of the 7th Hussars at Waterloo. On the morrow the Regiment was sent in pursuit of the fugitive French, who, after suffering heavily at the hands of the exulting Prussian Cavalry, to whom the pursuit on the evening of the battle had been entrusted, were now well on their way to Paris in the utmost disorder.

On the evening of the 24th Cambrai was captured by escalade, by the division of Lieut.-General Sir Charles Colville.

It was not long before the Allies arrived at their goal, the City of Paris. Resistance there, at least for a time, might have been made by the enemy, but was not.

The capital of France surrendered ; and was occupied by the Allied Armies. Napoleon became a captive, having voluntarily given himself up to the British.

Louis XVIII was restored to the throne.

Meanwhile the Allies occupied the capital and the country around it.

The 7th Hussars went into cantonments in sundry villages near the city, and were present at various reviews at which the Allied sovereigns of Russia, Austria, Prussia, and France were present.

Subsequently a portion of the British Army left the country for home or for foreign stations.

The Regiment, however, was one of those selected to form a part of the army of occupation.

They were first quartered at Estaples and in the neighbourhood, where they remained till the summer of 1816. Their quarters were then shifted to between St. Omer and Dunkirk, where they were engaged in field exercises, with, of course, the usual inspection and review. A squadron from England now joined the Regiment.

2 *December* 1816.—It was found that the men in France were in a reckless way writing to their wives to come out and join

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them while forming part of the army of occupation, the women in consequence suffering great hardships. This was sternly forbidden. The non-commissioned officers and men were cautioned not to do this. The women were to be stopped at Dover, and if they reached France clandestinely were liable to be arrested by the French police and sent back to England. Only six wives per troop were allowed.

The notorious—we can hardly say celebrated—John Mytton joined the Regiment during this year. His short life was full of such extraordinary events that a brief notice of some of them may well be here inserted.

John Mytton, of Halston, Shropshire, was born on 30 September 1796. His father died in 1798, so that he enjoyed a long minority. Mytton grew up as the spoilt child of his mother.

He was sent to Westminster, from which school he was expelled. At Westminster he was allowed £400 a year, and spent double that amount.

Later he went to Harrow, from which school he was also expelled. A private tutor was then tried for this remarkable youth. The private tutor was knocked down by his pupil. His name was now entered both at Oxford and at Cambridge, but he never matriculated at either.

It is, however, recorded that he advanced so far towards university life as to order three pipes of port wine to be sent addressed to him at Cambridge.

At the age of eighteen he went on a Continental tour, after which he returned to Halston, his home, and to his beloved pack of harriers.

In 1816 he obtained a cornetcy in the 7th Hussars and joined the Regiment, which was then in France, forming as it did a part of the Army of Occupation. He remained in the Regiment until his twenty-third year, and during that time appears to have devoted himself to racing and gambling.

The only outward and visible sign of his military career remaining to the present day is the handsome silver plate which he presented to the Regiment, and which is still preserved. In the notice of the Regimental plate a part of Mytton's gift is figured.

He married on leaving the army in 1818 and the issue of the marriage was one daughter. His wife died a few years after her marriage, perhaps luckily for her. Some of the exploits of this extraordinary man—

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madman one might almost truthfully call him—were of the most curious nature.

It is told of him that he borrowed £3000 of a banker at St. Omer (he was not yet of age, be it observed), and lost half of it gambling by the next day. A sharper—a captain, in what regiment or of what service is not stated—won no less than 16,000 napoleons from Mytton at billiards. His colonel, the Earl of Uxbridge, suspecting cheating, forbade Mytton to pay.

Mytton was a man of splendid physique and great pluck, and loved nothing better than a fight. His lack of science, however, more often than not cost him a defeat.

Ever clad in the very lightest clothing, apart from his drinking habits he ran risks enough to his health to have killed half a dozen men, yet for a time escaped all harm.

Mytton had even been known to go out wild-fowling in frost and snow, coatless and without a waistcoat—on one occasion indeed, and this on ice, stark naked.

He would eat and drink extraordinary things and in inordinate quantities. It is told of him that in company with a friend no less than eighteen pounds of filberts were consumed between London and Halston, and they arrived at their destination in a coach 'knee-deep' in shells.

Mytton never wore gloves, except, we must suppose, when compelled, and it is also related that he never carried that 'appurtenance of civilisation' a pocket-handkerchief.

He once drank off a bottle of lavender water! Curiously enough, though often engaged in brawls, yet he never fought a duel. His exploits in driving were both extensive and peculiar. Once, when driving, on finding out that a friend who was his companion had never been upset from a gig, he immediately drove up the bank and out went the pair.

At another time, having just purchased two carriage-horses, he had them harnessed into a gig as a tandem, and to find out whether the leader could jump timber, put them at a closed turnpike gate. The leader cleared it beautifully, leaving Mytton, the horse dealer, who was with him, the wheeler and the gig unharmed on the wrong side of the gate.

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He once chased a newly bagged fox three or four days after fracturing three ribs out hunting. His generosity, if it can be so termed, though recklessness in money matters would perhaps fit the case better, was extraordinary. Once he borrowed 10,000*l.* on an annuity at high interest and immediately lent nine thousand to a friend free of interest. The 'friend' bolted and was heard of no more. Fond of disguising himself, Mytton more than once played highwayman, stopping his own guests and even his butler: on this occasion robbing the man of a considerable sum which he was fetching for his master from the agent. Once he masqueraded as a mendicant in his own house, where the servants eventually set the dogs at him, and Mytton was obliged to take refuge, of all places, with his tame bear.

Another of his pets was a monkey; this animal came to an untimely end through drinking a bottle of Day & Martin's blacking.

Dog-fights in his drawing-room were not of uncommon occurrence; and to put an end to one which was likely to finish in the death of a favourite, Mytton himself seized the other with his teeth and pinned its nose to the floor. All this time it may be observed that his household was not an extravagant one, but his foxhounds, which he hunted without subscription, were costly, and his stud was yet more costly.

It is recorded that the name of his charger while in the 7th Hussars was 'Baronet,' and it is stated to have been one-eyed. 'Baronet' was a great jumper, and was once matched to clear nine yards over hurdles placed at some distance from each other. Mytton lost his wager, not because the horse could not jump the distance, but because he had been put at it so often before the time that he refused when again called on. Another of his horses, 'Hero,' cleared a deer hurdle six feet high and covered a space of eight yards in length at the same time.

The regimental tradition that for a bet he jumped his charger over the mess table when set out for mess might well therefore be true.

From 1817 to 1830 he entered and ran many horses in races, with varying success—more success rather than less on the whole, as there were at least one hundred and sixty-five races either won by him or in which his horse was placed.

Mytton married for a second time, but the marriage was no happier than his first had been.

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While in the 7th Hussars and in France he heard of a wonderful badger that no dog could draw, and immediately laid a wager that he would produce one to accomplish the feat. Accordingly he sent a man all the way to a village in Shropshire to get a dog of a certain breed there. The dog was bought for £8, taken to France, and successfully performed its task.

But the pace was too hot. The life Mytton led produced serious illness and he for some time lay almost at death's door in Calais, whither he had retreated to avoid writs, duns, and gaol in England. He at length returned to London, was arrested, lodged in Shrewsbury Gaol, and then removed to the King's Bench. Mytton then obtained his liberty again and returned to Calais. An attempt to leave Calais without paying his hotel bill led to his incarceration in Boulogne Gaol.

He next moved on to Lisle, then returned to Calais, where he was again arrested. Arrangements were next made to remove him to London, for by the sale of his estates some of his debts had now been paid, but it was too late. No constitution could possibly stand the amount of brandy which this luckless young man contrived to consume. On arrival in England he was again arrested and again committed to the Fleet Prison; there he died on 29 March 1834.

Mytton was accorded what reads like a public funeral, the body being escorted by a large detachment of the North Shropshire Cavalry with standard and trumpeters to the vault in the private chapel of Halston.

On 22 October the Duke of Wellington reviewed the army on the plains of St. Denain, and a sham fight took place on the same occasion. The Regiment after the function returned to their former quarters, where they remained for the rest of the year and until the month of February 1817.


In that month they were quartered at St. Omer in order to be near the scene of some field exercises which had been organised and in which they took part.

The next station of the Regiment was between Cambrai and Valenciennes.

Here a review was held by the Duke of Wellington in October, in which the British, Saxons, Danes and Hanoverians took part. Cassel and the neighbouring villages were the next quarters of the Regiment.

With the year 1818 came the end of the occupation of France.

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
Several times during this year the Regiment moved its station. Reviews on a grand scale were the order of the day.

Their Royal Highnesses the Dukes of Kent and Cumberland were present at some, and at others in addition the Emperor of Russia, the King of Prussia, the Prince of Orange, the Grand Dukes Constantine and Michael and other distinguished personages witnessed the spectacle.

This was the end. The army of occupation broke up. The soil of France was evacuated by the victors, and in due time the 7th Hussars marched to Calais, where they embarked for England. The ports of debarkation were Dover and Ramsgate, whence on arrival they marched to Chertsey and the neighbouring villages.

As a recognition for its gallant conduct at Waterloo the Regiment was subsequently rewarded with the honour of bearing the word 'WATERLOO' on its appointments.

The officers and men each received a silver medal; and the privilege of reckoning two years' service for that day was conferred on the subaltern officers, and also on the non-commissioned officers and private men.



THE MEDAL OF JAMES MANN (7TH HUSSARS)

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INDEX

A

ABERCROMBY, General, 222, 223, 230, 240, 241, 255, 257, 263
Adjutant, position of, 55
Aerschot, 10
Aeth, Siege of, 28; Surrender, 132
Aiding the civil power, 77–78
Alkmaar, 260
Allied armies, positions of, 212, 213
Allies, situation of, 235
Almack, Mr. E., history discussed, 385, 386
Amelia, Princess, at Bath, 84, 85
Anhalt, the Prince of, 180
Antwerp, Siege of, 134; Second Siege, 138
Apothecaries, Society of, 51–52
Apprentices, enlistment illegal, 45
Archduke Charles, 211
Arensberg, Surrender of, 190
Argyll, Duke of, letter, 67, 68
Army Medical Board, 51–52
Arrears of pay, 46
Arseele, 17
Augmentation, 7, 33, 206, 287
Austria and Prussia, 209

B

BARRACKS, cavalry, 207, 208
Bath, visits of Princess Amelia to, 84, 85
Bath and Wells Bishop of, Petition, 85, 86
Beaumont, battle of, 226
Beau Nash, 84–85
Becelaer, skirmish near, 18; foraging, 18
Beer, 48; present of, 26
Bergen, capture of, 257, 260, 263
Beverwyk, 263
  Pass of, 253
Billeting, 46
Bohain, 225
Bouchain, 216; Surrender of, 40
Bounty money, 201
Bourbonnois, the Battalion of, 163
Breda, 232
Bremen, Retreat to, 236, 237
Brigaded, 11, 17
British cavalry, non-arrival of, 213
British Guards for Flanders, 211
Brown, Journal quoted, 216, 222, 228, 231, 238
Bruges, gratitude of magistrates, 26
Brunswick, Prince Ferdinand of, 158, 161, 173, 174, 176–189, 190–197
Brunswick, Relief of, 187
Brussels, attack on, 28; bombardment of, 23, 24
  Quartered at, 40
  Siege of, 134
Burgoyne, 147
'Busby,' 310
Buying pipes, 288–290

C

CALLANTS-OOG, 247, 254, 266, 268
Cambridge, Prince Adolphus of, wounded, 220
Cameron, John, volunteer, 244
Campaign of 1761...175
Camperdown, 255
Camp of Cæsar, 214
Camps, 10, 205
  Bruges canal, 24
  Of exercise, 92
Cannon captured, 69
Cannon's History (quoted), 1, 29, 140, 166, 189, 196, 222, 223, 233, 237, 238, 239, 275, 342, 344, 345, 364, 388
  (reference to), 38, 137, 232, 237, 295, 305, 332, 342
Canterbury (New Cavalry Barracks), 243
Cantonments near Pampeluna, 342
Capt. Fraser's gallantry, 344, 345
Capt. Jones, Historical Journal, 233
Capt. Thornhill's gallantry, 346
Captured French guns, 157
Capture of a colour, 346
Carnot, 217
Cassel, Siege Raised, 175
Casualties at Helder, 277
Cathcart, Lord, 237
Cavalry combat, 215
Cavalry Staff Corps, 333, 336
Cavendish, Lord F., 193
Charge of the 7th, 346, 347
Clerfaye, General, 214, 215, 227

Digitized by Google

Clothing for ' fflanders,' 37, 38
Clothing, lack of, 233
Coasts, watching of, 59
Colloredo, Count, 215
Colours captured, 69
Commissions, price of, 203
Condé, 187, 191
Conflans, Mons. de, 191
Congress of Vienna, 368
Conspiracy (Col. Despard's), 285
Cope, Sir John, death of, 173
Corbach, Heights of, 159
Coruña Campaign, 293–331
  Alba de Tormes (arrival at), 301
  Astorga, Retreat from, 319
  Baird, proceedings of, 296–297
  Bembimbre, 319
  Benevente, Combat at, 307–309; action at, 315–318
  ' Benivenita ' Bridge, 298
  Betanzos, 325
  British swords, complaints of, 309, 310
  Burgo, 325
  Busby, 310
  Calcabellos, 319
  Calcadela, affair at, 312
  Castaños, defeat of, 300
  Cavalry screen, 302
  Coruña, Battle of, 326
  Craddock, Sir John, 297
  Date of arrival, 295
  Debelle rallies French, 310
  Despatch, transport, wreck, 326–330
  Discipline, want of, 320–322
  Dispositions of British, 295, 296
  Esla, passage of, 319
  French cavalry patrol attacked, 303
  French dragoons at La Nava, 301
  Hope's division, 297
    March to Peñaranda, 301
  Horse Artillery at Sahagun, 306
  Intercepted despatch, 303
  Kerrison wounded, 312
  King's German Legion, 311
  Lack of provisions and forage, 324
  Lefebre-Desnouettes, General, at Carrion, 298; prisoner, 316
  Loss of horses, 323
  Lugo, 322
  Madrid, Fall of, 303
    Napoleon at, 301
  Manacles, loss of life on, 328; sword from wreck, 329; wreck on, 326
  Melgar Abaxo [Monastero], 305
  Milhaud at Valladolid, 298
  Military execution, 322
  Moore, Sir John, army re-arranged, 304; change of plans, 301; decision, 300; marches to Valladolid, 302; at Sahagun, 311
  Movements of cavalry, 304
  Napoleon present, 318
  Napoleon's ignorance, 300
  Piquet affair, a, 312, 313
  Retirement decided on, 311
Coruña Campaign, Romana, 304, 319
  Sahagun, Combat at, 305
  St. Keverne's, memorial, 328–329
  7th Hussars as rearguard, 323
  Skirmish, 326
  Spanish co-operation, 299
  State of affairs, 293
  Stragglers, 324, 325
  Thornhill at Sahagun, 305–6
  Transport difficulties, 294
  Treachery of French dragoon, 313
  Villafranca, 319
Cost of transport, 7, 8, 9, 31
Cotton, Captain Stapleton, 224
Crabendam, 250, 267, 271
Cumberland, Duke of, 108, 113, 114, 116, 117, 118, 120, 121
Cysoing, Plain of, 227

D

Dampierre, General, 213; death of, 214
Danish officer, misbehaviour of, 20
D'Auvergne, his account of Vaudemont's retreat, 21–23
De Broglie, Marshal, 159–175, 176–189; intrigues against, 193
De Muy, Chevalier, 160, 161, 163, 164
De Saxe, Marshal, 111, 113, 114, 115, 120, 121
Deserters, 45
De Stainville, 186, 192
d'Estrées, Marshal, 194
Destruction, St. Malo, 154; Cherbourg, 156
Dettingen, Battle of, 101–110
  Allies, advance of, 104
  Aschaffenburg, camp near, 101
  Bavaria, Elector of, 97
  Black Musketeers, 107
  British dispositions, 103; force disembarks, 96, 98; money subsidy, 98
  Casualties, 107, 108, 109
  Cavalry charges, French, 104–107
  Charges by 1st, 4th and 6th Dragoons, 106
  Clayton, General, 104, 105
  Cumberland, wound of Duke of, 108
  Drums captured, 107
  Dunkirk, proposed siege, 99
  French artillery fire, 102
  French, flight of, 107
  Gallantry of 3rd Dragoons, 104–106
  Gallantry of 21st and 23rd Foot, 105, 106
  George II., bravery of, 108; leads advance, 104; orders attack, 103; orders of, 100; takes command, 100
  Grammont, Count of, disobedience of, 103; orders to, 101; position of, 102
  Hanau, Retreat to, 102
  Maillebois, Marshal, 98
  Maria Theresa, 97, 99
  Noailles, camp of, 101; proceedings of, 100

Digitized by Google

Dettingen, Battle of—Political situation, 97–99
Position on Allied left, 104
Pragmatic Sanction, 97
Prussian victory, Chotusitz, 98
Royal Dragoons, 107
7th Dragoons, charge by, 106
Stair, Lord, advocates advance, 100; plans of, 99; resignation of, 109
Standards and drums captured, 107
Standards captured, description of, 110
Supplies, lack of, 101
Trooper Brown, 106
Wade's caution, 99
Discipline, lack of, 131
Disembarkation at Helder, 246
Dottignies, 227
Drafts, 69, 133, 134
Dragoons, 'Cunningham's,' not the 7th, 9
Dragoon horses, long tails, 201
Dragoons made sergeants in infantry, 146
Drugs, cost of, 50; supply of, 49–52
Drummers, replaced by trumpeters, 200
Duel (Paget-Cadogan), 333–335
Dumouriez, General, 209, 210, 212, 286
Dunblane, Battle of, 61–69
Dundas, General Ralph, 224, 236, 237, 238, 256, 257
Dunkirk, garrisoned, 41; siege of, 217–221; retreat from, 220
Dutch, army, state of, 211; arrangement with, 210; Hussars, deserters, 259; Major, bravery of, 20; troops, arrival of, 68

E

Egmont-Maan-zee, 262
Egmont-op-de-Hoef, 261
Egmont-op-zee, 255, 261, 265
Elliot, General, 160
Emissaries of French in England, 210
England, 148; return to, 142
Enlistment, 43–45
Equipped as Hussars, 287
Establishment augmented, 147; English, 6, 7
Evacuation of Helder, 271
Execution, military, 322

F

Famars, attack on, 214
Farriers and drummers, arms, 201
Felons, imprisonment of, 45, 46
Ferdinand, Prince, 191; strategy of, 194
Flag of truce, 267
Flanders, 96, 209; arrival in, 9; drafts for, 38, 41; ordered to, 6, 7, 35–37, 82; voyage to, 39
Flers, General, 211
Fontenoy, Battle of, 111–123
Allied Army, 111
Amherst, Capt. Jeffery, 117
Army at Lille, 113
Arrangements for attack, 116
Fontenoy, Battle of—Attack, 118, 120
Aubeterre, Regiment of, 119
Austrian failure, 118
British guns, action by, 123
Campbell, General, 116, 117
Casualties, 122, 123
Courtin, Regiment of, 119
Cumberland, Commander-in-Chief, 113, 116, 117, 118–121; orders retreat, 121
Drafts for Cope's Dragoons, 112
Dutch cavalry, panic of, 118; failure, 118
French cavalry charges, 120; position, 115; reserves brought up, 120, 121
Grammont, Duke of, killed, 117
Grassins, 114, 116
Guards, French, 119; Swiss, 119
Hanoverians at, 118
Hay, Lord Charles, salutes French, 119
Ingoldsby, Brig.-Genl., 116, 117, 118
Königsegg, Marshal, wounded, 123
Ligonier, Lord, 120, 121, 123
Lord Stair resigned, 111
Lorraine, Prince Charles, 113
Pandours, 114, 116
Rear-guard action, 121, 122
Redoubts, 115, 117, 118
Retreat to Aeth, 123
Saxe, Marshal, advises flight, 120
Skirmish, 114
The 'two Columns' (British), 120
Wade, Field Marshal, 111; resigns, 113
Waldeck, Prince of, 116, 121
Forage money, allowance, 72, 73
Forage very scarce, 343
Foraging without orders, 11
Forfar, the Earl of, death of, 63–67
France, repulses, Nice and Rhine, 210
Frederick the Great, 159
French Army, state of, 211; partisans, exploits of, 348; position of, 224; preparations, 175; situation of, 235; wounded, 258
Freytag, General, 220
Frost, severe, 235, 236
Furnes taken, 217

G

Gallantry of dragoons, 231
'Gallopers,' 369
Gave d'Oléron, 344
Genappe, affair at, 372–386
Casualties, 379
Letters and Narratives:—
Anglesey, Lord, 380–381, 384
Arthur, Sir G., 382
Banner, Brevet-Major John, 381
Maclean, Col. A. T., 379–380
O'Grady, Standish, 373, 376–379, 383
Vivian, Lord, 375
Wood, Field-Marshal Sir Evelyn, 381
O'Grady, Standish, promoted, 385
Smith, Lieut. (10th Hussars), wounded, 376

Digitized by Google

Genappe, affair at—Thornhill, Lieut.-Col. A.D.C., 376
Verner, promoted, 385
General Order (Duke of York), 269, 270, 274, 275
Ghent, cavalry dash for, 128; Retreat to, 23; Surrender of, 129
Gittel, Combat at, 190
Granby, Marquess of, 158, 160, 164, 177, 179–189, 192
Grant's Cavalry Brigade, 371
Grass quarters, 75, 78, 144
Grassins, 114, 116, 125, 128, 129
Gravenstein. *See* Wilhelmsthal.
Great storm, 290–291
Griffin, General, 160
Göttingen, affair near, 190, 192
Groote, 249
Guelder Malsen, 236
Guns, capture of, 217

H

Hadfield, James, attempted assassination of King, 285
Half-pay officers, 59
Hall, Lieut.-Col. G. Lawson, 193
Harcourt, Lieut.-General, 227, 235
Hasparren, 342
Helder Campaign, 240–277
Helvoetsluys, clothing at, 233
Hereditary Prince, the, 161, 163–172, 174, 176–189, 190–197
Herman, General, 247, 250, 251, 253, 259
'Historical Journal,' 233
History, Mr. E. Almack's, 385–386
Homburg, Heights of, 159
Home, Regiment returns, 41
Honywood, General, 160
Horses, destroyed, 273; Irish, 4, 5; shipped to Dover, 42; sold to French, 270–271
Hospital arrangements, 48, 49
Houchard, General, 219, 220
Hudson, Mr. J., tobacconist, 288–290
Huntly, Marquis of, 256
Hunt's correspondence, 276–283; diary, 242–276
Hussars, Archduke Ferdinand's, 225
Regiment converted to, 287
Huy, capture of, 13, 15, 16

I

Imhoff, General, 158
Immenhausen, heights of, 186
Infantry regiments broken, 4
Insubordination of Russians, 251, 252
Ipswich, 291
Ireland, 332
Regiment proceeds to, 41

J

Jacobite plot, 24

K

Ker, Colonel, wounded, 66
Kick-down, Fort, 246, 269
Kilmansegge, Count, 161
'King's duty,' 333
King nearly shot, 285
King William III., wise rules, 46–47
Knobelsdorf, General, 212–215

L

Landrecies, 225, 227
Langensalza, Battle of, 174
Lannoy, attack on, 222, 230, 231
Lauffeld or Val, battle of, 139, 140
Laurie's saddles, 371
Le Cateau, 224, 225
Lefebre-Desnouettes, 298, 316
Letter of service, 54, 55
Light Dragoons, equipment as, 207
Light Troop, 193; expeditions to France, 153-157; raised, 147–149
Lincelles, Battle of, 218
Lückner, General, 159, 161, 190, 191

M

Major Thornhill, prisoner, 348
Manners, Major-General, 253
Maresches, passage of river near, 215
Marets, 225, 226
'Maroding,' 11
Martello towers, 286
Master trumpeters, to teach, 202
Maubeuge, siege of, 221
Maxwell, 163
McPherson, 'Secret History of England' quoted, 32
Menin, 227
Men on stilts, 348
Military canal, 286
Military execution, 322
Military riot, Braintree, 151; Maldon, 149; Witham, 150
Militia Act, 240
Militia volunteers, 253
Moorbrugghe, review at, 27
Mooresleede, skirmish at, 19
Mostyn, Lieut.-General, 166, 173
Mouvaux, 229, 230
Mutinous assembly, 5, 6
Mytton, John, 395–398

N

Namur, Siege of, 20
Napoleon, escape from Elba, 369; present, 318
Neerwinden, 212
Nieuport, *digue* of canal flooded, 26
Night march, 261, 262
Nimeguen, Siege of, 232
Northumberland, Duke of, letter, 280
Norwich, 291

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O

Officers of original troops, 2, 3; re-established Regiment, 56
on sick list, 343
Ohm, passage of, 159
O'Loughlin, Lieut., gallantry of, 226
Orange, Prince F. of, 215
Orange, Prince of, drowned, 40
Ordered to Scotland, 90
Orford, escort duty, 74
Orthes, Battle of, 345–347
Osborne, Lieut.-Col., prisoner, 230
Ostend, 96
British cavalry at, 217
Defenceless condition of, 217
Evacuation of, 132
Siege of, 131
Situation in, 130
Otto, General, 215
Owlers and smugglers, 80

P

Paget, Lord H. W., 248, 251, 254
Pandours, 114, 116
Parker, Captain Robert, diary of, 28
Patrick Crowe, spy, 124
Pay, 47; arrears of, 46
Peace, 28, 197, 350
Aix-la-Chapelle, 141
Negotiations, 27, 41, 141
Ryswick, 28
Utrecht, 41
Peninsula Campaign, Second, 337–363
Bad roads, 339
Buenza, 340
Cavalry covers rear, 341
Forage scarce, 340
Forced marches, 339
Garonne, crossing of, 350
Health of Regiment, 338
Horse-shoes lacking, 340
Kerrison, career, 354–356; chargers of, 356, 357; commands, 342
Medal roll, 357–363
Orthes, Battle of, 345, 347
Pampeluna, capitulates, 339
Peace, 350
Plate, presentations of, 351–354
Pontoon bridge, 350
Posted near Ebro, 338
Regiment brigaded, 337
St. Estevan, 340
Sarre, 340
Soult, opportunity lost, 350
Transports missing, 337
Vivian, Brigadier, 341
Voyage, 337
Weather bad, 350
Petten, 248, 252, 253, 254, 266, 267
Pichegru, General, 224, 225, 232, 235
Piquet affair near Breda, 232
Pistols, 8
Plague, patrol duty, 78, 79
Political situation, 97
Pounded gorse, 343
'Prest men for Flanders' forbidden, 13
Prémont, 225
Private William Wilkinson, tomb, 288
Provisions scanty, 342
Prussia and Austria, 209

Q

Quartermaster, position of, 55, 56
Quarters, rules regarding, 47
Pay and allowances in, 47, 48
Queen's Own Royal Regiment of Dragoons, 83, 92, 94
Quesnoy, Siege of, 41

R

Ramillies, dinner, 39
Rations, 47, 48
Reading, 'Riding House,' 79
Rebels, pardon and indemnity to, 6
Reconnaissance by King William, 18
Recruiting, 7, 12, 13, 43–45, 80, 278
'Reduced Officer's Complaint,' 144
Reduction of strength, 87, 142
Regiment 'broken,' 42
Dismounted, 42
Numbered, 145
Ordered to Flanders, 212
home, 133
to Scotland, 58
Raised, 4, 5
Re-established, 53, 54
Return to England, 30
Styled 'Her Royal Highness the Princess of Wales's own Royal Regiment of Dragoons,' 57; 'Queen's Own,' 71
Regimental Record (quoted), 29, 69, 140, 166, 196, 198, 238, 239, 275, 295, 332, 364, 388
(reference to), 1, 38, 137, 142, 208, 237, 305, 310, 344
'Regulations for Cavalry,' 239
Reinforcements, 135
Retreat from Dunkirk, 220
Retreat to Bremen, 236, 237
Revenue duty, 87, 91, 143, 199, 204, 205, 208
Reviews, 10, 13, 17, 91, 92, 143, 144, 146, 192, 199, 200, 206, 207, 243, 284
Before Allied Sovereigns, 364, 372
Regulations for, 201
Rewards (monetary), 228
Riots, 77, 93, 143, 144, 145, 284
(Corn), 365–368
Roubaix, 229, 230
Roucoux, Battle of, 136, 137
Rousselaer, 17; march to, 20
Route march, expenses, 7, 8, 9, 31
Royal Dragoons, 54–57
Royal Scots Greys, 54–57
History of, 385–386

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Russian Allies, 241
Ryswick, negotiations for Peace, 27; Peace of, 28

S

Sabbabourg Castle, 186, 193
Sanitary arrangements, 48
Sas van Ghent, 13, 17
Schlüter, General, 160
Schouldam, 250
Scotland, Regiment in, 32–35, 79, 94, 146, 203, 205, 206; march from, 6
Sedition, 87, 88
Sergeant Joseph Duncan, tomb, 286
Ship allowances, 48
Situation, March 1760...158; July 1760, 172
Slaper dike, 249, 252
Smugglers and owlers, 80
Soubise, Prince de, 175–189, 190–197
Souham, General, 219
Spain, detachment to, 332
Spörcken, General, 158, 161, 163–173, 174, 176–189, 190–197
Spy, punishment, 11, 12
Stair, Lord, 99
Statements of Mr. Almack discussed, 385–386
St. Germain, Count de, 158
St. Jean Pied de Port, 342
Strength of Regiment, 193
Sutlers, 48

T

Taylor, Captain Charles, 251
The '15,' 60–70
Tom Brown, 80
Tournai, siege of, 125; surrender, 126
Transport, cost of, 7, 8, 9, 31
Trees for Hounslow, 280
Troop Quartermasters abolished, 332
Troops (Dragoons) raising of, 3
Troops of Horse, independent, 2
Trouble with men who accompanied horses, 42, 43
Trumpet, silver, captured, 69
Trumpeters replace drummers, 200
21st Light Dragoons raised, 206
'XXI' Regiments (cavalry), 206

V

Val or Lauffeld, Battle of, 139, 140
Valenciennes, Siege of, 217
Vaudemont, Prince of, 20; skilful retreat, 21, 22, 23; visit to King, 25
Vaux, 225
Vellinghausen, Battle of, 174–189
Victuallers, molestation of, 11
Villeneuve de Marsan, 347
Volksmissen, Heights of, 192

W

Wade, General, 87, 88, 99
Waggons and horses to be impressed, 83
Waggons captured, 69
Walhouse, Major, 258
Wallmoden, General, 220, 232, 236
Warburg, Battle of, 158–173
  Allied Army, 158
  Arrival in Weser, 158
  Beckwith, Colonel, and grenadiers, 163
  Casualties, allies, 165; enemy, 165, 166
  Cavalry charges, 164
  Conway's Dragoons, 161
  Corbach, cavalry charge, 159; guns lost, 159; heights of, 159, 160; Prince defeated at, 159
  De Broglie, Marshal, 158–160
  De Muy, 160, 161; flank turned, 164
  Dymel, River, crossing, 161
  Emsdorf, Battle of, 160
  Ferdinand, Prince, 158–164; account of battle, 167–171
  Frederick the Great, 158
  Gallantry of three French squadrons, 165
  Granby, Lord, 158, 159, 160, 161; charge by, 164; sent forward, 164
  Grenadiers, advance, 163
  Gross Eider, 163
  Hereditary Prince, 159, 163; seizes hill, 163
  Imhoff, General, 158
  Kalle, camp at, 161
  Kilmansegge, Count, 161
  Korbeke, position at, 161
  Light Troop not present, 158
  Lückner, General, 159
  Meine, position, 163
  Ossendorf, 160
  Pace of British guns, 164
  Poppenheim, guns at, 163
  Queen's Own Dragoons, 161
  Rout of enemy, 165
  Small hill seized, 163
  Spörcken, General, 158, 161, 163
  St. Germain, Count of, 159
'Waterdeck,' 264
Waterloo, 370–399
  Cambrai captured, 394
  Captain Robbins wounded, 391
  Casualties, 388
  Charge by Regiment, 390
  King's German Legion, 389
  Lieut.-Col. Thackwell's account, 390
  Mytton, John, life of, 395–398
  Ninove, 370
  Paris occupied, 394
  Position of Grant's Brigade, 387
  Regiment arrives at Ostend, 370
  Return to England, 399
  Reviewed by Wellington, 370
  Reviews, 398, 399
  Siborne's 'Waterloo Letters,' 389
  Sore backs, 370

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Waterloo, Standish O'Grady's letter, 392, 339, 394
St. Omer, 394
Strength of Regiment, 389
13th Light Dragoons, 389
Wives of soldiers, 394
Weapons, the wearing of, 47
Wells, Petition by the Bishop of, 85, 86
'Widdows Men,' 55
Wilhelmsthal, Avenue of, 186; Battle of, 190–197
Willems, Battle of, 227, 228
Willemstad, 9, 10
Withdrawal of allies, 41
Women, dispute with, 259
Wounded, ill-treatment of, 125
Wrecks, 272
Wütgenau, General, 178–188
Wycombe, list of linen, 279
Wyk-op-zee, 263
Wynne, Brigadier, death of, 19

X

Xavier, Prince, 160, 177, 186

Y

York, H.R.H. the Duke of, 212, 215, 216–223, 224, 227, 230, 235, 244, 245



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